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S U M M A R Y
The thesis is essentially in two parts. The first, Chapters 2 to 4, 
is a comparison, using the case study method, of aspects of industrial 
relations in two British plants, two American plants and two Japanese 
plants all located in Britain. The second section, Chapters 5 to 8, is 
essentially analytical and uses the empirical results as a basis for a 
theoretical explanation of the reasons for the differences. A continuing 
contemporary link is provided by relating the analysis to recent events 
in Ford (UK) plants in Britain and industrial relations information 
emerging from the recently established Missan plant near Sunderland.
After delineating the field of interest, viz., the cultural 
implications for industrial relations of foreign companies manufacturing 
in Britain, the questions raised for industrial relations and the 
objectives of the research programme are set out.
Throughout the programme two British plants in Britain are used as a 
comparator and Chapter 2 logs and explores some of the salient features 
of those two labour forces. This is followed by a description of 
conditions and industrial relations in the four foreign owned plants, 
and a point by point comparison of attitudes at work in the six labour 
forces.
With the shift to a new theoretical level in Chapter 5, a central 
place is still given to the empirical evidence but an attempt is made to 
interpret the facts within the broader environment of three different 
socialisation processes emanating from the UIC, Japan, and Korth America. 
More specifically, three core areas of interest are examined, the 
relationship between socialisation and the working environment, the 
relationship between socialisation and employee attitudes at work, and 
the relationship between the three national cultures, worker perceptions 
of management and management styles.
Chapters 6 and 7 seek to answer the remaining questions for the 
programme arising from the initial analysis in the Introduction. Chapter 
6 is concerned with cultural absorption. Employee motivation is selected 
as the point of departure for the discussion which is developed to 
include issues of loyalty in the work place, job satisfaction and 
democracy. It is suggested that business, driven by product market
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pressures, is able to impose some ownership/management cultural 
conformity, if only temporarily.
The penultimate chapter identifies the style and character of the 
relationship between managers and managed as the key area for cultural 
analysis. In this regard the concept of the family as used in industrial 
relations and as found in the six plants of the programme, is examined 
and assessed. The Japanese "advantage" is explained with reference to 
historical features of that culture and compared with some American 
pleas for over-arching values. There fallows a discussion of the way in 
which concepts of individualism and community are handled in the three 
pairs of plants with particular reference to the basis of team working 
in Japanese culture.
The concluding chapter argues that there is a sense in which Japan 
may be the future of the Vest particularly in the field of industrial 
relations, in team working, flexible working practices and varieties of 
status in the labour force. The effect of socialisation, however, could 
prove to be crucial. In particular it is argued that employee 
perceptions of the category of the moral as distinct from the 
utilitarian are likely to shape outcomes where different cultures 
conflate at the place of work. Furthermore, there appears for a number 
of reasons, to be enhanced tendencies in foreign companies locating in 
Britain to adopt a more primitive capitalist ethos than that prevailing 
either in the host country or in the country of origin, nevertheless, 
the incoming Japanese particularly, bring with them strong and distinct 
cultural parameters which are sufficient to shape distinctively 
industrial relations in their plants and to distinguish them from 
practice in American owned plants despite the tendency of the host 
culture to constrain and erode.
It is recognised that this "snap-shot" type of study is inherently 
weak in determining questions of cultural absorption. Yet it does appear 
that in the crucial areas of authority, conflict and employee attitudes 
in the work place, the Japanese seem to have induced a cultural shift, 
however temporary, in favour of the efficient running of the enterprise, 
that is not equalled at any Df the other four plants.
Finally, it is argued that the Japanese are successful in creating 
at least the illusion of democracy, and that in this respect their 
socialisation offers a number of advantages, not least of which is its
-  6 -
intrinsically spiritual character and its ability to coalesce effort in 
the work place around commonly agreed objectives.
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CHAE1ERJL
"Before industrial relations can be studiedf one must first 
study how the actors acquire the features of their identity that 
remain fairly stable over time and, further, how the collective 
action domain is s h a p e d Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre.
_ Q _
The issues which the research seeks to explore are becoming ever 
more important for British employees and the development of industrial 
relations, as more and more foreign owned companies are encouraged to 
set up manufacturing units in the United Kingdom.
Until recently it was felt by many observers that the cultural clash 
between the socialisation of the owners and foreign managers and that of 
British employees was not significant for industrial relations. Amongst 
academics, W. W. Rostow(l), Daniel Bell(2) and others promoted a strong 
conviction of the validity of cultural convergence throughout the 
capitalist world. It was felt this would swiftly lead to uniformity of 
behaviour and response in the workplace that would allow management 
methods, control mechanisms and industrial relations praxis to develop a 
global uniformity of style to match capitalist production's increasingly 
international sphere of operation. In the 80s high levels of 
unemployment and market oriented philosophies in an increasing number of 
Western nations seemed to support the view that cultural differences 
between owners and managers and the indigenous labour force were of 
minimal consequence in comparison to the radical drive for efficiency 
fuelled by increasingly fierce competitive forces at the global level. 
How in 1988, in the aftermath of the Ford dispute in England, there are 
signs that cultural differences have more enduring consequences than was 
at first believed. Ian Gow, while he believes that "the cultural
argument is oversimplified", admits that "of all the Japanese
cultural traits, mature adaptation and learning from others, allied with 
a continuous improvement ethic, may be somewhat alien to Western 
industry."(3)
nevertheless belief in convergence remains strong. R.M.Marsh and 
H.Hiroshi conclude their paper on the internationalisation of Japanese 
management with these words,"In the main, however, our Japanese authors 
clearly see convergence as the dominant trend. Thus, our hypothesis that 
'made in Japan' organisational structure and management decline over 
time and that a convergence towards Western forms occurs as 
multinational strategies are played out by Japanese MFC subsidiaries 
must be regarded as provisionally confirmed."(4) While theories of 
cultural convergence have not been universally accepted, only recently 
have major studies of enterprises in closely related cultures (Germany 
and France, and Britain and France) been published which indicate the
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effects of an enduring cultural difference in the work domain in nations 
that have had an extensive and long-standing trading relationship. For 
example, Maurice et al<5) have argued strongly that stratification of 
the workforce is influenced by "education, organisation, and forms of 
collective action. Jo analysis of the autonomy of labour relations is 
possible without taking into account not only these factors but also the 
principles that govern their interaction." (6) Also”our approach to the 
firm goes beyond the approaches taken by other theorists of organised 
action. We have been able to do this by systematically taking notice of 
how the workers are socialised and how this shapes the social relations 
in which they subsequently become involved." <7) And D.Gallie(8) 
concludes his major study "In Search of the Jew Working Class" with 
these words, "The major determinants of worker attitudes were seen to 
lie in the particular type of local industrial or community setting in 
which specific sets of workers were located. While such local factors 
may be of some significance, we would suggest that rather more important 
are certain broader cultural and social structural factors, which can 
vary between societies and which can create quite distinctive social 
situations for their respective working classes. For, while Western 
nations share a common capitalist mode of production that generates 
similar conflicts of interest between employers and employed, this 
underlying system contradiction can have very different consequences at 
the level of social integration. The crucial mediating variables, we 
would suggest, are factors like the managerial ideology, the typical 
structure of power in social institutions, and the ideology and mode of 
action in the trade union movement characteristic of the specific 
society. Moreover, if we are to understand the differences between the 
working classes of the various Western societies, we will need to look 
much more closely at their pattern of historical development, and 
examine the way in which different historical experiences have generated 
distinctive cultural and social structural patterns." (9)
Thus while those who adhere to theories of cultural convergence may 
also acknowledge the importance of the effect of socialisation at work, 
Gallie and Maurice et al are able to show differences in effect of 
socialisation processes in countries which may well have been thought to 
have converged culturally some time ago. In a recent paper on the same 
subject Dickens and Savage(10) identify a number of key areas of
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Japanese praxis which they contend will be extremely difficult for 
British firms wishing to adopt or adapt Japanese practice to ignore. 
Their six areas are in fact socio-cultural in type ranging from 
"vertical relations between classes in large organisations", to the 
relationship between the state and the company and including the 
presence in Britain "of a comparatively fragmented and relatively 
autonomous 'middle' or 'service' class working mainly in small
companies","my homeism" amongst British managers, the close 
interrelationship between finance capital and manufacturing capital in 
Japan and the "often antagonistic separation in Britain.... between land 
ownership and capital ownership". (11) They expand this point to say "A
powerful but distinct class of landowners in Britain has separate
claims on the profits being generated by manufacturing capital".(12)
The conviction of all these scholars that the effect of technology 
is mediated by a social effect and that the division of labour is not 
just technically determined but also depends on social relations and 
perceptions of what a person is capable of, is the starting point for 
this thesis, which begins by comparing the scope and provision of 
working conditions and employee responses to those conditions in six 
factories in Britain in the nine month period Jovember 1985 to August 
1986. Two of the factories are Japanese owned and two British owned.
American owned factories were chosen for examination since Jorth 
America is the major foreign investor in the United Kingdom and has been 
a significant manufacturer in Britain since the beginning of the 
century. Japanese owned factories were chosen for several reasons. 
Firstly, the strength of the Japanese economy and its obvious industrial 
success is of widespread interest, not least to people in Britain. 
Secondly, there may be a qualitative difference between the cultural 
background of the Japanese economy compared with virtually all other 
industrially developed nations. Thirdly, Japan now shows every sign of 
becoming a major investor in Britain and perhaps more importantly for 
this study, a major employer of labour in Britain. David Thomas recently 
reported that,"The U.K. would retain its position as first choice for 
investment by Japanese electronic companies in Europe."(13) Incoming 
Japanese and American managers will themselves be socially conditioned 
by their country of origin. They will inevitably view industrial 
relations from the perspective of their culture. Although the company
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may well have researched British industrial relations praxis before 
setting up in Britain and indeed consciously decided to emulate British 
practice in regard to industrial relations, inevitably American and 
Japanese cultural mores cannot be entirely subsumed. For example many 
national cultures appear to have a natural propensity to imperialism. 
Archbishop Helder Camara talking about "la thdorie officielle qui 
gouverne le Brdsil" says,"Alors, la gdopolitique dit que la prochaine 
premiere puissance mondiale, le prochain empire, sera le Brdsil."(14)The 
demands of global manufacture would appear to find this aspect of 
national culture particularly congenial, and in the case at least of 
Japan, and historically Britain, strengthened by messianic overtones of 
the value of that particular national culture for the rest of the world.
The Ford Motor Co. operating out of a Horth American culture with 
world headquarters in Detroit, has moved to a position where an attempt 
is being made to impose a uniformity of working conditions and working 
practices throughout the company's plants in many different parts of the 
world. A major issue in the English strike in February 1988 was the 
signing of a three year agreement on wages and conditions. Ford had 
already signed three year agreements with employees in the U.S., Spain, 
and West Germany, were hoping to extend this practice to other 
countries, and aiming thereby to synchronise wage negotiations and 
harmonise working practices worldwide. At the economic level Ford's 
desire to synchronise and harmonise may be interpreted as driven by the 
need to increase efficiency in the face of competition. The point being 
made here is that imperialistic tendencies in national cultures serve 
the same ends and give an appearance of rationality and even 
desirability for global uniformity that enhances the economic arguments. 
Thus America and Japan and many major industrial countries are the 
natural home of multinational companies. That is, they are the home of 
M C ' s  not simply because they are the most efficient and profitable way 
to operate but because their culture encourages multinational expansion 
even if simply out of a misplaced conviction that that culture is good 
for the world.
Furthermore as the Japanese economy continues increasingly to 
dominate world trade it is seen as the model to emulate and if possible 
to overtake- a complete reversal of the way in which, until very 
recently, Japan saw the West. Many of the changes in working practice
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sought by Ford for its English plants were widely interpreted against 
the background of practice at Jissan in Washington, Tyne and Wear. In
other words there is now an interrelationship between American and
Japanese industrial relations practice which in the face of growing 
competition shows every sign of continuing. "The pressure on Ford to 
change working practices is partly the reflection of competitive
pressure from Japanese producers," (15) and not so happily for Ford,"The 
speed with which the U.K. action has hit Ford's continental plants 
testifies to the progress which it has already made in its attempts to 
match Japanese productivity standards, notably in terms of keeping 
stocks of components at its assembly plants to a minimum."(16) The type 
of impact foreign managers and foreign ownership make on the indigenous 
labour force and industrial relations practice forms the starting point 
for the questions of this research programme.
Culture.
Before considering those questions it is neccessary to try and
clarify what is meant by "culture". The classic study of the concept was 
made by Kroeber and IQuckhorn.(17) They identified more than 150 
definitions of culture and concluded that "Culture consists of patterns, 
explicit and implicit of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by 
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, 
including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture 
consists of traditional (i.e historically derived and selected) ideas 
and especially their attached values; cultural systems may, on the one 
hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning 
elements of future action."(18)
Their definition embraces the two basic strands of human behaviour, 
the ideal and the practical, thought and action, although they seem to 
place prior emphasis on ideas - "the essential core of culture..." 
Throughout this thesis the word "culture" is used in relation to a group 
of people, the group forming a nation (national culture), the group 
forming the capitalist nations of the world (capitalist culture), the 
group forming the total labour force in a factory (factory culture), the
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group constituting a company and thus embracing perhaps several or many 
factories (company culture).
The above definition of culture can therefore be adapted for an 
organisation such as a company to read "Organisational culture is the 
pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, 
discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problem of
external adaptation and internal integration - a pattern of assumptions 
that have worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel, 
in relation to those problems."(19)
Thus the culture of a group of whatever size, refers both to the 
ideas, beliefs and attitudes held by the group and to the material
outcome of the group in terms of language, art, music, literature, 
social behaviour and provision, at, say, national level, and their 
equivalent at company level- production practices, industrial relations, 
management techniques, company philosophy and story telling etc.
A further complicating feature of cross-cultural analysis is the 
knowledge that the observer participates in what is being observed. 
Inevitably this thesis is written from the standpoint of a British 
cultural background, nevertheless an attempt has been made to use what 
Dilthey(20) called "a sympathetic understanding" or "intuitive grasp". 
That is, the standpoint of the observer is not ignored nor is objective 
observation claimed, but an attempt is made to see e.g. Japanese 
cultural features from the point of view of the Japanese.
The issue of cultural transference raises questions of cultural 
production and change. In early human development there is what Williams 
calls a "symmetry" between cultural production and the culture for which 
it is produced.(21) A feature of modern developed societies is that much 
cultural production is not produced simply for one culture but for many. 
This in turn is giving rise to a convergence in cultural production but
not necessarily a convergence of cultures. This thesis is particularly
interested in asymmetry, i.e., the introduction of ideas, attitudes, 
etc., that differ from those of the host culture. For example, the 
introduction by Japanese manufacturers of techniques and practices not 
hitherto found in British factories.
This gives rise to at least two areas of tension related to the 
workplace, the question of control, and the impact of new practices and
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attitudes on the indigenous culture. Both of these are explored in the 
thesis.
Asymmetry interrupts "normal" culture reproduction to produce 
change. If particular practices are considered, and these are of 
interest in the ensuing pages, it must be recognised that these cannot 
be separated from social relations including issues of ownership and the 
management of the factory. Foreign management (i.e., U.S. or Japanese) 
by changing work practices, impacts also on social relations, and much 
of this thesis deals with both of these areas.
What is being suggested, is that here there is potential for 
cultural change but also that the indigenous culture exhibits a 
surprising resilience to change as in the Ford(UK) plants in England.
nevertheless, companies, including the six of this study, attempt to 
induce change by building company consciousness, by creating a group 
awareness, where the group ( a factory labour force) is, by virtue of 
its work, already incipiently separated from the local community. 
Traditionally the group is sectionalised by differing wage rates. By 
trying to make these secret, as at Maxell and Hewlett Packard in 
particular, companies recognise the historical basis of group 
sectionalism and seek to destroy it in the interests of creating a 
uniform company culture.
Labour force resistance by sharing knowledge of wage rates, as at 
Maxell, was successful in countering company attempts to destroy group 
sectionalism and this was achieved, as it were, intuitively, without 
organised leadership, for the labour force was not unionised.
Significantly, over the issue of secret wage rates the company made 
no attempt to enforce its will and thus minimised the risk of producing 
in the labour force a class identification with workers in other 
factories. Instead, employee wishes in regard to knowledge of wage rates 
were respected in the interests of company harmony, itself a powerful 
concomitant of Japanese culture.
The thesis is based on the assumption that there are distinct 
Japanese, Forth American and British cultures, giving rise to three 
distinct societies in which the central activity of work reflects 
something of the culture in which it is set. "....since the problems of 
how "properly" to go about working and "making a living" face all human 
groups, vie would expect every society, through its culture, to have its
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distinctive way of making sense of the question of work and a 
distinctive set of values and priorities giving guidance on how its 
members should proceed with it." (22) This is not to say that either at 
the national level or at company level, cultures can be understood as 
static structures into which people are made to fit. They are evolving 
as the people who contribute to them contribute in turn to that 
evolution. What does this suggest for companies? It suggests that there 
may be a company philosophy, company song, and sets of rules and 
regulations, but that a) company culture is evolving and, b) in the one 
company, factory culture in, say, Japan is likely to be different from 
factory culture in Britain. In other words, a Maxell consciousness or a 
Brother consciousness will really only apply to one plant or at the 
most, several plants in the one national culture. "The organisation can 
be seen as something which is continually being negotiated by the 
intersubjective relating of its members to each other."(23)
Since this programme is essentially based on six factory studies, at 
a particular moment in time, interest centers not so much on company 
culture as it changes over time, but on organisational culture per se, 
which allows employees apparently to identify with the goals of the 
employers. During the 1980s company culture has been more widely 
recognised as an important contributer to market success. Companies with 
a tight, clear, uniform culture demonstrably perform better than those 
with a loose and incoherent culture. (24) Peters and Waterman(25) argued 
that the most successful organisations managed through a strong culture 
of shared values enshrined in company story-telling
The questions for the research programme.
The first of these questions is, given that people in Japan and the 
United States live within the context of two specific national 
cultures,, how does that context influence their employment practices 
when they employ others in a foreign country and therefore in a 
different culture? Is Daniel bell accurate when he writes "Changes in 
culture and moral temper - the fusion of imagination and lifestyles - 
are not amenable to 'social engineering' or political control. They 
derive from the value and moral traditions of the society and these
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cannot be 'designed* by precepts. The ultimate sources are the religious 
conceptions which undergird society; the proximate sources are the 
reward systems and motivations (and their legitimations) which derive 
from the arena of work."?(26) To date, research on the behaviour of 
Japanese companies in Britain suggests that they recognise and accept 
the first part of Bell's thesis. They do not attempt directly to change 
the host culture. White and Trevor(27), who completed the only full 
length study so far (1988), of Japanese manufacturing practice and 
labour relations in Britain, found "...a great deal of diversity among 
the Japanese owned companies in Britain", and indeed concluded that 
"...there is clearly little reason to maintain that Japanese methods can 
be applied only with the support of the Japanese social milieu. "(28) Yet 
if "the proximate sources" for culture and moral temper come from the 
world of work, is there not inevitably a contribution from the foreign 
employer towards changing the host culture? Is it sufficient to suggest 
that "luckily" for Japanese and also for Forth American enterprises 
moving to Britain, the requirements of their work ethic happen to be 
fulfilled by the residue of Puritan influence in contemporary British 
culture? "There appears to be a fortunate correspondence between the 
requirements of Japanese production systems and some of the traditional 
values of the British working class,"(29) allege White and Trevor.
Maurice et al have demonstrated that national socialisation affects 
a whole range of important factors operating in the work domain, 
comparative rates of pay between blue collar and white collar workers, 
worker mobility, skills and professional training, job status etc. While 
their work was confined to the comparative study of French and German 
industry, their conclusions are of universal significance and raise a 
number of questions, including the second of this thesis. If cultural 
conditioning is an inescapable construct of human existence, how much if 
any of the culture of the employers and owners is absorbed by the 
foreign labour force? This is a question which clearly has great 
inherent difficulty. How does one not only describe but attempt to 
measure any culture, whether of employers, owners, or anyone else for 
that matter? When can changed attitudes and practices be attributed to 
cross-cultural influences as distinct, say, from changes occurring in 
the one culture? How much of any culture is indigenous and how much the 
result of influences exterior to it? Are not all cultures the product
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over time of an abundance of diverse influences, inevitably with their 
origins in other cultures? So the questions escalate. This thesis tries 
to confine itself to the question of cultural absorption in the 
workplace, i.e., the absorption of values and attitudes coming from a 
foreign culture that will influence action and commitment in the 
workplace, where values are defined as "sets of interrelated ideas, 
concepts and principles to which individuals, groups, and societies 
attach strong sentiments," and which "generate expected rules of 
behaviour when they are applied to a specific culture."(30) In the first 
half of the 80s there appeared to be an optimistic conviction that 
workforces would easily assimilate the main cultural convictions of the 
foreign owners and managers at the place of work. Peter Wickens, writing 
about the single union agreement with Nissan in Washington, Tyne and 
Wear, says "It is in relation to working practices, however, that 
British industry has most to learn from the Japanese, and a detailed 
study of such practices has had a significant influence on the 
development of the Nissan AUEW agreement."(31) Wickens recognises the 
myths surrounding Japanese management and the difficulty of transposing 
ideas such as quality circles, wrenched from their cultural background, 
nevertheless, he indicates that he too minimises the effect of 
socialisation, and argues for the adoption of the Japanese "tripod", 
teamwork, quality consciousness and flexibility, as though these 
concepts were less free of cultural constraint than, say, quality 
circles. "I have had to leave out many important elements, not only in 
the discussion of Japanese success but also in relation to the Nissan UK 
employment package, much of which is designed to create the conditions 
in which the 'tripod* can successfully transfer to the UK. When 
examining Japanese working practices the important point is to 
understand the background, the centuries of culture and not to fall into 
either of two possible traps. The first trap is to believe that we can 
successfully transfer all or part of the Japanese 'cultural background* 
to the UK and all will be well. The second is to believe that we cannot 
transfer the culture and therefore have little to learn. What we have to 
do is to identify those elements of Japanese working practices which are 
transferable."(32)
Now in 1988 there are signs that the effects of socialisation, both 
indigenous and foreign, have been seriously underestimated even in
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foreign owned companies that have been established in Britain for 
decades. (33) The Ford dispute in February 1988 was of interest for a 
whole variety of reasons, not least of which was the way in which 
employees were willing to oppose not only management, but full-time 
union officials. If there had been any cultural absorption over the 
decades of the company* s existence in England, it appeared to have been 
too fragile to cope with changes in work practices and new concepts of 
teamwork which the company were seeking to introduce. Or could it be 
that workers had absorbed some American cultural mores, ie. , 
independence of spirit and a "business" attitude to the union, which may 
have been latent in employers who were trying to instil an altogether 
different set of values?
The penultimate question follows logically from the first two. What 
are the main features of an industrialised culture that are likely to 
influence employment practices within that culture? Maurice et al have 
given an unequivocal answer to that type of question. As far as they are 
concerned education at school and subsequent training are the 
fundamental features, which, later in the employee's existence, are 
supplemented by enterprise organisation and the conduct of industrial 
relations within the firm.
"In each country there is a tendency for a close relationship to 
develop between the organisation of general education and occupational 
training and the behaviour of the firms. The results convince us that it 
is impassible to analyse either the educational system (in terms of 
number and type of degrees offered, nature of competition, tracking and 
selectiom, and so forth) or the job hierarchy in terms of the relation 
between training and qualification, variation between branches of 
industry, or direction of job mobility, for example, in isolation. In 
both countries we find particular kinds of interaction between education 
and stratification, certain specific national patterns."(34)
Maurice et al's position stands in some contrast to that of John 
Dunlop, who suggested that the basic influencing features were a number 
of systems, the legal system, the political system, the social system 
and the economic system. (35) Are not these systems themselves culturally 
conditioned? Is not the educational system culturally conditioned? Are 
there cultural concepts that shape and determine them that are also
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present in people at work? The thesis tries to address this type of 
question.
Finally can cultural effects influencing industrial relations be 
measured, quantified, and made amenable to value comparison? Miller and 
Simonetti(36) tried to answer this question by using a model with three 
sets of variables to assess the impact of cultural and environmental 
factors on industrial relations in one culture. Essentially it was used 
to measure management effectiveness in that one culture and, given a 
reasonable sample size, ought to be capable of use in a cross-cultural 
situation. They concluded that management effectiveness was very 
different in Britain and Japan, even although they believed that socio­
cultural influences and management practices were almost identical in
the two countries. Sasaki(37), who cites their work with approval,
suggests the result is due to two different types of relationship at
work in Japanese factories and British factories. Given that an 
enterprise consists of a set of people and a set of roles, in Japanese 
factories it is suggested the people dominate the roles, whereas in 
Britain the roles dominate the people. The former is more likely to 
contribute to a gemeinschaft type organisation and the latter to a 
gesellschaft type organisation. Of more interest to the current 
programme is Sasaki's conclusion that the two different types of 
relationship require two different value systems. (38)
Broad quantifications of cross-cultural effects in industrial 
relations have been attempted by writers like R.C.Clarke(39) and 
R.T.Dore(40). Work also continues in Japan by S.D.B.Picken(41) who, in a 
number of unpublished papers, draws comparisons between Japanese and 
British industrial practice arising from different cultural inputs. In 
the current thesis the attempt at measurement is confined to verbal 
discussion of the variety of outcomes in each of six factories, two 
Japanese owned, two American owned, and two British owned, all located 
in Britain. Quantification and value comparison are the subject of 
reflection based on observation and analysis of verbal responses from 
employees.
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The questions of the programme suggest a number of objectives. The 
first of these is to examine the cultural features which influence 
Japanese, Morth American and British employment practices, and to
identify the chief features. The importance of the objective lies both 
on its stress upon the importance of culture in relationships at work 
and the danger of ignoring cultural transference when assessing
industrial relations praxis. P.J.Turnbull underlines this point with an 
example from Lucas Electrical. "Flexible production systems may erode 
trade demarcations and dilute skills, but such forces have always 
operated under capitalist production systems, and there are still 
separate negotiating procedures and arrangements for different groups of 
workers (even though the skill demarcatons are no longer as clear cut). 
This highlights the problems of 'grafting on' Japanese production
methods without some of the wider social or institutional parameters 
found in Japan."(42) In a sense there can be no crisis for culture. It 
will inexorably continue albeit in a changed form regardless of
circumstances. Even if capitalism contains within itself a basic 
contradiction between the frugality and hard work of a remnant Puritan 
ethic and the new emphasis on the need to consume, the culture of 
capitalism will continue until such time as it is replaced or overtaken 
by a new and different culture. Meanwhile, continuing great interest 
surrounds Japanese employment practices, both in Japan and in invested 
countries such as Britain. It would be the subject of a whole new 
research programme as to why post war American companies locating in 
Britain failed to arouse the same level of interest and concern amongst 
indigenous British industry. A common temptation is to make a quick 
assessment of Japanese industrial practice and attempt to select 
features which look as though they are easily transferable. Their 
subsequent failure to match expectations can leave the innovator further 
confused as to the shape of best industrial practice. The study of 
cultural input, or transference, may have the effect of making praxis 
transfer a more reliable option and at the least, provide a possible 
explanation for failure.
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A more specific related objective is to compare the effects of 
Japanese and American enterprises located in Britain on attitudes at 
work held by the British employee. This is always a crucial area for 
employers. The search for an effective way of changing attitudes at work 
is the subject of an industry in itself. P.J.Turnbull writes, "This 
suggests that it may be in the social organisation of production that 
Japanese methods may have a more significant impact, and it is notable 
that a recent IR-RR survey of 'flexibility' agreements should conclude 
that 'at the centre of the many agreements negotiated lies the goal of 
changing attitudes towards work and working practices.... The agreements 
which have been signed are designed both to encourage and reflect in a 
general fashion the necessary changes in attitudes.' Changing our 
'manufacturing philosophy' and the social organisation of production 
thus appears to be as important (if not more important) a component of 
management's strategy and the new 'factory regime' as are changes in 
work practices, the introduction of new technology, capital mobility, 
and the collective vulnerability of labour."(43)
White and Trevor, researching a specific attitude, namely job 
satisfaction, revealed a somewhat paradoxical situation. Job 
satisfaction in Japanese and British factories appeared much the same. 
The International Centre for Econonmic and Related Disciplines at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, seemed to corroborate 
their findings.(44) The present study seeks to explore this contention 
and to assess a number of other employee attitudes, levels of 
conflict/cooperation, levels of participation, motivation and loyalty, 
perceptions of management and trade unions, many of which historically 
do not appear to have been the subject of comparable research interest. 
Initially it was thought possible that a research concept could be 
constructed that would allow cultural effects in American and Japanese 
owned factories to be value assessed and would allow measurement of the 
extent to which cultural inputs achieve a perceived optimum. Any value 
assessment has to adopt a perspective to address the question, whose 
values? Likewise, optimal outcomes presuppose a person or enterprise or 
system for whom the outcome is an optimum. The Japanese seem to have 
been more successful than either the British or the Americans in 
achieving some enterprise consensus as to values and optima, It is 
expressed succinctly by the Japanese industrialist Kanosuki Matsushita
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in a response to visiting European and American managers to Japan in 
1979 when he said, "Your 'socially minded bosses', often full of good 
intentions believe their duty is to protect the people in their firms. 
We, on the other hand, are realists and consider it our duty to get our 
people to defend their firms which will pay them back a hundredfold for 
their dedication. By doing this, we end up by being more 'social' than 
you."(45)
Despite abandoning the project in the course of this research, it is 
still felt that given sufficient numbers of participating companies, 
both Japanese and British, it will be possible to construct a research 
concept that will allow the assessment and measurement of cultural 
inputs to industrial relations.
Finally, a further objective of the programme is to identify and 
examine "dormant" categories in British culture that might be activated 
to achieve a perceived optimal outcome at the place of work. This is a 
problematic undertaking for at least two reasons. Firstly, it 
presupposes the existence of such categories. A number of scholars, 
including Pinder and Thurley suggest the reality of the concept. "The 
argument presented in the book is not that the Japanese work ethic has 
been transplanted, but that a traditional British work ethic has been 
rekindled."(46) For the purposes of this programme the phrase "dormant 
cultural category" is used to describe an attitude or practice that was 
traditionally recognised as a mark of that culture but which is widely 
alleged is no longer extant. The British work ethic, derived from the 
impact of Calvinism on British society, is said by Thurley and Pinder to 
fall into this category. Are there more of these concepts and can they 
likewise be rekindled? The suggestion of "rekindling" raises a second 
question of the manipulation of cultural mores. Is there not an inherent 
contradiction here? If culture could be manipulated and concepts 
rekindled, that mechanism would itself be part of a culture, a culture 
of change. There can be no such objective mechanism. The previous 
definitions of culture(page 12f.) leave no space for a mechanism outside 
a culture. Indeed they leave no space for the concept of an area of 
human existence unaffected or not included by a culture. There is 
nothing outwith either ideas, practice, or feelings, and certainly not 
some objective manipulating mechanism waiting to be employed. How can 
cultural concepts be influenced and changed as distinct from a foreign
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culture Influencing and changing people in a different culture? If an 
apparent reappearance, or rekindling of a cultural feature arises, it 
does so as a result of the conflation of cultures in the workplace such 
that people adopt a different attitude, or embrace a new set of values. 
In every case they will do so in order to maximise perceived self 
interest. It could be argued that in so far as a national culture, say, 
values the conversion of the rest of the world to its value system - a 
not uncommon feature in the history of nations, and alleged to be 
present in Japanese social thinking - there will inevitably be a 
manipulative or proselytising component in that culture. In the 
workplace, such proselytising is endemic, from the flow of books on how 
to manage, to the constant pressure from the foreman or supervisor to 
optimise work performance and quality. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
changes in attitude could be achieved by a single act - more likely to 
be the result of a process over time. This presupposes an agency such as 
religion, a political party or a foreign cultural influence that is 
likely to remain operational over a timespan sufficiently long to induce 
change. Secondly, a change to be effective would need the broad consent 
of the majority of people likely to be affected. Prima facie this would 
seem an insuperable obstacle in a modern pluralist society but a
possibility in a factory.
What is in mind for this research programme is something much more 
immediate, and in some ways more specific. The programme is directed to 
the changing of attitudes at work in favour of the capitalist mode of 
production. In this regard it seeks to examine the changing of attitudes 
at work without raising the more profound question of the justice of the 
economic system itself. In other wards, in pursuing this particular
objective, it is . not primarily concerned with the possibility of
changing the economic system in favour of increased justice. It is
essentially the rediscovery of categories inherent in Western cultural 
tradition that would enhance the ability of British and Morth American 
enterprises to compete with the Japanese in a market place where 
competition is ever becoming more intense. Such an enterprise might, of 
course, raise uncomfortable questions about the structure and justice of 
the economic system. That would simply represent a risk inherent in the 
programme. Furthermore, it would almost inevitably involve wider issues
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of education, training, government interference in the labour market and 
individual freedoms and civil liberties.
The methodology adopted and tha_sc_Qpj£_of_±h_e^tu_dy_._
The original project hope was to gain access to as many as possible 
of the thirty eight Japanese owned companies operating in Britain in 
1985, to use a survey technique which would reveal trends or patterns 
of behaviour and change as a result of Japanese management and 
ownership.
In the event this was not possible for only two Japanese owned firms 
gave access for research. The research method had therefore of necessity 
to be changed from the quantitative to the qualitative, from an emphasis 
on survey to an emphasis on particular situations. The case study method 
was therefore adopted. In the event, as with most if not all case 
studies, it included an element of survey, for within each of the six 
factories there were also aggregates and "what are aggregates on one 
level of analysis can become case studies on another level."(47)
The change from a quantitative to a qualitative approach was simply 
accepted as a result of facing the reality of the situation while 
maintaining the conviction of the importance of the research. The case 
study method is in no way a second best(48) approach but able to be 
justified with as much rigour as the survey technique. Before the 
current fashion for statistics and the emergence of powerful computers, 
it was the main method in sociology, made particularly prestigious by
the Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s.
Its limitations, however, must be appreciated and an answer given to 
the basic question of the justification of generalisations from a single 
case. The fundamental point is that extrapolation and general theorising 
are based on "the validity of the analysis" of the observations,
interviews, documents, etc., "rather than on the representativeness of
the events."(49)
The success of the method therefore almost entirely depends on the 
quality of the analysis and the rigour of the logic in moving from the
a
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data to general conclusions. There is a sense in which the 
representativeness of the case itself is irrelevant. "The case study- 
wili be related in a wider population not because the case is 
representative, but because our analysis will be unassailable."<50) 
Trying to make the case representative indicates some confusion between 
qualitative methodology and quantitative methodology. The case study may 
be chosen for its explanatory power or even for its atypicality, in 
order "to make theoretical connections apparent which were formerly 
obscure."(51)
In the case of this programme the "case" is properly speaking, six 
factories whose selection was largely determined by the "givenness" of 
the initial two Japanese factories. Once they had been identified the 
other four were chosen to match them, in order to facilitate comparison 
between the six. Such comparative analysis, it is hoped, will strengthen 
the subsequent theorising by giving several points of reference.
In the present work, Mitchell's definition of a case study is 
accepted, viz., "A case study is a detailed examination of an event or 
series of events, that the analyst believes exhibit the operation of 
some general theoretical principle." <52> Thus the present work is not so 
much six case studies as an example of the case study method being 
applied to research at six factories. Strictly speaking, according to 
Gluckman's schema<53), the "social situation" type of material rather 
than the "apt illustration" or the "extended case study", has been used. 
The "apt illustration" is a fairly simple event from which a general 
principle can easily be drawn. The "social situation" is essentially 
synchronic, a snap shot in time, while "the extended case study" is 
diachronic. Although return visits were made to two of the factories, 
GEC Kirkcaldy and Brother Industries these were essentially to clarify 
and amplify the research results and certainly not an attempt to cope 
with the additional demands of extended diachronic study.
Thus, as with any method, there are limiting factors which must be 
recognised from the outset. Chief of these is that the value of the case 
study is to some extent dependent on the quality of the existing body of 
analytical theory. "The extent to which generalisation may be made from 
case studies depends upon the adequacy of the underlying theory, and the 
whole corpus of related knowledge of which the case is analysed rather 
than on the particular instance itself."<54) For the current project,
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the underlying theory, although growing, still remains sparse. There has 
been a growing number of short papers on Japanese manufacturing practice 
in Britain in the 1980s<55) but still only one full length study to 
date. <56) There also appears to be relatively little published research 
on cross-cultural comparison of U.S. and Japanese manufacturing practice 
in Britain. Much of the theoretical basis for the present project stems 
from analysis of Japanese practice in Japan<57) and Earth American 
practice in the United States. <58)
It will already be clear from the foregoing that a further limiting 
factor of the case study method is that predictions will be 
theoretically based rather than extrapolated from an empirical base, 
conceptual rather than substantive. In practice they will fall between 
minor everyday working theories and grand theorising. In the survey 
technique, with a large enough sample, it could be argued that the 
conditions giving rise to the phenomena under study, the causal prime 
mover, is within the sample, whereas in the case study method, with the 
study focused on one or at most few particular situations, the causal 
prime mover is always external. In the former situation, empirical 
conclusions are possible, but not in the latter especially where the 
case makes no claim to be typical. Even where the conclusions are 
theoretical, the generalisations must be qualified by a "ceteris 
paribus", in view of the necessary contextualising of the case study.
Finally, it could be argued that in the absence of constraining 
empirical evidence, there is a greater danger in the case study method 
of the researcher influencing the analysis and thus eroding the rigour 
of the logic in moving from the particular to the general. Goode and 
Hatt put the problem this way, "Most of the difficulties in the use of 
this method <case study technique) can be reduced to one, although a 
more complex classification is possible. Interestingly enough, the basic 
danger in its use is the response of tie researcher. The researcher 
comes to feel a false sense of certainty about his own conclusions."<59) 
In fact the present project does have a significant survey element and 
to some extent that tempers the final analysis, for in the end of the 
day there is no essential contradiction between analytical induction and 
enumerative induction. Indeed the case study conclusion must be capable 
of withstanding experimental verification if and when such is available. 
"In reality no case study can be presented in isolation from the corpus
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of empirical information and theoretical postulates against which it has 
significance."(60)
One way of minimising researcher interference is to "triangulate 
perspectives",(61)that is, to allow the perspectives of others to 
corroborate the analysis through the accumulated findings of subsequent 
case studies.
While these are some of the limits of the technique, the case study 
approach has some positive advantages in its own right. Principal 
amongst these is the fact that the relationship between researcher and 
case becomes sufficiently close to allow an intimate knowledge of the 
case content to arise from which to see general principles at work, 
possibly more clearly than from the objective standpoint of data 
analysis. Concurrently, the case content remains intact and does not 
merely become a trait or trend, as might happen with the survey method. 
In other words, the theorising is from a unitary base that respects the 
richness and wholeness of the research material and not from a base that 
reduces and fragments the human stuation under analysis into a number of 
impersonal traits.
Further, the researcher is him or herself enriched by proximity to 
the case content which is in itself an aid to and a widening influence 
on the researcher’s sociological reflection and analysis. "Precisely 
because of the narrowness of most survey work, the researcher actually 
derives most of his wider range of experience in such investigations at 
the stage of analysis, when the meaning of the questions is probed more 
deeply. This latter stage is most fruitful, however, if there has been a 
prior period of absorbing the varied experience of others. The case 
study is particularly useful because of its attempt to find the meaning 
of the recorded data within the life of the individual, and only later 
in terms of classes of individuals. Often, too, these experiences yield 
new insights because of their very differences from the ordinary 
experiences of the researcher;...."(62)
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b)The scape of the study.
The basic research for the programme has come from the study of 
factory life in six plants in Britain, two British owned, two American 
owned and two Japanese owned. The information on which the study is 
based has come from interviews at the place of work, information 
supplied by the management of the enterprises, and extended informal 
conversation with employees. The overall aim of the research was to 
study the effect of foreign ownership and management on worker attitudes 
in Britain. The choice of firms was governed by a number of parameters - 
the declared interest in foreign owners and management and the need to 
choose factories of similar size and similar type of manufacturing, with 
similar levels of technology and labour forces of similar socio-cultural 
background.
For reasons already stated, two Japanese and two American owned 
companies were selected. While, inevitably, the two Japanese plants 
would give only a short term view, the two American plants were chosen 
to give a longer term view of the impact of foreign ownership and 
management. The two British factories were chosen to act as a 
comparator. Also, an attempt was made to choose plants of a similar 
size, employing similar types of labour for similar types of work. In 
this regard Hewlett Packard was the least satisfactory choice because 
the South Queensferry plant included a substantial research and 
development facility resulting in a labour force with a much higher 
proportion of graduates than at any of the other five factories. 
However, it was felt desirable to use Hewlett Packard as one of the six 
since it largely met the conditions of the other criteria and had a 
widely acknowledged management approach to manufacture that was of 
particular interest to the Japanese.
Light engineering seemed to offer the best area in these respects. 
It seemed to be the primary area of interest for Japanese investment and 
there was a fairly wide choice of British and American owned factories 
with which to compare. The two Japanese companies(Maxell and Brother) 
were initially identified through an approach to the Japan Trade Centre 
(JETRO) in Baker Street, London. The Centre sent a list of the thirty 
eight Japanese owned manufacturing companies trading in the United 
Kingdom (August 1985). The three oldest companies were established in
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1972. One very large company was a fairly recent Japanese buyout of a 
long established British company. Three firms had just begun production 
that year (1985), two had no Japanese personnel on site, had never had 
any, and were , to all intents and purposes, British companies. In one 
long established firm a large Japanese company had bought a substantial 
and majority holding. One had yet to begin production (Hissan), ten had 
less than sixty employees (one employed sixteen, another fifteen, two 
fourteen and one as few as three people). This left twenty companies 
from which to choose. All were approached individually by letter. Two 
factories of almost identical size agreed to give access for the 
purposes of the research programme. Fortunately they were factories 
making similar types of product, in one case electric typewriters and in 
the other, video tapes and floppy discs. Both used similar equipment and 
could fairly be described as in the light engineering field. Both were 
essentially assembly plants, buying in many of the finished parts for 
assembly to complete the final product. In both cases, this included the 
purchase and impart of some parts from Japan. Both factories had been in 
operation in Britain for the same length of time and used a highly 
automated and robotised production technology, using a variety of 
equipment largely designed and manufactured in Japan and West Germany. 
Both were located in new buildings on greenfield sites and had similar 
types of labour forces, particularly in terms of socio-cultural 
background, which will be more fully described in Chapter 2. One labour 
force was drawn largely from a new town (Livingston) and the other from 
a long established ex-mining town (Wrexham).
The parameters of factory size, type of production and social type 
of labour force were effectually set by the management of the two
Japanese companies who agreed to participate in the research. With these 
determinants in mind, two matching American owned companies and two
matching British owned companies in Britain were approached. It was felt
important in any comparative case study of the effects of foreign 
cultural influence on the British labour force at work, to keep in
parallel an equally up to date view of British socialisation and its 
response in the workplace. Four companies (Hewlett Packard, Burroughs, 
GEC. , and Lothian Electric Machines) agreed to participate giving a 
portfolio of six plants in light engineering, approximately the same 
age and size, and employing labour forces with similar social
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characteristics. In each case, personnel departments agreed to choose a 
maximunm of twenty people from all departments, including managers, 
supervisors and non-supervisory workers for interview. As far as is 
known, this is the first time that large Japanese companies have agreed 
to allow employees to be interviewed during working hours and in the 
factory.
In the most recent study by White and Trevor<63), access was gained 
to only one large Japanese company and two very small ones. In the one 
large Japanese company, denoted in the study as JEL, it was possible to 
interview on site only managers, supervisors and a few Japanese ex­
patriot technicians. Other workers were surveyed using a postal 
questionnaire. Similarly at the two small Japanese companies, in one 
case no interviews were allowed on site at all. "The company’s 
management decided that it could not afford the loss of production time 
which would result from the workplace interviews."(64) White and Trevor 
appear to have tried to compensate for the paucity of on-site interviews 
by interviewing people in the community. Although they maintain that 
this was the "lynch pin” of the study, it is clear such a technique also 
has its dangers. People selected for interview on site by the one
department (personnel) in each case, do thereby have an intrinsic factor 
of comparability. It is assumed that most, if not all, personnel 
managers will behave in a similar manner, eg., in choosing their "best" 
workers for interview, thus giving a bias towards a measure of control 
over interview samples. Interviewing people in the community, on the 
other hand, is likely to introduce an unacceptably high level of 
randomness, with little knowledge beforehand of the relationship of the 
interviewee to the company concerned.
Furthermore, at work the environment imposes a number of constraints 
on people in terms of minimising the risk of repeating mythologies,
interesting but largely extraneous legends concerning company ethos and 
practice. People interviewed in the community are less likely to feel 
thus constrained and more likely to introduce popular local myths
regarding companies that might otherwise be the case on site. For 
example, in both towns in which the two Japanese companies of the study 
were located, both factories had a largely unjustified reputation for 
secrecy. In fact they appeared to be no more secretive about their
operation than any of the other four companies. It seemed to be more
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likely that a thinly disguised racial prejudice was expressing itself, 
perhaps fuelled by a social background in which many British companies 
had gone out of business in recent years.
The current research programme is therefore based on interviews on 
site conducted during the period 1985-86. At each plant the interviewer 
was given an extensive conducted tour of the factory and a room was 
made available in each for the conduct of the interviews. Only at Maxell 
did the management ask to see the interview schedules and express 
reservations about taping interviews. Eventually the Japanese managing 
director gave permission for the tape recorder to be used provided every 
employee was given the option of refusing to be taped. In fact this
practice was adopted throughout the study and only two people out of one
hundred and twenty interviewed refused to be taped. The interview
framework was provided by two types of comprehensive questionnaire, one 
for the personnel manager, and one for all other employees. There were 
additional questions for employees who were also shop stewards.
It was recognised early in the programme that the shape of the 
questions, their content and the number of options allowed an occasion 
to the interviewees were crucial to the success of the study. 
Consequently, questionnaires were tested on a sample of twenty employees 
at Longannet Power Station, where the interviewer already had access to 
the labour force. Some adjustments were made in the light of that 
experience. The questionnaire for personnel managers was designed to 
expose as comprehensive a picture as possible of the work environment 
provided by the company. Questions were put relating to company
practice, vis a vis welfare provision, participation and consultation, 
sick pay schemes, earning curves, loss of hours to disputes, quit rates, 
absenteeism, industrial clothing, commonality of facilities, age of 
retirement, wage differentials, management shop floor experience, 
education, training and social background, union cooperation, intra-firm 
communications, status gradations, and demarcation.
Questions to shop stewards explored, the number of unions on site, 
branch attendance and locality, union facilities, level of wage 
bargaining, union welfare and education provision, ratio of full-time 
officials to members and the number of members on site. Questions to all 
other employees were designed to solicit attitudes to work and 
perceptions of management, and explored, job satisfaction, length of
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service, place in the company structure, quality of relationships with 
others on site, discipline, career opportunities, intra-company ranking, 
information flow, working conditions, religious background, 
qualifications and/or skills on entry, readiness for overtime, 
timekeeping, perceptions of management, management authority, treatment 
of conflict, job rotation and on-site training. Since the interviews 
were taped, there was ample opportunity to enrich impressions with 
information additional to that solicited directly by the questionnaire. 
This technique effectually gave two sources of research material, 
completed questionnaires and transcriptions of the interviewees. A third 
source of material was gained from less formal conversation with 
managers and Japanese ex-patriots. Additionally, company literature 
provided a source of company philosophy and value systems.
The result is six studies of the practice and ethos of six different 
factories and three pairs of very different factories in terms of the 
cultural background of the owners and ex-patriot managers. It has 
provided an opportunity to explore and to some extent to compare 
sensitively, the different cultural emphases in the place of work. After 
selecting a number of areas of typical interest in the field of 
industrial relations, and allowing employees to reveal their feelings 
and attitudes towards these issues, an attempt has been made to move to 
a different level of analysis, inductive theorising, to explore a number 
of key areas of interest in industrial relations practice, with a view 
to assessing the cultural contribution to their present shape and scope. 
It is hoped that in Chapters 5 to 8 this task has been done with some 
sensitivity and insight, to improve understanding of management 
techniques and employee responses at the place of work. Ultimately, the 
hope is that enhanced insights into human relationships at work will 
lead to more enriching work life for all who must spend their working 
days in factories.
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CHAEIBR_2x
THE TWO BRITISH LABOUR FORCES AMD THEIR RESPONSES TO
"The social and historical context in which organisations evolve 
is inevitably a primary determinant of how they take shape."
\J. Ouchi.
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Before examining in some detail the circumstances of the two British 
labour forces which form the comparator for the study, the more general 
question of what British employees can expect by way of management and 
working conditions in American and Japanese owned factories is raised. 
The answer is given in the from of a brief resumee of the popularly 
accepted stereotypes of American and Japanese management and working 
conditions. The stereotypes are outlined for at least two reasons. They 
are an important vehicle for people in one society to understand social 
behaviour in another society. Secondly, they are theories or models of 
reality which provide guidance rather than an accurate picture. While 
the literature on American and Japanese industrial relations and 
management praxis is extensive, all that is being offered here is a 
brief stereotype to give some impression of the popularly accepted 
background against which the current study is set.
The Japanese manager in the large Japanese company with foreign 
plants is likely to have been recruited from school or university.(1) 
At school, in particular, he may have experienced extreme pressure to 
perform well. (2) University educated, he is likely to have joined the 
firm with a "general" type degree, in, say, arts or social sciences, 
rather than with a "specific" type degree in, say, a branch of
engineering, mathematics, economics, etc. <3) His American counterpart is 
more likely to have begun his industrial career with a degree specific 
to the needs of at least his first employer. Unlike the Japanese
manager, he will have frequently changed employer while developing his 
management career. He may well have enhanced his career prospects by
taking a post-graduate degree in management or a management related 
subject, while his Japanese counterpart’s further training will almost 
certainly have been provided by the employer. <4)
While twenty or thirty years ago the American manager may have begun 
work on the shop floor, serving his time in a recognised apprenticeship, 
in recent years he is more likely to have gone immediately into 
management type work after, perhaps, a condensed period of practical
training. The Japanese manager is more likely to have spent three to 
seven years on the shop floor, rotating through a number of departments 
and skills. Indeed, he is likely to have remained in that position,
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perhaps taking on foreman type jobs and junior supervisory positions 
along with all other colleagues who joined the company at the same time, 
until he was about forty years of age. (5) Only at that point was the 
group likely to have been streamed and a few chosen for senior
management posts throughout the remainder of the employee's working 
life. His American counterpart, by that time, would possibly have seen 
himself as something of a failure if he had not, by his early forties, 
acquired a senior management position.
During the formative years with the company the nascent Japanese 
manager will have been exposed to a socialisation process that is 
likely to have "locked" him into the company culture. As a result, the 
company and its domain is likely to make by far the major demands on his 
life in terms of interest, commitment and time. T.P.Eohlen describes the 
process for bank employees thus, "There are a number of courses 
specifically designed to assist in the sponsorship of good human
relations. Office recreation leaders, for example, learn how to conduct 
games, folk dances, and other group activities. There is a course for 
women who are office sempai, and a group of deputies undergoes a five 
day sensitivity training ("tea group") session each year. These efforts 
seem rather insignificant compared to the much larger and infinitely 
more involved introductory training new members receive. This programme, 
constituting in effect, an elaborate socialisation attempt, is far and 
away the most important educational effort in Uedagin. Hew men spend 
three months at the training institute before their first assignments, 
while entering women attend for only two weeks."(6) The recruit's entry 
into this culture may have been assisted by a period of "spiritual"
training. Examples of this are documented by T.P.Rohlen, (7) in a 
Japanese bank, and by D.C.Lewis in a synthetic fibres factory. (8) In- 
house company training programmes are also likely to have associated 
business success with the overall good of Japan.
A further consequence of the socialisation process in Japanese 
companies is the strengthening of ties between employees to induce a 
sense of belonging to a family. The American manager may also have been
exposed to family type perceptions of the company, but his privatised
and individualised lifestyle is likely to have intervened to produce a 
manager with apparently less sense of commitment to the company, qua 
company, as his Japanese counterpart. Furthermore, the Japanese manager
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may well regard "family" as a moveable concept, beginning with the 
natural family, moving on to embrace the "family" at school and/or 
university, and now enshrining the company for which he works.(9) While 
both he and his American counterpart may be encouraged to socialise 
"after hours", only the Japanese manager is likely to rate the 
importance of this socialisation higher than that of nuclear family 
life. Such is the alleged success of the socialisation process, Japanese 
employees are said to forego holidays and work unpaid overtime in order 
to maximise production.
The Japanese manager is likely to be accustomed to spending much of 
his working day on the shop floor. He may well also be used to catching 
up with the "paper work" in hours after the dayshift has finished or 
when the next shift is at work. By contrast, his American counterpart 
will like to be seen on the shop floor fairly often, but not necessarily 
at the expense of working regularly long hours of unpaid overtime. Here 
the differing levels of enterprise conditioning are likely to have 
produced differing work patterns. The Japanese manager will probably 
expect to remain with the company throughout his working life, retire at 
fifty five and pursue either leisure time interests, embark on a new 
self employed career, or take a post in a smaller company. Both American 
and Japanese managers may be expected to be dismissive of the 
traditional divide between men and management in British industry. While 
the Japanese management may expect to work with a trade union, on the 
whole the American manager may feel the presence of a union or unions an 
indication of failure on the part of the firm.
The stereotype of American and Japanese industrial relations.
Given the traditional fourfold analysis of Japanese industrial 
relations, lifetime employment, seniority wage system, corporate 
welfarism and company unions(lO), the British labour force may well 
expect some vestige of these to be established in the Japanese owned 
factory. Something of the concept of the company union may well be 
continued by the signing of an agreement for recognition and bargaining 
with one union, as, for example, at the Hissan plant in Washington, Tyne 
and Wear. <11) Corporate welfarism in Japan may be an expression of overt
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paternalism which may well manifest itself in the workplace by a high 
priority on discipline, eg., timekeeping, cleanliness, steady work rate 
etc., and . by a high ratio of supervisors to manual workers. Given the 
differences in social provision between Britain and Japan, the incoming 
Japanese factory is unlikely to emulate the comprehensive welfare 
provision of some of the large Japanese companies in Japan, whereby 
housing, education and health provision may be on offer to employees. It 
may be more reasonable to expect that, like many American companies, a 
high premium is placed on fitness and the value of physical recreation 
through sport specific clubs, in inducing a sense of belonging to the 
company. The incoming Japanese company may also be expected to introduce 
physical exercises (taiso) at the beginning of each shift. <12)
While, in Japan, the wage system based on length of service with the 
firm may be declining in favour of a more merit based system<13), like 
lifetime employment, the seniority system would appear to have deep 
roots in Japanese culture, and therefore not easily be abandoned in 
principle. The seniority system clearly rewards long service with the 
company and thereby encourages continuity of employment with the one 
firm. Likewise lifetime employment, which has always only been extended 
to the core labour force, has an obvious appeal in terms of maximising 
loyalty to the enterprise and minimising labour turnover and its 
attendant costs. Both contribute to a recognised feature of Japanese 
companies whereby growth is often dependent on management expertise 
accumulating over time in the company, although it may well be true to 
say with Dickens and Savage that "The concept of the core labour force 
is two hundred years old." <14) The American firm is more likely to be 
led directly from the top beginning with a strategic plan, to which all 
other considerations, even the buying and selling of whole companies and 
projects, are likely to be subservient. <15) The plan often focuses on a 
particular product range <eg., as at Ford, Caterpillar, Kodak etc.) and 
may issue in a tactical and/or action programme. By contrast, the 
Japanese conpiany can be expected to focus on production per se, 
especially quality, cost reduction, product improvement and sales. <16) 
The Japanese company is likely to take a longer term view of both 
markets and returns on investment than the American company. <17) The 
practice of quarterly reporting to share holders, for example, is not 
engaged in by the Japanese.
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In line with the alleged groupiness of Japanese society, companies 
usually exist together in hierarchically stratified conglomerates, 
trading almost exclusively within the conglomerate. While the 
conglomerate remains essentially within Japan, it may be expected that 
Japanese companies will cultivate ,,relations,, with suppliers in the 
overseas environment to compensate for the loss of the effect of the 
conglomerate. Crowther and Garraher(18> argue this is the reason why 
Hissan have purchased a further 436 acres of land (three times greater 
than that needed for the core factory) from the Borough of Sunderland. 
They suggest that component suppliers will be attracted to this area to 
facilitate the Kanban (Just in time) system of production. American 
companies are likely to take a much more "business" view of the supply 
market and trade with those who can supply solely on the basis of 
ability to meet specifications.
As for the work environment, the Japanese company may be expected to 
anticipate high trust relations in the factory and therefore not 
introduce time clocks for employees, and to propagate an egalitarian 
ethos by uniformity of work wear and hours of work, and commonality of 
facilities such as parking, open plan working, canteen and recreational 
facilities, sick pay and pension provision. The American company may 
also share many of these practices. Indeed, the apparent minimising of 
class consciousness in American society and its work domain, compared 
with Europe, may well have been consciously copied by Japanese industry 
in the post-war period(19).
Organisational structure, however, is likely to vary between 
American and Japanese companies. If Japanese companies replicate 
themselves in the overseas location, they can be expected to be highly 
and finely stratified, with the use of many rankings and job titles(20). 
The American companies are likely to have relatively few grades and to 
have a somewhat flattened hierarchical structure, accompanied by an 
apparent degree of informality in the workplace. The use of first names 
in this regard is a well known characteristic. Unlike the Japanese 
enterprise, the work discipline is likely to be based on rules and 
penalties, whereas the Japanese seem to prefer the use of rules and 
exhortations. In Japan it is claimed that large companies take extreme 
measures to avoid redundancy and seldom sack employees. The "poor" 
employee is regarded as a mistake of the system, requiring all other
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workmates to take responsibility for supporting the person who, for one 
reason or another, is not thought to be making the expected contribution 
to the corporate effort.
Ringi decision making is said to be a common feature of Japanese 
production methods.(21) Decisions are taken after apparent widespread 
consultation at fairly low levels in the enterprise and accompanied by 
written suggestions, amendments and agreement. In practice, it is 
alleged decisions emanate in embryo at middle to senior management 
level. The proposal is then moved down the organisation and up again to 
the top for final approval. This method is said to minimise the shock of 
change upon the labour force and to give an appearance of participation 
in decision making by. people even in fairly lowly positions in the 
hiearchy of the company.
These are some of the main features of industrial relations and 
management practice that can be expected from incoming Japanese and 
American employers, if one is to believe Japan’s official literature 
about itself, as published, for example, by the Japan External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO), and the image of Japanese industry sustained by 
the holistic school of Japanese studies (Hakane 1970, Doi, 1973, Vogel, 
1979 and Reischaeur, 1979 et al)
The British labour force.
The chief interest of the current programme is the effect of the 
encounter between the incoming company and its managers, and the culture 
of the indigenous British labour force. After the foregoing brief 
picture of what British employees may expect of incoming Japanese and 
American companies , the question is what can the incomers, Japanese 
and American, expect to find in Britain? From what type of industrial 
milieu can the incoming employer expect his new labour force to come? 
What will be some of the attitudes, prejudices and needs instilled by 
The British socialisation process in the new labour force? What will the 
British employees expect in terms of industrial relations and working 
conditions? To answer this type of question, two fairly typical examples 
of British factories in light engineering are examined - GEC at 
Kirkcaldy and Lothian Electric Machines at Haddington.
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Firstly, the work environment at GEC and Lemac is described, 
preceded by a brief history of what is known about each company. This is 
followed by a comparison of the facts of the working conditions as given 
by the personnel departments in response to a questionnaire (Tables 1 to 
11). There follows a factual description of the employees interviewed in 
the two factories, tabulated for easy reference (Tables 12 to 14). 
Employee attitudes, prejudices and needs arising from their social 
conditioning are tabulated in response to an interview schedule to which 
each person submitted at the request of the personnel department (Tables 
15 to 21). The postscript reflects on the methodology of this chapter.
s) GEC
The GEC factory at Kirkcaldy was formerly owned by Associated 
Electrical Industries Ltd. The two companies merged in 1967. In 
September 1968 a further merger, largely government induced and 
supported(22), took place between the new GEC and English Electric. The 
enlarged company, under the managing directorship of Arnold Weinstock, 
was thought better able to face international competition and 
today(1988) is Britain's largest electrical and electronic group with 
annual sales of over £5,500 million (23). In the 1960's all three 
companies, GEC, AEI and English Electric were facing declining profits. 
They were said to be engineering oriented, run by engineers, with an 
emphasis on quality and reliability. The new enlarged company was 
entering a more intensely consumerist era. There was an urgent need to 
improve marketing, to cheapen the design and quality of many products in 
order to compete with foreign manufacturers. The leadership of Arnold 
Weinstock, an outstanding salesman, was therefore anticipated with an 
air of expectation.
Weinstock, essentially an entrepreneur, was a very similar type of 
person to Hugo Hirst who effectually founded GEC after the company had 
purchased the Manchester Gas Ignition Company in 1889. Much of the early 
business was involved in worldwide cartels making and selling light
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bulbs, and since all the products were basic to warfare, company profits 
rose dramatically during the 1914-18 war. The opportunity of 
coordinating trade associations and rings came in 1916 with the founding 
of the Federation of British Industry of which GEC became a member. In 
1918, GEC moved into heavy engineering, manufacturing steam turbines, 
and engineers rose to influential positions in the company. As was later 
to happen to Weinstock, they maintained a steady resistance to Hirst 
because he was essentially a salesman. By 1930, 34% of the equity of the 
company was owned by General Electric of America, but as far as is 
known, they had no influence in the operation of the company.
Between 1942 and 1962, GEC declined under the chairmanship of Harry 
Railing who was said to be a good engineer but lacked the 
entrepreneurial flair to keep GEC at the forefront of the worldwide 
electrical industry. When Hirst's son-in-law, Leslie Gamage, took over 
in 1957, the decline continued due to a number of contributory factors 
additional to Harry Railing's deficiencies. Management was said to have 
become in-bred, dominated by engineers who despised the market. The 
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act of 1948 had broken their near 
monopoly on the light bulb market. In 1954 GEC entered the nuclear 
industry with very adverse results for profitability and by 1956 they 
were heavily over borrowed.
Management consultants were brought in in 1959 and two important 
consequences followed. The retail chain of "Magnet Houses" was closed 
with an improvement in profits, and Radio and Allied Industries was 
acquired .together with a new management team under the leadership of 
Arnold Weinstock. There followed a period of rationalisation and 
mergers. The Kirkcaldy factory of GEC was opened in 1966 and employed in 
1986, eight hundred people making telecommunications equipment. The 
telecommunications group with headquarters at Coventry was one of ten 
groups comprising one hundred and thirty companies, arranged in 
operational divisions. "Like the GEC group, we have our own policy of 
decentralisation. The company was divided into four product units, 
telephone switching group, transmission group, private systems division 
and telephone division."(24) All research, development and design work 
for the telecommunications division was located at Coventry, while the 
Kirkcaldy plant was essentially an assembly factory, manufacturing to 
specifications received from Coventry. Until 1985, the main customer,
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and at most times the sole customer, was British Telecom (and prior to 
that, the Post Office). With the privatisation of British Telecom, the 
purchase of telecommunications equipment was opened to competitors 
worldwide. Formerly, GEC production operators were trained and tested to 
a British Post Office standard. This gave them virtually a monopoly 
position with respect to the Post Office telephone section. In 1986 GEC 
at Kirkcaldy was examining its competitive position. This had already 
led to the closure of a sister factory at Glenrothes, with a sustantial 
number of redundancies. A number of the Glenrothes employees had been 
transferred to the Kirkcaldy plant, without appearing to cause any 
particular labour relations problems.
No graduates were employed at Kirkcaldy, most engineers and 
technicians being qualified to Higher National Certificate(HNC) level. 
During the previous two years labour had been reorganised into new work 
groups, which had reduced the number of levels of supervision, increased 
the scope of the work of supervisors and clarified and simplfied the 
chain of command. The work groups were under the supervision of a 
controller and, between the controller and some forty or fifty workers, 
a link operator. The controller was, de facto, the supervisor, while the 
link operator had a production job to complete in addition to feeding 
and supervising the flow of work from the controller to the workers. 
Controllers were directly responsible to the works manager.
In addition to market changes there had also been, in the previous 
five years, substantial changes in product design. Originally, the 
factory was making electro-mechanical equipment for the Post Office. 
This was followed by a phase in which semi-electronic bus-bar equipment 
for the telephone industry was made. The equipment was then completely 
miniaturised by a combination of electronics and "chip" technology. 
Fewer people were needed to make this equipment, hence a further reason 
for the closure of the Glenrothes factory.
The Kirkcaldy plant was of a traditional design, light and airy, 
with plenty of windows to the exterior. The offices were partly open 
plan, but most senior staff had closed offices. In 1984 a step towards 
single status working was taken by establishing one canteen for all 
employees. To the disappointment of the General Manager, senior managers 
refused to use the new canteen, preferring to eat prepacked lunches in 
their own offices.
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Many older managers seemed to be retiring at about the same time, a 
trend which had also been aggravated by the closure of the Glenrothes 
plant. The new intake of younger managers had a reputation amongst the 
labour force for a more abrasive style of management. There was a 
tradition amongst all employees, and particularly amongst managers, of 
long service with the company, which almost amounted to a lifetime 
employment outlook. There was, however great uncertainty about the 
market situation which, together with recent redundancies, was a cause 
of anxiety in the labour force and in May 1988 there were renewed fears 
that the factory would close. The lack of information about the 
company’s future was a common cause of complaint although several 
managers said that if "good working practices are adapted", the factory 
could become "fully competitive" and find a reasonably permanent place 
in the telecommunications industry.
Production was divided into three basic areas. One section made 
electronic "shelves", another, flat electronic boards which were plugged 
in to the final assembly, and a final assembly section of digital 
switching equipment for telephone exchanges. There was also a packaging, 
dispatching and warehouse area. A number of parts were bought in, some 
of them locally manufactured, and these were sample inspected on site, 
as were also finished boards and the end product. Many assembly 
functions were done by machines and robots.
In 1986 there were fifty young people on a Youth Training Scheme in 
the factory, of whom, it was said, a number would be offered permanent 
jobs at the end of the training period. During the training period some 
trainees had the opportunity of earning full employee wages. The labour 
force was predominantly female with an average age of about thirty seven 
years, which was significantly higher than at either Maxell or
Brother.(The average age of interviewees at the five other plants was, 
Brother 24 years, Maxell 28.6 years, Burroughs 34.7 years, Hewlett 
Packard 37.5 years, and Lemac 42.9 years.)
Until 1985 the company was a member of the Engineering Employers'
Federation and continued to pay above Federation rates. Wage bargaining
was conducted at factory level within a budget set by headquarters at 
Coventry, so that there was factory bargaining controlled at company 
level. Line workers also participated in a bonus incentive scheme. They 
began work at 8am. and finished at 4.30pm., while office staff and
management began at 9am. and finished at 5pm. There were several other 
differences of conditions between managers and managed. The former were 
paid monthly, the latter weekly. Sick pay and pension arrangements were 
different, as were also toilets, parking areas, and entry and exit to 
the factory.
Five unions were recognised in the factory for bargaining purposes 
and there was a joint shop stewards’ committee, a works committee and 
joint consultative meetings. There were very few non union employees, 
and all the blue collar members of both the works committee and the 
consultative meetings were trade union representatives, although in 
theory they could simply have been workplace representatives.
Adjacent to the factory was a large car park with reserved spaces 
for senior staff. Security at the gate and at the main entrance was 
tight. The main door was permanently locked, and only once a bell had 
been sounded and people screened by the receptionist, was entry gained. 
The company was very sensitive about its community image. It was one of 
the largest employers in the town, was a generous contributer to a 
number of local* schemes in the Kirkcaldy area, and there were frequent 
visits from local schools and community groups.
Lothian Electric Machines Ltd traded under the name Lemac. Their 
Haddington factory was built almost thirty years ago and was owned for 
the first fifteen years of its life by the American company, Ranco 
Motors. Ranco sold out to a management group assisted by the Scottish 
Development Agency, who were in turn bought over by Kicrolex of 
Cirencester. Lemac was now part of a group of four companies and 
employed some four hundred and fifty people at Haddington. It produced a 
range of fractional horse power electric motors and keyboard 
subassemblies for IBM computers.
The offices which we re traditional in design, were located on a 
floor above the production area and included a small open plan section, 
but there were neither canteens nor rest areas. The factory was largely 
open plan, and compared to the other five, dirty and poorly lit. There 
appeared to be substantial quantities of parts and equipment squeezed
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into a fairly tight area. There was no mention of a "just in time"
policy and stocks of parts in the stores appeared to, he substantial. 
The largely mechanical assembly lines looked dated and there was an 
absence of computers and electronic equipment, both in the factory and 
in the offices. The plant was not air conditioned, although it was
intended to install air conditioning in the area in which the computer 
keyboards were being made.
The general atmosphere was fairly relaxed. Hourly workers began work 
at 8am. and finished at 5.15pm. two days a week. On two days they
finished at 4.45pm. and on Friday at 1pm., giving them a total of thirty 
nine hours per week. Office staff began work at 9am. There was an 
incentive bonus scheme for shop floor employees. Middle ranking managers 
were said by the labour force to be seen frequently on the shop floor, 
although there was no overt management or company philosophy. "When
Ranco was here the place was run along American lines with a company
philosophy. We have not continued that. We have a set of rules and 
guidelines but not in the sense of a company philosophy for all 
employees.", said the Industrial Engineering Manager.
The Personnel Department consisted of one person with some
secretarial assistance and there was also a small Research and 
Development department which reported directly to the Managing Director 
who was also a member of the parent board in Cirencester. There was also
a small design section in the factory, which modified existing electric
motor design rather than developed new products.
There were five unions recognised for negotiating purposes, a joint
shop stewards' committee, which met with senior staff every two months, 
no consultative meetings, but full factory level pay bargaining. Rates 
of pay were said to be about or slightly above the average for the area, 
and there was a pension scheme for staff employees only. Machinery and 
equipment was maintained by a team of millwrights, all time served 
fitters, turners and electricians. Managers were all time served 
engineers, but line operators were trained on the job by more 
experienced personnel. There were a number of apprentices belonging to 
several crafts, who had been recruited on the basis of school leaving
qualifications and who were encouraged to participate in further
education by a day release system. Unlike GEC, management turnover had 
been high far a number of years although some managers had been with
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the company for more than ten years. ITon supervisory grades tended to 
have worked for the company for the most part of their working lives. 
Many were bussed in daily from several surrounding towns and villages. 
Employees were prepared to work fairly high levels of overtime when the 
opportunity arose and occasionally, to meet a rise in demand for the 
product, the company operated an early evening shift in addition to the 
normal dayshift. There were no quality circles, no system of job 
evaluation, and no time had been lost due to disputes in the past two 
years. Some industrial clothing was provided for those who needed it, 
but there was no attempt at uniformity of dress. There were separate 
toilets and car parks for shop floor employees and staff, while intra­
firm communications were largely verbal, supplemented by a notice board. 
There appeared to be no security on entry to the site and neither 
visitor tabs nor means of identification were issued on entry.
There was no company literature apart from a small handbook 
outlining conditions and rights, which was given to each person joining 
the payroll. Disciplinary and guidance procedures were not detailed in 
this book but were available on application from the personnel 
department. As at GEC's Kirkcaldy factory, there was an obvious feeling 
of community and the Managing Director appeared to know most people by 
their first names. Conversely, everyone seemed to be on first name terms 
except the Managing Director who was addressed by his surname by 
everyone on site except his most senior managers.
Tables 1 to 11 give a comparative picture of working conditions at 
the two plants. These tables include the questions put to the personnel 
department in each factory.
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Some initial comments on. Horktng-CQxidildnn-S„_at_GEC_amL-L.enac.J-
Tables 1 to 11 give a summary of working conditions at GEC and
Lemac. Each factory had, of course, a background peculiar to itself.
Lemac had had a somewhat chequered career. Born out of the demise of a 
post war American company, Ranco Motors, it was now living in the 
tension between coping with shrinking traditional markets for fractional 
horse power electric motors and trying to adapt to the demands of new
types of work, such as keyboards for IBM computers. It had a long
established labour force, drawn locally from a former coal mining area. 
Within the plant the emphasis appeared to be almost exclusively on 
production. The sructures of production had been partly inherited, 
partly allowed to arise, and cohered to some extent under the 
charismatic leadership of the General Manager.
GEC at Kirkcaldy was part of a large British multinational. The 
factory was in a difficult market situation recently destablised by the 
privatisation of British Telecom. At the time of the survey the plant 
was in a transitional phase between manufacturing traditional electronic 
switchgear for telephone exchanges, and manufacturing a new high-tech 
System X type of telephone exchange. The new product needed less labour, 
which had resulted in the closure of the second factory at Glenrothes. 
Fear of redundancy at Kirkcaldy was high, and that in an area where 
there were high levels of unemployment. Labour force morale was 
therefore somewhat depressed. The apparently rather benevolent General 
Manager was assisted by an able and allegedly slightly abrasive team of 
younger managers. The General Manager recognised the need for changes in 
working practices and, as already noted, had introduced a single status 
canteen. The management team gave the impression that their focal point 
was the need for production results. On the shop floor there was some 
residual tension as a result of recent reorganisation of work teams, 
which had eliminated some grades and introduced a new grade of worker 
who both organised the flow of work and worked on the production line. 
This seemed to be an entirely structural change, there being no attempt 
to accompany it with notions of team competition or team loyalty.
Working conditions at the GEC plant were generally good with 
adequate canteen facilities and rest areas, a universal pension scheme, 
good sick pay conditions, and a stock purchase plan, none of which
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existed at Lemac (Table 1). There the consultative machinery had 
virtually disappeared leaving only a bimonthly joint shop stewards’ 
committee meeting with management.
Toilets at both plants were graded for different types of worker and 
at both factories there were some reserved parking places for senior 
personnel. Neither GEC nor Lemac operated an open plan system, but at 
the time of the research, the shop floor environment at Lemac was 
uniform for everyone, whereas at GEC there was a substantial air 
conditioned section. Lemac’s superannuation scheme covered staff only, 
but unlike GEC, it operated a savings scheme. Lemac also had annual 
incremental pay rises for non managerial employees (Table 3). While GEC 
might have allowed more than fifteen days off work on full pay with a 
doctor's certificate, Lemac allowed none(Table 3). Perhaps partly as a 
consequence, Lemac had almost three times the quit rate of GEC, and also 
more than twice the daily absentee rate (Table 4).
While there was no works committee at Lemac, at GEC a works 
committee still functioned and there were separate joint shop stewards’ 
meetings (Table 2). The impression at both factories was one of guilt 
feelings at the demise of the consultative system and a determination to 
restore it as soon as possible. Both companies implied that a very 
difficult market situation had forced them to concentrate entirely on 
production with the minimum amount of time spent off the line by 
everyone on the shop floor, thus implying that consultation was a luxury 
which could be afforded only when times were "good". There also appeared 
to be little pressure from the labour forces for consultation, although 
there was little satisfaction at the flow of information (Table 16). 
Satisfaction with the flow of information at Lemac was comparatively 
high (Table 16). Lemac's plant was almost closed in 1980 and there was a 
general awareness that slowly the situation was improving. The IBM 
section was clearly seen as a hopeful development in this respect. There 
was an impression that when the situation was really difficult, all 
people wanted to know was that work was coming in and this could be seen 
by anyone walking around the plant. "It’s orders that really matter’’, 
said one operator. It may be that in a desperate situation all other 
information can look like an unnecessary luxury, and to take time off 
production to acquire that information may even appear foolhardy. These 
impressions also imply that consultation is a matter of primarily
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sharing information rather than participating in the decision making of 
the production process.
In both the GEC and Lemac plants a traditional style of management 
appeared to operate. Managers and technicians seemed to have no overt 
practice of being seen on the shop floor. Instead, the emphasis seemed 
to be on the immediate demands of production, with no evaluation of 
systems or setting of objectives for employees, or quality circles or 
their equivalent (Table 2). Trainee managers at both factories spent 
some time on the shop floor and managers at both plants were almost 
entirely drawn from the ranks of time served craftsmen (Table 6). At GEC 
the highest formal qualification held was an H1TC, whereas at Lemac there 
were at least two graduate members of the management team (Table 14). At 
GEC senior managers were said to appear daily on the shop floor, whereas 
at Lemac, this was denied by those interviewed (Table 6). Interviewees 
did say, however, that in both factories middle managers appeared daily 
on the shop floor (Table 6). At both factories management had received 
specific training and only at GEC were there opportunities for in­
company training. Several managers at both plants had received a private 
school education (Table 6). In both GEC and Lemac personnel departments 
stated that managers were promoted on the basis of merit and that there 
were career opportunities in both companies for managers (Table 6). 
While there was virtually no criticism of management at Lemac by blue 
collar workers, at GEC there was frequent mention of their abrasiveness, 
their infrequency on the shop floor, and their alleged hoarding of 
information.
The wages structure was also traditional, a mix of accepting 
nationally agreed rates and supplementing these by bonus systems 
negotiated at plant level (Table 7). In the case of GEC, scope for 
negotiating locally was constrained by limits set by headquarters in 
Coventry. At neither factory were wage levels secret, and while both 
operated a bonus system, only at Lemac was it in the form of a payment 
by results system (Table 10). At GEC the bonus formed a small element of 
wages based on the productivity of the company as a whole. It was also 
said at GEC that individual effort could be rewarded through the 
suggestion scheme which was in operation. The general feeling concerning 
wages was that they were low, and even although both factories were in a 
difficult market situation, there was little enthusiasm for doing the
- 6 6  -
same job for less money (Table 15). If wages were lower it was implied 
the employee would be better off on social security or unemployment 
benefit. This response may also have been a function of an older labour 
force not so interested in establishing a work record. Also most seemed 
to be married women with families, and conditions for them might 
sometimes have appeared more rewarding than for single people. Although 
it was said there were no industrial disputes in the year prior to the 
research, the quit rate and daily absentee rate at Lemac appeared to be 
twice that of GEC (Table 4). There are many possible reasons for this
disparity, but given the similarity of the market situation for both
factories and the similarity of labour force in terms of social 
background and conditions, the disparity may be attributed to a 
variation in the quality of management at the two plants. There are many 
other possibilities, and perhaps when enterprises are in difficulty 
there is a critical low point below which people lose the will to assist 
company survival. While GEC had not appeared tD have reached this point, 
Lemac may well have come dangerously close to it.
In the use and designation of both toilets and car parks, both GEC 
and Lemac reflected common British practice, with some gradation of 
facilities dependent on the category of employee. At GEC, where an
attempt had been made to erode the practice, resistance had come from 
managers. At both GEC and Lemac the shop floor environment reflected the 
age of the factory, but the environment at Lemac was markedly poorer 
than at GEC. It was more poorly lit, less tidy and less clean. While 
employees at both factories were content with lighting levels, they were 
more discerning on the question of cleanliness and tidiness. Employees 
at Lemac, many of whom had had previous work experience and therefore a 
basis for comparison, were critical of levels of cleanliness and
tidiness. Heating levels were a much more problematic area of working 
conditions and at both factories most people thought the working 
environment too warm in summer, but approximately half of those 
interviewed at GEC nad Lemac thought the factories were adequately 
heated in winter (Table 18). At GEC a particular feature of factory 
organisation was blamed for the lack of heat in winter. Finished 
products were loaded for dispatch through a large end door in the 
factory. When this was opened heat was lost to the outside atmosphere. 
This seemed to constitute a long standing greivance, and may account in
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part for the very low number of Interviewees believing that management 
at GEC was "very concerned" about the work environment (Table 18).
Trade union density, both in terms of numbers of trade unions and 
the number of people unionised, was much the same at both GEC and Lemac. 
So also was branch attendance (Table 7). While there did not appear to 
be any trade union facilities at the Lemac factory, trade union officers 
said they were given any time off for trade union activities, whereas at 
GEC, they were held to the recommendations of the appropriate 
legislation. This would appear to reflect a more relaxed management 
control at Lemac compared to GEC. Lemac, belonging to a much smaller 
organisation than GEC, responded to bargaining only at national level 
and at factory level. Since the same trade unions were recognised at 
both factories, union welfare and education facilities for members were 
virtually the same at GEC and Lemac (Table 8). At Lemac trade unions 
appeared to be consulted over a wider range of issues than at GEC (Table 
9). Unions at Lemac had not felt the need to resist any management 
induced changes in the previous five years, whereas at GEC there were 
said to be two such occasions, over the issue of redundancies and the 
introduction of a new product. GEC, however, was prepared through the 
personnel department, to say that there was a consultative role for 
trade unions in management decision making, a view which was denied by 
the personnel department at Lemac (Table 9). AT GEC trade unions had 
engaged in an overtime ban during the past two years, but otherwise, at 
both factories, personnel departments said that trade unions had been 
cooperative (Table 9). The workforce perspective of management's 
feelings about trade unions was generally positive, more than half
believing that trade unions were "tolerated" and some believing that
they were "a help in managing" (Table 19). At both GEC and Lemac there
was some demarcation of work (Table 21). While most people seemed not to 
be trained for a specific job and most had done a number of different 
jobs on site, none of those interviewed at either plant regularly 
rotated through different jobs. This could indicate that their varied 
job experience was more likely to have been a function of the length of 
time of their employment and the chequered production history of the 
factory than of a deliberate management policy aimed at eliminating 
demarcatory practices. At the same time, despite the fact that the 
samples seemed to be largely of mature employees, most of them were
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prepared to be flexible and adaptable and stated their willingness to 
train for a wider variety of jobs (Table 21).
At both GEC and Lemac the nature of the product (electric motors and 
telecommunications equipment) could be said to be more socially useful 
than at the other four factories (telecommunications test equipment, 
document processors, electronic typewriters, and video tapes), although 
it is recognised that there is a substantial element of subjectivity in 
this assessment. The question was raised from a feeling that employee 
attitudes at work might be influenced by perceptions of the importance 
of the end product. There might be grounds for arguing that where the 
product is recognised as being socially useful there will be less 
alienation, and enhanced feelings of pride and self confidence amongst 
employees. A related issue is the question of technologies. GEC was 
working at the forefront of telecommunications technology, although all 
the design work was done in Coventry. The production technology was a 
mixture of small batch production, line production and manual sub and 
final assembly. Assembly stages were interspersed with visual and 
electronic inspection. In Lemac fractional horse power electric motors 
were produced by line production methods with automatic stator and rotor 
winding and manual final assembly and inspection. The design was 
admitted to be about twenty five years old and more robust 
(ie.,expensive) than that of competitors.
One of the most striking differences between the two companies was 
in the stratification of their labour forces. The newly redesigned 
division of labour at GEC had resulted in 80% having a job title (as 
distinct from a job description). At Lemac there were comparatively few 
titles (5%) For pay purposes, however, the number of grades was the same 
in both factories, sixteen (Table 11).
Finally, while there were notice boards in both factories, only GEC 
published a newsheet, and at neither GEC nor Lemac were there workforce 
meetings. GEC also employed a system of "state of business" briefings, 
the information for which came from headquarters at Coventry (Table 11).
- 69 -
The interviewees.
Since it was not possible to interview everyone in each factory, the 
personnel departments were asked to select approximately eighteen from 
each plant for interview. They were asked to select as typical a cross 
section of the labour force as possible, ie. , from middle management, 
foremen, shop floor workers, male and female, young and old. Tables 12 
to 14 give a comparative record of the people selected for interview.
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Employee attitudes.
Tables 15 to 21 give in summary form the responses of employees at 
the two British factories to the working conditions provided and the 
style of management exercised. They include the questions put to 
interviewees. Analysis of these responses forms the substance, along 
with analyses of the responses at the four foreign owned factories, of 
Chapter 4. They are inserted at this point for two reasons. They give a 
quick graphic overview of the responses at GEC and Lemac and they are a 
preface, as it were, to the methodological justification for the way in 
which the study was conducted.
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Some initial comments on employee attitudes to work and ..perceptions— o£ 
management
Tables 15 to 21 summarise the views of employees in two British
engineering firms on a range of issues arising fom the work domain.
There is a sense in which that is all these results are, viz., a
comparison between attitudes at GEC and Lemac. Their views are alleged
to be typical, not because they express an average or a majority view,
but simply because there is no good reason to believe that the factories 
and labour forces, as labour forces, at GEC Kirkcaldy and Lemac, 
Haddington, are special, unique, or in any sense extraordinary. By
comparing them we are effectually saying that while they may be typical 
they are not identical and, indeed, reflect a spread of opinion which is 
likely to be found throughout British industry. Their comparison with 
results compiled at the four foreign owned factories will fallow later 
Csee chapter 4).
Turning to the results, it is immediately clear that employees at 
GEC appeared less likely to admit absence from work than those at Lemac. 
They may have been better time keepers, or fears for jobs may have been 
encouraging them to take a more optimistic view of timekeeping than the 
facts warranted. It follows also that job satisfaction levels appeared
to be higher at GEC than Lemac (Table 15), since GEC employees appeared
to have a better absentee record, were more likely to do the same job 
for less pay, to find their work 'quite enjoyable' and to have had less 
difficulty in relations with other employees. Employees at Lemac seemed 
to have a more positive approach to their work, being more prepared to 
work overtime without payment.
From the employer's point of view, interviewees at Lemac appeared 
rather more uncooperative than those at GEC (Table 16). This appeared to 
be reinforced by their description of status at work as 'high'. Their 
perception that they were better timekeepers than interviewees at GEC 
seemed to contradict their apparent uncooperativeness, although good 
timekeeping may be a function of pieceworking and reflect a degree of 
self interest. On balance, GEC appeared to have the more quietist of the 
two labour forces (Table 16), although there was a strong feeling 
amongst them that they were being starved of information.
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Attitudes to overtime (Table 17) indicated a higher desire for 
overtime working at GEC, with perhaps a slightly diminished feeling of 
obligation to help out the company than at Lemac. This was reflected not 
only in the question of working overtime for the firm, but also in the 
question of working unpaid overtime (Table 17).
Interviewee perceptions of,_mnagamenlt.
Interviewee perceptions of management concern for the work 
environment were almost identical (Table 18), but most people at GEC 
felt they were being managed in a paternalistic and/or authoritative 
way, whereas a significant number of people at Lemac saw the management 
style as participative.
Interviewee perceptions of how managers saw the company were almost 
the same at GEC and Lemac, as were also the perceptions of the handling 
of conflict (Table 19). A significant proportion of people in both 
factories felt that management recognised a clash of interests in the 
work place (Table 19), with slightly more at Lemac recognising this than 
at GEC. The same feeling was also reflected in the conviction that 
management merely 'tolerated* trade unions, while a significant number 
of people at GEC thought they were seen as a nuisance.
On views of the labour force as a whole, the biggest single group of 
people in both factories saw themselves simply as an ad hoc collection 
thrown together by the exigencies of the need to work.Responses to this 
set of questions were very similar in both factories. Only a minority 
was attracted to the 'family' concept of the labour force (Table 19).
Employees at Lemac may have been more likely to have been left free 
of supervision in 'getting on' with the work than at GEC (Table 20). The 
difference in product design and age may be a factor here. Many of the 
women at Lemac had been building the same type of fractional horsepower
motors for so long there would appear to have been little anyone could
have taught them about the job. This was further enhanced by a
significant number claiming to be consulted on product design, unlike 
those at GEC (Table 20).
Mane interviewed at Lemac could recall being consulted on industrial 
relations. Despite the apparent lack of recognised 'signposts',
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industrial relations did appear to be reasonably good, even relaxed, 
albeit on two comparatively brief visits by an observer. Perceptions of 
management truthfulness, and the imposition of discipline and fairness 
seemed to corroborate this view (Table 20).
Clearly anxiety about the future was keen at GEC for reasons already 
stated, and the apparently abrasive style already alluded to seemed to 
be supported by perceptions of the imposition of discipline and 
management truthfulness (Table 20). All told, management was perceived 
in both factories as less knowledgeable of the practicalities of the 
production line work than manual workers, apparently uninterested in 
what the operator was doing, or alternatively having much trust in 
operator skills, apparently uninterested in worker views of the company, 
and of key issues at the workplace, but generally honouring agreements 
and acting fairly. Opinions were more divided over the application of 
discipline. Most people in both factories were divided between those who 
felt it was erratic and those who felt it was fair. Very few felt 
discipline was administered consisitently (Table 20). While most people 
at Lemac thought management was truthful, most people at GEC thought it 
untruthful. This • may have been a function of the alleged paucity of 
information at GEC with regard to future production. In the absence of 
information it could be argued rumours are likely to arise to fill the 
vacuum. Their almost inevitable diversity is almost equally inevitably 
attributed to management deceit, whether fairly earned or not.
Most people at both factories were not trained for one specific job, 
but rotated through a variety of jobs over time (Table 21). The job 
rotation did not appear to be part of a conscious plan with, say, a 
timescale of weeks or even months. Rather, job rotation seemed to be a 
function of length of service in the factories. People had been there 
for a time long enough to have witnessed changes in product and product 
design which had necessitated movement of personnel. At both factories 
most people seemed willing to retrain for alternative work, many more at 
GEC than at Lemac, presumably because of the perceived difficult market 
situation (Table 21).
Finally, interviewees seemed to feel there was less job demarcation 
at Lemac than at GEC. Lemac did have a less formal, more 'all hands on 
deck' feel about the enterprise, than GEC, The GEC factory retained the
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'feel' of being part of a large, long established company, certainly in 
comparison to Lemac.
In this programme it is being assumed that these two labour forces 
are typical, even although they exhibit a number of characteristics that 
appear to conflict with the stereotypical image of British workers. A 
significant minority was prepared to work overtime without payment 
(Table 15). Most people obtained satisfaction from their work (Table
15). Very few admitted to being disciplined at work (Table 16), a
significant minority accepted high levels of overtime working (Table 
17), most people felt conflict was faced up to (Table 19), most appeared 
to cope with the job without management assistance (Table 20), most felt 
management acted fairly (Table 20), and most were generally trained and 
willing to undergo retraining.
Perhaps more in line with stereotypes of British workers were the 
following characteristics. Most people had argued with superiors (Table
16), felt that unions were not really accepted (Table 19) and felt
little sense of corporate identity with the firm (Table 19).
Msth.P-do.1 pgical j ust.lf.fca.tion..
Why were these particular issues raised with personnel managers and 
employees? Firstly, the objectives of the programme must be kept in 
mind, remembering that the primary focus of interest is the cultural 
impact of and on large foreign owned companies in the United Kingdom. 
The social and work domains in Britain and Korth America have been
extensively analysed by scholars in both of these countries and have
been well documented. In Japan, comparable analyses by British and
American scholars of the work domain began in earnest in the 1950s. 
There was an existing body of literature on Japanese society and
culture, much of it from a religious and anthropological point of view. 
With the work of Ronald Dare (25), a new era. of interest in the work
domain began to evolve. From the work of Dore and others, a generally
accepted view of employee attitudes in large Japanese companies emerged, 
to the effect that absenteeism was low, job satisfaction high, people 
worked some overtime without payment, employees were recruited from 
school and/or university with a general education, and remained with the
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one company for the rest of their life, etc. This was also accompanied 
by a generally accepted view of large Japanese companies as 
paternalistic/authoritarian (see page 309ff.), generous in welfare 
provision for employees, strong on in-house training, extremely
reluctant to sack employees, dividing the labour force into core group 
and temporary workers, very reluctant to pay off workers, etc.
These assertions and many more were mirrored in the pattern and 
content of the questions put to employees in the six factories. This 
modus operandii was intended to go some way towards answering the 
question, are Japanese employers in the United Kingdom treating British 
employees as they would Japanese employees in Japan and, if so, are they 
soliciting a comparable response? Certainly the media view seems to
suggest that they do tend to see British employees as Japanese workers 
and that they are engendering "Japanese" type responses from British 
employees.In a recent article on Japanese companies in Britain, Alan 
Road began, "Culture shock number one for Pamela Rice when she began
working for a Japanese company in Britain was the 7.30 a.m. start for
office staff and production workers. 'It took me a long time to be awake 
at that hour,' she admits."(26) In the same article he later wrote, 
"Culture shock number two was discovering that she would have to wear an 
overall at work. Her initial resentment was not entirely dispelled when 
she learnt that Mr. Hakamura, her boss, wore an identical overall. Mow 
she concedes that it is part of the Japanese approach to industrial 
relations. 'It's a family feeling they are trying to create,' she 
explains. At first, the bells that call staff to their ten minute tea- 
breaks and half-hour lunchtimes were a further cause for 
resentment."(27)
At the academic level, only one full study to date has been made of 
this issue in the United Kingdom, and that by White and Trevor (28). 
Their findings suggest a much more varied and skilful approach by the 
Japanese than a simple transposition of Japanese practices to Britain. 
The present study tends to confirm the views of White and Trevor in this 
regard, but some points of difference from their findings and the 
reasons for them will emerge in the subsequent analysis. Furthermore, 
the present study tries to push the research a stage further in a 
particular direction. The end interest is not how Japanese. companies 
organise themselves and their workforce in Britain, but the Japanese
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cultural processes that have given rise to current practices and the 
effect on people of the encounter between the Japanese socialisation and 
British socialisation as manifested in British employees.
It should be noted at this point that theories of cultural 
convergence in the work domain are treated with much scepticism and the 
enduring presence of national cultural processes, even amongst the 
collective of advanced capitalist nations, is a fairly firm conviction. 
The reasons for these have been imaginatively explored by M.Maurice et 
al (29)
The effects of the encounter of the two socialisation processes of 
Japan and Britain are of interest at the cultural/religious level, since 
of all the advanced capitalist countries, Japan is unique in being 
largely uninfluenced by Christianity. Secondly, while Japan is generally 
counted as an advanced capitalist country, its form of capitalism and 
particularly the relationship between state and industry, "styles” of 
investment, relations between companies, the nature of conglomerates and 
the shape of the labour market, even accounting techniques and 
procedures, have sometimes led to the conclusion that it espouses an 
"heretical" form of capitalism. A latent question of the current 
research programme is the question whether or not these phenomena have a 
bearing on industrial relations praxis.
This is something of the background against which the questions of 
the programme have been framed. How do American companies scare, as it 
were, if the same questions are put to their employees? There is wide 
agreement of a close relationship between Japanese industry and American 
industry. Indeed, in the years immediately after the Second World War, 
the Americans helped to organise and rebuild Japanese industry. It would 
also appear that the same Japanese spirit that induced Japan to model 
its local government organisation on that of France led to a study of 
management practices in what were perceived to be the best American 
companies. Indeed, the present study will reveal a close similarity 
between practice at Hewlett Packard and that at Maxell. The recent use 
of quality circles by the Japanese appears to be a further example of 
the same approach.
A comparison base is produced by putting the same set of questions 
to two British companies. Two further sources of information have been 
used, company literature, and from interview tapes, comments further to
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the direct answers to the questions posed or initiated by the questions 
posed, and offered as additional unsolicited comment. Neither source 
lends itself to numerical assessment and tabulation. They do, however, 
reveal nuances of attitude and values that are often referred to in 
subsequent chapters.
The focus of interest,
If the focus of interest is primarily comparative, the results 
almost speak for themselves. Tentative conclusions of the White and 
Trevor type could be made. They would be tentative because a sample of 
two is not a base on which to build general conclusions. The results are 
more fairly seen as six case studies, perhaps to be added to many more 
in subsequent years, to build a picture from which general conclusions 
could be drawn in the future. From general conclusions it might then be 
reasonable to expect some general theory to account for the patterns of 
organisational behaviour in the domain of work. While the present 
programme would be flattered to feel that it made a contribution to 
future theorising, it has itself a set of immediate aims and objectives 
as outlined in Chapter 1.
Maurice et al argue that work attitudes are influenced fundamentally 
and primarily by education and training<30). The educational system in 
particular (whether it is general, eg., France or Japan, or specific, 
eg., Germany and to some extent, Britain and the United States) 
determines social perceptions of blue and white collar work, pay 
differentials, and mobility from blue collar to white collar work. While 
their arguments appear lucid and strong, the current programme takes the 
view that the educational system itself is culturally determined in 
terms of content (general or specific), length (compulsory, short or 
long), and shape (private versus public, internal stratification, type 
and status of qualifications, etc.). The argument has been elegantly 
used by Maurice et al as a base on which to build a comparison of 
employment practices in French and German industry. Two other features 
of the internal structures of companies and industrial relations in the 
sense of firm level relations and human resources management, are also 
identified as basic parameters for the cultural ethos of enterprises. In
comparison, the "systems11 theory of industrial relations sees people at 
work as influenced by the political, economic, social and legal systems, 
each one of which is culturally conditioned, while Marxism argues that 
industrial relations are the distilled essence of class warfare.
The present programme suggests that none of these theories addresses 
the fundamental cultural values which give rise to the categories used 
by the theorists. In fairness to Marxists, it is recognised that they 
believe that values are the product of economic relations and not vice 
versa. Maurice and Dunlop(32) seem to imply that their basic categories 
are as basic as it is possible to become while remaining "scientific". 
There is a tacit assumption that values do not lend themselves to 
"scientific" analysis. This thesis is postulated on two assumptions. 
Firstly, it is possible to be as scientific with values and value type 
concepts as with the social, political, educational and occupational 
systems referred to by Maurice et al. Secondly, comparisons of 
educational, economic and legal systems, and systems of enterprise 
organisation may lend themselves more directly to factual analysis, but 
that analysis is necessarily limited if it confines itself only to the 
"how" and the "that" of the system without asking about the "why". Why 
is the German educational system specific and that of France general? 
Why did Japan adopt the general system of education? Why do French 
enterprises have a substantial hierarchy compared with German and even 
British enterprises? Why is large company organisation in Japan finely 
stratified like the British Civil Service? There are cultural answers to 
these questions which, if completely understood, would provide a new 
theory of industrial relations.
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THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE FOREIGN ENTERPRISE. ITS MANAGERS AND THE
IN P IGEI .QU.S-XABQM ..E QRCK,-
",..there is a need to recognise that what Japanisation might 
be, and whether it is occurring, raises many questions of 
comparative analysis that are at present unresolved. " S.Ackroyd 
et al.
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Inward investment is avidly pursued by most countries including the 
United Kingdom where it is often assumed to be a national good per se. 
Against a background of popular perception that the world is moving 
towards one global culture little account seems to be taken of the 
effect of the encounter between the culture of the managers and owners, 
and the culture of the labour force of the invested country. There is 
evidence to indicate that the Japanese can be particularly dismissive of 
at least some cultures, <1) and that their propensity for putting 
everything into hierarchies also includes national cultures. In the 
ranking of cultures British culture seems to rate fairly highly as may 
be illustrated by Mr. Atushi Hagai's <2> translation of the 
autobiography of Thomas Telford into Japanese(3).
Secondly by way of introduction to this chapter, it must be noted 
that amidst the high unemployment of the 80s and increasing global 
competition, it often appears to have been assumed that cultural 
differences between the inward investor and the host culture will be 
virtually insignificant. The impact of competition and unemployment 
will force labour to conform to company demands, giving at least a 
veneer of similitude to labour worldwide. The international move to 
similar types of labour, core, temporary, part-time, subcontract, etc., 
appears to substantiate the argument and support the view of a global 
movement towards one industrial culture. The recent dispute at Ford's 
English plants (February 1988), however, may indicate that indigenous 
cultural attitudes are more robust than at first thought, and perhaps 
even able to lie dormant until market changes provide an opportunity for 
their reassertion.
Before proceeding to the substance of the chapter, the description 
of a public limited company as "foreign owned" needs to be clarified. 
What is meant here is that the registered head office of the company is 
in a country other than the United Kingdom and that the enterprise is 
generally regarded as Japanese Dr North American as the case may be. 
This programme is not particularly interested in the national 
composition of the stockholders, but assumes that where a company is 
described as North American or Japanese, that a majority of the stock is 
held by nationals of these countries or national institutions (i.e., 
banks, pension funds, etc.) in these countries.
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The substance of this chapter, begins with a brief description of 
the four companies and their plants in Britain, two Japanese and two 
American owned. Essentially this section is examining the question, what 
changes, if any, are induced in the indigenous labour force by the 
incoming management and new framework of plant and conditions provided 
by the inward investor? To try and answer that type of question there is 
available a "long" American picture, at Hewlett Packard and Burroughs 
and a "short" Japanese picture at Maxell and Brother ("long" and "short"
referring to the length of time the factories have been operating in
Britain).The chapter therefore begins with a brief description of the 
four companies and their factories which is followed by a tabulated 
description of the people interviewed. These tables are in turn followed 
by a description of the working conditions, tabulated in the form of 
responses to a standard set of questions for personnel managers and
departments. Employee response to management practice and their working 
environment is also tabulated from interview schedules. Finally, both 
the work environments and employee responses at the four factories are 
compared.
MXSLl .(UK) LID -,,
Maxell (UK) Ltd. is a subsidiary of Hitachi Maxell Ltd (established in 
1961 in Japan), and was established in august 1980 in Harrow, Middlesex. 
Hitachi Maxell Ltd. is part of the Hitachi group of companies which 
began as an engineering offshoot of a mining company in Japan in
1910.(4) In 1985 the sales division of Maxell (UK) Ltd remained at
Harrow, but the head office and manufacturing divsion was located at
Telford, in Shropshire. A manufacturing plant was built there in 1983 to
make a range of video cassettes and floppy dies. The company alleged it
chose Telford for a number of reasons. Firstly Telford had a" high 
quality workforce with a well developed awareness of technology, a good 
supply of parts and materials, good facilities for contracting out sub- 
assembly work, a favourable location for distributioin, and good 
relations with the local community".(5)
Secondly there was no history of Japanese factories operating in the 
district. The Managing Director wrote "Our basic policy was to apply to
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our European operations those very management concepts which have been 
strictly adhered to since Maxell was established, right up to the 
present day and the know-how that we have developed over the years, and 
for this reason we felt that in choosing a location to find a place 
whose people have the kind of qualities I have just described was very 
important. Furthermore, in order to implement our management policies it 
was preferable that our prospective employees have no preconceptions 
about Japanese companies and should not be influenced by what goes on at 
other companies, and this is why we chose a place where there were, as 
yet, no other Japanese companies, virgin territory, as it were."(6) 
There was no mention in this document of substantial government grants 
and local authority inducements to locate in Telford.
The 110,000 sq. ft. factory, a £20 million investment at 1983 
prices, began production in the Spring of 1984 on a greenfield site of 
60 acres, and by 1985, 150 people were employed. The completely air
conditioned factory was divided into a number of different departments. 
The production process began in the injection moulding bay, a 
substantial area which contained eight Swiss made injection moulding 
machines. These produced the two outer halves of the cassette case. The 
machines ran continuously on a three shift cycle. After passing into the 
production line assembly area the finished casings received a number of 
small internal parts, some bought in from local suppliers,from a row of 
robots. The assembly line was supervised by technicians and maintained 
by engineers, a number of whom were Japanese. Adjacent to the 
production line was a tape insertion process. The almost completed 
cassettes were opened, the blank tape which was brought in from Japan 
was fed into them, and they were resealed, the whole process being 
completed by robots. People were used to load and unload at either end 
of the line, to check the process down the line, and to maintain the 
equipment. In parallel with the video tape production was a second 
production line making floppy discs.
After production both floppy discs and video cassettes moved into 
the packaging and finishing department. The fifth section of the factory 
was a warehouse area for storage and dispatch. The finished products 
which had been put into cardboard boxes in the packaging and finishing 
department, were stored in high, electronically controlled racks, and a 
"just in time" policy prevailed here. Finished products could be
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produced in the morning and dispatched in the afternoon, so that there 
was a minimum amount of stock on site at any one time. In addition this 
warehouse also handled items not made in Britain, such as the Maxell 
audio tape.
There was a separate quality control department where the quality of 
the tapes, discs and finished products was continually monitored on 
audio visual units by a small team of people who had had previous 
production experience. The office/production area was completely open 
plan, with the Managing Director's desk at one end of the L-shaped 
office. Even the interview area was merely screened off from the rest of 
the office. Here people tended to speak quietly, which lent to the 
faintly "hospital" atmosphere. Only the conference room was a separate 
area, in which the monthly Members' Council met and in which videos were 
occasionally shown to customers or other interested parties. The factory 
was throughout well lit and very clean with drinking wells provided 
here and there to compensate for the low humidity levels. There were 
different toilets for different sexes but not for different grades of 
labour. No rest rooms were provided but the canteen included a rest 
area in which there were also two table tennis tables. No smoking was 
enforced throughout the factory. On entry to the canteen and production 
area white hats, coats and plastic shoe covers were provided and in 
contrast to many other factories, the production area was the clean area 
and the offices the dirty area.
The box shaped factory was built almost entirely on the one level 
and, in the local town, had a reputation for secrecy, perhaps heightened 
by its futuristic shape and the lack of windows, which contributed to 
the impression that something esoteric might have been going on inside. 
There was some technology secrecy, especially about production in the 
floppy disc section, and also about the design of the line of robots 
which had been developed by Maxell to assemble the video tapes. In the 
Spring of 1985, Central Television had made a film on the working of the 
factory, but had not been allowed to film the video tape assembly 
robots. Very little scrap appeared to be produced in any of the 
production departments.
Initially in 1983 there had been some 3,000 applicants for 150 
jobs. (7) People had been chosen on the basis of personality, dexterity, 
and dependability. The majority were young people, recent school leavers
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or YTS trainees, with little or no qualifications. (8) Vomen had been 
chosen for non supervisory posts, and men as technicians. Some men were 
time served in a branch of engineering, and a few held HNC 
qualifications. Some supervisors had previously been in the armed forces 
or the Civil Service, and came with no formal qualifications. People 
recruited for more senior jobs, such as production manager or office 
manager, had been chosen mainly on the basis of previous experience.
The company gave the impression it had not been looking for highly
qualified people or craftsmen. It had been looking essentially for 
people who would conform to the company ethos and practice and who would 
be qualified enough to operate the processes on site. This seemed to be 
unlike the recruiting policies observed by White and Trevor at JEL. "The 
JEL employees were also as a whole more qualified than elsewhere in New
Town some 40% had some kind of qualification- either school,
technical, or higher."(9)
People were rotated both within sections and across sections, 
sometimes on an hour to hour basis. Throughout the production process 
there was great emphasis on quality control. One of the visits coincided 
with "quality month" during which everyone wore lapel badges on which 
was the word "quality". It was said that the people who were employed on 
the production process were there basically to check quality at every 
step of the process. In the quality control section regular checks were 
made, not only on Maxell products, but also on the products of 
competitors. Maxell, whose tapes and discs are dearer than those of
competitors had decided to compete on the basis of quality rather than
price.The impression given was that quality meant staying amongst the 
market leaders or perhaps at most, one step ahead of the leaders. It did 
not mean going for quality in any absolute sense.
The factory also appeared to employ the minimum number of people 
both in production and in administration. It was acknowledged by the
Managing Director that this was company policy, and that it caused some
problems when people were absent. In order to meet market demand, it was 
not uncommon for the company to ask people in administration to work on 
production lines, either in the evenings or at the weekends. The female 
receptionist/telephonist had already done this on a number of occasions 
and said when working in the injection moulding department she was
working so hard sweat was running from her. She had also worked on
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occasion from 8am. to 11pm. , leaving the reception area at 5pm and 
working on production until 11pm. She admitted she liked this 
occasionally, but would not want to work in this way on a permanent 
basis. The same person said she enjoyed working for the Japanese company 
and had been there almost since its inception.
Maxell admitted that they had a policy of looking for a certain type 
of person. "Vhat we felt most important in selecting personnel for the 
Telford operation was to find individuals who could apply themselves 
with equal vigour to a variety of tasks rather than to employ people 
with a particular technical expertise. To train senior members of staff 
in our main factory in Kyoto was also part of our plan."(10) In fact it 
later transpired that Maxell was looking specifically for young, female, 
labour, with no previous industrial conditioning and with personalities 
that would maximise harmonious, quietist relations in the factory. 
Indeed this latter requirement appeared to be given priority over 
formal qualifications in the interests of labour control and 
flexibility. Initially the eight senior British people chosen for 
training in Japan were in the age range 21 to 39. They were called by 
Maxell, "samurai" after the warrior class responsible for the success of 
the Meiji restoration. The plant was run as "a one class factory where 
everyone is a member" .<11) People were employed on the understanding 
that there would be no demarcation, that everyone would be prepared to 
be flexible and to undertake a variety of different tasks within the 
factory. Traditional stratification was overtly blurred by company 
policy. "I am a member just as the young girls on the shop floor are 
members," <12) wrote the Managing Director. He went on to say, "Our 
locker rooms have the kind of atmosphere you expect to find in a golf 
club and are ideal for fostering good communications among the 
staff."(13)
The Japanese practice of beginning the day with exercise was used at 
Maxell."One thing that the eight samurai brought back from the Kyoto 
factory was exercising to music before work each morning. They urged me 
to institute the same thing at the Telford factory, insisting that a 
pre-work warm up made them feel fresh and raring to go, so I had an NEK 
tape recorded in Japanese sent over from Japan, and we exercise to this 
every morning.■(14) The Managing Director extolled the virtues of this 
practice and implied that it was introduced by popular demand.
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Links with the local community were also highly valued. The company 
stated bluntly that having invested £20 million in Telford, it had no 
intention of uprooting and pulling out but of remaining for the 
foreseeable future. To foster good relationships with the local 
community, Maxell had presented 1,000 cherry tree seedlings to the local 
council. The Council had responded by planting a cherry tree orchard in 
the park in the centre of Telford and they had named this "The Maxell 
Cherry Garden". Additionally the Managing Director undertook many 
speaking engagements at schools and community events in the Telford 
district.
Something of the company's business philosophy was reflected in the 
handbook which was given to everyone who became an employee. "Our 
primary responsibility is to serve our customers in the most efficient 
and effective way possible."(15) A glimpse of the company view of 
industrial relations is contained in the phrase "Create and maintain an 
atmosphere of mutual trust, confidence and cooperation within Maxell 
(UK) Ltd. "(16) The employee was reminded that the success of the 
operation was a team effort and that four factors were uppermost - 
safety, quality, delivery and price. Employees were also reminded that 
efficiency was a key concept and one that "helps us keep a price that is 
competitive in the market." (17) and that "we all work for the same 
bosses - our customers."(18) The handbook was in fact comprehensive and 
partly influenced by the British Personnel Manager.
Every employee was known as a "member" and canteens, car parks and 
toilets were not differentiated. The labour force was essentially young, 
the average age being approximately 31. It was a dual labour force 
having some 30 to 40 temporary workers out of a total of 150 employees. 
There was a no redundancy policy, but since inception, absenteeism had 
risen to 4%. and a number of people had been moved on several occasions 
to positions where they were thought to be more "suitable". Each member, 
on their uniform, wore an identity card on which was a passport type 
photograph, their birth date but not the year, their starting date with 
the company and their company status.
The company did not appear to encourage the acquisition of external 
additional qualifications, further training being given "in house". 
Something of the same philosohpy was also present in the company's 
attitude to pay. Maxell did not want to be the poorest payers in the
area nor, significantly, the best payers. At the beginning, wage levels 
were set at the district average and the Personnel Manager admitted that 
over the past year they had fallen a little below that average. This in 
fact was reflected in the feeling of the workforce who, without
exception, said they would not do the same job for less pay. The 
impression given was that people were aware that they were now a little 
underpaid in comparison to the area average. There were no trade unions 
or staff associations in the factory, and when people were being 
selected, those who were active in such organisations were overtly
avoided.
The Managing Director, a Japanese national, was a man of 61 years of 
age, who had spent all his life with Hitachi Maxell. He gave the
appearance of being well informed of the day to day running of the
company, without being too closely involved in the less important 
decision making.He liked to keep contact with local schools, local 
farmers, the local authority and with his counterparts in the supplying 
companies and was keen to introduce as many Japanese practices as 
possible. He said he saw himself reversing the tradition of "when in 
Rome do as the Ramans". Hence his enthusiasm for work force exercises in 
the mornings and his enthusiasm for the open plan office layout. 
Although no one interviewed would use the word "paternalistic" of the 
management, there were a number of small indicators of a paternalistic 
attitude on the part of the Managing Director. Facial hair on men was 
discouraged and one of the technicians had been asked by the Managing 
Director to remove his moustache. The British Personnel Manager felt 
obliged to remove his moustache at the same time, to set an example. The 
Managing Director has also been known to discipline people for whistling 
on site and for standing with their hands in their pockets. He was the 
oldest person in the factory and the only one to be addressed by the 
title "Mr." Everyone else was known by their first name including the 
eight Japanese engineers who had all adopted British first names. These 
men were not on the Maxell (UK) payroll, but on the payroll of the 
parent company in Japan. The Managing Director saw the investment at 
Telford as a long term one, was prepared to write off the initial costs 
over a fifteen year period, and spoke openly of several generations 
working in the factory.He disclosed that a number of products were ready
to replace existing ones when market conditions demanded a change. All 
research and development was done, however, in Japan.
Brother Industries CUK) Ltd.
This firm was wholly owned by the Japanese parent company of the 
same name. It began production on the Wrexham technology park in North 
Wales in 1983, in a new factory built on a greenfield site on the 
outskirts of the town. The cost of the investment had been met by 
Brother Industries from its own resources. The factory was very similar 
in external appearance to the Maxell factory, being essentially an air 
conditioned box-like construction, with virtually no windows to the 
outside. In 1985 there were 315 British employees and 6 Japanese 
employees. The majority of the British employees and almost all of those 
who worked on assembly lines, were school leavers in the age group 17 to
19. No trade unions were recognised although some older employees were 
memebers of unions.
In an unpublished leaflet, Brother industries said they had built in 
Britain to allow them to respond quickly and flexibly to European market 
demands, to reduce trade friction between Europe and Japan, and to 
safeguard employment in Japan.(19) Investing abroad is said to stimulate 
in Japan research and development jobs which need high quality Japanese 
labour.The company chose Wrexham for its proximity to Manchester, where 
they already had their European sales headquarters.They were producing a 
full range of office, compact and portable electronic typewriters and 
aimed to produce 200,000 units for sale in EEC countries.The company 
appeared to have had no difficulty in recruiting general workers, who 
had been given on-the-job training initially by Japanese engineers and 
technicians,but did have some difficulty in recruiting the more highly 
skilled engineers and staff members.Many of the Japanese engineers and 
technicians had returned to Japan so that on-the-job training was now 
the responsibility of the more experienced British operators. Those in 
supervisory grades had been trained in Japan for approximately one 
month. Wage levels "are decided through discussions between British 
general manager and Japanese staff on the basis of the original plans 
made by the Japanese staff. The result of discussions are explained by
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the British general manager to the British supervisors. We have adopted 
this way to communicate with local employees satisfactorily.H (20)In 
practice, the system was very similar to that in operation at Maxell.
The company was trying to buy most of the components and sub- 
assemblies in Britain and Europe, although they complained they had had 
problems with both the quality and price of locally supplied 
components."We think it is mare efficient to use local subcontractors to 
supply master components, giving us better communications and a personal 
working relationship with suppliers."(21) Quality circles were 
introduced in 1986 and currently productivity levels were said to be 
comparable with those being achieved in Japan.
Management policy was said to be "Good is good and bad is bad. 
Though our main company system is based on a Japanese system, we do not 
have any intention of imposing it totally upon the local personnel, 
because not all of the Japanese system is good. In this instance we will 
introduce the good points of the British system to our factory"<22) 
Although they had introduced a single status policy, the factory was not 
as "Japanese" as the Maxell factory. There were, for example, no 
exercises to music at the beginning of each shift.
In Brother Industries, personnel matters were the responsibility of 
the British Production Manager, who reported to the senior Japanese 
official on site for production output and the supply of components and 
subassemblies. He had been trained in Japan and said that throughout the 
company there was a very heavy emphasis on growth and, in Japan, many 
graduates were being recruited. The parent company expected almost total 
commitment from its "members", who were directed to work abroad and must 
accept a foreign posting if they wished to remain with the company. In 
practice, most of the Japanese in the factory we re on the payroll of the 
parent company, and spent three months in Britain. The British 
Production Manager felt that although ostensibly the Japanese appeared 
unambitious, underneath many were driven by strong feelings of ambition.
When recruiting personnel, he admitted he was looking for 
"unambitious youngsters with low qualifications but good manual 
dexterity", and "easy personalities". He did not want "outdoor types" , 
and was looking for only some five or six years work out of these 
recruits, after which time he would replace them with another batch of 
young people. He was sure that the Japanese needed good senior British
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managers to "save them making mistakes", and would have liked to have 
seen Brother Industries operate as a British company. To that end he was 
making every effort to modify perceived Japanese practices.
In contrast to Maxell, the Japanese at Brother kept a very low 
public profile and had not adopted British first names. Like Maxell they 
had a reputation for male chauvinism, encouraged by the fact that there 
were only three female supervisors. They also displayed some personal 
dislikes, such as the practice of chewing gum, which was directly 
discouraged in the factory. Like Maxell, managers were frequently 
visible on the shop floor and appeared to work after the production day 
(8am to 4.30pm) had finished, from 5pm to 9pm, to clear paper work and 
administration.
Their method of setting rates of pay was essentially "British" in 
character, there being set scales for different employees depending on 
job and age. As in Maxell there were no incentive schemes or bonuses, 
only flat rates and overtime rates and there was no wage negotiation. 
Rates had risen annually since start-up by increments set by the 
management team. Employees had the simple option of accepting these 
rates or leaving the company. Wage rates were perceived by employees to 
be a little above the average for the district, and high levels of 
overtime were being worked.
Basically, the product was manufactured by five teams making five 
models of typewriter on five different assembly lines. Competition 
between assembly teams was actively encouraged by, for example, the 
daily publication of the number of completed and fully inspected 
products. While there was frequent job rotation in any one team, it was 
rare for members of one team to be moved to another, even in the event 
of absenteeism threatening team production. This had the effect of 
putting team social pressure on employees to minimise absenteeism. It 
also put pressure on line supervisors and teams to work harder to cover 
the effect of any absent member.
Some extruded parts were manufactured on site,but many small parts 
were bought in from local suppliers and the production lines were 
essentially engaged in assembly work. After on-the-job training, 
employees could be promoted to the position of floater, "floating" to 
any one of a variety of jobs on the line, and earning a small wage 
premium. After a further six months, promotion to team leader could
follow with responsibility for the work of five or six, out of an 
assembly line of thirty people. The team leader was expected to engage 
in any one of a number of jobs if necessary, and to enforce overall 
quality standards for that section of the assembly. Some team leaders 
(for which there was a small pay increment) were eighteen years of age 
and in charge of people older than themselves. This called for quite 
mature management/supervisory skills, which the line supervisor tried to 
encourage and support. Those removed from line work to inspection also 
had the status of team leader and when needed could be put back on 
production for a period.
The company had published few items of literature in Britain and did 
not have a published company philosophy. Like Maxell, it encouraged 
people to see themselves as "members", and part of a manufacturing 
family. All facilities on site were single status and. the office 
accomodation and production areas were open plan. Where Maxell sought 
to be as Japanese as possible, Brother alleged it tried to be as British 
as passible in the sense of avoiding the more periferal external signs 
of Japanese labour relations such as morning exercises, and the 
celebration of birthdays. In fact, on examination, the Brother factory 
appeared to be organised and run in a way very similar to that at 
Maxell, and had many features associated with Japanese manufacturing 
practice in Britain, single status working, common workwear throughout 
the labour force, just in time stock holding, an emphasis on total 
quality control, labour recruitment criteria based on personality rather 
than formal qualifications, and team working/competition.
There were also signs of a growing interest in company sponsored and 
work based social activities. Once a month groups of employees formally 
arranged a supper dance in Wrexham, partly subsidised by the company. 
This looked almost like a British adaptation of the Japanese practice of 
retiring for drinks and socialising after working hours.
There were no consultative meetings or Works Council, and there 
appeared to be few opportunities for formal collective participation. 
All enquiries concerning working conditions were channelled through line 
supervisors to management.
Several traditional British demarcations did not exist so that there 
was no separate maintenance department, no apprenticeships, and no
formal or recognised skill training. Instead people were being 
specifically trained to meet the needs of Brother’s production.
Hewlett Packard.
Hewlett Packard who began operating in England in 1961 opened their 
factory in South Queensferry in 1966. It was extended by 100,000 sq. ft. 
in 1970 and a new microwave operation added in 1984. The South 
Queensferry factory was making telecommunications test and measurement 
equipment, microwave systems, and printed circuit boards. It was part of 
a multinational company based at Palo Alto, California, which is the 
world's sixtieth largest US based company employing 84,000 people 
worldwide in seventy five countries. The company was divided into a 
number of divisions, each responsible for research and development, and 
manufacturing and marketing a variety of products. The company stated, 
"This indigenous small company spirit is of importance even today in the 
light of the company's dynamic growth as every employee feels that they 
are working for an identifiable unit"(23) The company believed that the 
quality of the work environment was important and stated that it 
actively encouraged "initiative and creativity by providing a relaxed 
and pleasant work environment".(24)
The management style was described as "open door", indicating that 
everyone, from managing director down, was in theory equally available 
to all employees. This view was fostered by having a factory which was 
almost entirely open plan, and all on the one level. Under one roof were 
production areas, stores and offices, separated by temporary walls some 
five feet high. The whole of the internal area was air conditioned and 
very adequately lit.
The main factory at South Queensferry, called the Queensferry 
Telecommunications Division (QTD) included the largest R&D facility of 
its kind in any of the Hewlett Packard manufacturing operations.(25)
Hewlett Packard claimed that its benefits for employees were amongst 
the best in Britain and that they offered "attractive merit based 
salaries which are reviewed every three months."(26) After six months 
service employees were eligible to take part in a profit sharing scheme
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which had meant an average 7% on salaries in the past five years. After 
one year of employment conpany shares could be purchased at 75% of the 
market value. Employees worked a thirty nine hour week with flexible 
start tines and flexible lunch breaks. Individuals could choose to begin 
work within a period of two hours from 7am to 9am, and were responsible 
for their own timekeeping thereafter. In practice, some social pressure 
was brought to bear on them by their immediate colleagues who were 
apparently quick to spot those who were cheating the system. All 
employees qualified for a non contributory pension and free life 
assurance.
Attached to the South Queensferry factory was a substantial sports 
and social club with its own bar, function centre and squash courts. 
There were many employee based clubs, including golf, football, fishing, 
photography and curling. Near Blairgowrie the company owned a 120 acre 
estate, including a well stocked trout loch, and a number of holiday 
cottages for employees. The company stated that "Hewlett Packard regards 
its employees as its most valuable resource, a fact which is fully 
reflected in the rewards offered."(27)
Frequently, both amongst employees and in the literature published 
by the company, "the HP way" was referred to as a management style which 
encouraged individuals to take responsibility for setting targets and 
achieving objectives within their own areas. In practice, everyone 
including the Managing Director, had a number of objectives to which 
everyone subscribed over a period of a year. These objectives were 
annually assessed by immediate superiors and on the basis of that 
assessment the individual's rate of pay for the following year was 
calculated. This was said to encourage individual and corporate 
progress.
The company had enjoyed very substantial growth since its inception, 
attributing this to a massive and continuing investment programme which 
had amounted to 2.5 billion dollars in the previous five years(28) and a 
continuous stream of new products. The QTD was to be "the world's 
leading supplier of dedicated measurement capability, needed to design, 
install, performance monitor, troubleshoot and repair telecom equipment 
and networks."(29)
Hewlett Packard said they had decided to build a factory in South 
Queensferry because of "the excellent potential workforce", (30) its
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proximity to universities such as Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and 
Dundee, and the "response and help which it received from the local 
authorities."<31) It had further been attracted by the greenfield site 
and the very acceptable environment. <32) The capital investment of the 
company in Britain in 1985 amounted to £29 million. <33) This compares 
with a little over £20 million capital invested by Maxell at Telford in 
1983. The company stated "HP continue to be actively involved with the 
community in the UK during 1985 both as a local citizen and as a 
contributor to a number of issues of national interest."<34) It further 
stated that "The company's primary business objective is satisfying its 
customers' requirements for business solutions to business 
problems."(35) It prided itself on having created a relationship of 
confidence and trust between customers and company, and emphasised its 
support service to customers.
It appeared very sensitive about its relationship to the local 
community. "Its employees have tried to ensure that the communities in 
which it operates have benefitted from HP presence," (36) and had also 
been careful to foster links with polytechnics and universities. As part 
of its interest in employee involvement, Hewlett Packard published 
newsletters, convened meetings to ensure that the labour force remained 
informed on matters of concern to them as employees and on the financial 
performance of the company, and distributed to all employees a copy of 
the annual financial report.
Explaining their company philosophy, Hewlett Packard said, "We know 
that the phrase people are our most important asset is one of the most 
overworked cliches to appear in graduate brochures. We also know that HP 
is distinguished by practising what we preach. Our working philosophy is 
a staightforward statement of working principles based on the importance 
of the individual.We call this simply, the HP way. What it means to you 
is that we will respect your individual talents...." (37) As part of its 
marketing philosophy, company effort was almost always directed towards 
"profitable markets with high growth potential".(38) The company made a 
paint of funding new products out of operating profits so that it could 
claim all capital investment and growth was self financed. It was 
therefore free of long term borrowing commitments. This practice is very 
similar to that adopted by large Japanese conglomerates.(39) 
Furthermore, Hewlett Packard also claimed that the programme of
sustained reinvestment and growth meant that they had been able to 
introduce and stand by a policy of no redundancies, which was also very 
similar to the Japanese lifetime emloyment claim.
Two themes continually repeated in company literature were the claim 
that they placed great emphasis on after sales service, and that the 
company focused on worldwide marketing and exporting which, in turn, 
created opportunities for people to work overseas. An effort had been 
made to create a relaxed and open style of management in which everyone 
from the President of the company downwards was on first name terms. In 
their leaflet for graduates the company also said "There is no 9 to 5 
mentality, and you are as likely to find people keenly discussing the 
latest HP product development in the bar, as thrashing out the day's 
tensions on the squash court!" (40) When recruiting graduates the 
company looked for people with degrees in a number of specialised 
engineering fields. It also accepted a relatively large number of 
graduates with a more general background and was prepared to train 
these, particularly in areas of marketing, sales, personnel and 
business administration.
The "HP way" included open plan offices, first name terras, 
management by wandering round, setting objectives for the job and 
executing those objectives by the indiviual's own methods and ideas. An 
employee was quoted as saying "My impression of HP was that it employed 
industrious people who, whilst working hard, are able to do so within a 
relatively relaxed atmosphere. HP comes over as a company that treats 
you as a responsible adult." (41) Senior management made a point of 
mingling freely and talking to people on the production line. While 
birthdays as such were not marked, at five, ten, fifteen and twenty year 
periods the employee's aniversary with the company was marked with a 
gift of shares. In 1986 Hewlett Packard was a public limited company 
quoted on the Wall Street Stock Exchange and there was an intention in 
the near future to have the company's stocks and shares quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange. Every day the company's share prices were 
published both in dollars and pounds sterling on the notice board in the 
factory.
There was a substantial in-house training programme under the aegis 
of a training manager. People were trained at every level and an 
attempt was also made to build in statistical skills, data collection,
data analysis and the use of cause and effect diagrams. Manufacturing, 
recruitment, salaries, administration, production and virtually every 
other facet of the company's operations were referred to as "processes". 
There was a continuous attempt to measure the performance of these 
processes, involving frequent departmental meetings. At one time there 
were twelve quality circles in the South Queensferry factory. Currently 
only two were operating. The Human Resourses Manager said the company 
had "now moved on from quality circles" because they were voluntary by 
nature and employee led. The new policy claimed to involve everyone in 
the company but in order to eliminate the possibility of people "going 
off in all sorts of different directions" the new discussion groups were 
overtly supervisor led. An attempt had been made to structure them so 
that the participants could be seen to be moving together in the one 
direction. Key goals were set at the top and each level below instructed 
to ask itself the question, what ought our objectives to be in order to 
meet the agreed goals set at the levels above us? The weakness of 
quality circles, as far as Hewlett Packard was concerned was that they 
were employee driven and focused on problems which the employee 
preceived to be an issue. There were times when it was felt these 
issues were not the ones which contributed necessarily to the greater 
good of the organisation. While making the situation better in one
particular area, sometimes the problem was simply being shifted from one
area to another, or indeed was even creating new problems in some other
section. Nevertheless, it was admitted that quality circles did throw 
up a number of good projects, some of which had saved the company money 
and some which cost money.
Information on sales turnover, production targets, plant performance 
and profitability was available to everyone on a quarterly basis. 
Supervisors met once a month to discuss these issues and were expected 
to pass on any relevant information to the labour force.
30% of the employees at South Queensferry were women and all
employees practiced self evaluation in conjunction with a supervisor. 
It was believed that if left entirely to himself, the individual would 
be hypercritical of his performance.
The company tended to be managed by engineers who were alleged to be 
promoted on the basis of merit, technical skills and skill in managing 
people. The company pursued a "just in time" philosophy with respect to
the supply of parts, thereby minimising stocks held on site. Sub­
contractors and suppliers were cultivated as much as possible and a 
relationship built up with them over time.
Projects were developed and planned on a three year cycle. One of 
the overall objectives at South Queensferry in 1986 was to reduce the 
three year development cycle period to eighteen months. Future planning 
was conducted at divisional level, i.e. at South Queensferry, and also 
at production and research and development level.
The company was convinced that a company philosophy which tended to 
remain static was valuable for maintaining consistency in decision 
making. The philosophy was also a source of general parameters when it 
came to making decisions. There were a number of product areas which 
the company claimed it simply would not enter because it believed it 
would be difficult to continue to adhere to the company philosophy. For 
example, the product market might be so volatile that they would be 
hiring and firing labour on short term contracts. The philosophy also 
operated in the finance area, with growth being financed from profits 
earned rather than money borrowed. Thus the philosophy was said to be a 
discipline imposed by the company on itself.
Hewlett Packard said it tried to maintain an organisational 
framework for its objectives. "The achievements of an organisation are 
the result of the combined efforts of each individual in the 
organisation working toward common objectives. These objectives should 
be realistic, should be clearly understood by everyone in the 
organisation, and should reflect the organisation's basic character and 
personality."(42) The company’s statement concerning corporate 
objectives went on to say that there were three basic requirements. The 
first of these was that there should be adequate opportunities for 
training and education, and the activities of the company should be 
engaged in with "enthusiasm", so that others were also enthused with the 
possibilities of meeting the objectives. In other words, the company 
was looking for high levels of commitment emotionally as well as 
intellectually. The company stressed the importance of business ethics 
and said that honesty and integrity should be hallmarks of the way in 
which people conduct themselves. The statement alleged that success in 
the end of the day depended not only on individual commitment but on a 
degree of unison in working toward common objectives. To this end, a
military type organisation had been avoided. Instead,a relaxed 
atmosphere was promoted in which it was claimed people could be 
enthusiastic and committed.(43)
In the subsequent list of objectives, the first was stated to be 
profit, which would indicate that the company was taking seriously its 
injunction to adhere to honesty and integrity. The second objective was 
products and services of such a quality that they would win and hold the 
respect and loyalty of customers and the third was growth. Their 
business area of interest was set within a growing segment of 
technological society and company growth was thought to be necessay to 
attract and hold high calibre personnel. The company believed such 
people would only remain if they saw some opportunity for career 
development in a growing enterprise.
Hewlett Packard claimed to believe in the importance of good human 
relations. "Relationships within the company depend upon a spirit of 
co-operation among individuals and groups, and an attitude of trust and 
understanding on the part of managers towards their people. These 
relationships will be good only if employees have faith in the motives 
and integrity of their peers, supervisors and the company itself." (44) 
High trust relations were therefore prized and job security was seen as 
a major contributor towards this end.
A further objective of company policy was to enable people to share 
in "the company's success". (45) It was claimed that this was reflected 
in company pay policy."Management by objectives" was also a key concept. 
It was understood in terms of self assessment within agreed objectives 
and also in terms of corporate goals and policies. It was said 
"Management by objective, as opposed to management by directive offers 
opportunity for individual freedom and contribution; it also imposes an 
obligation for everyone to exercise initiative and enthusiasm." (46)
The company appeared to have characteristics similar to the Japanese 
conglomerates being essentially decentralised but at the same time one 
single company. The importance of maintaining good relationships and 
some interaction between separate parts of the company was valued. As 
with Maxell at Telford, relationships with the external community were 
said to be important to the company. "All of us should strive to 
improve the environment in which we live. As a corporation operating in 
different communities throughout the world, we must make sure that each
of these communities is better for our presence. This means identifying 
our interests with those of the community; it means applying the
highest standards of honesty and integrity to all our relationships with 
individuals and groups; it means enhancing and protecting the physical 
environment, building attractive plants and offices of which the
community can be proud; it means contributing talent, time and financial 
support to worthwhile community projects".(47)
Burroughs Machines Ltd.
Burroughs, which first came to the United Kingdom in 1895,opened a 
new factory in Livingston in Midlothian in 1979 to manufacture a range 
of document processing systems. In 1986 they were employing 700
permanent workers and 300 temporary workers in manufacture, design and 
development. Some of these had formerly been employed at the Burroughs 
factory at Cumbernauld, where a range of mechanical business machines 
had been made for many years. The labour force at the Cumbernauld 
factory was completely unionised, but unions were not recognised at
Livingston. Some production workers had had previous skill training, for 
example, in motor mechanics and in production engineering. It was a 
reflection of the state of the local labour market that, financially, 
skilled people were better off engaged in assembly work at Burroughs. 
For many, the alternative was unemployment (48) and this may have given 
Burroughs access to an unexpectedly high quality labour force.
The main company objective and their individualistic view of people 
was set out in the company handbook. "Your contribution is essential in 
order to continue the corporation’s high level of success and to help 
achieve the corporation's objective which is to maximise the use of 
technology, to solve human problems within the information technology 
industry. At the same time it is the corporation's hope that you will be 
able to fulfil your own personal goals and ambitions while working at 
Burroughs at the Livingston facility. We are confident your employment 
with Burroughs will be a satisfying, rewarding and challenging 
experience" (49) The company followed this with a fairly lengthy 
"statement of human resources philosophy". It claimed that its 
philosophy was based on two princples, the people oriented nature of the
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business and the emphasis on "resolute commitment to excellence" <50) 
They were looking not only for excellence, but for "extraordinary 
accomplishment" <51) from their employees. It was said that these two 
emphases placed a number of obligations and responsibilities on both the 
company and the individual employee. In fulfilling its obligations and 
responsibilities the company stated that it would at all times try "to 
treat employees with respect, dignity and concern for their rights, 
freedoms and individual needs, to recruit, select and appoint the most 
qualified people available, on the basis of demonstrated ability, 
experience and training, to provide training and development 
opportunities through which employees can upgrade their job skills, 
improve their potential for advancement, and enhance their personal 
development, to place employees in assignments that make the best use 
of their abilities, that take into account individual performance, 
experience and interests, and that are part of a career path to greater 
responsibility and fulfilment, to provide a working environment that 
is challenging, stimulating and rewarding, and which encourages 
employees to long term careers with the company, to inform employees 
what is expected of them in their jobs, including regular evaluations 
and reviews of their performance, to apply all personnel policies and 
programmes in a fair, uniform and consistent manner, to provide 
employees with compensation and benefits that are competitive with those 
offered by other companies in the industry and the countries within 
which we operate, to give insight into the direction of the company's 
business, timely reports on its progress, and the opportunity to express 
their views and ideas on how the company might improve its products, 
services and operations."<52) The obligations and responsibilities from 
the employee were stated as follows. "To act with honesty, integrity 
and professionalism in accordance with the corporation's high standard 
of ethical conduct and to comply with all the laws that affect us, to 
respect the rules and policies of the corporation and the rights of 
other employees, to know and accept the goals of the corporation and 
contribute fully to their attainment, to assume primary responsibility 
for his or her own professional development and to pursue additional 
training and education as appropriate, both inside and outside the 
corporation, to encourage individual initiative, creativity and the 
courage to be innovative in the best interests of the corporation, to
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strive for superior job performance characterised by maximum effort and 
a personal commitment to quality in all activities of the business." 
(53)
At all levels of the company an attempt was made to evaluate and 
improve policies and practices involving as many of the employees as 
possible. For the first few years of the factory's operation there had 
been monthly meetings of all workers in each section. Over time, almost 
all of these meetings had withered away. One continued as a result of 
vigorous representation from employees in a particular section. With 
the demise of the monthly meetings there appeared to be a growing
dissatisfaction with the quality of information employees were receiving 
concerning the company's performance and expectations. There were also 
few outlets for a sense of grievance, other than speaking with 
colleagues. The Human Resources Manager said he was aware of this and 
would be reintroducing a system of consultative meetings "in the near 
future".
The Personnel Department was known as the "Corporate Human Resources 
Staff". This was probably more than a change of name and implied a 
different role for "personnel". Besides being knowledgeable in
industrial relations theory and practice and understanding and coping 
with traditional conflicts of interest especially with respect to trade 
unioi^, the new HR function implied a more flexible labour force, few, 
if any unions recognised, and a greater role for line management in
more traditional personnel areas. Officially the HR function was the 
integration of the human resources policies with the business plans of 
the company. At the end of the "statement of Human Resources 
Philosophy" the company said "ultimately, the responsibility rests with 
individuals - with the relationship each manager has with every employee 
under his or her supervision, and with the fair and consistent 
application of all policies, procedures and practices".(54)
An earlier statement of human resources philosophy, which was still 
in circulation in 1981, added to the list of obligations and
responsibilities for the company, the claim that all personnel policies 
and programmes would be applied in a fair and consistent manner "While 
recognising the need to develop special programmes to improve employment 
opportunities for minorities, females and other g r o u p s w h i c h  
historically have had less opportunity." (55) Burroughs' elimination of
the above statement probably stemmed from the slack nature of the labour 
market.
In the employee's handbook there was much emphasis on the centrality 
of quality. Quality was said to be an "open secret" and "an attitude of 
mind". The company also hoped that quality would become "a way of 
life".(56)
Burroughs emphasised the need for communications and claimed to be 
operating an open door policy which gave access for every employee to 
his or her immediate manager or supervisor. An employee suggestion 
scheme, with financial rewards, was also in operation.
There was no clacking in or clocking off at the Livingston factory, 
but employees arriving for work more than five minutes late were asked 
to log their time of arrival in a book reserved for that purpose at the 
main entrance.
For "key staff employees" there was an individual reviewing system 
of job performance measured annually against pre-determined objectives 
and goals. The review system was called the "performance planning and 
evaluation system" (57) and was a key factor in career development, as 
an annual rating of performance was given to each employee. The 
achievement award programme could have led to financial gain for 
employees for a number of reasons, for example, making significant 
contributions towards achieving company objectives, performing on the 
job in a way which is considered to be outstanding, improving existing 
products or inventing products and procedures of particular usefulness 
to the company. The awards were also based on "individual achievement" 
and were designed to encourage employee participation.
The employee handbook gave details of the disciplinary and grievance 
procedures. In a situation of failure to agree, the decision of the 
General Manager was binding on all parties concerned. By encouraging 
employees to take their grievances to their immediate supervisor and, 
failing satisfaction at that level, to the manager next in line above 
the supervisor, the company encouraged line management to engage in 
traditional personnel work. Only at a point of failure to agree at 
managerial level was an issue referred to the Human Resources 
Department.
There was much in-house training for operators and the company also 
encouraged educational programmes in technical colleges and universities
by meeting some of the expenses involved and by giving time off from 
work, while many non production employees had spent a period of 
training and skills updating at the parent plant in Detroit, Michigan. 
The company was said to be very much oriented to paper qualifications. 
There was wide recognition amongst employees that career development was 
virtually open to everyone, whether or not they had served a formal 
apprenticeship but it was said to be strictly on the basis of "paper 
qualifications and merit." The company was generous in granting time 
off for further education provided steady annual progress was being.made 
by each candidate.
Burroughs had just bought over the Sperry Co. , making the new 
enterprise the second biggest computer manufacturer in the world after 
IBM. By 1988 , the name of the new combined company had been changed to 
Unisys. This buyover had engendered some feelings of insecurity in the 
labour force. People who spoke of it at Livingston indicated that they 
were not sure if Sperry's also made document processing systems, fearing 
that there would be some rationalising of manufacturing capacity which 
would place a possible question mark over the future of the Livingston 
plant. A second cause of concern was the state of the product market. 
Demand for document processing systems was apparently erratic. Requests 
for new units were said to lack a sense of continuity, with the result 
that the production process tended to be "jerked about" to use the 
phrase of the Human Resources Manager.
Blue and white collar workers at the Livingston site worked from 8am 
to 4.30 pm although during particularly busy periods some people were 
asked to work twilight hours and even night shift hours. The labour 
force was divided into two categories, weekly paid and monthly paid, 
which was alleged by the Human Resources department to be the only 
basis of difference between the two sets of people. Unlike Hewlett 
Packard, the ratio of line operators to supervisory and management 
grades was almost as high as in the two Japanese and the two British 
factories. Unlike the Japanese, there appeared to be no attempt to 
induce competition between production teams. Lines were under the 
control of a supervisor who reported to the production manager. A large 
number of graduates were employed because of continuing R&D and design 
functions on site. Production was essentially the assembly of parts 
and sub-assemblies bought in from outside suppliers, with an
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electronically controlled stores system operated on a "just in time " 
principle.
There were some signs of single status practice on site. The 
factory was almost entirely, but not exclusively open plan, there being 
only one canteen and a large day room for all employees. There was some 
reserved car parking for members of the senior management team and for 
visitors, and there were many traditionally enclosed offices including 
those of the Human Resources department. The plant was not air 
conditioned, but kept to a very high standard of cleanliness, with much 
emphasis on minimising the effects of static. Finally, the factory at 
Livingston was a "cost" centre and not a "profit" centre, selling its 
production to a marketing division of Burroughs.
The Interviewees
These were the people who, unlike those at GEC and Lemac, had been 
exposed to foreign management and control and a work environment 
provided by a foreign company. Like their counterparts at GEC and Lemac 
they shared a similar cultural background compared to, say, that of the 
United States of America and of Japan.
Tables 22 to 26 illustrate this by giving the salient features of 
those interviewed in Maxell, Brother, Hewlett Packard and Burroughs 
factories. They were as reasonable a cross section of the labour force 
as the personnel departments were prepared to release from work for 
interview. Each interview lasted between 20 and 30 minutes.
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What type of work environment do the Japanese and American companies 
provide for employees? Tables 27 to 36 should go some way to answering 
that type of question at the factual level. As in the case of GEC and 
Lemac, the same interview schedule was put to personnel managers at the 
four foreign owned factories to solicit the facts of the working
environment.
The more difficult question as to how much of the working
environment was culturally conditioned is left to subsequent chapters.
Meanwhile tables 27 to 36 give a comparative picture of the range of
working conditions at the four plants.
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Comparison of Work .Environments.
In terms of canteens and rest rooms, all four factories provided 
almost identical facilities. These facilities, together with car parking 
and toilets, were all single status. The longer established American 
factories had a wider range of sports and social facilities. Both had 
extended choices by entering into agreements with outside organisations, 
Heriot Watt University in the case of Hewlett Packard and Livingston 
Development Corporation in the case of Burroughs.
Only Hewlett Packard employed a nurse and this could well have been 
a function of its greater size compared to the other three factories.
Only Maxell practiced the Japanese custom of marking employee birthdays.
No bonuses of any kind were paid by the Japanese companies, whereas 
the American companies operated a profit sharing/plant bonus type scheme 
that accounted for a small percentage (5 to 7%) of wages. While all 
four either had a superannuation scheme in place or were intending soon 
to institute one (Brother Industries), only Hewlett Packard's was non 
contributory. Burroughs had a contributory life assurance scheme. In 
this respect the the American companies seemed to be offering better 
working conditions than the Japanese companies. Only Burroughs claimed 
to have either a welfare fund or a savings and loans scheme, both of 
which were present in Hitachi in Japan.
Both American companies had a stock issue plan, which allowed 
employees to purchase company shares at favourable rates, up to a 
percentage of salary (10% at Burroughs). At Maxell and Brother there was 
no mention of any plans to enter this area of employee participation.
Experience in Japan suggests that overtly little emphasis is placed 
on the investment and returns sector of company existence compared to 
management and labour force input and return in the form of salary, 
wages and other benefits. The emphasis on "family" in the company is 
bound to be accompanied by cultural perceptions of the family. 
Culturally, the financial dimension of family life seems seldom to be in 
the forefront of "members'" concern in Britain. In this regard there 
appears to be no evidence to suggest that practice in Japan is any
different. It is therefore possible to emphasise the "familial"
character of work life without much reference to stockholding and
investment. This appears to accord with Japanese practice. The Americans 
appear to approach this issue from a very different point of view, 
seeing it in terms of employee participation and employee incorporation 
into the company, with the hope that these will lead to greater levels 
of commitment at the workplace. In practice, the analysis of employee 
participation structures and procedures in the four factories is 
complicated. One American factory (Burroughs) and one Japanese factory 
(Maxell) had a works council or its equivalent. Mane existed at either 
Brother or Hewlett Packard. Hewlett Packard, however, claimed to be 
organised in such a way that continuous dialogue took place throughout 
the factory at every level, reinforced or stimulated by the practice of 
management by "wandering about".
The operation of the Works Council in the Japanese factory (Maxell) 
differed from that of Burroughs in two important respects. Firstly, 
Burroughs Works Council was open for attendance to all employees, 
although, in practice, only a proportion attended. At Maxell, 
representatives were elected from the various works sections within the 
plant. Secondly, at Burroughs all items including wages could be 
discussed. At Maxell wages were regarded as a private matter between the 
individual and the employer. Despite these differences, significantly 
fewer people at Burroughs were satisfied with the flow of information 
compared with interviewees at Maxell (see Table 38). One reason for this 
might have been the lack of opportunities for ad hoc informal meetings 
between key people and work groups that was the norm, not only at Maxell 
but also at Hewlett Packard and Brother. In other words, Burroughs had 
put all their concern for participation and consultation into one 
concept, the "open door" to all employees to meet monthly with 
management. Other forms Df intra firm communication were largely 
confined to the use of notice boards, with Hewlett Packard having the 
best record of the four of maximising intra firm communications (Table 
36). On technical matters, eg. product design and manufacture, there was 
evidence at Burroughs,of a Japanese style pusuit of communication via 
written propositions prepared for circulation amongst senior staff.
The differences of practice in the operation of Works Councils 
illustrated deep divisions of perception of the labour force, its need 
to know, and its right to share in management decisions. They also 
illustrated differences of management styles. Burroughs gave the
impression that a previously firm management style had been allowed to 
degenerate into a more laissez faire mode. The open-ended invitation to 
attend Works Council meetings rather than a tight system of worker 
representatives was an illustaration of this. The withering away of 
departmental labour force meetings at Burroughs was a further 
illustration.
Perhaps more importantly, Maxell gave the impression of a genuine 
desire to keep the labour force informed of production progress and 
marketing success, not as an end in itself, but to stimulate the sense 
of competition between the factory and its competitors in order to 
maximise quality and output. In other words, it seemed to be part of a 
total coherent approach to factory organisation that embraced every 
aspect of life in the factory. The absence of discussion on wages was 
part of this overall strategy. While secrecy had been breached, as 
already noticed, there was clearly no desire to depart from the practice 
of avoiding the emergence of labour force sections based on pay which 
would fragment the total labour force and destroy the concept of members 
of a family.
Mane of the four factories was engaged in collective bargaining over 
wages at any level. Wages were set by the company and effectually 
"negotiated" with the individual, as might normally be the practice 
between a company and its senior staff. Only Hewlett Packard employed a 
fairly sophisticated system of "element curves" whereby wage rates could 
vary between a maximum and a minimum depending on performance over the 
proceeding year.
While wage differentials in Japan may have been widening in recent 
years, Dore and others observed they were much closer than those in 
Britain. (58) The four factories in the present study gave a spread of 
results for differentials. Differentials at Maxell were exceptionally 
low, whereas those at Brother were relatively wide, with Hewlett Packard 
and Brother coming between (Table 32). At none of the four factories was 
there evidence, even from personnel managers, that employees were aware 
of this issue.
Wage levels were ostensibly secret at all but Burroughs, where rates 
for grades were generally known. At Maxell the policy of secrecy had 
broken down and indigenous cultural attitudes in this regard seemed to 
have prevailed. Uone of the four had any type of payment by results
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system. High levels of overtime were being worked in all four factories, 
so that no one interviewed complained of a lack of incentive schemes.
Only the two longer established American plants had systems of job 
and self evaluation. By and large, Hewlett Packard treated the sick 
employee marginally better than the other three, but all four claimed to 
have a generous view in the event of ill health.
In the area of disputes, quit rates and daily absentee rates (Table 
30), all four plants appeared to perform in an almost identical way. 
Hewlett Packard may be singled out on the grounds that it had a very low 
quit rate and employees seemed to regard the company as a lifetime 
employer.
Maxell, Brother and Hewlett Packard all practiced a fairly 
thoroughgoing single status approach to facilities. Burroughs' practice 
in this regard was not so comprehensive. Office accomodation was not 
open plan and status differences were apparent in different colours of 
workwear. In this area the Japanese companies saw themselves pursuing a 
policy common in Japan and amongst some large American companies. They 
had therefore completely ignored traditional British practice in regard 
to facilities for employees and the new policy seemed to have been 
widely accepted.
The recruitment and employment of managers seemed to indicate 
commonality of practice throughout the four factories, with virtually no 
specific Japanese input at Maxell or Brother. Most had entered industry 
with a specific qualification and gone on to specific training. While 
middle managers were frequently on the shop floor, only at Hewlett 
Packard was it alleged that senior managers also engaged in this 
practice. British managers at Maxell admitted there was, at the moment, 
no prospect of advancement within the company. Only if the company made 
further investment in Britain was it felt more senior positions might 
become available for British nationals. Personnel managers at Hewlett 
Packard and Brother said trainee managers spent time on the shop floor. 
The question was too premature for Maxell, not having any trainee 
managers by 1985. It was felt that if they did, they would be asked to 
spend some time on the shop floor.
While unions were not recognised in any of the four factories, at 
both Maxell and Brother the Japanese management showed signs of wanting 
to recognised at least one union. At Maxell the Japanese administration
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manager asked the researcher if he could recommend a trade union for the 
factory. This seemed to be contrary to the thinking of the company 
president, Mr Hagai, who in his English foreword to the autobiography of 
Thomas Telford wrote, "Under the belief that they have many strikes and 
unstable labour problems in the UK, the reasons why we have selected 
Telford as our factory site are as follows. 1. It is generally said that 
there are many strikes, but the actual situation varies in each 
individual enterprise, and many small sized companies have been 
operating without labour unions or without strikes. 2. Telford new town 
appeared to absorb comparatively young couples, and many companies in 
the town wished to operate in a peaceful atmosphere. 3. Since Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher has been in power, the labour situations in 
the UK have changed, and the number of strikes reduced. We basically 
desired to operate our factory without labour unions, if possible, in 
the future as well."(59)
The Personnel Manager at Hewlett Packard seemed to imply that unions 
were for poorly managed companies and that a good employer had no need 
of them. At Burroughs a quiet air of hostility to unions prevailed. The 
company had recently had a fully unionised factory at Cumbernauld and 
had established the new facility at Livingston as non union after nearly 
thirty years of unionisation at the previous site. In this regard, these 
foreign companies were not taking cognisance of traditional British 
practice.
Only at Hewlett Packard was there an admission of some job 
demarcation between, for example, machine operators and assembly workers 
(Table 43). In practice, some demarcation had been imposed at Maxell by 
health and safety inspectors, compelling machine operators to train and 
certificate themselves in electrical maintenance. Otherwise the two 
Japanese companies aimed at complete flexibility of labour even between 
some office jobs and shop floor jobs.
In terms of status gradations, there was some evidence of the 
introduction of "fine" layers at Maxell and Brother claimed a relatively 
high number of people with a title (30% of the labour force).(Table 36) 
The grading of the labour force for pay purposes may have been 
developing along Japanese lines as it could be argued, size for size, 
Maxell had twenty eight grades for Hewlett Packard’s thirteen.
Superficially there seemed to be relatively few uniquely Japanese 
practices being introduced by Maxell and Brother, even although one 
(Maxell) had a policy of maximising its Japaneseness and Brother the 
opposite policy. In fact both Maxell and Brother had completely ignored, 
where possible, demarcations between maintenance and production, blue 
and white collar workers, skilled and semi-skilled.
Hewlett Packard seemed more overtly American than Burroughs. In 
these areas the role of the British personnel manager could well have 
been the determining factor. A further complicating feature was the 
question of what was Japanese and what was American (eg., single status 
working). The emphasis on the company as a family perhaps belonged more 
to Japan (Table 41).
All four seemed to be making strong attempts to break or mask the 
traditional two tier mould of capitalist labour relations by the 
conditions offered and the environment provided.
Eggoy.ee . J t e s p o p g e s - a ± _ j L h & -  F .q u  r.. FjoralgiLi hmed -.EaslQr.i&£b..
The same set of questions put to employees at GEC and Lemac was put 
to employees at Hewlett Packard, Burroughs, Maxell and Brother. The key 
question for the study is what cultural induction, if any, has taken 
place in the British employees at these four factories. It is suggested 
that if changes in attitudes and responses have been induced they should 
be apparent in tables 37 to 43. In these tables figures for GEC and 
Lemac have been included to give a more complete comparison.
The analysis of the responses forms the substance of Chapter 4.
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"It is the constitution of human activity as social labour which 
provides the materialist basis for human development to take 
place within the framework of culture and h i s t o r y C.Woolfson.
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Chapter 2 reveals what is known of the work environment and the 
responses to that environment in two typical British light engineering 
firms. Chapter 3 reveals what is known of the work environment at two 
American owned factories and two Japanese owned factories in Britain, 
comparable in size and type of manufacture to the two British plants. 
Chapter 3 also sets out what is known of employee responses in the given 
work environments.
In this Chapter (4), a point by point comparison is made of 
attitudes at work and perceptions of management in the six plants using 
the completed interview schedules and drawing also on company literature 
and additional comments of interviewees taped in the course of 
completing the interview schedules.
First, however, a prior question, why were these particular issues 
raised with employees? They were chosen for at least two reasons. 
Firstly an attempt was made to select issues that would solicit
responses that were not entirely subjective, or could be checked from 
empirical evidence, eg. , absentee rates, intra company ranking, 
information flow, etc. Secondly,, issues were chosen on the basis of 
their perceived importance to industrial relations, which is the broad 
background area of interest of the project.
Tables 37 to 43 give a comparative view of employee responses in the 
four foreign owned factories to the questionnaires. The two American 
plants had no American nationals on site, although there had been
Americans employed at the plant during the first decade of its
existence. In 1985 the Burroughs plant was managed by a Belgian and the 
Hewlett Packard site by a Briton.
Both Japanese factories had several Japanese personnel on site, 
mainly engineers and technicians, but also a works accountant (Maxell) 
and a senior manager's secretary (Brother). At both factories, the
senior management team (1985) was almost entirely Japanese. The British 
element was represented by the inclusion of the Personnel Manager at 
Maxell and the Production / Personnel Manager at Brother Industries. 
What effect, if any, was this management practice or history having on 
the local labour force culture at the place of work? Before beginning to 
attempt an answer to that type of question it is important to note that 
comparisons between samples rather than within samples of company 
interviewees are treated with extreme caution. The samples have a
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certain similarity in that they were chosen by personnel departments, 
whose remit was to select a cross section of employees in terms of work, 
age and sex. They were not in any sense carefully matched samples 
containing for example, the same numbers doing the same types of job, or 
being of the same age and with similar length of work experience etc. 
It was felt, rightly or wrongly, that personnel department co-operation 
across the six plants in this respect would be virtually impossible to 
achieve, given the pressure on people's time not only in the personnel 
departments but, more importantly on the shop floors. Nevertheless, 
given what similarity they have, it is comparisons between companies 
that are the major interest of the programme and thus an attempt has 
been made within the given constraints to compare, albeit, cautiously.
As with the interviewees at GEC and Lemac, the same issues were 
raised at the four foreign owned plants, beginning with absentee rates 
(see Table 37).
Absence. irom .work and_tJjBe.keepi.ng,
Interviewees at GEC claimed the lowest rate of absence measured in 
days off per year compared to those employed in the other five 
factories. Interviewees at Brother claimed the second lowest rate of 
absence, followed by Hewlett Packard, Burroughs, Lemac and Maxell. 
Interviewees in the last two factories claimed to have average absences 
of 2.3 days per year. (See Table 44 in Appendix.)
It should be noted that the figures in Table 44 are not actual 
figures for absence, but interviewees' perceptions of their absence. 
The actual figures are likely to be higher. Since all interviewees were 
from one culture, ie. , British as distinct from North American or 
Japanese, it is reasonable to assume the distortion between the actual 
figures and people's perception of their absence was likely to be fairly 
even across the six labour forces.
Average timekeeping at GEC was the poorest of the six factories 
under examinaton, (See Table 45, Appendix. ) Was this a function of a 
more mature labour force who, out of a measure of job insecurity, kept 
the absentee rate to a minimum, but knew that there was a relatively 
safe level of discretion on the question of timekeeping? Unlike the
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American and Japanese factories, all GEC blue collar workers clocked on 
and clocked off. Their poor average timekeeping in comparison with the 
other five would therefore appear to substantiate the view that 
timekeeping improves when the labour force is trusted to come to work 
and leave work without the times being recorded.
Job Satisfaction in the Factories. (Table 37)
When asked about working for another firm most people interviewed 
appeared to be content with their current employer. No one, for
example, at Hewlett Packard and almost none at Maxell and Burroughs had 
any desire to work for another company. If anything, discontent with 
the current employer was highest in the two British owned factories and 
also at Brother. In this respect, attitudes at Brother might have been 
showing signs of divergence from those at Maxell.
When contentment with the job was raised, responses throughout the 
six factories were much the same. Once again, interviewees at Brother 
appeared to exhibit high levels of job contentment on a par with
interviewees at the two British firms. There may, however, be very
different explanations for this. Those at Brother were recent recruits, 
still perhaps enjoying the work. Those at the two British plants knew 
they were working in a very uncertain product market, so that fear of 
job loss might well have been inducing a sense of job contentment.
On the question of doing the same job for less pay, the labour 
forces fell into three groups represented by those at Lemac and
Burroughs where there was most resistance to this suggestion, • GEC and 
Maxell where there was less resistance, and Hewlett Packard and Brother, 
where people were willing to think about the issue. Perhaps there was a 
certain level of willingness at Hewlett Packard since they had all 
recently taken a pay cut of 5% and for them it was no longer an unknown 
experience. But why were so many willing to do likewise at Brother? 
Was this response a function of the fact that the factory was recently 
established and people were glad of work in an area of high 
unemployment? No-one in the factory gave the impression of being 
overpaid and, indeed, at Maxell, as noted in chapter 3, there were 
specific complaints that wages had declined in real terras. It was an
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issue currently being discussed between the Personnel Manager and the 
Japanese senior management at Telford. The Personnel Manager was not,
as it happened, hopeful of a rise in wages and felt the labour force
might have to settle for an extra day of holiday on the annual 
entitlement.
Factory Stratification
Employee perceptions of the shape of the enterprise, its
stratification and the types of relationships passible within that 
stratified structure were explored with a series of questions. This is 
an area that appears to be under researched. Ronald Dare <1> is one of 
the few to examine in any detail, Japanese company structure, despite 
all that has been written on stratification and the related concepts of 
status and social identity. Perceptions of company structure are the 
converse of perceptions of individual place and role in the enterprise. 
The stereotypical large Japanese company is said to have a tall
hierarchy, with a narrow span of control. In GEC, Lemac, Hewlett 
Packard abd. Burroughs, the span of control over the production sector of 
the complete bureaucracy was wider, and the hierarchy consequently 
flatter and broader. This had the theoretical effect of enabling the 
employee near the bottom of the hierarchy to see at least the path to 
the top and to form a mental view of the different layers of the 
structure.
Considering the issue of enterprise shape first of all, interviewees 
were asked a number of questions to solicit their impressions of company 
shape, with the interviewer having in advance precisely what the 
hierarchial structure of each of the six factories was. Most 
interviewees at Hewlett Packard knew exactly where they "fitted in". 
There were 13 grades in the South Queensferry factory, and each person 
interviewed knew the grade he or she was on, (2)
At Burroughs, 44% interviewed said there were dozens, even hundreds 
above them in the company, revealing a vague idea of company structure. 
In fact, in a direct line, most were four to five steps below plant 
manager level. At GEC, 80% gave very vague answers to these questions. 
At Lemac the situation was identical to that at Burroughs, 44% were
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■ either extremely vague or admitted simply to not knowing the corporate 
structure.
In marked contrast, only two people interviewed at Brother were 
vague about company structure, and this in a labour force young and 
inexperienced. Likewise at the other Japanese owned factory, Maxell, 
with a relatively young and inexperienced labour force especially in 
comparison to the two British owned factories, only two people did not 
have a clear picture of the company structure,
On the question of stratification, Dare alleges that both Western 
and Japanese enterprises have adopted a hierarchial, pyramidical 
structure.(3) In British factories the pyramid is split into two or 
three fundamental parts, workers, management and perhaps non-working 
directors, almost akin to an aristocracy reflecting an essentially class 
based system.
In Japan the pyramid is sub-divided into very many layers, 
"infinitely divisible strata" (4) Already there were signs of this 
emerging at Brother and Maxell, where the line workers were 
hierarchially divided into floaters, those able to float to any job on 
the line, repairers and team leaders. Each category commanded a small 
pay premium. In charge were assistant supervisors and supervisors, both 
below production manager grade.
By contrast, at GEC and Lemac, the two British owned enterprises had 
assembly lines of some forty workers, controlled by a link operator and 
supervisor below production manager level. Burroughs had a very similar 
system and Hewlett Packard had adopted what was, de facto, a set of 
"standard" grades embracing what would normally be regarded as hourly 
paid workmen grades in a British factory at one end, and management 
grades at the other. The line between workman and manager was therefore 
effectually blurred, if not obliterated.
Information Sharing
When interviewees were asked how they felt about the amount of 
information concerning the company which came to them, 86% of those 
interviewed at Hewlett Packard said they were happy with the status quo.
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More that half in Maxell, Brother and Lemac were also satisfied, and the 
high levels of satisfaction at Maxell and Brother may have been a 
function, to some extent, of the youthfulness of the labour force. <5> It 
is also known that information in a Japanese company is more likely to 
be correlated to decision making than in a British or American 
enterprise. In the latter, information, in principle, is thought to be 
good per se. The better informed employee is thought to be more likely 
to react in a responsible way to the demands of the enterprise, an 
example of Aristotlian thinking so ingrained in Western culture.
Information is a commodity which can be "traded" for a return in terms 
of employee response. Japanese process thinking sees information as 
part of a process that issues in a continuous stream of corporate
decisions. (6) These decisions are the sinews controlling company
fortunes as they move forward in time and in the hostile competitive 
world of international trade. The real reason therefore why the
youthful labour force at Maxell and Brother was not exposed to a flow of 
company information was that they were not involved in the decision 
making process. Those who were, the senior British managers, appai'ently 
were informed of at least part of a whole range of issues including 
company profitability.
Generally speaking, high levels of overtime were being worked in all 
six factories. (7) The working of overtime is itself one of the very 
many strands in employee response to a particular set of circumstances, 
Clearly where wage rates are considered below average for an area, 
overtime working is a method of increasing earnings to a level judged to 
be more acceptable. In this sense, overtime working is fulfilling a 
personal need.
Although in the first place employees see overtime in terras of 
working for themselves, when asked if they would work overtime to clear 
an important job for the company, or simply if they would work overtime 
for the sake of the company, a variety of responses was solicited. For 
many these were odd questions. <8> They were questions they had not been 
asked before and questions which hitherto they had not asked themselves.
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Ta work overtime far the sake of the company, as with doing anything for 
the sake of the company rather than for one's own sake, implies a 
relationship of trust and a presence of loyalty. The employee has trust 
in the company. Likewise the company has trust in the employee in the 
sense of relying on the employee to respond to the request to work 
overtime rather than declining to meet market demand or placing the work 
with a subcontractor, or hiring additional and perhaps temporary labour. 
In recent years in Britain there have been signs that company trust in 
this regard has been declining. ' A growing number of employees now find 
that a condition of employment is that they will work "reasonable levels 
of overtine".
The question of working overtime for the company is a parameter of 
loyalty. Some employees in Burroughs, GEC and Lemac, said they would 
never be prepared to do this. The actual percentages of those who felt 
like that were 11%, 33% and 21% respectively. Those who were prepared 
to work overtime "occasionally" (ie., about 2 hours per week) for the 
sake of the company appeared in every company with the exception of 
Hewlett Packard. The actual percentages were GEC 33%, Lemac 32%, Maxell 
29%, Burroughs 28%. Those who were prepared to work overtime for the 
sake of the company either frequently (ie., about 6 hours per week) or 
very frequently (about 10 hours per week or more) gave the following 
comparative diagram of results (Figure 1.)
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Figure 1 indicates that everyone interviewed at Hewlett Packard was 
prepared to work overtime for the sake of the company. Hewlett 
Packard’s labour force, on this parameter, indicated a strong sense oi 
belonging to the firm. Employees at Brother also scored comparatively 
highly in Figure 1. Indeed, it can be said that on this parameter, 
employees at both Japanese factories also exhibited a strong sense oi 
belonging to the enterprise. Many were prepared to work up to an hour 
of overtime unpaid discussing the problems and challenges oi the work 
with colleagues. Many said they thought "constructively or with 
interest" of the work when not on site. These kind of responses were 
likely to have been engendered by the total impact of a complex and 
diverse number of issues. However, what is being argued here is that 
the sense of belonging to the company was already to some extent 
developed in two out of the four foreign owned factories even in a 
comparatively new factory, and certainly in comparison with the two 
British factory labour forces.
At Lemac and GEC there appeared to be comparatively little 
enthusiasm for the concept of belonging to the company. "If I did not 
need the money there is no way I would work over'time either for the firm 
or for anyone else for that matter.", said one interviewee at GEC. Here 
the more traditional centrality of the cash nexus was paramount.(9) The 
reaction to the question is also an illustration of a degree of 
alienation from the work. (10) The work is seen as a means to an end, 
The money earned is the passport to "real" life.
Exceptions of Management
More striking differences of attitude occurred with respect to 
employee perceptions of management. At the two Japanese plants, 
managers were seen as very strict about safety and "high" on concern for 
the work environment. Generally speaking, management in the foreign 
owned companies was seen as participative, but this was blurred in the 
minds of the interviewees in the Japanese factories. They tended to 
interpret the more frequent presence of the managers on the shop floor 
as "participative" management. In practice, the management could be 
very authoritarian as illustrated by their aversion to moustaches and
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whistling and walking with hands in pockets 011 site. The overall 
impression of "sameness" of treatment was sharpest in the two Japanese 
plants.
Employees interviewed in the six factories were given a number of 
alternative, descriptions of management style from which to choose, 
authoritative, participative, paternalistic. When faced with a range oi 
descriptions of management style, they opted for each term as in Table 
46 which summarises their response.
Table 46. Perceptions of management style. (Extracted from Table 41.)
Perceptions of Hewlett 
Management style Packard
Burroughs Maxell Brother GEC Lemac
Participative 78 32 69 29 7 37
Authoritarian 14 63 19 41 53 47
Paternalistic 7 5 12 29 40 16
Almost all of those interviewed at Hewlett Packard described the 
management as 'participative'. One young assembly line operator said 
"Managers are always on the shop floor and are always willing to come 
and show you how they want the work done". Others added some 
qualification. "There are individuals here. Certainly the description 
of participative is a reasonable overall description of management, 
style. But all three could apply. It's not all black and white." By 
describing the management as 'participative' employees at Hewlett 
Packard and in the other five factories meant that management was seen 
to participate in events 011 the shop floor and in the design section, by
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being frequently present, by wishing to be kept informed of what was 
going on, and by appearing to share some decision making with non- 
management grades.
Of the six companies only Hewlett Packard made public in their 
literature any description of management style. "In discussing Hewlett 
Packard operating policies, we often refer to the concept of 'management 
by objective' . By this, we mean that, as far as possible, each 
individual at each level in the organisation should make his or her own 
plans to achieve company objectives and goals." (11) It is also 
described as "open door" management, "Our open plan, well lit and air 
conditioned surroundings and open door management style encourage every 
employee to make a significant contribution to the company's success." 
(12) One employee described it as "management by wandering around". He 
went on to say "Formally the supervisor and manager are close to the 
people who work for them. They are also encouraged to have a policy to 
go out and talk to them, to establish a rapport with them." Hotice the 
two reasons given in support of the practice are the early detection of 
problems and the establishment of a rapport with the labour force. The 
early detection of problems can allow the operator or designer to 
participate in decisions on a one to one basis with the manager 
concerned. This coincides with Hewlett Packard's individualistic 
approach to labour relations. At South Queensferry there was no formal 
consultative process, no committee structure and no works council. 
Participation was therefore given a narrow definition. It implied 
small group discussion at the most, and more often dialogue between 
manager and supervised employee. Secondly, it was a definition that 
excluded the "normal" areas for participation in British industry, 
labour relations, pay and conditions of work, and confined them to the 
production task. This view of participation was also a feature detected 
at Comco by Cressey. "We (management group of 8) run the company and 
take the decisions. We don't, for example, consult with the shop floor 
about the expansion but do consult about implementations or details in 
formulating new work organisation or machinery etc." (13)
Insofar as management by wandering around stimulates rapport with 
the labour force, it does so in a way that reinforces company 
philosophy. The rapport is contained largely within small group 
relations or one to one relations. Committees, councils and
-162-
mass meetings can also be occasions for rapport, but one outwith 
Hewlett Packard's philosophical approach to labour relations. Secondly, 
this kind of rapport is entirely within the control of the manager. He 
is the one who does the wandering around. Even the reciprocal 
arrangement whereby his ’door is always open' to an employee, by and 
large preserves management control over the rapport. It discourages 
deputations, delegates, representatives, all common features of British 
industrial relations. If the manager has received training in 
management, and many in large American companies have, then the 
individual employee is almost always at a disadvantage in this type of 
participation. He will seldom be an equal partner in the discussion, 
lacking perhaps technical ability and articularity. It could be argued 
there is little real participation in this type of situation. There has 
been a change from one person as boss of many, issuing instructions, to 
one person bossing each individually. At the individual level the 
issuing of instructions can be more easily couched in language that 
makes the exercise feel like a discussion to which both parties have 
contributed. This in fact constitutes much of a "good" manager's man 
management skills. (14) As in all management techniques there is 
therefore an element of manipulation. Here it revolves around the 
refusal to accept the other as an equal. Insofar as the organisation 
recognises one as a manager and the other as, say, technician, 
inequality is inevitable. Only some radical form of cooperative could 
avoid this. Hewlett Packard was not a cooperative. The inescapable 
conclusion is that even in a well managed company like Hewlett Packard, 
managing people is based on a deception. To some extent, "beer-busts", 
which Hewlett Packard employees did engage in, are an attempt to mollify 
the deception. They remind the employee that the inequality is 
temporary, associated only with the workplace, and that in the end of 
the day managers are just the same as everyone else. Does the employee 
need to be thus reminded? The assumption of the part of companies like 
Hewlett Packard that he does, masks an underlying paternalism that is 
inherent in Western civilisation and Forth American culture in 
particular. (15) Encouraged by class division, it fragments humanity 
into those who are "managed" and those who manage. For all William 
Ouchi's titanic struggle to carve out a special place for Type Z 
organisations, he still has to admit that "In Type Z companies, the
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decision making may be collective, but the ultimate decisions still 
reside with one individual. It is doubtful if Westerners could ever 
tolerate the collective form of responsibility that characterises 
Japanese organisations. This maintenance of the sense of individual 
responsibility remains critical to Western society but it also creates 
much tension in Type Z organisations. When a group engages in 
consensual decision making, members are effectually being asked to place 
their fate to some extent in the hands of others". (16)
More importantly, the moral ambiguity remaining even in the best of 
Western companies points again to that fundamental flaw in capitalist 
production that Daniel Bell called its basic "contradiction". "The 'new 
capitalism' .... continued to demand a Protestant ethic in the area of 
production - that is, in the realm of work - but to stimulate a demand 
for pleasure and play in the area of consumption."(17)
Is this a characteristic of capitalism or a basic feature of any 
human society? Ostensibly other systems are based on the satisfaction of 
need which in itself, does not require a Protestant work ethic but a 
response to the stimulus coming from the desire to fulfil the need. 
There is no pressure to stimulate demand as in capitalism. The need 
stimulates its own fulfilment. If it is not fulfilled presumably the 
need was not all that pressing in the first place.
Where perhaps Bell does oversimplify is in stating that capitalism 
stimulates "a demand for pleasure and play in the area of consumption." 
Consumption can also take the form of the purchase of equity and this 
also is a demand that capitalism stimulates for the purposes of 
regeneration.
Nevertheless Bell's basic thesis is accepted and Western 
Christianity, with its emphasis on forgiveness and acceptance, makes it 
possible to tolerate the moral ambiguity. After all, are not companies 
like Hewlett Packard paying above the norm, providing excellent working 
conditions and generating a reasonably happy labour force? People 
interviewed at South Queensferry testified to all of these. When the 
company is profitable and jobs seem secure, forgiveness and acceptance 
make even the raising of the issue of moral ambiguity seem churlish and 
unnecessarily disruptive. When there is a down turn in the business 
cycle, however, the deception rises closer to the surface of factory 
life to impair relationships. Even at Hewlett Packard in 1985 there
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were many who felt that the management style had taken a turn for the 
worse. "Now some of the managers don't seem to care so much about what 
the workers think and feel", "The management style has changed. It has 
become more authoritative", "The company is no longer a family, just 
different groups of people with different concerns". These were some of 
the comments made. As already noted, the company was aware of a change 
and had introduced the company wide industrial survey "Open Line", of 
which the personnel manager said, "We had an attitude type survey 
recently. It's the second one. We had one in 1978. Everybody fills up
a questionnaire and it's fed into a computer It gives a feel for
where the issues are We get people like test engineers into a room
and say ' here are the results for test engineers, what do you think is 
behind these results? Give us some issue statements on things like 
communications - or whatever.' So these groups work together for half a 
day. They come out with separate issue statements. We have had about 
twenty analysis groups for one division and they all came out with about 
five issue statements. These went to management to respond to. We are
still going through the process of responding......  You are going back
to the people involved in it saying 'Why do you think it's going like 
this? What are the issues?' Some of it is based on expectation. 
Things we talked about like management by wandering around..... You get 
the expectation and sometimes the expectation is much higher than you 
ever intended to set it."
Essentially this was an exercise which was saying "You tell us what 
is wrong". In that form, the company is unlikely to receive suggestions 
that will go further than modifying the present system. What is 
probably needed is an excision of the basic deception.
By contrast to Hewlett Packard, many of those at Burroughs felt the 
management style was 'authoritative' and only 33% of those interviewed 
would describe it as 'participative'. Ostensibly the company philosophy 
on management was described as an 'open door policy' giving an 
"environment of access to immediate supervisors and/or managers". (18) 
It was intended that this policy be supported by regular monthly 
departmental meetings. The cultural climate for the management style 
had been set out on paper. In practice, from the perspective of the 
shop floor, it felt as though a different policy was being pursued. 
The management style appeared to be shaped by a different set of
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parameters largely connected with the external labour market. 
Livingston was an area of high unemployment. (19) One interviewee said
"They have people over a barrel. They can say to people 'do a job' and
they will do it." Thus it would appear that external social conditions 
were proving much more powerful than the internal company culture.
Internally there was cultural ambiguity. The collapse of the 
regular monthly departmental meetings had led, said one employee, to a 
situation where "They tend to lose track in certain areas of what they 
wanted to achieve." The individualism of the essentially American
company philosophy was diluted by an innate sense of belonging together
and collective responsibility. "The management has to be authoritative 
to get the work out. Sometimes they think you are just a number and 
that you're not interested in your work when you are interested. I hope 
the management sees the company as a family because everyone has to work 
together." Another employee said "Industrial relations could be 
improved if people were treated as adults. They could do a lot in that 
respect because there is a them and us situation."
Of the four foreign owned factories the cultural clash seemed to be 
sharpest at Burroughs. The reason for this is not difficult to see. As 
stated earlier in the chapter, management is the main channel for 
cultural influences emanating from ownership and senior management, to 
the workforce as a whole. At each of the three foreign owned companies, 
management was controlled by the owning culture. Even at Brother where, 
ostensibly, a "British" management style had been adopted, Japanese 
managerial influence had allowed this development while still 
controlling the overall situation. At Burroughs the statement of human 
resources philosophy had the status of a work of reference rather than a 
daily textbook. Vhile production schedules were controlled from 
Detroit, the daily management of the factory was in the hands of the 
people who appeared not greatly influenced by company philosophy. The 
counter cultural response was coming from British management. The 
pressure of British cultural mores was greater than that of the would-be 
incoming American culture. British management at Burroughs seemed 
therefore to be acting as channels in reverse, keeping out American 
cultural influences. They were able to do this because the local labour 
market was so much in their favour with plenty of good quality cheap 
expertise. Presumably, the continued profitability of the factory
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ensured American aquiescence in local industrial relations practice. 
The conclusion seems to be that where owners must work hard to train a 
labour force capable of making a production unit profitable, local 
cultural mores are allowed to prevail. This philosophy of pragmatism 
coincides with a strand in Forth American culture that minimises the 
importance of metaphysic and emphasises the primacy of accomplishment 
and achievement. (20) Burroughs' American management appeared to be 
content to allow the British factory at Livingston to function with an 
essentially indigenous set of management practices. While there might 
have been a convergence at the broad macro level, at the more micro 
level, American cultural influences appeared to have diminished at 
Burroughs to allow the local British culture to predominate.
Despite the complete unionisation of the labour force and the 
comprehensive consultative system in GEC's Kirkcaldy factory, only one 
person interviewed felt that management could be described as 
'participative'. All other GEC employees interviewed described the 
management style either as 'paternalistic' or 'authoritative'. (21) 
Certainly, unionisation and consultation are not guarantees of a 
participatory style of management. When asked if their views on a 
number of important issues including industrial relations, work methods, 
design of tools and jigs and product design were ever requested, 60% at 
GEC and Lemac said they were not. (22) The remaining 40% of those 
interviewed had occasionally been consulted on the question of 
industrial relations and work methods. This is not the picture of a 
participative management. One 40 year old tester said "Managers never 
come on the shop floor to ask how you are getting on. I would like 
them to ask me about the job. There should be much more communication 
at this level. The men themselves have made a number of improvements to 
the job but you never get recognition."
Other employees said "You don't really see managers. Instructions 
get passed down the line. When managers do go on the shop floor they 
tend to look at people as though they were not there", "You are here to 
work and that's it", "They are vey distant, very aloof", "There are 
many young managers all trying to prove themselves - trying to show 
their authority", "They don't care how we are geting on. They're up 
there and we're down here. They should be seen more often on the shop 
floor. They seem to stay in their office all day long." Essentially
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three criticisms of management were consistently made by supervised 
employees, managers were aloof, they gave the impression of having 
nothing to learn from the shop floor, and were lacking in leadership. 
Iianagers at GEC were divided between senior people with long service at 
the plant and a fairly recent influx of younger, more abrasive people. 
The former would be in the minds of those who described the style as 
paternalistic and certainly the latter were in the minds of those who 
described it as authoritative. In other words, how managers actually 
behave rather than the formal structure of management is what seems to 
determine management style.
Managerial leadership
In the West managerial leadership is largely understood in 
individualic terms. In large Japanese companies the emphasis is often 
said to be on collective leadership, a view with which Pamela Briggs
does not always concur. " despite their adherence to the complex
ringi system of decision making, there is evidence to suggest that 
Japanese managers are more likely to ignore group decisions " (23)
The concept of "amae" is important here. It is the "key concept for 
the understanding not only of the psychcological makeup of the 
individual Japanese, but of the structure of Japanese society as a 
whole." (24) Essentially "amae" refers to a basic feeling of 
dependence, stemming from the mother/son relationship, but also 
widespread in Japanese society. The British and Western concept of the 
self made autonomous manager seems to have no equivalent in Japan.
In the West, often leadership is not only individualised and 
personalised, but appears essentially anarchic, accepting no law other 
than that of personal conviction of the optimum method of achieving 
results. The effect on the labour force seems almost guaranteed to 
produce the collectivity of prickly opinionated personalities which the 
above quotations reveal, as distinct from the apparently smooth, 
compliant collectivity formed in Japanese factories. With such a 
fertile breeding ground, that egalitarianism, best exemplified by the 
writings of Robert Burns, has apparently flourished. A line operator at 
GEC captured something of the egalitarian spirit when she said "In the
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end of the day we are the company. When the Regional Manager,
Mr..........is known to be coming round the factory, everyone becomes
agitated. This is all wrong. We work hard all the time. Our 
forefathers gave their lives so that people like us would not have to go
cap in hand to folk like Mr......... " Thus the culture may increase the
difficulty of managing people.
Management - a final word
"Japanese and American management is 95% the same and differs in all 
important respects." (25) These words of Tako Fujisawa, the President of 
Honda, are cited by Pascale and Athos in their fascinating comparison of 
American and Japanese practices. The words of Fujisawa aptly describe 
the comparison of management at Hewlett Packard and Maxell. In many 
respects they appear so similar, the one might well have been 
consciously copied from the other, but there is one fundamental 
difference. Where Hewlett Packard seemed to be managed as a company of 
entrepreneurial individuals, Maxell was managed as a team of
entrepreneurs. This is a difference which may have its origin in
differences of cultural perceptions of people. Traditionally, US 
culture sees people as hands to be hired. Pascale and Athos call this 
an "engineer's view of individuals". (26) Its roots are in a culture 
that tends of objectify, reify, and make sharp distinctions for the 
purposes of description and analysis. Japanese culture sees people as 
part of a group, at home, in the community, or as employees. Hence, the
roots are in a culture where everything that is, forms part of an
organic whole. (27)
The individual/collective distinction between Hewlett Packard and 
Maxell implies basic differences in perceptions of leadership, as 
already noted. Differences over the issue of leadership are likely to 
conceal differences with regard to authority. Weber spoke of three 
types of authority which legitimised power. The first of these is 
traditional authority, endowed by heredity, the second, legal authority, 
derived from rules and regulations, and the third, charismatic (ie. , 
innate, 'gifted', and unstructured) authority. (28)
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In both Hewlett Packard and Maxell, management exercised both 
traditional authority and legal authority. Only at Hewlett Packard, 
however, was the emergence of charismatic authority encouraged, and this 
precisely through the overt emphasis on individualism. In the "1985 
Report and Accounts", Hewlett Packard outlined with approval their 
support for a scheme to help the Third World. The "High Seas Project is 
the brainchild of a Hewlett Packard employee. A team of marines, 
artists and scientists will sail around the world, publish the results 
of research and creative^ work in the form of books and commentaries. 
These will be sold to raise money for War on Want" (29) Hewlett 
Packard's "management by objectives" techniques were being used. The 
whole project derived from the charismatic authority of a Hewlett
Packard employee who was organising the complete programme.
At Maxell and Brother there was no encouragement of charismatic
authority. Its omission seemed to be causing some tension in these 
factories in the minds of the British workforces.(30) This same tension 
was apparent in the factories examined by White and Trevor. "It was 
felt, for example, that in the early days when Japanese influence had 
been stronger, relationships had been easier, whereas British management 
left on its own tended to put up the traditional barriers." (31)
At Maxell one operator said "The maintenance of the machines and the 
operating of the machines have been split. This is English 
interference. If it had been left to the Japanese I would have been 
doing both. When we first started we were told that everyone was equal 
and one would be doing a little of everything."
These two somewhat negative examples seem to be the result of the 
reassertion of charismatic leadership by British managers. A senior
British manager at Brother said "We have not introduced the Japanese
ringi system of decision making, but have tried to hang on to a British 
system. I often make decisions without consulting anyone else and then 
I tell my Japanese boss."
In fact, many people interviewed at Maxell and Brother felt they no 
longer wanted charismatic leadership. They preferred what appeared to 
be the more egalitarian participative approach of the Japanese. This 
comment was typical of several. "I just wish they (British managers) 
would let the Japanese get on with running the factory their way."
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Obviously Japanese "groupiness" was influencing their management 
practice abroad, as was American individualism in the American 
factories abroad. The centrality of the individual/collective concept 
in culture is so powerful that it influences management practices in 
foreign countries. Bound up with these ideas are notions of shame and 
pride, which are also operating to affect the work life of employees. 
While the Americans, especially at Hewlett Packard, saw the factory as a 
collectivity of individuals and the Japanese, especially at Maxell, saw 
the factory as one familial collectivity, the British labour force at 
each factory seemed reasonably content and well motivated, In other 
words, it does not appear to make much difference to labour force well­
being which model is adopted as long as it is pursued with some sense of
fairness, internal integrity and coherence. Where there is more of an
uncertain cultural mix, as at Burroughs and to a lesser degree at
Brother, people were less convinced and more dissatisfied.
The main issues raised by management for the supervised employee are 
issues of leadership and authority. People at work in the factories 
appeared very open to new styles of management and seemed ready to adapt 
attitudes to work to suit the new style. Essentially they were prepared 
to undertake any task asked of them. White and Trevor also observed 
this phenomenon and interpreted it in terms of a desire to "break away 
from the class divisions typical of British industry". (32) While this 
may be essentially correct, a more immediate reason seemed to be the 
desire for new patterns of authority. The ostensibly more participative 
approach of the Japanese did genuinely appear to strike a strong chord 
of sympathy in the young British workers. Any hesitation in this regard 
appeared to be coming from the British managers who seemed anxious to 
maintain the more traditional British practices. These practices were 
defended in terms of alleged Japanese inability and unwillingness to 
understand the indigenous culture (eg., the Maxell personnel manager's 
modification of Japanese practices on the occasion of an employee's 
birthday).
There is some evidence of the Japanese taking this view in Third 
World countries. "Some Japanese employees assigned to overseas 
subsidiaries have the following characteristics, designed to trigger off 
antagonism; a lack of understanding of local culture, manners, customs, 
religion, language and the situation of labour unions. They also
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possess a narrow outlook concerned only with the development of their 
business, a group cohesion among themselves, a strong identification 
with their parent company in Japan, and may also be condescending in 
speech and behaviour." (33) While this may be true of some Japanese
in Britain, their overall reputation and impression at Maxell and 
Brother was much to the contrary, even if it was only temporarily 
influenced by some transient respect for British culture.
Only GEC and Lemac of the six factories recognised trade unions. 
Nevertheless, employees in the other four factories were asked how they 
understood the company to feel about trade unions.
Where in the United States, unions are seen as "business type", 
confining their activities fairly strictly to enhancing the wages and 
conditions of their membership and avoiding the more overtly political 
role of unions in the United Kingdom, in Japan, as already noted, trade 
unions are described as "company unions" being peculiar to each company, 
often enjoying high status, good facilities, and including supervisory 
grades. At Burroughs, some who were interviewed were members of trade 
unions, having joined in a previous place of employment. At Brother, 
people interviewed said, when applying for a job, they had been asked if 
they had "links" with a trade union. They had all felt it expedient to 
deny this. People who had been members of trade unions had allowed 
their membership to lapse after joining Brother.
In view of the widespread understanding of the role of trade unions 
in contemporary Japan, how do Japanese companies locating in Britain 
respond to the presence of the British trade union movement? Will they 
continue to think in terms of a company union, and if that is not 
possible, a non union shop? Will they accept multi-unionism and 
recognise several unions? There have been a number of different 
responses amongst Japanese owned enterprises in Britain. A number have 
signed single union agreements, eg. , Nissan in Washington, Tyne and 
Wear. An agreement at Nissan was signed in 1985 with the AUEW, as it 
was then, for sole negotiating rights with the company. (34) Several 
others, of whom Maxell and Brother are two, are running non union shops.
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At Maxell and Brother, policy in this regard appeared to be dictated by 
the British personnel manager. At Maxell, senior Japanese management 
appeared to have second thoughts about union recognition. They had 
been influenced by the experience of a neighbouring Japanese owned 
company who discovered their labour force had been secretly recruited to 
membership of a union perceived by company advisors to be "undesirable", 
presumably on the grounds of a reputation for militancy. To keep 
control of the situation, senior management at Maxell had already been 
comparing the policies of a number of unions with a view to selecting 
the one most "suitable" for their labour force. In this regard they 
seemed to be moving towards an emerging norm of practice in Japanese 
owned companies in Britain. White and Trevor note that "Industrial 
relations and the role of trade unions was another area giving much 
concern to Japanese management. And yet in practice industrial 
relations in the manufacturing firms we studied are both
unproblematical and inconspicuous. All had set up single unions 
negotiating agreements but this is not to be regarded as a distinctively 
Japanese policy since it is prevailing 'good practice* among large firms 
setting up on green field sites in Britain."(35)
The Japanese companies clearly appreciated the relationship between 
the question of trade union recognition and issues of cooperation and 
conflict. Although trade unions have a recognised cooperative effect 
on modern Japanese industry, they were imposed rather than voluntarily 
embraced after the end of the last World War. (36) In the 1920s and 30s 
they were often brutally suppressed despite a number of outstanding 
leaders such as the Marxist Kawakami Hajimi(37) and the Christian 
Toyohiko Kagawa.(38) The essential co-operative nature of Japanese 
trade unions must always be understood in the light of a common rash of 
short strikes fallowing the annual round of wage negotiations, popularly 
dubbed the "Spring offensive". (39) In other words, Japanese trade 
unions frequently find it necessary to display strength in order to 
maximise their interests in wage negotiations.
The situation of the two American owned factories was also of 
interest in this regard. Hewlett Packard had always been a non union 
company. Their total company philosophy, with its unashamed emphasis on 
individual development and implied individual competition, had clearly 
no room for trade unions.
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Burroughs had worked with unions. Their previous Scottish factory 
at Cumbernauld had been completely unionised. It had been conceived and 
developed in the 1950s when trade union membership in Britain was at its 
peak. Their Cumbernauld factory had been a large employer of craftsmen, 
traditionally highly unionised. At Livingston, the company had decided 
to recruit and operate the factory on the basis of no trade union 
recognition. The opening of the factory coincided with the period in 
which craft sectionalism began to decline through erosion of the 
apprenticeship system of training, the dilution of demarcations and the 
introduction of multi-skill training and multi-skill working patterns. 
Insofar as it could be claimed that North American culture with its 
emphasis on individual "freedoms" is unsympathetic to the concept of 
unionism, Burroughs had adopted at Livingston a more "American" approach 
to labour 2'elations. What effect, if any, was this having on the 
current labour force?
Interviewees at all six factories were exposed to a number of 
questions relating to trade unionism. Six shop stewards at Lemac and 
GEC were interviewed, as were also the six managers responsible for 
personnel or human resources in the six factories. When employees in 
the four non union factories were asked how they felt the enterprise saw 
trade unions, a variety of comments were made, for example, "They don’t 
agree with it", "They are against them", "They don’t like them", "They 
won’t have anything to do with them", and one said "I have no idea at 
all". The overall impression was of covert, and sometimes overt, 
hostility.
Even at Lemac, where four unions were recognised, 63% of all 
interviewees thought the company "tolerated" trade unions and the 
corresponding percentage at GEC was 53%. 32% at Lemac thought the
company saw trade unions as a "help in managing". Exactly half of this 
part of the sample were shop stewards and the other half managers. At 
the other four factories, only at Maxell (non union) did a significant 
number (75%) think that the company would tolerate trade unions. People 
in all six factories thought their company viewed trade unions as a 
"nuisance", and this was particularly true of responses at Burroughs. 
Similarly at Hewlett Packard, where the higher grade of labour force was 
clearly individualised, such a workforce was less likely to appreciate 
trade unions. In this respect, North American attitudes to trade
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unionism seemed to be paramount. That is not to say that it is a view 
necessarily shared by employees, although that was probably the case at 
Hewlett Packard.
Perhaps surprisingly, at GEC a significant 33% felt the company saw 
trade unions as a "nuisance" even although they had been present in the 
factory since the beginning. One of the shop stewards said "The new 
management (a reference to the influx of young managers) could see the 
unions far enough." A contributory factor was likely to be the 
disappointment at the role of the shop stewards in keeping the labour 
force informed. Most stewards were accused of being reluctant to pass
on information, "They meet for two or three hours and when they come
back to the line and you ask them what went on at the meeting they say 
’Nothing much'", said one disgruntled interviewee. Externally, as has 
been noted elsewhere, the company was facing a particularly difficult 
market situation. The management wanted to share the bad news, but not 
in such a way as to depress unduly the labour force.
A second factor was likely to be the frustration on the part of the 
"new management" at what were perceived to be trade union constraints on 
management prerogatives. Essentially, it is a view based on what Alan 
Fox calls a "unitary frame of reference". (40) It was apparently a 
recent reintroduction at GEC. In Maxell, Brother and Burroughs the 
unitary frame of reference seemed to be accepted implicitly by 
management. In some ways, Hewlett Packard also subscribed to this 
perspective. There was an awareness of being part of * one family, 
although the word was seldom used. On the other hand, there were 
elements also of extreme pluralism at Hewlett Packard, in the sense that 
employees were so individualised they were treated as separate "centres 
of authenticity" (41) for the purposes of payment and contribution to 
production.
Older employees at GEC indicated the factory regime had been 
pluralist in the sense of recognising a strong and central role for 
trade unions. It was the new young managers who were introducing the 
unitarist outlook. By describing unions as a "nuisance" there was 
implied inauthenticity with regard to their role. The dominant cultural 
view of management was that the owners, managers and supervised grades 
were all one, and that there were intrinsically those who gave orders 
and those who obeyed. Fox traces this attitude to the master/servant
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relationship which prevailed for centuries in many developed societies. 
Even this terminology was used until, in 1875, Master and Servant 
legislation became the Employers and Workmen Act. <42) Wot only was the 
role of trade unions regarded as inauthentic but their existence was 
perceived to imply a threat to cooperation. Those managers who were 
prepared to describe the trade unions as "a help in managing" presumably 
felt that there were some benefits in having trade unions.
Historically it is known that enterprises have appreciated the
ability of trade unions to impose discipline, particularly with respect 
to absenteeism and safety. Instead of negotiating de facto with every 
employee, as at Maxell, Brother and Hewlett Packard, employers have 
found it more efficient to negotiate with a small number of
representatives. There have been occasions where regionally or
nationally negotiated wage levels have assisted in the control of 
competition.
Experience at GEC appeared to indicate that the "ideology which has 
its origins far back in the historical texture of class, status and
power" <43) was reasserting itself in a changed economic climate. 
Since that economic climate was shared by the other five factories, the 
same ideology was there well established. Is this the case of the mode 
of production imposing a uniform cultural attitude? Probably not. The 
master/servant relation precedes feudalism. The modern capitalist mode 
of production divides people into two basic groups, managers and 
managed. There is immediately a structural sympathy with the older 
master/servant relation. By establishing apparently single status 
factories, the American and Japanese companies appear to have had some 
success in mitigating the more glaring anomalies of the older relations, 
whereby, for example, a relatively unskilled daughter of an artisan can 
find herself in the "master" category, enjoying some of the additional 
benefits therein, while her highly skilled and long serving father 
remains in the "servant" group. So ingrained are the basic relations, 
however, that Worth American and Japanese cultural attitudes in this 
regard appear to have made no impact on the British employee, whether he 
be manager or managed.
In short, in these six factories, trade unions are not very popular. 
One of the Japanese plants (Maxell) had, on the basis of those 
interviewed, a labour force in which more people thought the company
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tolerated trade unions than at GEC <75% and 53% respectively). Any such 
Japanese tolerance at Brother, however, was being successfully filtered 
out by the senior British management, so that the workforce opinions 
regarding company views of trade unions almost coincided with opinion in 
the two Worth American owned factories.
Employee pemeptionis__pf_teamworkingL
This section begins by repeating the results of the survey on 
employee perceptions of the work group from Chapter 3. It will be
recalled that interviewees were given a number of options from which to 
choose, a family, a football team, a number of different groups with 
different interests, or a collection of people simply thrown together at 
their place of work.
Table 47 shows which option people chose at each of the six 
factories.
Table 47. Employee Perceptions of the Work Group CBased on Table 41)
Maxell Brother Hewlett
Packard
Burroughs GEC Lemac
A family 94* 53 64 26 20 16
A football team 47 21 22 20 21
A number of different 
groups with different 
interests 14 22 13 21
A collection of people 
thrown together at the 
place of work _ _ _ 28 47 42
A group of friends 6 - - - -
* Percentage of those interviewed.
At Burroughs the familial factor was less significant than at 
Hewlett Packard. When both British owned factories are examined, the 
trend away from any Japanese familism is even more marked. At Lemac few 
saw the work group as a family, and even then one said the feeling 
prevailed "amongst only the older ones." One employee said "You are 
just a number here." Hotice the divergence of experience between 
employees at Burroughs and employees at Hewlett Packard. At Burroughs 
employees said "There is no particular stress on us to see ourselves as 
a team or a family." In this regard, Burroughs seemed to operate in a 
way similar to the two British owned factories. Furthermore, 
opportunities for consultation and the sharing of information are often
-178-
seen as a forum in which grievances can be aired. The Human Resources 
Manager at Burroughs described those opportunities as follows:
"We have monthly departmental meetings and we are extremely conscious of 
the need to speak with our people on a regular basis. Obviously the 
fact that we are a non union facility heightens the need to have those 
kind of meetings, and to this end we have regular monthly meetings 
where all employees in any department meet with the supervisor or the 
manager, an occasion the 'activity head' and perhaps even with myself. 
But generally there is a HR representative at the meeting. It's a forum 
for them to make suggestions as to how we can operate better. Hopefully 
any criticism will be constructive criticism, but generally it's a forum 
where they can air their grievances, if that's a way of describing it, 
and generally discuss their employment situation."
When monthly meetings of all employees in each section at Burroughs 
were held, people could attend or remain at work. "You can stay at your
work if you want to but I don't see many people wanting to do that" said
one employee. Another said "The firm really is a family because if we
don't pull together we will all be out of a job. In this particular
interviewee's section, inonthly meetings with management were still being 
held. They were being convened because of continuous pressure from the 
employees. "We don't let them (the monthly meetings) slip by" said the 
same employee. What seemed to be emerging here was a very pragmatic 
sense of belonging together rather than belonging to the company. It had 
the feel of a more authentic, even primitive sense of belonging in 
contrast to the more romantic views of belonging to the enterprise. 
Their sense of belonging had a purpose and it was the purpose element in 
belonging that "drove" the concept. They belonged together because it 
afforded an opportunity to air grievances and, in the end of the day, 
was thought to be necessary for economic survival. One also feels there 
was a certain maturity of outlook here in contrast to the somewhat naive 
acceptance that workers were all part of one large benevolent family, as 
stated by the company. Indeed, one other interviewee said "I hope they 
(management) see us as a family because everyone has to work together." 
This is very different from management saying to workers "You are part 
of a family", implying at the same time "You had better believe it". 
The inherent realisation amongst employees that there is real material
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advantage in being part of a family is likely to be of more value than 
management attempting to impose the concept on employees "from above".
In the former case the outcome has emotional roots more likely to 
sustain the concept in times of adversity. Indeed, there are numerous 
examples of the authentic awareness of belonging sustaining a
beleaguered labour force in the face of perceived massive threat from 
the enterprise, the market, and/or political and philosophical forces, 
upon jobs and future work, for example, British mineworkers during the 
1984-85 dispute. It is more likely that where the concept is imposed on 
a somewhat bemused labour force, in the face of adversity, it quickly 
melts away. It is known that Lemac's former owners, the American
company Ranco had attempted to induce a family awareness. Virtually no 
remnant of that awareness could be detected in the Haddington plant.
At Burroughs it seemed that, in a tighter labour market situation 
which prevailed when the factory at Livingston first opened some eight 
years ago, the concept of belonging to a family was imposed with a 
fairly high level of welfarism. In the slacker labour market of the
mid-80s, it could be argued there was less need to create worker
loyalty, either by welfare provision or by imposing a philosophy or by 
providing for consultation. In other words, the concept of the family 
is part of a wider package of mental and material provision that is no 
longer perceived to be essential to the production process and is 
therefore expendable when labour is relatively cheap and freely 
available. Hence the demise of the monthly section meetings, the 
withering away of social activities, the diminishing emphases, by the 
company, on the labour force as a family and the growing anxiety amongst 
some employees manifested by a dsire to see themselves belonging to a 
family for economic survival.
In fact, if the foregoing is a fair analyis of recent developments 
at Burroughs, it indicates that the company was performing in accordance 
with contemporary Horth European/American cultural mores which were 
engendering stressful responses from employees. The values which 
appeared to be propagated by management included the drive to atomise a 
whole range of human relationships and thereby contributed to what Paul 
Tillich calls the "bourgeois principle"". (44)
"The bourgeois doctrine of natural law not only broke down the forms 
of political domination, it also weakened and partly dissolved all
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remaining cultural bonds of a pre-bourgeois sort. The ties to the land 
were cut by the right to choose one’s own place or residence, the bonds 
to social rank by the abrogation of ancestral rights, bonds to race and 
region through the emergence of the centralised national state". (45)
The basic drive was to individualise people. Within the ranks of
management of many modern companies this process appears far advanced,
and usually works in favour of the corporate goals of the enterprise. 
That is, it maximises efficiency, productivity, turnover and profits. 
The Personnel Manager at Burroughs was a member of the six man
management team which effectually ran the Livingston factory. As far as 
he was aware, only two members of that team were in the habit of
exchanging occasional social visits. The remainder, while friendly
enough with each other and able to manage collectively with good human 
relations, had nevertheless little in common, apart from their work. 
They were essentially a team of individuals whose only common area of 
overlap was at their place of work. By contrast, the Japanese managers
and engineers at Maxell's Telford factory constituted a community of
people, a "little Japan" in a corner of England. Nor was this a
function merely of ex-patriot life. There is ample evidence to indicate
that in Japan managers' lives overlap both on site and off site in a way
which many Western people would feel perhaps a little oppressive. (46)
At the shop floor level Burroughs appeared to have discovered that 
the state of the labour market influences the efficacy of the drive to 
individualise people. When the labour market is tight, workers can be 
retained by disregarding the bourgeois principle and appealing to a pre­
bourgeois category, namely family. Such is the power of the concept it 
has the ability to appeal to radically primitive feelings of belonging 
and security. These can be exploited to hold a labour force together 
and to maximise output in the face of an acknowledged "enemy”, the 
competition.
When the labour market slackens the need for such an appeal
diminishes. The more modern bourgeois principle can be allowed to 
assert itself. The individualising of the total labour force becomes 
the more fruitful way of maximising production, efficiency, etc. The 
worker is "managerialised". The type of enterprise pressures and 
insecurities that many managers have always had to live with can be
imposed upon the managed employee. This was apparent amongst many of
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those interviewed at Burroughs. 79% admitted to thinking constructively 
and/or with interest of their job when off site, a typical management 
condition. Burroughs practice seems to be suggesting that this is more 
advantageous for the enterprise than retaining temporarily pre-bourgeois 
notions of family, especially when labour is freely available. The 
employee's need to belong can be ignored. It can be replaced by the 
more fundamental need for security and income. It is possible not only 
to move up Maslow's hierarchy of needs, it is also possible to move 
down!
When the situation at GEC and Lemac is examined it is clear that 
cultural influences more indigenous to contemporary Britain were also at 
work. At the macro level neither company made any attempt to induce a 
sense of belonging to a family. There was no published company policy, 
no newspaper, no verbal encouragement for employees to see themselves 
other than what they were, employees. At employee level, contractural 
type relations appeared to exist.
As already noted (47) when the enterprise is perceived to be 
failing to meet its side of the bargain, employee feelings towards 
fulfilling their side of the contract quickly evaporate, giving an 
immediate impression of ingratitude and emotional distancing from the 
enterprise. This reaction is fully in accordance with Alan Fox's 
definition of what he calls, following Max Weber, a "purposive contract"
(48). He writes "Only a tenuous and temporary association is created."
(49) The strength of the contract depends on rates of pay and 
conditions and perceived job security. At GEC and Lemac there was a 
sense of belonging which had the character of a reassertion of more 
original feelings of community in the face of the atomising influence of 
the relations of production. This was particularly the case amongst 
older employees who had spent most of their working lives at the 
Kirkcaldy and Haddington factories. For younger members, the separation 
of economics and ethics appeared to be more complete. The factory was 
simply a place where one's labour power could be sold. One employee 
spoke for many when she said "I would never dream of coming in and 
working for nothing. I would need to come in for money. I can't see it 
(working for nothing) happening here."
High levels of overtime therefore provided opportunities for 
maximising the return of the sale of labour power in the face of a
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future for employment that looked uncertain. While there was some 
welfare provision at GEC, Lemac provided only the basic statutory
minimum. In other words, little attempt was made to mask the purely
contractural nature of the employment relationship by encouraging bonds 
of loyalty or stimulating a sense of ethical obligation to the
enterprise, or superimposing upon the relations of production a
philosophy based on religion or ideology.
There is a certain attractive honesty and openness about this
approach to industrial relations. It has the merit of treating the
employee as an adult. Effectually it implies that a social life is the 
private concern of the individual and that health provision and leisure 
needs are obligations on a wider community rather than the employing 
company. It leaves the enterprise more "free" to maximise the surplus 
produced from the hire of labour power, the investment in plant and
machinery, and the marketing of the product.
This approach may be wholly attractive in a developed welfare
democracy. It would be very acceptable in a social milieu where people 
are treated fully as adults in all aspects of life together. It could 
be argued that from about 1960 to 1975 Britain had come closer to that 
goal than ever before in her history. The right to work was more 
entirely satisfied than at any time since the beginning of the 
industrial revolution.(50) The welfare state had quickly evolved to 
fulfil mast of the basic human needs from the cradle to the grave. 
Housing provision, while incomplete, was on target to satify most of the 
perceived need. It looked for a decade or so as though man had indeed 
come of age.
In Britain in the 1980s, the social situation has changed. The new 
political philosophy is returning to a radical emphasis on 
individualism. In this changed political and social milieu a new 
opportunity arises for the large work enterprise to reclaim some of the 
welfare provisions hitherto understood as the responsibility of the 
state.
In this respect the factories owned by GEC and Lemac at Kirkcaldy 
and Haddington had the appearance of places of work left over from the 
1960s. They appeared not to have the will to adapt to the new 
situation. In the case of Lemac the company may have felt it had not 
the financial resources to make the adaptation.
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So far, what is being said in this secion is that employees at 
Maxell, Brother and Hewlett Packard had virtually had a sense of 
belonging thrust upon them. At Burroughs the sense of belonging, if not 
destroyed, had been allowed to evaporate. At GEC and Lemac an original 
sense of belonging had arisen with very little overt stimulus from the 
companies. The issues of individualism and family which have arisen in 
this section will be pursued in Chapter 7. Superficially, the two 
Japanese owned factories were the most successful at inculcating 
familial feelings in the labour force, and the British owned factories 
were the poorest in this respect.
A number of industrial relations practices in the two Japanese 
factories strengthened the awareness of being part of a family. These 
included the use of first names, a uniform type of industrial clothing, 
the encouragement of social activities and gatherings after hours, high 
trust relations epitomised by lack of 'clocking on', gentle verbal 
encounter between management and supervised employee and, perhaps more 
importantly, a policy of no redundancies except for industrial 
misconduct.
Hewlett Packard also shared these practices but, for a number of 
reasons, acquired a family concept of the labour farce that was 
substantially different from the word 'family' as understood in the 
Maxell and Brother factories. At Hewlett Packard these practices had 
produced a family of individuals, as distinct from a homogenous family 
group. There were also signs of change at Hewlett Packard. Many of 
those interviewed spoke of a better 'atmosphere' at the factory a few 
years ago. "Once this factory was a family but now it is just a 
collection of people with different interests" said one employee. 
Several mentioned a change in management style from participative to 
authoritative in recent years. In fact, the one certain factor had been 
a downturn in the market for the product in these years, which was 
reflected in the Profit and Loss Account for 1985, in Table 48.
Table 48. Hewlett Packard Consolidated Profit and Loss Account for 1985.
For the year ended 31 October 1985 1985 1984
Note £000 £000
© TURNOVER 2 353,612 293,107
Cost of sales (283,444) (215,718)
Gross profit 70,168 77,389
Distribution costs (54,677) (46,331)
Administrative expenses (14,458) (11,647)
Operating profit 3 1,033 19,411
Interest receivable 1,909 474
Interest payable 6 (6,086) (2,247)
© (loss)/profit on ordinary activities before taxation (3,144) 17,638
Taxation on ordinary activities 7 1,152 (6,114)
© (loss)/profit on ordinary activities after taxation (1,992) 11,524
Extraordinary item 8 1,100 -
© (loss)/ profit for the year (892) 11,524
What this seems to indicate is that industrial relations are very 
much at the mercy of market forces or, rather, of how management react 
to market forces, especially when they are adverse. It seems to be 
relatively easy to engender feelings of comradeship when things are 
going well, but in difficult trading conditions, old prejudices are 
quick to reappear. "How some of the managers don't seem to care so much 
about what the workers think and feel" said one 40 year old employee. 
He felt the situation could be improved if management returned to the 
ethos of previous years, and added "There still seems to be a bit of a 
division between workers on the shop floor and, say, office staff. This 
exists although the factory is'supposed to be a one class area."
Conversely, the trading situation at the two Japanese factories was
very good and they had been relatively successful at inculcating a
feeling of belonging to a family in a short space of time. The hope had 
been expressed by the Managing Director. "Maxell (UK) Ltd is one
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family; all of those who give of their best and contribute to company 
success will have every opportunity for promotion". (51)
Generally speaking, employees at Brother were less convinced than 
those at the Maxell factory. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Brother was 
located in an ex-mining area and some perceptions of the parents were 
clearly present in their children. One interviewee said the perception 
of the labour force as a family "is just rubbish". A further 
complicating factor at Brother was the company's apparent inability to 
mask discrimination against women. This is an issue which goes to the 
heart of differences between Western and Japanese concepts of the 
family. Japanese society is still allegedly very male chauvinist. 
Family life in Japan has ostensibly been patriarchal in a way which is 
now largely absent in the West. (52) Any organisation practising 
discrimination against women in the West is likely to have great 
difficulty in persuading those same women that they are part of one 
large family. At Brother discrimination took the form of excluding 
women from supervisory posts. When a number of female employees were 
asked if they thought there was further opportunity for advancement in 
the company, they replied there was no such opportunity because "the 
Japanese discriminate against women". There were a number of female 
supervisors but in the early days of the factory, "the Japanese were 
keen to promote the men" into positions of supervision over the women. 
"They soon discovered that the women were better at the job than men" 
said one operator and they were forced to modify their policy and 
promote a number of women to supervisory roles. Another female employee 
said "The Japanese offered the group leaders' jobs to the boys but they 
were not up to it and so I was the next choice." The legacy of 
discrimination remained to the detriment of familial feelings within the 
labour force. Writing about discrimination against women in Japan, 
Pamela Briggs says "Women, out of all the Japanese workers, suffer most 
from the system, facing discrimination in almost all areas on 
employment." (53)The experience of the female employees at Brother would 
suggest that something of this discrimination has been imported to 
Britain.
It is clear that regardless of the views of the British personnel 
managers, the two Japanese companies had come to Britain with very 
definite views of the kind of work atmosphere they wished to establish
-186-
in the factories. (54) Where they had needed people with skills, these, 
few in number, had been recruited. When they wished to impart skills 
that were necessary to carry out the work and social skills considered 
desirable to operate a harmonious and efficient factory, they had been 
able exclusively to recruit young labour with little or no previous work 
experience. It was precisely this group that ostensibly, at any rate, 
had absorbed the factory culture based on a family concept. They were 
therefore quiescent, nonunionised, flexible, willing to work long hours 
of overtime, and conditioned to think exclusively of the monetary 
rewards of work rather than its social implications.
There were others. One of the supervisors who had spent some time 
in Japan spoke at length of a number of issues related to Japanese 
familism, the importance of status, identification with the company, and 
the relationship between career development and golf.
"Status is important for the Japanese" he said, "The status of 
senior people is reinforced by giving them more information. Information 
is power. This is part of the Japanese philosophy. They are supposed to 
be a society of equals but in fact it is a society where status and rank 
is very important. After a while you can go into a Japanese factory and 
get an idea of each person's rank by by the size of their desk, the kind 
of chair they sit on, and all sorts of small details around them. Quite
often we are here to eight o'clock at night. The Japanese just don't
understand the idea of overtime. They expect people to commit
themselves to the company and work until the day's work is finished. It 
is very difficult to explain to them why you want to go home at 4.30. 
Golf is very important to the Japanese. Jobs can be lost on the golf 
course. Promotion can depend on how you behave on the golf course. 
Anyone who is ambitious in Japan must play golf. To be invited to play 
golf with the senior manager is a very great honour."
The importance of status has already been examined. What can be 
said now is that it serves as a counter to the popular myth that
"family" means equality. Just as people are not equal in natural 
families, neither are they at the place of work. When the Japanese talk 
about "family" they bring with them a very substantial cultural view of 
the family that is in a number of respects quite different from Western 
conceptions of the family. One of these has already been mentioned, the 
role of women. Another which is raised again in this study is the
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question of ranking. There is a sense in which, in the Japanese family 
no one is equal. Everyone has a separate 'place'. Each 'place' is 
associated with a 'role'. 55) Throughout one's life that role, together 
with many other roles, must be enacted before one's contemporaries. 
What appears as quiescence, subservience or excessive humility in the 
West may be signs of strength, self control, and character in Japan.
A sharp illustration of some of the possible combined effects of 
Japanese views of status and the role of women was discernible in the 
feelings expressed by the English secretary of the Japanese managing 
director at Maxell. This lady, now in mid-life and therefore one of the 
oldest employees in the factory, said "You are not included in the work. 
If I had been the secretary of an English managing director I would know 
much more about the company and its work than I do here." She was 
consistently consulted about personnel issues and asked to look after 
visitors and the company house etc. In other words, in stereotyped 
female roles she was given almost complete autonomy, as is the wife
within the Japanese home. (56)
Japanese life is not a patriarchy in the sense of excluding 
women or necessarily giving them inferior roles. It does confine them 
to a very specific area, home and children, in which they have virtual 
autonomy. (57) Something of this matriarchalism pervades company life, 
not just in the role allotted to secretaries, but in the ethos of the 
company itself. The large company is in the role of a secular church in 
Japan, looking after employees and their families from the cradle to the 
grave. In the two Japanese factories there were vestigial signs of this 
essentially matriarchal view of the company. The employee who spoke of 
Japanese difficulty with the concept of overtime and the desire to go 
home at 4.30 pm was illustrating another consequence of seeing the
company as a family. In real families there is no "overtime", no time 
off, and no opting out even on a temporary basis. Neither, it appears, 
is there for core employees of large Japanese companies. Line operators
were expected to work 12 hour shifts when the need arose. Managers were
expected to work into the evening to complete administration work long 
after the production lines had stopped. In return, no one goes in want, 
even of a job.
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Ihg_inaii3gement .of. .conflict..a.t..wpr.k.
When interviewees in the six factories were questioned about the 
management of conflict at work, the most consistent views were held at 
Maxell and Hewlett Packard. In each factory only one person interviewed 
thought that conflict was only indirectly faced up to (at Maxell) or 
that it was hidden (at Hewlett Packard). All others thought that it was 
faced up to. Interviewees at Brother also exhibited a high degree of 
uniformity of opinion on the question of conflict. Only two thought 
that it was hidden rather than faced up to. At Burroughs, Lemac and 
GEC, 31%, 32% and 27% respectively, of those interviewed thought that
conflict was not faced up to, Of these percentages, approximately half 
thought that it was hidden, and half thought that conflict was ignored. 
It could be said that best Japanese practice and American practice 
coincides. The effects of two culturally differently approaches to the 
issue of conflict produce similar results. Where there is no company 
cultural construct at work in the area of conflict management, employees 
have much more ambivalent feelings about conflict, as in Burroughs, GEC 
and Lemac. A more complete picture of feelings about conflict at work 
is given in Table 49.
Table 49. 
Table 41. >
Employee Perceptions of Conflict at Work. (Extracted from
Maxell Brother Hewlett Burroughs GEC Lemac
Packard
Conflict
Faced up to 87* 88 93 68 73 68
Hidden 13 12 7 21 7 21
Ignored — — — 10 20 11
^Percentage interviewed.
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The issue was explored a little further by asking about the 
application of discipline and perceptions of management behaviour. 
Interviewees were given a number of options from which to choose to 
describe discipline in the factory. GEC and Lemac had the highest 
proportion of those interviewed who described the application of 
discipline as “erratic" (40% and 31% respectively). At the same time, 
33% at GEC and 32% at Lemac said the application of discipline was 
"fair" and/or "consistent"
Perceptions of management's fairness were higher in the foreign 
owned factories. In terms of this parameter, interviewees in two 
Japanese owned factories had comparatively more positive and consistent 
views of enterprise discipline than interviewees in either of the two 
American owned factories or the two British owned. It would appear that 
on this, admittedly very slim evidence, something of the Japanese 
cultural approach to discipline was having an effect on conflict and 
discipline. The cultural approach is described by W. M. Fox.
"A rational and open approach to issues is discouraged. Avoidance
of embarrassment and 'sharp cornered words' is almost always more 
important than a search for objective truth. It is felt that individual 
will and rational situational requirements should yield to group will. 
Therefore from the president down there is little in the way of creative 
decisive leadership. The best leader is the one who loves his company 
and can act as a reflector of the elements of wa (harmony) in his 
subordinates." (58)
The weakness in Table 49 is that it does not portray the wider 
spread of views of these issues amongst those interviewed at Burroughs 
and Hewlett Packard. In these factories some described discipline as
"spasmodic", "erratic" and "slack". Given the emphasis on individualism
in American culture the spread of views is probably to be expected. The
average age of labour in Hewlett Packard and Burroughs was also much
older than that at the two Japanese factories. Also, as already 
observed, many employees at Hewlett Packard were university graduates 
and could be expected to take a more cynical view of the management of 
conflict. At the bureaucratic level, discipline was managed by the use 
of employee handbooks in four of the six factories. Brother and GEC 
were the exceptions. The rules and regulations delineated in the
handbooks were very similar.
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Management knowledge of production
Employee perceptions of management technical skill were highest at 
Burroughs and lowest at Hewlett Packard. Product technology at 
Burroughs and Hewlett Packard may have contributed to these responses. 
Both were probably more advanced than any technology in the other four 
factories. At Hewlett Packard interviewees reflected the high 
proportion of graduates on design and research who would feel few 
managers could contribute directly to their work. At Burroughs the 
knowledge of the more complex product technology was clearly held by 
managers perhaps than at GEC, Lemac, Maxell and Brother.
Job, ...trjBlnln g  a nd-.j-ob._mt at Lon
Job training in terms of "general" or "specific" was very similar 
across the six plants, with interviewees at Maxell being more generally 
trained than elsewhere, and experiencing more regular job rotation. 
Only at Lemac was there a significant lack of interest in widening job 
skill.
Overall what is being said is that there were some differences in 
attitudes to work and perceptions of management between the foreign 
owned factories and the British factories and between the Japanese 
factories and the American factories. They need not all have arisen as 
a result of foreign ownership and management. Length of time the 
factory had been established was obviously a contributory factor, as may 
also have been regional variations in the job market, eg. , relatively 
slack at Livingston and tight at South Queensferry. Nevertheless, a 
comparative picture has been established with some interesting 
differences. The task is now to examine those differences in terras of 
broader, more permanent cultural and social mores at work. That is, a 
move must now be made from historical observation and comparison to 
analysis.
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SOCIALISATIOF AMD ITS IIPACT OM THE WORK EMVIRQIKEMT, 
ATTITUDES AT WORK AMD _PERCEPTIQMS OF MAIAGEMENT.
"Managerial reality is not an absolute; rather, it is socially 
and culturally d e t e r m i n e d Pascale and Athos.
The preceding two chapters have been comparative, quantitative and 
descriptive. They have catalogued the working conditions which the 
owners have provided, and employee responses in terms of job 
satisfaction, performance at work, perceptions of managements, etc. In 
order to address the questions which have given rise to the programme it 
is necessary to move the analysis to another plane, to produce the 
beginnings of a theory to account for the differences observed in 
working conditions and employee responses, and the relationship between 
them. Before doing so, at least one preliminary is necessary, ie. , to 
outline briefly the factors which govern the shape and provision of 
working conditions.
Some factors which govern the shape and_provision of workingconditions,.
These factors can be divided generally into at least two types, 
objective and subjective. The objective factors are "given", eg., 
climate, type of product, length of service of the factory and cost of 
provision working conditions. Clearly the most objective of these 
factors is that of climate. All the others are open to some 
manipulation.
The subjective factors are, perceived expectation of employees, the 
values and expectations of the incoming investors, the expectation 
generally accepted in the host country and actual expectations of 
employees.
a) Qbi.esA i v&..Xa.Q.t..Qr-S _.a£ie.Qt ing.-£M— sgMitlons
Climate. Since all six factories of the study were in the United 
Kingdom this factor need not concern the research per se. All six 
needed to protect the employee against the same set of natural 
conditions, particularly in terms of temperature changes.
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Type of product. The factories were chosen partly on the grounds of 
similarity of product. While each of the products of the six factories 
was essentially of the clean assembly of parts type of manufacture, each 
also involved the use of dirtier, heavier machine tools and processes on 
the same site, eg., plastic extruders at Maxell and Brother, stamping 
machines at Hewlett Packard and Burroughs, soldering type operations at 
GEC and aluminium casting and machining of small parts, eg., spindles at 
Lemac.
In almost every case this had meant some division in working 
conditions between a clean area and a dirty area. The exception was at 
Hewlett Packard where the stamping machines vie re run under the same roof 
as that covering the rest of the labour force. By and large, with the 
type of product these six factories were producing, it was possible to 
provide clean, noise free, dust free, well lit environments.
Length of service of the factory, Ceterus paribus, older factories are 
likelier to have poorer working conditions than new factories. In terms 
of age, the six factories of the study are listed thus, with the date of 
opening in parenthesis: Lemac <1963) ; GEC (1966) ; Hewlett Packard
(1978) ; Burroughs (1981) ; Maxell (1983) ; Brother (1984).
Cost of provision gfL__york i The amount of money the
employer intends to spend on working conditions will clearly determine 
their quality. This will range from the initial provision Df the 
factory and its facilities to pay related issues such as sick leave, 
holiday entitlement, pension provision and fringe benefits. Naturally 
the cost burden of working conditions was not the same across the six 
factories. The differences will be discussed in the following chapters.
b) Subjective factors affecting working conditions.
Perceived expectation of employees. The foreign owner is likely to 
be unwilling to provide working conditions significantly better than 
those generally enjoyed by comparable groups of employees in the host
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country. The usual argument in favour of this policy is that it avoids 
destabilising wages and conditions in the host economy.
Industrial expectations of._ihe incoming investors. The incoming
investor is likely to have a complete set of industrial relations 
expectations based largely on practice in his own country. He will not 
necessarily replicate these conditions in the host country but they are 
bound to remain for him comparators, especially in assessing costs. His 
industrial relations expectations will also have influenced the original 
decision to invest in that particular country.
The expectations generally accepted in the host country. In a 
developed industrial nation these will be enshrined in a body of
legislation comprising rules and regulations anent safety and good 
working practice that have accumulated over time. In practice, the 
foreign investor may rely on the personnel manager drawn from the host 
country to interpret these expectations and to ensure that the company 
remains within them.
Actual expectations of employees. Actual employee expectations of 
working conditions may vary from incoming investors' perceptions of
these and from the generally accepted norm for an industry depending
largely on labour market conditions and perhaps on associated regional 
variations. In slack labour market conditions employees may be willing 
to accept poorer working conditions than in a tight labour market 
situation. The importance of working conditions is that they set the 
tone for industrial relations. Although industrial relations is
primarily human relations, people directly form the subjective factors 
of working conditions and influence indirectly most of the objective 
factors (climate excepted). ¥e now turn to the main substance of this 
chapter.
i
The difference in working conditions and employee responses.
These have been summarised and tabulated in Tables 1 to 11, and 
Tables 27 to 43. The question now is, why these differences? Thus far 
the differences in attitudes at work, including perceptions of 
management and the provision of working conditions have been noted using 
features available to observation and quantification, eg. , Job 
satisfaction, absenteeism, timekeeping, overtime working, preceived 
levels of management fairness, the grading of facilities and the quality 
of provision of working conditions, etc. Unfortunately these features 
are qualitatively different and cannot be compared one with the other.
To pursue the first two of the thesis’ objectives(see Chapter 1.), 
theoretical explanation of the reasons for the differences must be 
developed. Such theorising must aim to explain how differences, eg., in 
attitudes at work in the three pairs of factories, are related to 
perceptions of management and the provision of working conditions in the 
three pairs of factories. The thesis is based on the assumption that 
cultural values i.e., "the generally accepted underlying standards or 
principles by which social and individual goals in that society are 
chosen and the criteria by which ends and means are judged and 
evaluated” (1),offer a rich resource from which to extract an explanatory 
theory for the differences. While this view appears somewhat out of 
favour with some industrial relations scholars (Thurley, Trevor and 
Worm(1981>, and White and Trevor(1983)), there are a number of Japanese 
researchers (Sasaki(1981>, Morishima(1982)), and American researchers 
(Pascale and Athos(1983), Alston(1986)), who recognise a role for 
cultural values in industrial relations without explicitly formulating 
their intuitive convictions into a comprehensive theory of the 
explanation of the variations in industrial relations practices and 
particularly with regard to foreign owners and managers operating in one 
country.
The empirical and comparative base of the approach to this challenge 
will be maintained but the information will be interpreted in the light 
of what is known of cultural values that are considered to have the most 
immediate impact on the differences being studied. While it is 
recognised that there is an unavoidable introduction of subjectivity at
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this point, its impact on the analysis is minimised by occasional 
references to the wider industrial relations context of the six
factories.
The first question of the programme was, how does the national
cultural context of the employers influence employment practice in the 
foreign country ? By way of an answer, the three basic sections arising 
from the interview schedules, ie., provision of the working environment, 
attitudes at work, and perceptions of management are discussed. While 
technology influences all three, the basic contention of this thesis is 
that they are fundamentally culturally determined. The comparative 
empirical information will continue to have a central place in the 
analysis, but it will be set within the wider framework of cultural
constructs as these are understood with respect to Japanese society,
Forth American society and British society.
To answer the question, some aspects of the relationship between 
socialisation, i.e., the process of social learning that leads to the 
adoption of common perspectives, and the provision of the physical work 
environment at the six factories will be examined in order to tease out 
the reasons for the differences in the light of cultural values 
influencing the shape of the work environment. Secondly, socialisation 
and attitudes at work will be examined. In order to give this part of 
the analysis as hard an empirical focus as possible, grievance and 
consultative procedures in particular are analysed. These have been 
chosen because attitudes at work have been traditionally enshrined in 
these areas so that they reflect not merely the current attitudes but 
also traditional attitudes. Finally in this section, styles of 
management are discussed together with worker perceptions of management 
and the relationships between these and the three national cultures of 
the study.
Single status and open plan working,
Preconceptions on the part of owners and managers have determined, 
along with economic criteria, the physical conditions in which the 
labour forces are employed and the ways in which they are structured and
organised. Writing ostensibly about 18th century factory architecture, 
Jennifer Tann says ’’Like domestic architecture (it) must be centred in 
the context of the thoughts fears aspirations and political views of the 
person who was responsible for the building in question. To ignore the 
social context of factory architecture or to study a building in 
isolation is meaningless."(2) These preconceptions will inevitably be 
culturally determined, i.e., determined by the values commonly 
associated with a particular national culture, as well as influenced by 
the made of production.
Like Hewlett Packard the two Japanese plants were largely open plan 
and ostensibly single status. The Japanese differed in at least one 
significant respect. At Hewlett Packard and also at Burroughs workers 
were actively encouraged to pursue further education and it was made 
clear that educational achievement was an important element in 
promotion. By contrast, the two Japanese companies discouraged further 
education by requiring lengthy overtime working from virtually the whole 
labour force, by an emphasis on in-house training and, most importantly, 
by implying that promotion beyond supervisor level was a remote 
possibility far the majority.
On reflection, this may not appear to be as surprising as at first 
sight. While there is intense competition at school in Japan, that
educational competition declines in university and ceases once people 
gain the payroll of large companies. At that stage it could be argued a 
new form of competition takes place, the competition albeit submerged in 
the group and long term in its consequences, for promotion based largely 
on willingness to work long hours for the company, and of course ability 
in furthering company interests. There appears to be little sense of
enhancing the employee's human capital once he or she has joined the
payroll. This accords with practice at Maxell and Brother whereby 
individuals were actively encouraged to see themselves as members of the 
company. In other words, the incorporation of employees into the
company as members rather than highly educated individuals may have 
cultural roots in the Japanese emphasis on the centrality of the group.
The issue of apparent single status is one of the main differences 
between the foreign owned plants and the two British plants. The 
importance of the issue lies not with single status per se, but with the
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assumptions behind single status, particularly assumptions related to 
class. In this respect only Hewlett Packard appeared to be nearest 
truly single status and nearest a true meritocracy at plant level. GEC 
and Lemac continued the separation of blue and white collar workers 
right across the board, as has been seen with respect to working hours, 
sick pay arrangements, pension provision, physical conditions etc., and 
as will be seen again in subsequent analysis. The two Japanese 
companies separated blue and white collar workers not so much in terms 
of pay and conditions, but obliquely, indirectly, more subtly, on the 
basis of qualifications and even sex and age.
Clearly practice in this regard has important connotations for 
labour flexibility. The Japanese have wanted to eliminate the
traditional demarcations between blue and white collar workers, skilled 
and unskilled workers, and production and maintenance. At Telford and 
Wrexham they had been almost entirely successful in eliminating the
first two and partially successful in eliminating the third.
GEC and Lemac maintained all three sets of demarcations and, while 
Hewlett Packard and Burroughs had gone a long way to eliminating the 
first two, they had not been able to integrate the maintenance function 
into production.
In theory the elimination of the skilled/unskilled distinction in
the four foreign owned plants had allowed the transfer of labour to a
wide variety of work. In practice, there must be some doubt about the 
reality of this claim. Certainly people could be transferred to any one 
of a number of jobs on the production line as eg., at Maxell. But this
was also done at GEC and in fact represented no breach of the
skilled/unskilled distinction. People did not appear freely to move
from, say, operating machine tools, to production assembly work, or from 
testing and fault finding to assembly. In other words the old two-fold 
system seemed to allow as much flexibility or transferability with the 
two traditional categories as under the so-called new system. The new 
system may have differed from the old by allowing some
interchangeability between traditional skills rather than between 
skilled and unskilled. In fact the new system as operated in the four 
foreign owned factories may have eliminated a bipartisan distinction and 
replaced it by a multi-partisan arrangement of skills, packers, machine
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operators, testers, inspectors, assemblers etc. Does this actually 
represent an increase in labour flexibility? It may do so only at the 
cost of fairly intensive in-house training as at Maxell. But even this 
cost is merely replacing the cost of training apprentices in traditional 
skills. The more likely benefits for the firm are not so much labour 
flexibility but reduced training costs (cf. say, a three to five year 
apprenticeship) and a flexible reskilled worker whose skills are much 
more company specific than would have been the case, and who is 
therefore more locked into employment with the firm than might hitherto 
have been the case. This is no doubt a factor in the rigid labour market 
in Japan and must surely tend towards making the British labour market 
more rigid as these practices become more widely accepted. This in turn 
must pose a threat to rising real wages and if it becomes widespread, 
may in the long run effect that reduction in real wages that was 
originally anticipated as a result of high levels of unemployment. In 
other words unemployment alone may not be enough to drive down wages so 
long as those left in employment have skills that are applicable to a 
wide number of companies. By making people's skills company specific as 
at Maxell and Brother in particular, the real effect, as distinct from 
the potential effect of high levels of unemployment, can be made to 
operate on wage levels to the advantage of the employer. The fact that 
Maxell's real wages had declined since start-up may be a symbol of 
things to come, and in the end of the day, the real meaning and value of 
"flexible working".
Turning to open plan working, it seems always to have been the norm 
in production areas. The reason for enclosing a work area is likely to 
be either security, the need to confine pollutants or the demand for a 
super-clean environment. While there is a long tradition of open plan 
working in offices it is an issue that is still capable of arousing 
heated debate, and has found new currency in many modern office designs. 
One of the American owned factories (Hewlett Packard) and the two 
Japanese owned companies of this study had fully open plan working in 
the office areas. In a fairly recent publication on the subject, 
Kraemer, Sieverts and Partners contend that "Almost all professional 
office planners are supporters of the open plan office."(3) The 
technical advantages are, equipment can be located for easy reach,
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improvement of communications, encouragement given to closer contact 
between managers and managed, reduction of fruitless visits to others, 
optimal use of space, flexibility, reduction of costs and equality of 
working conditions. The disadvantages are, an increase in the 
difficulty of concentrating due to distractions, people are more likely 
to interfere or annoy others, loss of confidentiality, the feeling of 
always being under observation, unsatisfactory air conditioning systems 
and continuous use of artificial light.The major social advantage for 
companies is the increase of contact between people and management and 
between management and subordinates, facilitating various styles of 
management which are discussed later in this chapter.
Where there is an overt philosophy, as in Forth American and 
Japanese enterprises, towards projecting a team or family image of the 
labour force, that which maximises opportunities for people to meet is 
obviously more apposite. Open plan layout has the additional advantage 
of using group dynamics to suppress agressive verbal contact and 
ostensibly enhance harmony. As indicated in Chapter 4, this is 
particularly valued by the Japanese, even when it appears to Western 
eyes that conflict is merely being repressed. The group dynamic effect 
is also likely to enhance productivity as there are fewer opportunities 
for "hiding" in an open plan layout and, as already noted, a 
psychological awareness of being under observation.
Conversely, the desire to be shut off from other people so that 
contact can be to a greater extent controlled, and to be surrounded by a 
psychologically defensive space, seems to belong to a more British view 
of human behaviour that has its roots in individualism, the need for 
privacy and freedom from constraint, a desire to control and perhaps 
minimise contact with other people, freedom to slack or simply read the 
paper without the feeling of continuous supervision, and value placed on 
secrecy and confidentiality. Underlying these roots are concepts
related to guilt (the work ethic), justice (no supervision and some 
privacy and confidentiality), and love (has difficulty in extending 
beyond the obvious and immediate neighbour).
The wcommodlfication of space" and the question of .single, status
Giddens reminds readers that Marx's concept of commodification 
extends also to space. (4) In feudal societies, space was conceived as 
an unalterable given physical framework, apparently "owned" in part, but 
essentially common. Under capitalism it became a commodity to be bought 
and sold like any other commodity.(5) At Hewlett Packard and Burroughs 
it was used as a costing datum. Factory productivity was measured in 
terms of dollars per square metre of floor space. Comsequently, the one 
complaint of employees in both of these factories was of their cramped 
working conditions. Many people said "We could do with more room to 
work in ".
De facto this was one of the few signs of a breach in company 
philosophy at Hewlett Packard. The company alleged that it put people 
first and considered their employees as their greatest asset.(6) Yet 
their basic accounting standard put the welfare of employees in some 
jeopardy.
Presumably the base of square meterage was chosen since it remains 
constant over time and, given the relentless rise in land prices, is 
likely to be an appreciating asset. Crowther and Carrahan calculate a 
substantial potential profit to Missan by the purchase of land around 
their new plant near Sunderland. "We estimate this non-industrial land 
price to be in the region of £1800 per acre. In the 'onwards sale’ we 
can assume that lissan is in a position to charge at least the current 
price in the region from prime industrial development land which is of 
the order of £20,000 per acre."(7)There are, of course , other reasons 
for this which will be described later in the thesis.
A base in terms of money invested would need continual adjustment to 
take account of the fluctuating value of currency. A more common 
measurement of output is to compute output in terms of people employed. 
Presumably Hewlett Packard had ignored this option on the basis of its 
stated policy of no redundancies.(8) Commenting on the company he calls 
Comco, Peter Cressey says "This accepted practice (of no redundancies) 
is one which management insists has not been breached. In fact 
according to the MD, the only thing he could be dimissed for was if 
redundancies were to happen in the Edinburgh plant. This policy he
said, had a number of implications for employee and management 
relations. First, it has made managers more responsible for their 
actions. Without the easy fallback of staff losses they had to be better 
managers, more cautious in their targeting, costing and performance. It 
also meant that recruitment was a very important area. If you could not 
make anyone redundant then one had to be right in one's selection the 
first time. But more importantly he said that with an entrenched no 
redundancy policy this produced a secure atmosphere in which bad news as 
well as good news could be transmitted with plain candour." (9)
It also means that the temptation to improve productivity by 
reducing the labour force is no longer an option. It might be argued 
that cramped working conditions is a relatively small price to pay for 
jab security. The net result is curious in this respect also, that a 
company turning over millions finds itself in the position of stressing 
its labour force for the sake of a very modest, one-off expenditure on 
additional space. It could be argued that packing people close together 
at work is more likely to induce not only a sense of belonging, but a 
feeling of common endeavour and hard work, all for the benefit of the 
company and presumably outweighing any irritation arising from cramped 
working conditions. Indeed, while the farmer is likely to have an 
economic cost benefit, the latter is likely to incur a cost 
disadvantage. Perhaps a more satisfactory conclusion is that this was a 
company with exceptionally tight accounting procedures. Ouchi writes "A 
Japanese professor of acounting, a brilliant scholar trained at 
Carnegie-MelIon University, who teaches now in Tokyo, remarked that the 
status of accounting systems in Japanese industry is primitive compared 
to those in the United States."(10) Most Forth American companies have 
two accounting systems, the more detailed of which measures every 
financial aspect of "transactions between departments, divisions and key 
individuals in the organisation for the purpose of untangling the inter- 
dependancy between people".(11) Hewlett Packard appeared to belong to 
this particular genre of company. At the end of the day the comfort of 
the workforce was subservient to the need to control costs.
A further feature of the commodification of space was particularly 
apparent at Maxell and Brother. As already noticed, the complete 
absence of windows in the production area and the entirely artificial
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environment represented an ultimate separation of people from the 
natural environment. Thus Giddins can write "In all pre-capitalist
societies, human beings lived close to nature - and in many cultures 
have conceived of themselves as participating in the natural world in 
ways that have become completely alien in the West. But the built 
environment of capitalist societies draws a radical separation between 
human life and nature. This is the case in the first instance in the 
capitalistic workplace, in which both the character of the labour task 
and the physical setting of the factory or office sever human beings 
from the influence of the soil, weather, or cycle of the seasons. The 
situating of the workplace in an urban milieu of commodified space,
moreover, strongly reinforces this. Most of us today spend most of our 
lives in settings that are almost wholly of human manufacture." (12) In 
this respect the two Japanese factories and Burroughs differed from
Hewlett Packard. Hewlett Packard did claim to have abolished the 
distinction between the "plush office and the noisy workshop".(13) 
Everyone shared the same environment and similar conditions. At the 
other three factories and, indeed in the two British factories,
conditions varied between production and administration. Cressey*s 
managing director at Comco "went on to criticise the form of 
paternalistic and class based system of management that he saw in
Scotland, the double standards and mediocrity of it. The plant at 
Edinburgh had inaugurated a classless system based on equality of
treatment of employees in all things beyond gradings. Therefore the 
production employee was not singled Dut for evaluation, for bonus 
schemes, for dirtier conditions or for separate canteens, toilets etc. 
Everyone has the same conditions. Once more the effect was to
strengthen the non-institutionalised system. With little of the double 
standards and unequal treatment in staff practices, another leg of
workforce representation falls." (14) Here he is making the point that 
the radical single status option diminishes the need for alternative 
employee representation. Significantly this was a need that was not 
felt to be entirely removed at Burroughs, Maxell and Brother compared 
to feelings at Hewlett Packard. These were summarised succinctly by one 
supervisor who said "There is no discussion about trade unions here and 
no role for them."
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Certainly at Hewlett Packard a number of traditional employee
concerns appeared to have been addressed if not entirely dealt with to 
the employee's satisfaction, eg., job security, job status, fairness of 
wages and conditions between employees, participation in decision making 
(albeit not through traditional structures), pace of working, autonomy 
at the workplace and even "involvement in a collective identity"(15).
This last point will be dealt with more fully in Chapter 6 as it is of 
central importance to the whole discussion of culture in the workplace.
Burroughs, Maxell and Brother had not embraced single status working
as thoroughly as Hewlett Packard. Conditions for the office staff were
a little better than those for production workers in that they could at 
least see the world outside the factory. There were, of course, other 
subtle ways in which the single status concept had been modified,eg. , 
overtime payments for some, expectations placed on managers, and the 
size and position of desks for senior personnel etc.
It would be tempting to interpret the desire for single status in 
terms of a moral understanding of the basic equality between people. In 
reality, the adoption of single status does give those who have embraced 
it a moral angle with which to justify its adoption. Hence the managing 
director who spoke of the "paternalistic class based system of 
management that he saw in Scotland, the double standards and the 
mediocrity of it". It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that 
single status working had resolved class division at work. As already 
observed, the distinction between those who received payment for working 
overtime and those who did not, remained, as did distinctions such as 
company cars, and share holding schemes. Its retention as a management 
method, therefore, is likely to have an economistic base. Companies 
which have adopted single status are convinced that ultimately it 
increases profitability by producing a more flexible labour force by 
eliminating internal sectional divisions between skills.
In the factories of the study, single status was closely associated 
with non-unionism. The argument seems to be, and this is probably the 
real reason for its adoption, if employees are all basically equal with 
equal rights and privileges why do some need trade union representation? 
What is almost entirely ignored is that single status working is 
essentially about how people are designated and some would say,
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manipulated. Management prerogatives remain intact and control is more 
firmly in the hands of management. That is, the managed employees have 
paid a price for single status in terms of relinquishing any claims to 
"regulate, limit and even displace aspects of capital's control of the 
labour process,"(16) Specifically, rates of working, hours of working, 
rates of pay, competition between individuals and between teams, are all 
in the hands of management, as was particularly the case at Maxell and 
Brother, so that their labour farces have no protection other than the 
economic viability of the factory. In this regard they seem to be models 
of the new factory working for the 80s.
Finally single status working is geared to producing a cooperative 
labour force by maximising trust and employee output. Employee
reflections seem to confirm that where people are apparently treated as 
equals the cost in improved working conditions and perhaps fringe
benefits is more than compensated for by an awareness of enhanced 
valued?) and therefore dignity and even a sense of obligation to the 
employer(18) that is calculated to maximise loyalty. The conditions for 
greater effort and increased output have therefore been optimised.
Philosophically and theologically it has always been known that people 
generally respond in a way commensurate to the way in which they are 
treated by others. Hence the 'golden rule', "Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you", and the Jewish/Christian interpretation 
"Love your neighbour as yourself". Where religious and ethical teaching 
can be demonstrated to induce a reasonably profitable result it will be 
heartily embraced by capitalism. That it happens to coincide with 
private convictions of many managers, in particular, is an added bonus. 
The association of the 'golden rule* with capitalistic self interest, 
was a central conviction for the Mew England journalist and writer
Edward Bellamy, whose vision of public capitalism aroused widespread 
interest at the turn of the century. Perhaps the last word in this 
section should be left with him. "Edith introduced me to the 
superintendent of one of the factories, a handsome woman of about 40 
years. She very kindly showed us about and explained matters to me, and 
was much interested in turn to know what I thought of the modern 
factories and their points of contrast with those of former days. 
Naturally, I told her that I had been impressed, far more than by
anything in the new mechanical appliances, with the transformation in
the condition of the workers themselves  On the other hand, when, as
in your day, a class like your private capitalists, who did not share 
the work, nevertheless settled how it should be done, it is not 
surprising that the conditions of industry should have been as 
barbarous as they were, especially when the operation of the competitive 
system compelled the capitalists to get the most work possible out of 
the workers on the cheapest terms.'1 (19)
Grievance and consultative procedures
A major area of potential grievance is the question of earnings, 
bonuses, wage payment systems and the division of profits between 
company, shareholders and employees.
Differences in practice with regard to the purchase of shares 
emerged. The Japanese owned companies gave no preferential access to 
share purchase to their British employees, whereas both the American 
owned factories had a number of attractive share purchase schemes 
available to employees. The Hewlett Packard scheme was described by the 
Personnel Manager as follows:
"There is a profit sharing scheme open to anyone after being with the 
company for six months. There are two schemes. The first scheme is 
profit sharing, and when an individual has been with the company for six 
months he can share in that scheme. It's designed so that people who 
work hard for the company and make it profitable can get a piece of the 
action, so to speak. What happens is, as a total company worldwide, we 
set aside 12% of pre-tax profits to distribute to employees as profit 
sharing. So that if you add up the salaries of all the people employed 
for more than six months and divide that into the pool of money, that 
comes out as a percentage. The individual gets that percentage of their 
salary as profit sharing. It gets paid in two halves, one in June and 
one in December. Typically, it's in the range of, say, 7%. This year 
it's 5 and a bit, which means an individual gets 7% of their six month 
salary in June and 7% of six months salary in December. You have the
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option to take that either in cash or in shares. If you take it in 
shares then it's tax efficient to the extent that if you hold on to it 
for three years, the tax comes down a bit, and eventually after five or 
seven years they are completely tax free. If you take it as cash it is 
income. Ve also have a stock purchase plan where people can buy shares 
in the company at preferential prices - 25% discount. An individual can 
save up to 10% of his salary on this scheme."
At least two points are immediately apparent. Firstly, while the 
Personnel Manager may have believed that the profit sharing scheme was 
designed to reward those who had worked hard for the company, in 
practice it rewarded all who had been employed by the company for more 
than six months.
Secondly, as a result of the above point, the "reward" in effect 
came as a bonus on salary twice a year, This was almost identical to 
the lump sum bonus system common in large Japanese companies in Japan. 
In Japan an entirely different cultural argument is used in support of 
the practice. Where the argument in Hewlett Packard was said to be 
grounded on the promotion of individual endeavour, in Japan it is 
alleged to support the need for personal savings, to meet the expenses 
of educating a family and buying a house. >
That employees are paid partly on a regular basis and partly in the 
form of a lump sum has a number of advantages for the employer. A 
significant amount of revenue can be invested to yield an income in the 
period between lump sum payments. The employee is put under additional 
pressure to remain with the company since part of the wage due to him is 
effectively in the future. A significant element of wage costs can be 
tied directly to profitablility, etc.
The large American companies who probably initiated this practice, 
defend or "sell" it to the labour force on the basis of individual work 
effort, which accords with the general thrust of American culture. 
Since this is not a recognised desirable emphasis in Japan, the Japanese 
take the same practice and "sell" it to employees on the basis of 
personal savings for basic commodities such as education and housing. 
In other words, they take clearly advantageous economic practices and 
present them in terms that are culturally acceptable in Japan. Practice 
in some American companies and large Japanese companies is the same, but
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presented in ways that are different to suit a different cultural 
context.
It has to be remembered also that the saving element is not entirely 
ignored by American companies. After all, saving money is not by any 
means unique to Japan. The stock purchase plan at Hewlett Packard was 
described as a means of saving up to 10% of salary. The scheme at 
Burroughs was described similarly. "There is a stock purchase plan the 
company operates for employees who have been with the company one year. 
They can elect to allocate up to 10% of their salary to buying stacks 
and shares. They qualify to buy shares at 85% of the market price." GEC 
also gave an annual opportunity to employees to purchase shares in the 
company, but placed strict limits on the amount available at any one 
time. Lemac did not operate an employee stock purchase scheme.
The argument in favour of promoting share purchase or share 
acquisition in an enterprise often seems to turn upon the question of 
promoting employee identification with company interests. This 
identification is valued as a means of contributing to employees co­
operation and minimising conflict of interest between shareholder and 
employee by converting the latter into the former. From the analysis of 
the questionnaires (see Table 37) that sense of identification seemed to 
be approximately equal amongst the labour forces of the two Japanese
owned factories and the two American owned factories. In Maxell it 
appeared to be greater and, in Burroughs, less than the other three.
Yet, the two Japanese owned factories, as is general in Japan, did not 
encourage the purchase by employees of company shares, and the two
American owned companies did.
Insofar as employee shareholding is part of American industrial 
culture, it appears to be having a cultural impact internally within 
the enterprise. Stronger alternative conditioning features within 
Japanese companies must be at work achieving more fully the results that 
promoters of employee share holding attribute to that practice.
Furthermore, the class and age differences between say Hewlett
Packard employees and Maxell employees were likely to be factors in 
assessing responses to incentives. The main notice board at Hewlett 
Packard's South Queensferry plant held a daily bulletin on the price of 
company shares on the Wall Street stock exchange in dollars and pounds
- 213 -
sterling. It was unlikely that Maxell's working class teenagers would 
have been as excited by this type of information as Hewlett Packard's 
older and more middle class employees, although there is no intrinsic 
reason why Maxell's teenage labour force could not have become
interested in the price of company stock.
The conclusion must surely be that Maxell and Brother did not want 
their young labour force to take an interest in stock. It is already 
known that large Japanese companies in Japan do not encourage
shareholding and indeed that the shareholder interest in company
ambience is virtually ignored in comparison to companies in the Vest. 
Maxell and Brother are not interested in promoting long term commitment 
to the company, but short term commitment. A whole different set of 
techniques was therefore being used in which there was no room for a 
stock purchase plan or for a profit sharing scheme.
As already observed, the annual bonus concept was also not invoked. 
Its individualistic basis in personal endeavour was perceived to be 
undesirable. The emphasis was on team working and team endeavour. With 
the absence of the wider cultural/community reason for saving there 
appeared to be no good reason either for annual bonuses or for the 
savings/loans schemes which were operating in the two American owned 
factories and in the two British owned factories.
The variation between Japanese practice in Japan and Japanese 
practice in Britain appears to substantiate one of White and Trevor's 
findings that the Japanese management is above all "flexible and 
pragmatic".(20) Where immediate social considerations do not justify 
the expense of importing a Japanese social need, the practice is 
abandoned.
Since education and housing are comparatively accessible to all in 
full time paid employment, the rationale for encouraging employee saving 
must have less important motives, not sufficiently important for the 
Japanese to adopt employee saving as part of the personnel practice of 
the company. Indeed, it is likely that employee saving schemes, as in 
Japan, are a function solely of a particular social situation. 
Elsewhere they are a problematic appendage to what Bell calls "the 
cultural contradiction of capitalism". (21) It is not in the 
capitalism's own interest to encourage individuals to invest either in
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stock or savings. Instead the system is engaged in an endless struggle 
to stimulate demand and encourage "investment" through the purchase of 
consumer goods. Such emphases have the added attraction of encouraging 
the individual to work more assiduously to maximise earnings. Without 
going into the economic wisdom of buying shares in the employing 
company, the question for this study is that of the potential increase 
in levels of cooperation and decrease in levels of conflict induced by 
by a shareholding workforce. The conclusion from the current picture of 
the practice in the four companies under examination substantiates the 
well known view that employee shareholding appears to have no impact on 
identification with the company or on levels of cooperation and/or 
conflict. It is perhaps more likely, to minimise labour turnover, erode 
the boundary between manager and managed, assist in labour flexibility, 
further privatise and individualise the labour force and destroy any 
incipient desire for a collective identity in, say, a trade union, 
rather than the company. In addition to single status working it seems 
to be aimed at making a contribution towards isolating the employee in 
the subculture of the enterprise, but the lack of empirical support for 
this suggests that the employee’s wider socialisation is currently able 
to resist the new enterprise conditioning.
The question for the present project is that of explaining the 
differences in practice and their impact on employee attitudes at work. 
There are cultural reasons for the differences in practice, as detailed 
above, and in this instance employee reactions in terms of, say, 
commitment to the company vary for different sets of reasons, many of 
which have still to be discussed in the following pages.
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Wage payment systems.
Specifically, the wage payment system is more likely to be a 
potential source of grievance. At Hewlett Packard each individual was 
on an earning curve which was reviewed annually. <see Figure 1.)
FIGURE 1.
Employees at Hewlett Packard's South Queensferry factory were 
divided into thirteen pay levels described by the Personnel Manager as 
fallows ;
"We have thirteen grades that cover the whole plant. The top two 
grades overlap with what we call the management grades. These 
management grades include the function managers, the personnel manager, 
the marketing manager, the research and development manager, financial 
controller, division general manager, quality assurance manager. That's 
the management team that runs the division. These people are not in the 
thirteen grades, Which you are on from the management point of view is 
dictated by the US. The job eyaluation scheme dictates where people sit 
on ranges 1 - 1 3 .  For senior functional managers the US have a system 
called scaping based on the scope of the job and that will pigeon-hole 
people into particular management grades. We start giving cars at grade 
12. We tend not to split up grades and benefits by job. The only
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benefit is cars and that starts at grade 12 and that’s nothing to do 
with the job. If a person is on grade 12 they need not be a manager or 
a supervisor. They do tend to be management jobs."
A number of points are being made here. Firstly, the management 
team which effectually ran the plant and comprised six senior 
"functional" managers, formed an elite whose wages and conditions were 
set by the parent company in the US. They were convened, as it were, by 
a general manager, a Belgian national, with experience of working for 
Hewlett Packard in a number of countries. This group represented a 
break in the homogeneity of the labour force, partly bridged, as it 
were, by grades 12 and 13 who had similar wages and conditions, but 
were not part of that select controlling team. This apparently 
egalitarian factory of about 800 people was effectually controlled by 7 
people. For control purposes this represented a very "authoritarian" 
structure, cleverly masked by a range of working practices that gave the 
structure of control a very broad and flat appearance. This appeared to 
have been almost replicated in the control structure of Maxell and 
Brother, where three or four senior Japanese managers effectually ran 
the plant. "Below" them in the structure were parallel rows of teams 
headed by supervisors who were all on the same grade. Within these 
teams there was further fine stratification. Where the Japanese system 
differed from the American system was that the former found it necessary 
to employ two (Maxell) and one (Brother) senior British manager to act 
as a link person between the Japanese controlling management elite and 
the labour force.
These systems were likely to have had the effect of minimising the 
feeling amongst employees that they were unimportant ciphers in a 
massive hierarchical structure. The hierarchy per se was relatively 
small. The point for this programme is that here were people from two 
very different cultures organising themselves and their labour forces in 
two very similar ways. The apparently small difference between them 
was, however, of crucial importance. Hewlett Packard's system allowed 
progression to continue from the 13 basic grades, through to the top 
management position. Maxell and Brother's "buffer" grade, occupied by 
senior British managers, was unbridgeable. lot only was the Japanese 
language a factor here but also the number of suitable senior Japanese
people available in Japan to fill these posts. Unlike the British 
personnel, the Japanese "members" of Maxell and Brother had been 
promised lifetime employment. They had to have precedence over any 
British manager no matter how effective and no matter how competent in 
the language. And this is precisely the point where cultural 
differences do matter. Culture was not apparently affecting the
structure per se and thus the structure could be copied from what was 
perceived to be "best" American practice. It was affecting what was,
after all, more important than structure, the actual running of the 
plant. It was in the hands of Japanese personnel and looked like 
remaining there for the foreseeable future. Their culture did not allow 
them fully to exploit the potential of the foreign labour force (ie. , 
senior British managers) as is the case with American multinationals and 
this in the end of the day must be a limiting or handicapping phenomenon 
for the Japanese abroad. Indeed, it is said the Japanese do not 
encourage foreigners to acquire a knowledge of either the Japanese 
language or culture.(22)
The second point to note from the Hewlett Packard personnel 
managers's description of the wage payment system is that these gradings 
were quite independent of traditional British lines of pay demarcation 
based on recognised apprenticeships and trades. Neither were they based 
on qualifications although these could have affected the employee's 
grade position. They were based on job evaluation, the value of the job 
to the company. This was also the situation at the two Japanese plants. 
At GEC and Lemac, however, pay was related to traditional craft 
experience and professional qualifications which introduced a rigidity 
into the labour force. Once again very different cultural backgrounds 
had made little difference to operational practice in this reagrd at the 
American and at the Japanese plants.
Where the multi-national, usually for historical reasons, has 
adopted a more traditional British approach to wage payment structures, 
eg., at Ford, and is in competition with a multi-national which has not, 
eg. , Nissan, then pressure to change to the cheaper method of working 
(eg. , flexibility of labour) is bound to arise. The point for this 
programme is that not only Maxell and Brother, but few if any other 
Japanese enterprises in Britain are adapting in this sense to
traditional British practice. They are imposing, through single union 
agreements and working practices as outlined above, a method and 
structure of wage payment that may have been copied from a number of 
large American multinationals, and which has long been in practice in 
Japan. In this regard they appear to be adopting an approach that is as 
similar to that adopted in Japan as possible. For both American and 
Japanese firms there appears to be no cultural accommodation in this 
basically important area of labour relations.
Wage negotiations
At Hewlett Packard each level of wages was bounded by a minimum and 
a maximum earning(Fig. 1). The position between these limits was set by 
the immediate supervisor on the basis of the previous year's performance 
by the employee. An opportunity was given to the employee to discuss
his position on the curve prior to the new wage level coming into
operation. As already noted, the practice of superiors setting rates of 
pay on the basis of performance was also engaged in at Maxell and 
Brother. In the remaining three factories, basic pay rates were
negotiated at national level by trade unions and employers'
federations, even in the case of GEG which was no longer a member of a 
federation. Thereafter there was scope for local adjustment with unions 
at GEC and Lemac, and without union agreement at Burroughs. At 
Burroughs, the Human Resources Manager and the General Manager surveyed 
local and national wage levels. These provided a "benchmark" for 
setting rates of pay. These rates were then submitted to the company's 
American headquarters for approval. The Human Resources Manager said 
"We have been very successful almost from the plant's inception of 
getting very good awards for our people", a statement which must have 
masked the tension between minimising costs and increasing wages. By 
investing in the same set of people, responsibility for minimising costs 
and increasing wages (both American and Japanese companies had adopted 
this practice) the firm, a) eliminates the third party, ie. , trade 
unions, b) creates pressure to minimise the wages bill, and c)
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promotes a culture of dependency in the labour force on senior
management.It is precisely this third point that is congenial to 
Japanese culture with its emphasis on familial dependency.
Two further features characterised the wage structure at Burroughs. 
There was no automatic annual increase, but a hint of the possibility of 
more frequent pay rises. This was justified on the grounds that "We 
want to demonstrate to our people within reasonable business limitations 
that we are looking after them." Secondly, a policy of equal pay for 
equal work was pursued. A 19 year old man could have been earning
exactly the same as a 43 year old if engaged in the same kind of work
and performing at the same level. "I think it is the best system
because it is very difficult to differentiate at that skill level
between one employee and another." said the Human Resources Manager.
For managers at Burroughs, there was a "comprehensive planning 
system"(23) similar to the wage payment system at Hewlett Packard. At
Burroughs it meant in essence, payment on the basis of merit. In
agreement with the manager to whom the employee was accountable, 
objectives were set for the ensuing year. The Human Resources Manager 
explained as follows :
"Managers are part of the 'key staff group' . They operate on a 
merit basis. It's a pay for performance basis. We have a very 
comprehensive planning and evaluation system that allows each individual 
to sit down with their boss, set objectives for the year in key results 
areas, and the system allows for an on going appraisal, or interim
review throughout the year. At the end of the year there is a formal 
evaluation that rates them on a scale of 1 to 7, 7 being exceptional, 1 
being marginal - not doing a very good job. Within these ratings we 
have a salary matrix - salary guidelines. There is flexibility to give 
them higher or lower, based on performance, or medium percentage. So 
the flexibility is there to really pay people who are performing at 
high levels, still recognising that people who are doing a good job can 
still have an increase without necessarily giving as high an award as 
someone who is really performing in an outstanding fashion".
At both Maxell and Brother this system had been applied to the whole 
labour force. At Maxell an attempt had been made to keep individual 
earnings secret. The young labour force had soon divulged to each other
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what they were earning and the secrecy had been abandoned. In 
practice, however, the individual worker negotiated his or her own 
wages, initially with the supervisor and, if feeling aggrieved, with a 
triumvirate of managers - a daunting prospect for a 19 year old. Clearly 
the system in the two American and the two Japanese companies was highly 
personalised, concentrated power into the line management structure and 
privatised individuals. This seemed to point to a dialectic in Japanese 
culture.
The immediate question at this point in the study is, what are the 
effects, if any, of different cultural attitudes to money, wages and 
earnings ? The United States is often portrayed as much more money 
oriented than either Britain or Japan. "Few wish to eliminate the 
chance to strike it rich" <24) What is perhaps more important to take 
seriously is the point made by Harvey Cox when he wrote " Money is not 
utterly rational but 'esoteric attributes and talsimanic properties' are 
projectd into it." (25) In the more money centred society of 
contemporary North America, new class divisions have emerged on the 
basis of money rather than consanguinity. This advanced bourgeois 
society appears to be reintroducing myth and mystique via the 
acquistition of wealth. The contemporary cult of the "smart" winner and 
the "despised" loser is a logical outcome of this new cultural emphasis 
which is "easy on compulsive achievement and obsessive greediness". (26) 
If Cox is right, American culture has moved away from work as an end in 
itself towards the benefits of rewards, and to success rather than 
achievement. In this sense, it is post bourgeois, a curious amalgam of 
traditional working class and aristocratic goals which confirm Marx's 
prophetic insight into alienation from both the work process and the end 
product of work. In the "Myth of the happy worker" Harvey Swados (27) 
gives a telling description of that alienation.
"They know that there is a difference between working with your back 
and working with your behind (I do not make the distinction between hand 
and brain work since we are all learning that white collar work is 
becoming less and less brain work). They know that they work harder 
than the middle class for less money. . . . nor is it simply. . . . status 
hunger that makes a man hate work that is mindless, endless, stupefying.
sweaty, filthy, noisy, exhausting, insecure in its propects and 
practically without hope of advancement.
The plain truth is that factory work is degrading. It is degrading 
to any man who ever dreams of doing something worthwhile with his life; 
and it is about time we faced facts. The more a man is exposed to 
middle class values the more sophisticated he becomes and the more 
production line work is degrading to him." (28)
Paul Tillich calls this a situation of estrangement. (29) Its most 
corrosive effect is to persuade the individual of the futility of 
participation. It promotes feelings of insignificance, loss of worth 
and inability to effect change. The individual is encouraged to turn to 
objects and immediate means of self gratification for solace. Questions 
of poverty and wealth, of exploitation and justice, cease to be 
existential questions. There is therefore less desire to seek answers, 
either of a theological, political or sociological kind. The world is 
likely to be reduced to a question of the purchasing power of money and 
its equilvalent in terms of hours of sale of labour power - in short, 
wages and conditions.
In fact, where the process is more advanced, as in the United States 
and Japan, the pay and conditions are likely to be better than in, say, 
British owned companies and the differentials between highest and 
lowest wider. Rates of pay at Hewlett Packard and Burroughs were 
acknowledged by the workforce to be higher than average for the area or 
for comparable work for people of similar education and skills. The 
differences between highest and lowest rates of pay at the six 
factories, as perceived by the personnel departments, were as follows :
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Hewlett Packard 8 
Burroughs 7
Lemac 5
GEC 5
Maxell 6
Brother 6
The two American owned companies had the highest differentials. The 
different cultural attitudes to money were apparent even in branch 
factories remote from the centres of large corporations. Insofar as the 
wage payment system can contribute to employee cooperation even when 
people feel alienated from the work, it was clearly being used in this 
way by the two Horth American owned companies. Neither factory had had 
an industrial dispute (strike, go-slow, overtime ban, etc.), nor lost 
time due to labour unrest since its inception. Cooperation was being 
reinforced, conflict minimised. The estrangement of the individual at 
the place of work serves the immediate interests of the employer. 
Logically, any countervailing influence likely to minimise estrangement 
and reintroduce issues of a wider social significance, such as British 
style trade unionism, is unwelcome. In American corporate culture, 
conflict is channelled into maximising individual potential at the 
workplace. Hewlett Packard spoke of "recognition of personal 
achievements"(30) enabling people "to share in the company's success, 
where achievement is based solely on individual initiative, ability and 
demonstrated accomplishment". (31) Burroughs spoke of the opportunity to 
"fulfil your own personal goal." (32)
The treatment of wages and money indicated that grievance 
procedures at the two American plants and the two Japanese were 
concentrated in line management and had to be pursued by the individual
without representation. By isolating the individual employee in this 
way the threat of disrupting production as well as uncertainty in 
production were minimised. Yet again there was a basic cultural 
difference of approach in achieving what looked like the same end. The 
American way is to appeal to individual fulfilment; the Japanese way is 
to maximise awareness of obligation to the group (family). By all 
accounts obligation (giri) is an important concept for the Japanese.(33) 
Without the Japanese cultural background, how successful will the 
Japanese be in sustaining the individualising of the labour force? 
Already there were signs that people were prepared, temporarily at 
least, to see the total labour force as a family. This was particularly 
easy during the start-up phase when there was a sharp sense of 
pioneering and eveyone "mucking in".On the other hand there were 
indications that people were beginning to question the concepts of 
family and obligation, and to reinforce more traditional obligations to 
home and natural family, and the companies were themselves nervous of 
their ability to change attitudes and, in particular, sensitive to the 
possibility of employees wishing to restore a sense of collective 
obligation via trade unions.
Consultation
Participation as a form of cooperation is influenced by enterprise 
attitudes to trade unions. As already noted, no unions were recognisd 
at the two American and the two Japanese factories, and concern and 
even alarm had been expressed at Brother over the possibility of 
unionisation outwith company control. At Brother there even seemed to 
be a reluctance to accept that the labour force had a legal right to 
join a union of its choice. At Maxell the senior Japanese personnel on 
site were considering recognising a union selected by themselves as a 
defence against secret recruitment of the labour force by a union 
pereived to be undesirable. They may also have feared that several 
unions would recruit members from the labour force, and present, in due 
course, a number of claims for recognition leading to a multiunion
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situation or one in which the management felt their ability to control 
had been impaired.
Wickens claims that the issue of trade unions in Britain is a cause 
of alarm for incoming Japanese investors, but adds that "in the UK, 
potential investors’ adverse view of British trade unionism is related 
to the whole movement and not just specific sections."(34) In the case 
of Maxell this did not appear to be true. Maxell had identified certain 
trade unions as "undesirable" on the basis of their perceived record of 
militancy. Maxell and Brother were also at odds with a further 
observaton of Wickens, "Those companies that have gone down the non­
representation road have made what they consider to be the right 
decision but they tend to be in the frontier technology sector where the 
nature of the staff they employ makes it less likely that they will wish 
to join a trade union anyway". (35) While both could fairly claim to be 
in the "frontier technology sector", the labour forces which they 
employed would normally be ripe for unionisaton. They had, in fact, 
emulated Hewlett Packard who had also adopted this policy, but whose 
labour force did fit the description Wickens has in mind. The question 
for the Japanese companies would be, can the non-union position be 
sustained with a "low skilled" labour force? Maxell appeared to be 
having second thoughts, but both Maxell and Brother might arguably have 
sustained their position if they were convinced the majority of the 
labour force would be replaced within a period of about five years. In 
other words, the non-unon policy at Brother and Maxell seemed to depend 
on a form of high labour turnover which was related to the hope that 
girls would marry and drop out of the labour market to be replaced by 
school leavers. This policy does appear to be conditioned more by 
practice in Japan than in Britain and may illustrate a Japanese 
relucance to come to terms with a quite different cultural pattern of 
behaviour.
The most interesting case of the six in this regard is possibly 
Burroughs who, after working fully with unions at Cumbernauld for almost 
30 years, set up a non-unionised plant employing a very similar type of 
labour force at Livingston. Clearly the company felt there was no role 
for unions in their plant. With an integrated grading structure and 
integrated pay structures, high levels of unemployment in the district,
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flexible working arrangements, good pay and conditions in comparison to 
the district norm, the time had apparently cone to cease recognising 
unions and to reinforce line management control and prerogatives. While 
there was some unrest amongst those interviewed, no one argued for union 
recognition. This, of course, is not to say that they did not want union 
recognition. More likely fear of job security was inhibiting them from 
speaking out for union recognition. Additionally, the factory 
socialisation process could be expected to be having a result in terms 
of individualising people, making them more economistic than hitherto, 
and alienating them in the factory from wider industrial relations 
issues.
Where unions were recognised, as at GEC and Lemac, traditonal forms 
of participation prevailed. Both factories had a structure of 
consultative committees and joint bargaining. At Lemac the structure 
had been allowed to fall into disuse and consultative committees had not 
met for almost two years. Mo one interviewed at Lemac mentioned the 
lack of consultative meetings or formal opportunities for consultation. 
Neither did they comment on the fact that they had seldom been consulted 
about their job, nor that they had never been asked for their opinions 
on a range of basic questions of common interest at work. To the 
external observer it would appear almost axiomatic that levels of 
cooperation might best be maximised by management at least being 
informed of worker opinions on a range of issues common to all the 
labour force. When interviewees were asked if their opinions were ever 
solicited on a variety of issues including industrial relations, work 
methods, the design of tools and jigs and product design, 64% of those 
interviewed at GEC, 53% at Lemac and 42% at Burroughs said they had 
never been thus consulted. Only two people alleged their views had 
never been asked for on these topics at Brother.
At GEC, Burroughs and Brother, of those interviewed, none claimed to 
have been consulted about product design. At Burroughs there was a 
suggestion scheme in place to which suggestions concerning product 
design could have been submitted. In practice, product design work was 
not carried out in any of the factories, nor at the Maxell factory at 
Telford. Product design was executed either at Coventry in the case of
GEC, or in Japan and the USA in the case of the two Japanese owned 
companies and Burroughs respectively.
Research and development was conducted at Hewlett Packard's South 
Queensferry plant and also at the Haddington factory of Lemac. In this 
respect, Burroughs, Maxell, Brother and GEC could fairly be described as 
"screwdiver" plants. It could be argued that Maxell and Brother in 
Japan saw themselves in an increasingly post industrial situation with 
blue collar jobs being exported to, for example, Brtain, and high grade 
white collar workers being retained in Japan.
Hewlett Packard's R & D facility was probably determined by the type 
of technology which the market sector they served demanded of them. 
They were effectually under pressure to produce new products at frequent 
intervals for at least the requirements of a national market in 
telecommuncations test equipment. To locate the R D facility 3000 
miles away in a different country would have been counter productive. 
It made economic sense, therefore, for Hewlett Packard to locate their R 
& D facility at South Queensferry. Maxell and Brother may have retained 
theirs in Japan for socio-cultural reasons as well as economic 
considerations.
In all six factories people were consulted about work methods. The 
percentage Df those interviewed who felt thus consulted in each factory 
is shown in Figure 2.
- 227 -
< ? o
Sc>
b  3
Hi/j p
* b
3 ?
cr ^
o .0 
>  ?
60
4 0
Jo
0
J
Is1
!li
X
i
h
t
,a
qZ 
<£
<o i
:fc
o'
3
0
Ci
c£
.3&£?
<
*4
c &
FIGURE 2.
Notice a very high proportion of young and inexperienced workers at 
Brother and Maxell felt they were consulted about work methods, and the 
way in which these proportions compare with the lower number thus 
consulted at Lemac and GEC.
In addition, there were many opportunities for informal discussion 
and consultation on a variety of topics at Maxell and Brother. Each day 
began with group briefing and from time to time supervisors and team 
leaders drew a section together for discussion about a common problem. 
It was a feature which White and Trevor also discuss at length although 
their conclusion may be a little simplistic.
"The conclusion drawn from them has usually been the need for 
greater participation by workers in corporate management. The evidence 
of this chapter leads in a different direction ; it points to.the need 
for management to become involved in the system of production and to 
develop a sense of equality ^through the sharing of work disciplines." 
(36)
From the current study it appears not to be a case Df either/or, 
either greater participation by workers in corporate management, or 
"management to become involved in the system of production", but a case
D f  both/ and. When management becomes involved in the events on the
production line, even young, inexperienced workers, feel they are 
sharing in managing the production process, and, to some extent, 
managing the assembly team effort. So one interviewee said "If there is 
anything wrong we sit down and talk about it."
Thus the employee appears to be the subject of at least two
simultaneous processes. In the area of industrial relations and
indirectly social politics, the employee is being individualised and 
privatised. In the area of the production task, he is being socialised 
into a team whose raison d'etre is to accomplish the task as quickly and 
effectively as possible consistent with minimising costs and maximising 
quality. Compared to "teams" of which the employee may be a member
outside the factory, this team has a very specific and clear cut remit, 
demands total commitment during working hours, is almost entirely 
economistic in terms of benefits and almost totally unrelated to the 
rest of that employee's existence. The connecting link is wages and 
there may be a number of negative effects on the rest of life because of 
additional hours spent at the factory and the interruption to social 
activities outwith the factory.
While this type of teamwork concept clearly has benefits for 
production in the short term, it further fragments the employee's life, 
substantially narrows any sense of obligation to the wider work group, 
and isolates the employee from the wider group consciousness in the 
workplace. It seems almost to be a reintroduction of a type of 
sectionalism based not on skill or craft, but on the production task. As 
such, this type of teamworking seems to have the potential for all the 
traditional negative outcomes for the employee and more than all the 
traditional advantages for the employer, for in this type of 
sectionalism earnings are related to production and not to skills.
Such teamworking represents a conditioning at the workplace which 
will always need to live in tension with the wider socialisation to 
which employees are subject. In Japan, for employees of large companies, 
much of that wider socialisation is also in the control of the large 
company. In Britain and the US, this has historically seldom been the 
case. It is therefore difficult to envisage employees of firms in 
Britain ever being "Japanised" in this sense. The Ifissan (UK) threat to
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Ford (UK) may therefore not be as great as is currently perceived and 
Ford's desire to emulate Missan's working practices may simply be driven 
by the traditional desire to minimise costs and maximise profits.
The response to questions of consulation reveals important 
differences of attitude to employee contribution to the totality of the 
production process. It has been put very sharply by Mr Matsushita, who 
is reported to have told a group of visiting Americans and Europeans in 
1979,
"We are going to win and the industrial West is going to lose out: 
there's nothing much you can do about it, because the reasons for your 
failure are within yourselves. Your firms are built on the Taylor 
model; even worse, so are your heads. With your bosses doing the 
thinking while the workers wield the screwdrivers, you're convinced deep 
down that this is the right way to run a business. For you, the essence 
of management is getting the ideas out of the heads of the bosses and 
into the hands of labour.
We are beyond the Taylor model: business, we know, is now so complex 
and difficult, the survival of firms so hazardous in an environment 
increasingly unpredictable, competitive and fraught with danger, that 
their continued existence depends on the day to day mobilisation of 
every ounce of intelligence: For us the core of management is precisely
this art of mobilising and pulling together the intellectual resources 
of all employess in the service of the firm. Because we have measured 
better than you the scope of the new technological and economic 
challenges, we know that the intelligence of a handful of 
technocrats,however brilliant and smart they may be, is no longer enough 
to take them up with a real chance of success. Only by drawing on the 
combined brain power of all its employees can a firm face up to the 
turbulence and constraints of today's environment.
This is why our large companies give their employees three to four 
times more training than yours, this is why they foster within the firm 
such intensive exchange and communication; this is why they seek 
constantly everybody's suggestions and why they demand from the 
educational system increasing numbers of graduates as well as bright and 
well educated generalists, because these people are the lifeblood of 
industry.(37)
And P. Wickens, writing about practice in Nissan, says "Essential 
to this process is an acceptance on the part of managers and supervisors 
that they have no monopoly of wisdom on the best way of performing a 
task or on making improvements."<38)
There are basic cultural differences here that embrace questions of 
class and the status of different types of work as well as cooperation 
and conflict. Essentially, Matsushita is saying that the Taylor model 
is potentially conflictual. Endless subdivisions and specialisation 
multiply barriers which work against the overall interest of group 
activity.
At shop floor level this seemed to be apparent in the way which 
accumulated knowledge and experience often appeared to be consistently 
ignored and, particularly at GEC, Lemac and Burroughs, there seemed to 
be an assumption that the knowledge acquired by an operator using a 
piece of equipment on a daily basis was not worth enquiring after. 
Tables 50 and 51 show responses to two questions designed to illustrate 
this point and amplify the earlier argument(see page 215).
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Table 50. Perceived interest in employee work activity.(Extracted from 
Table 42.)
"Are you asked to demonstrate or explain what you are doing ?"
Maxell Brother Hewlett
Packard
Burroughs GEC Lemac
Never 27* 41 50 58 47 68
Seldom 30 41 33 16 40 32
Often 43 12 17 26 13 0
Very often 0 6 0 0 0 0
^Percentage of those interviewed.
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Table 51. Perceived interest in potential employee contribution to a 
selection of factory issues.(Based on Table 42.)
Maxell Brother Hewlett
Packard
Burroughs GEC Lemac
Are your opinions ever 
sought on
Industrial
relations 46* 29 50 0 33 0
Work methods 80 82 64 53 27 31
Design of tools 
and jigs 27 35 50 5 13 31
Product design 14 0 50 0 0 25
Never asked 0 18 11 42 64 53
* Percentage of those interviewed.
One of the older employees at Lemac said MKy opinions are never 
asked for on product design. There are times when I tell them how the 
job could be improved. Sometimes they listen and make changes.
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Sometimes they don't. Sometimes I take advantage of the fact that I am 
a woman and I bug them rotten. This gets results."
This comment taken with the views of Wickens and Matsushita must 
surely form part of the socio-cultural argument for quality circles, 
briefing groups,etc. While all these concepts have an obvious advantage 
to the employer, people at work also feel the need to improve the 
quality of what they are doing. D. Wallace Bell, the Director of the 
Industrial Participation Association, reflecting on a visit to Japanese 
industry in 1986 said, "Employees (in Japan) seemed to welcome the 
opportunity to do something about aspects of their work which seemed 
irksome and inefficient." (39) In this regard employees in all three 
sets of plants appeared to be like minded and in tune with attitudes in 
Japan. The differences were coming from the employers. The rigidities 
of the British system of training and industrial relations seemed to 
have produced managers who were unable to tap into this resource of 
information and intelligence in the blue collar labour force. Perhaps a 
contributory factor here was that British managers in GEC and Lemac had 
begun worklife on the shop floor, as managers are said to do in Japan, 
but with one major psychological difference. The managers at GEC and 
Lemac had begun with little or no recognised direct advantage over their 
peers(40). They had attained management status largely as a result of 
studying for technincal qualifications ( ie. , ONC, City and Guilds, HNC, 
see Tables 12 to 14.) Whilst doing so they had been conditioned to think 
of the manager as set apart largely on the grounds of leadership, 
knowledge, and commitment to the firm.
In Japan, managers begin their training on the shop floor but as 
trainee managers in a dependency role with respect to the shop floor. 
This seems to produce a manager with a heightened and continuing sense 
of respect for shop floor skills even when he is in the position of 
teaching, instructing and correcting as seemed to be the case with the 
Japanese technicians at Maxell and Brother. It seemed to produce a less 
one-sided relationship than was apparent, for example, at GEC. Secondly 
company conditioning in Japan seems to have been more successful than in 
Britain, in producing the view that all are committed to the enterprise 
(at least all core members) and not just managers.
The. ConsuXtafl.v.e._s.ys,f,e3ii...i...n_the_g.li-L-fac.tg_rl^-SL
Peter Cressey observes that the employers preferred term for the 
area of interest of this section is participation. Of the three "broad 
camps" of participation identified by Cressey, interest in this section 
focuses on one; "workforce involvement in management decision making 
below board level".(41) Some points of the second; "involvement in the 
issues surrounding the job, job satisfaction schemes, job enlargement, 
work humanisation, etc. , (42) will be dealt with in Chapter 6. The
third; "workforce involvement in the planning of corporate strategy, in 
setting the general objectives of the enterprise"(43) does not figure at 
all in the current study since it appeared to be absent in all six 
factories
At Hewlett Packard's South Queensferry factory there were no formal 
structures for participation and consultation. There was no works 
council, no consultative committees, and trade unions were not 
recognised. There were regular departmental meetings chaired by the 
supervisor and, once a week, the manufacturing manager met with a 
complete department in a question and answer session. Despite the lack 
of "the familiar landmarks of industrial relations" (44) there was a 
widespread feeling of a high level of participation in decision making 
amongst employees. This awareness was no doubt substantially supported 
by the "management by objectives" technique.
It could be argued that the regular setting of goals and their 
review is a form of sharing in the decision making process. Be facto it 
is tantamount to a form of self management and is likely to contribute 
to employee autonomy and the entreprenurial spirit. "People are happy 
here not because they can compare it with a previous employer. I have 
forgotten what it's like to work for other companies. Here I am given 
responsibility to do the job my way. I think this kind of freedom is 
more important than anything else.", said one employee.
There also appeared to be a high level of informal consultation. 
One research and development engineer said "Industrial relations is 
quite highly rated here. My own project leader is in the habit of 
asking the team what they think about his handling of the project."
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Here a "superior" was asking "inferiors" in the system for a comment on 
his performance.
At Burroughs there was a system of monthly departmental meetings 
chaired by the departmental manager. "We are extremely conscious of the 
need to speak with our people on a regular basis" said the Human 
Resources Manager. "Generally the department manager or supervisor 
chairs the meetings but traditionally if someone like myself went along 
I would end up chairing the meeting because that's the way it tends to 
go. The meetings really are intended to be more of a two way exchange 
between the local management and their people, with HR there to answer 
specialist type questions. Very often it isn't necessary. I think the 
important thing is people get a chance to put questions to the relevant 
people. The employees see this as an opportunity to do that. Very 
rarely is there any restriction on things that coma up. We encourage 
employees to raise issues that are relevant to the whole group rather 
than personal or individual issues, which really we encourage them to 
take to their local supervisor, manager, or if it's a personal issue, 
to take it to HR on a regular day to day basis."
This perception of the role of consultation was almost identical to 
that at Hewlett Packard, where the Personnel Manager said, "We very much 
take the view that the most important resource is the people and we 
would underline that strongly. And as such we give responsibility to 
managers and supervisors to be responsible for the person's performance, 
training and general well being. If a person has a personal problem, 
where appropriate, he should raise it with the supervisor, or if it's 
inappropriate, the next level supervisor, a senior manager, or 
personnel, general manager. We don't have a body as such."
In Burroughs there ought to have been ten departmental meetings but 
in 1985 only two had been convened. "We do not let them slip by" said a 
female assembly line worker, implying that in her section they were able 
to apply enough pressure on management to continue the meetings.
Another said "We could do with more frequent meetings but only if
there's something to talk about." There was no mechanism for
representation since everyone in the department was expected to attend. 
Any issue could have been discussed, including pay levels. The Human 
Resources Manager added "There are no informal group meetings in the
factory. We operate an 'open door' policy. If anyone wants to see me 
they can come and do so, provided they have the courtesy to inform their 
own manager first. We encourage them to speak to their local supervisor 
or management in the first instance on an open door basis, so that any 
grievances or any problems they have can be hopefully addressed. Now, 
if it's a personal issue, as long as they tell the manager they want to 
come down to Human Resources, we' 11 usually accommodate them. The name 
of the game is to encourage people to talk to any of the company's 
representatives, supervisors, managers, HR, even activity head, rather 
than sit there in a corner feeling nobody's interested."
A number of employees felt strongly about the demise of the monthly 
meetings. "With no trade unions it's our only chance to get a say" said 
one. The cessation of the monthly meetings was clearly contributing to 
a lack of knowledge of practice elsewhere in the factory. One packer 
did not realise that most of the meetings had failed to convene for some 
time and thought that the failure of the packing section meeting was 
peculiar to that section, and due to the inordinate and, hopefully, 
temporary pressures of work. Other people in other areas gave the same 
reason for failure to convene a meeting in their department. Most 
people, however, understood these meetings, not in terms of 
participating in the running of the factory or the improvement of 
efficiency etc., but as a forum in which to air grievances. Clearly 
there was a feeling that these were better expressed with the support of 
fellow workers than in the one to one relation with a supervisor or 
manager. One employee said "When the factory started at first they 
organised group meetings with there not being a union, where a manager 
took his group monthly and gave them the opportunity to air any points. 
Some departments ended up calling them grouse meeings or gripe meetings 
or greeting meetings. These were group meetings and supposed to be 
constructive, and to give people an opportunity to talk to their manager 
and to the personnel. Since we've become the size we are, 
communications have collapsed in a lot of areas. There are some 
meetings erractially. In other departments meetings are only held when 
people get so fed up they want to meet the manager". Half of those 
interviewed at Burroughs said their opinions on a range of issues
including industrial relations, product design, work methods etc., were 
never asked for.<45)
At Maxell there was a Members Council to which employees were 
elected by ballot. It met once a month and was chaired by the Japanese 
Administration Manager. (46) Any issue could have been discussed except 
wage levels. There were frequent informal meetings throughout each 
working week between supervisors and line operators. Each morning, 
after exercises, a brief meeting was held at which the previous day's 
production and the task for the current day was briefly discussed. This 
meeting was described by the Personnel Manager as follows:
"If there's anything happening, B will talk to the members in 
production, I'll talk to the members in administration, just after 
exercises. It's one time when everyone gets together. OK, B may have 
to come in at six o'clock to talk to some people or he may pass it on to 
the shift leaders, but that's a time when we hope everyone's together, 
so if there's anything we want to say, perhaps who's coma in, or what's 
happening or anything, then it's an ideal opportunity to do it. So we 
do use that for announcements, just to keep people informed. Eight from
the word go we have emphasised communication......... At the moment it's
small enough to still be able to do that. There could be a problem as
we get larger. We can tell people face to face. If something isn't
going to be popular we can get that feeling back straight away." People 
said their views on production methods and industrial relations were 
often solicited by their supervisor but there was no opportunity to 
contribute to product design.
At Brother there was no formal structure of consultation, no 
committees, departmental meetings or works council. The lack Df formal 
structures of participation accorded with John Pinder's comment in the 
foreword to White and Trevor's study, where he writes "There is also 
surprisingly little emphasis on participation, in any formal sense, in
Japanese firms' subsidiaries in the United Kingdom...... " (47) As at
Hewlett Packard, trade unions were not recognised. Soon after the
factory opened, section meetings without exercises were held each
morning, but these had been allowed to lapse. There were very 
occasional group meetings to discuss improvements to the work 
environment, including the cleaning of work areas and toilets. At the
Brother factory all those who earned overtime clocked in. Relations 
between management and labour force at the Brother factory did not 
therefore appear to be in the same high trust category as at Maxell.
In contrast to the other four factories, GEC had a traditional
British consultative system. There was a Works Committee to which 
worker representatives were elected by ballot. In practice, trade 
unions supplied candidates for these elections and these candidates 
were almost always successful. At one time the Works Committee met 
monthly, but from 1984 to 1986, the meetings had been allowed to lapse. 
The joint shop stewards' meeting convened regularly every month. At the 
Works Committee any subject could be placed on the agenda except wages 
and profits. There was plant level bargaining over wages and conditions 
and five unions were recognised for the purposes of negotiation. Both
the joint shop stewards' meeting and the Works Committe meeeting were
chaired by the General Manager. In addition there were weekly meetings 
between managers and link controllers, those who fed work to line
operators. At these meetings questions of production and efficiency 
were discussed. Despite these opportunities, there was a feeling 
amongst employees of a lack of consultation. A maintenance fitter said 
"The management needs to accept that we are here. Very often they don't 
try to work with the labour force." Few people were consulted on issues 
of production methods or industrial relations. (48)
At Lemac, staff and shop stewards met every two months. There were 
no other meetings. Two unions were recognised for bargaining purposes 
and there was plant level bargaining over wages and conditions. As at 
most of the other factories, few people felt consulted over a range of 
work related issues. (49) Despite the lack of formal structures, there 
was a general appreciation of the difficulties facing the factory, of 
the concern of the Managing Director, and a sense of participation, if 
not in the decision making, certainly in the overall functioning of the 
factory. "I have a lot of respect for Mr A (the managing director)", "I 
have had occasion to go higher than my supervisor because of the poor 
quality of work I was getting. In fact I went straight to Mr A and I 
got results." These were two of the comments made by a number of 
employees.
Experience at Lemac, however, may indicate that levels of 
participation and consultation actually experienced are independent of 
formal structures. This also seems to be the Japanese point of view. 
Levels of participation and consultation at Lemac seemed to be 
influenced by the length of service of many of the employees, which was 
long in comparison to, say, the young workers at Maxell. The factory 
had been through a difficult period and this may also have contributed 
to what Cressey calls a form of "lifeboat democracy". (50) For a period 
there was an awareness of everyone "mucking in" to save the factory. 
The personality of the Managing Director may also have been a factor. 
In short, the crisis at Lemac had induced a micro-cultural atmosphere 
within the factory that had led to an ethos not unlike that which had 
prevailed during the opening months of Maxell's plant in Telford. It had 
induced inordinate levels of informal consultation, assisted by a 
tolerant management style. Very similar conditions existed at GEC, an 
uncertain product market and little formal consultation involving shop 
floor workers. Much of the management style at GEC, however, differed 
from that at Lemac, There was a section of younger more abrasive 
managers, eager to "turn the factory round" and perceiving this in terms 
of a personal crusade rather than a collective effort involving 
everyone. At this point Protestant individualism appeared counter 
productive. An essentially "religious" view of the problem of continued 
production was adopted by individual managers. The problem was 
perceived in terms of a factory in need of "salvation".
Salvation calls for inordinate levels of personal commitment and 
sacrifice. Other individuals who are clearly not sharing in the 
"sacrifice" tend to be despised. Their lack of commitment is
interpreted as a reflection of their agnosticism. They are not 
convinced of the intrinsic beneficence of the organisation, its ability 
to endow participants with wealth and job security. The
management/worker divide is akin to a clergy/laity divide and, as so 
often in the Church, maximising cooperation and joint endeavour is seen
fundamentally as a problem of communication. If the workers only
realised the potential for personal material growth locked up in the 
factory, they would commit themselves as fully as the managers and to
the ends and means of capitalist production. This conviction also
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seemed to be shared by managers at Burroughs and appeared to be the 
impetus for the Human Resource Manager's concern to "speak with our 
people".
Theory X(51), which is a secular explanation of the same phenomenon of 
dwindling commitment, ignores the drive to improve communications. 
Hewlett Packard operated a Theory Y type organisation. "Organisation 
structures and work roles inspired by this approach are designed to 
release this potential (far accepting responsibility) : remove obstacles 
to 'personal growth'; rely D n  self control and self direction as against 
external control; encourage creativity; and promote participation in 
decision making."(52) In contrast to the older European Christian 
dichotomy between clergy and laity, Hewlett Packard seemed to manifest 
the more democratic ethos of American Protestant asceticism. 
Ultimately, the factory population was a congregation of individuals, 
equal before the "powers and principalities" associated with the market. 
It was in everyone's interest to be responsible and to set personal 
growth targets that were perceived to be consistent with the growth of 
the company.
Even the two Japanese factories indicated the essentially religious 
nature of capitalism. Both had adopted a quite different form of 
participation from that in the four other companies. It was a form 
consistent with their hierarchic, family type structure and was 
essentially founded on continuous dialogue between manager/supervisor 
and labour force, and between any two or more groups of people within 
the total production team. It thereby reflected an ostensibly less 
class dominated ethos of a society whose roots are in a synthesis of 
three Eastern religions, one of which (Confucianism) has bequeathed a 
legacy of social structuration based on age and family.(53)
Specifically, the tendency to continuous dialogue betrays the 
essentially Buddhist bias to a metaphysics of process rather than the 
Aristotelian bias to a metaphysics of substance. The process and those 
involved in it, take precedence over any product consciousness. Indeed, 
the product for this type of thinking is never an end per se, but 
always part of the process. Incidentally, this seems to give to the 
totality of Japanese production a fluidity and an atmosphere of being at 
ease with change, that so often appears to be missing in the West. In
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some respects the system of consultation at Hewlett Packard looked very 
similar to those at Maxell and Brother, At Hewlett Packard, however, 
the system was dictated by the nature of the product and the type of 
labour force needed to produce it. The research and development 
function was crucial, significant in size compared with all other 
sections, and an integral part of the factory's daily operation.
Altogether the question of consultation in the six factories has 
much to contribute to perceptions of team working especially as these 
were effected at Maxell and Brother, but also in the modified forms of
team working at Hewlett Packard and Burroughs. First it is clear that
team working eliminates the need for traditional formal consultative 
structures embracing departments and sections, and including trade union 
representation. Having narrowed the concern of team participants to 
questions related to the team's production task, information can be 
equally confined to suit those concerns. The briefings after morning 
exercises contained information of the type, what went wrong yesterday 
and how can it be put right today.
More radically, team working uses as a model, concepts found in the 
armed forces. This was openly acknowledged by at least one supervisor at 
Brother. As in the armed services at least three consequences seem to 
follow. Any desire for industrial democracy is pushed down the agenda of 
concerns for team members. Likewise the desire for trade union 
representation and recognition is also suppressed. Thirdly, team working 
seems likely to exploit natural competitive and macho instincts,
particularly in male employees, for the benefit of enterprise
profitability.
Management in the 6 Plants
In the Japanese cultural tradition the world is essentially an arena 
for the interaction of man and nature. All existing subjects and 
objects are ascribed being.(54) The outright anthrapacentrism of 
Western civilisation is replace by a world view in which everything that 
is shares in being. Paul Tillich drew on this tradition to link Eastern
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and Western thought by suggesting God as the ground of all being, as 
being itself. (55) In this regard he is aided by the essentially Greek 
distinction between being and existence. If there is a basic difference 
between East and West it is that the former emphasises being and the 
latter, existence. By emphasising being, Japanese capitalism can escape 
the anthropocentrism that introduced the fundamental deception in 
Western capitalism which persuades companies to say that they put people 
first, when in practice they they must do as everyone must do, and put 
the task first. In this sense, Dore's contention that capitalism is 
converging to the Japanese form could well be correct.(56) As global 
competition increases, the 'people first' hypocrisy is likely to come 
under increasing pressure and 'task first' to predominate. The change 
in management attitudes alluded to by employees at Hewlett Packard (57) 
could well be a current example of the shift in priorities. Logically
it is to be expected that this will be the direction in which capitalism
will move. The demands of the market will probably oust old cultural 
ties with an anthropcentric Judeao/Christian ethic. Japanese management 
therefore does not see itself primarily as the "stewardship of personal 
resources". Its primary goal is the production task. In a sense the
first need of the labour force is not management but a task to
accomplish. Managing the task in hand is the first priority. This is in 
fact apparent in the statement of one employee at Maxell who said "They 
are participative, due to the whole structure and philosophy they 
believe. They make no bones about it, workers are a happy family. If we 
do start having problems which may get out of hand a bit,they will step 
in and try to put it right. The emphasis is on us. If we are not pulling 
our weight - perhaps weight is not the right word - they will subtly 
make it clear."
Managing people is achieved indirectly by directly managing the the 
production task. Under this system more is probably demanded of 
managers than of operators. Managers at Maxell and Brother were 
observed working from 5 to 8 at night on paperwork, after spending most 
of the day on the shop floor supervising production. Once production 
had been established, after the factory had been built and people 
trained to run the production lines, few managers of this type were 
needed. At Maxell and Brother there was only one British production
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manager in each factory. His immediate supervisor was a Japanese 
accountant. He, in turn, reported to a Japanese plant manager, who was 
responsible to the Japanese managing director. This thin management 
line was served by a team of Japanese technicians, a British personnel 
manager, an administrative manager and stares and office personnel.
Normal production concerns often seemed to be pushed down to 
supervisor level. They, however, earned overtime payments. In other 
words, Maxell and Brother did not feel the same moral compunction as 
Burroughs to state that "we are essentially and fundamentally a people 
oriented business". (58) They were a task oriented business. This, in 
fact, is more logical and honest. Enterprises do need to accomplish 
tasks in order to survive.
In practice, this is common knowledge. The North American companies 
were responding to cultural mores influenced by Western morality that
obstensibly places people at the centre of all concerns. The
Judaea/Christian tradition tries to avoid the basic anthropomorphism by 
substituting God for man at the centre, and struggles to delineate the 
qualitative difference between them. In the end of the day it claims no 
proof is passible and that only existential commitment to the concept is 
sufficient to convict people of the veracity of the belief.(59)
Secondly, the Japanese company is not seen primarily as a number of 
jobs filled by a number of people, but a set of people looking for
roles. That is, the people in the organisation dominate the roles. In 
the West, the set of roles needing to be fulfilled is paramount. Sasaki 
calls the latter, Relationship I and the former, Relationship II, and 
says , "In order to understand Relationship II a drastic inversion of 
Western value criteria is necessary". (60) Schematically the
relationship between the two systems can be illustrated as in Figure 3.
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Human system and role system.
In Relationship I, System R dominates System P, as is indicated by the 
direction o f the inequality sign in parentheses. Here the role o f the firm 
is partitioned into individual roles for the individual member of Sys­
tem P (R -> 2 r0> ^ d  each individual role r t demands a person p { 
who is expected to perform the role. The acceptance of r, by p { is a 
contract.
In Relationship II System P dominates System R. A set o f people is 
formed (2/>, -* P) which then explores what it can or should do. Although 
the result is the same in thatp, performs r ls the boundary of the individual 
roles is vague. This relationship can be described as gemeinschaftlich.
In the West, Relationship I is prevalent, and in Japan, Relationship II.
FIGURE 3.
The real importance of this model is that it further contributes to 
an understanding of the two chief aspects of working practice at Maxell 
and Brother and to a lesser extent at Hewlett Packard and Burroughs, 
viz., flexibility of labour and team working. R II gives further support 
to a number of so-called "Japanisation" practices, namely, a no 
redundancy policy and associated team working, product diversification, 
especially in Japan, and of course, elimination of traditional British 
demarcations, and thus flexibility of labour.. R I, which begins with a 
set of roles, is likely to lead in precisely the opposite direction.
Continuing with the analysis, at Brother only 29% of those 
interviewed described the mangtgment style as "participative". 41% of 
those interviewed felt the management style to be ’authoritative' but 
by this they meant that managers and supervisors were essentially 
issuing orders that had to be obeyed - overtones of militarism. The 
British members of the management team seemed to be much more
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obtrusive than at Maxell, indicating not so much traditional Japanese 
management authoritarianism at work, but an overt decision of senior 
Japanese management to allow the management function to be British 
rather than Japanese.
At neither Japanese factory was there evidence of the 
individualisation of the labour force that had taken place at Hewlett 
Packard. On the contrary, as already noted, operators in Brother were 
organised in teams, and at Maxell had been encouraged to see themselves 
as members of one family. In addition, the hierarchical structure of 
the labour force was overtly recognised. There was no attempt to delude 
people into thinking they were participating in decision making when 
they were not.
At Maxell the management seemed to have been fairly successful in 
persuading the labour force that there was no basic division between 
manager and supervised worker. They had achieved this by job rotation, 
by uniformity of conditions and by persuading everyone to see themselves 
as ’members’, whilst, in practice, the two basic differences remained, 
overtime payments for some, and wage differentiation. Only the two 
British factories made no attempt to obscure the differences. The 
Japanese factories, like the two North American ones, from a Western 
cultural point of view, effectually attempted to deceive the labour 
force into believing they were an homogeneous group.
The cultural history of the 'labour issue' in Japan is sufficiently 
different from that in the West to allow the Japanese a greater 
potential for success in obscuring it. The concept of the economic 
family which exists within a recognised hierarchical and patriarchal 
framework is important in this respect. The role playing aspect of 
human existence (62) serves to perpetuate and reinforce the social 
framework. The Japanese company collectively is a micro-model of wider 
Japanese society. Despite the Meiji Restoration, Japanese society seems 
not to have experienced the bourgeois revolution that changed European 
and North American social norms to produce the pluralist hegemony that 
exists in modern Britain and contemporary North America. A tiny 
indication of the unitary and patriarchal approach has already been 
noted in the form of the Japanese Managing Director's practice at
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Maxell, of determining small details of personal behaviour amongst 
employees.
Conclusion
The question with which this chapter began was that of the influence 
of the culture of the owners and managers on employment practice in 
Britain. The physical environment in the foreign owned factories seemed 
to contribute t D  a feeling of togetherness, and of awareness of 
belonging to a specific and even elite manufacturing group, commonly 
called a "family" by the Japanese. The shape and appearance of the 
building, the wages systems, profit sharing schemes and welfare 
provision all assisted in locking employees into the company.
In keeping with American cultural mores, the two American companies 
tried to bind employees into a collection of self fulfulling individuals 
while the Japanese tried to bind the employee into a 'family*. More 
importantly, these relationships were set within the nexus of 
relationships between the provisions of working conditions, attitudes at 
work and perceptions of management
Normally the provision of good working conditions would be expected 
to lead to attitudes at work thought to be constructive and helpful by 
management. Perceptions of management must be correlated to management 
views of the labour force. In Maxell, where the young labour force 
appeared to be treated humanely, decently and with some sensitivity, 
perceptions of management were generally positive. In GEC, where there 
appeared to be a tendency on the part of some managers to treat the 
labour force as unruly children, worker perceptions of management were 
poor. In turn, GEC management attitudes as in any capitalist enterprise, 
were conditioned by what Ackroyd et al call the "articulation of the 
forms of capital."<63)The "structure of capital" <64)ie., its impending 
possible withdrawal, was pressurising management at GEC into a 
personal and individual response to the crisis.
It could be argued however, that capital and its deployment are 
functions of the market. The market influences management behaviour and
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the provision of working conditions and therefore ultimately attitudes 
at work. The Japanese seem to have acknowledged this by their 
traditional emphasis on company growth and market share. In other words 
they have made capital serve the market. In that sense they are not 
capitalists but marketeers rather like the early Quaker indusrialists 
in England who made capital serve production and working conditions. A 
probable reason for this approach in Japan is a latent but thinly 
disguised nationalism and sense of natural destiny as a world leader.
In other words Ackroyd et al's conclusion that " .....  the most
important processes are not what Japanese firms are doing in this 
country but what British firms themselves are doing and attributing 
to Japanese practice"<65) may be adequate at the narrow industrial 
relations and business level, but would be dangerously facile at the 
wider cultural level, for Japan now looks to a world of an "equilateral 
triangle of forces of itself, America and Europe(66)
The relationship between, provision of working conditions, 
attitudes at work and perceptions of management is dictated by the 
international production and consumer market, which in turn is 
controlled by cultural values, (some might say the lack of cultural 
values), even when these "values** nay simply be the fear- of being small 
and weak rather than big and strong.
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ISSUES OF CULTURAL IITERACTIOM.
"The best firms link their purposes and ways of realising them 
to human values as well as to economic measures like profit and 
efficiency»"Pascale and Athos.
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Cultural Interaction.
The second question of the progrannne is now examined, vis. , how
much, if any, of the culture of the employers is absorbed by the
indigenous labour force and the second objective, to compare the effects 
of Japanese and American enterprises in Britain and the induced or
influenced work attitudes of British employees. The importance of the 
question has been underlined by the recent wave of Japanese investment 
in Britain. It has been highlighted in a way that was not found
necessary while the foreign industrial investors shared a culture that 
had common roots with British culture, eg., France, Italy and of course, 
the USA.
The Japanese investor brings a qualitatively different culture that 
presents problems both for the host labour force and incoming Japanese 
personnel. Faohiro Amaya, a former vice minister of international trade 
and industry, said in a recent Financial Times report, "The most 
difficult thing about industry becoming international is the big 
cultural gap between Japan and the other countries." Cl)
Guy de Jonquieres in whose article the above quote arose, said, "Due 
to growth of overseas direct investment and of alliances with partners 
abroad, many Japanese companies are suddenly being forced to take
account of a much wider range of international influences than ever
before. In the process their sense of distinctive cultural integrity, 
until now a keen spur to the national competitive effort, is emerging as 
something of a hurdle... Furthermore in many Japanese plants overseas, 
the learning process is mostly one way. Usually it is the local workers 
who are required to adapt to models for organisation, working methods 
and labour relations already firmly established by the parent company in 
Japan - not the other way round."(2) The current study has already shown 
that this is happening in Maxell and Brother, but it is no new
phenomenon. A process of cultural interaction has been going on for a
much longer period in the American owned plants.
Haw robust is the host culture? Observation seems to indicate a 
willingness on the part of blue collar workers and some white collar 
workers to adopt what appears to be the more superficial changes, eg. , 
morning exercise to Japanese music, only for a period of time. After the
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first year it was already becoming apparent that some people were not 
prepared to accept this for the rest of their working life. Some of the 
more important but external or structural impositions were being 
accepted, eg., open plan working and single status working. Probably the 
most important area is that of internal organic commitment to a changed 
cultural environment. Here the signals were perhaps more conflictual and 
the task of assessment more difficult.
Out of the width and diversity of the culture of the employers, a 
selection has been made to narrow the scope of that culture to features 
likely to be important in industrial relations. Four themes, motivation, 
loyalty, job satisfaction and democracy, have been selected for a number 
of reasons.
They are themes which arise strongly from the stereotypical view of 
Japanese industry in particular. The Japanese employee of a large company 
is alleged to be highly motivated, loyal to the firm, and "happy" at his 
work. While stereotypically, Japanese industry may not be democratic, 
nevertheless it is alleged to be enjoying a participative system of 
decision making and high levels of information sharing. Likewise the 
stereotypical view of Eforth American industry suggests good levels of 
communication throughout large companies, an elimination of a number of 
traditional demarcations found in British industry, and a general air of 
egalitarianism symbolised by the widespread use of first names. How 
accurate are the stereotypical pictures of Japanese and American 
business and to what extent are the above mentioned features being 
transposed to the British factories of Japanese and American 
multinationals? The interview schedules were designed to test the 
presence and strength of these features, to explore the methods being 
used to induce them, if induction was in fact taking place, and the 
resultant effect on the British labour force.
Furthermore, at a time of high unemployment and changing work 
patterns how have traditional British employee attitudes to these themes 
changed with the impact of American and Japanese management practices?
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KotivaiLQib.
One of the enduring values of Maslow's<3> work has been to show that 
motivation is not merely a result of immediate material interests, but 
of self interest at a more profound level. In Maslow's widely read study 
of motivation where he suggested a hierarchy of needs as the basis for 
motivation, he postulated five basic needs, not entirely mutually 
exclusive, "physiological", "safety", "love and belongingness", 
"esteem", and "self-actualisation". (4) Using his analysis as a 
framework, it is clear there are cultural differences at work in terms 
of a different approach to industrial relations on the part of each of 
the three pairs of factories and, to some extent, amongst all six 
factories.
The state, and many employers in Britain, provide for Maslow's basic 
physiological needs and the need for safety. For example, there was no 
evidence that earnings in any of the six factories were so low that some 
employees needed assistance from social security.
Given the stereotypical emphasis on belonging to the company in 
North America and particularly in Japan, Maslow's need to belong as a 
basis of motivation, is examined in the six factories of the study. This 
need is dealt with in a variety of ways. Maxell and Brother insisted on 
every employee being known as a "member" of the company. In normal 
Western usage, a member of a company is one who owns stocks and shares 
in the company. In this respect the Japanese faintly echo a Marxist 
thought that the employee is also a shareholder by virtue of his labour 
power invested in the enterprise. (5) More recently there have been 
signs that individual shareholders in Japan are expecting higher returns 
on their money. "The controlled financial system in Japan, which was for 
so long used by the government to provide cheap long term finance for
industry, is already being liberalised and is likely to be liberalised
further, as more individual investors demand better returns on their 
money."(6)
On the other hand these demands may be in turn modified by pressure
on shareholders in America and Britain, to accept lower rates of
return. (7) Certainly the Japanese appear to take the view that
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shareholder Interests are not necessarily paramount, though important. 
(Shareholders with at least a 3% stake can ask a court to force the 
resignation of a company director.>(8) The composition of shareholders 
in Japan is different from that normally found in the Vest. In the Vest 
shareholders are likely to be individuals and financial institutions, 
whereas in Japan they are more likely to be associated companies.(9) 
Table 52 shows Sasaki’s list of company shareholders in Mitsui Toatsu 
Chemicals.(10)
Table 52. Company Shareholders in Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals.
Company Marne Ratio of the Employees Humber of
stocks owned number. Directors,
by MTC.
Toyo Engineering 60 1,198 16
Kanto N.G.Kaihatsu 85 187 6
Toyo Gas Chemical 50 310 8
Osaka Petrochemical 50 274 16
Nippon A. Aluminium 75 55 6
Mitsui Toatsu Varehouse 98.6 26 5
Shintomi Transport 99.3 110 3
Orient 100 266 4
Toyo Fibre Glass 100 88 3
Senhoku Hydrogen 50 13 8
Anjo Plastic 50 65 6
Sansei Chemical 93 145 10
Toyo Kosan 100 53 6
Toyo Service 100 20 4
Sanshin Sangyo 83 52 9
Toyo Sports 50 13 5
Toyo Colouring 100 35 4
Other 40 Companies.
Source: Kigyo Keiretsu Soran, Toyo Keizai, Tokyo, 1974.
-258-
Their immediate interest is not profit but turnover and market 
share.(11) "Until recently, the only league tables of Japanese companies 
that mattered were those that showed the size of company sales, their 
sales growth rates and their market shares."<12) A contributory factor 
here is the seniority wage system. "Simple arithmetic easily verifies 
that under the seniority wage system, the higher the growth rate the 
lower the unit labour cost."<13) Company growth is more likely to 
coincide with employee interests in company size. The bigger the company 
in Japan, the more its social status, and the greater the perceived job 
security. "The more a company makes of a thing the bigger the company 
becomes, and the bigger it becomes, the better respected not only the 
company but also the employee will be."<14)
By encouraging company employees to see themselves as company 
"members" and part of a company family, Maxell and Brother at the same 
time encouraged employees to see themselves as stakeholders, not by 
virtue of shares owned but through their labour power invested for the 
good of the company. Japanese ideas on the nature of the company can be 
traced back through the merchant houses to at least feudal times. The 
social structure included the Emperor and his family but was effectually 
dominated by Shoguns and their subordinates, the Daimyo together with 
their Samurai warriors. At the heart of each order including the 
Emperor's family, was the "house principle" <ie gensoku) which had 
existed for many centuries. At the time of the Meiji restoration in 
1868,the orders of Shogunate, Daimyo and Samurai were swept aside, 
leaving intact the house principle and the Emperor and his family. <15) 
In many respects the house principle remains the central element in 
modern Japan's social structure. It has been particularly adapted for 
the world of industry and commerce.
In the traditional house the head was the eldest son. In the absence 
of an eldest son, the husband of the eldest daughter was adopted as the 
new head of the house. Younger sons and daughters were encouraged to 
leave and set up homes of their own. These independent houses (bekke) 
would either remain within the family or constitute branch houses 
attached to the main house. Sometimes these branch houses might be 
established by a faithful employee of the main branch. S.D.B. Picken<16) 
gives as an example of this phenomenon the house of Mitsui, which began
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in 1710. By 1740 there were eleven branch houses attached to the 
original house of Mitsui. Internally the houses were divided into a 
number of basic ranks on the basis of seniority and merit. The 
reputation of each house was very carefully cultivated and the 
reputation of branch houses was meant to conform to the overall 
conception of the house's reputation with respect to its customers.
A number of cultural phenomena were at work internally within these 
houses. For example, the father of the house was not understood as an 
independent individual in an autocratic relationship to all other 
members of the house. Rather he was seen as embodying the spirit and 
honour of the house. The claims of the house came consistently before 
the interests of the individual "The househead merely managed the 
property for the sake of the h o u s e . (17)
The family operated as a community, so that individual interests 
were subservient to family interests. "Filial piety enjoins all the 
numerous responsibilities which rest upon the head of a family to 
provide for his children, educate his sons and younger brothers, see to 
the management of the state, give shelter to relatives who need it and a 
thousand similar everyday duties."(18) Important decisions such as 
marriage, in traditional families are still made by a family council. 
There is much stress upon the idea of loyalty to the family and the need 
for submission to the will of the family. Women are looked on as 
inferior to men and the family is stratified in accordance with the age 
of the memebers.(19)
The family is a microcosm of society as a whole. Each is 
hierarchically structured and each demands loyalty of the participants. 
It is thought that historically this structure emerged from the basic 
rice growing economy of Japan(20) which called for a collective 
approach. Traditionally this was recognised in the tax system, whereby 
collectives rather than individuals were taxed. Vork within the 
collective was not seen in personal or individual terms, but as a 
contribution to the collective, thereby enabling it to sustain the lives 
of the individuals of which it was made. The appropriate response from 
the individual was that of gratitude. These social mores can apparently 
still be detected in Japanese commercial organisations in the form of 
dedication to group goals, task sharing, the sense of mutual obligation
and the sense of loyalty and gratitude to the company. "Like a Western 
marriage, the Japanese work group imposes task roles which are not 
always clearly delineated, tend to need revision, and require a constant 
investment of emotional capital."<21)
Hewlett Packard and Burroughs were also interested in inducing in 
the labour force a sense of belonging. "The company has been built 
around the individual", and "While our success and growth are dependent 
on many factors, first and most important are the skills, intelligence, 
creativity and dedication of our employees."(22) It was significant, 
however, that they made no overt mention of belonging to a family, 
community or collective. The sense of belonging, as in almost all other 
areas of their cultural and philosophical background, was radically 
individualised. Hewlett Packard's Annual Report for 1986 cited several 
examples of individuals who were perceived to be doing a good job for 
the company.(23) The clear message was that whoever joined Hewlett 
Packard or became a customer, joined the list of clever individuals who 
were making the company successful. In the "Statement of Corporate 
Objectives" it was written, in respect of "our people", that a company 
objective was "To recognise their individual achievements" and even more 
explicitly "The company has been built around the individual, the 
personal dignity of each, and the recognition of personal achievements". 
The nearest this statement came to projecting any sense of belonging to 
gemeinschaft was to say "In the final analysis, people at all levels 
determine the strength and character of our company."
Burroughs took initially the same line. In the handbook given to all 
new employees, reference was made to the term "member" as used by 
Maxell and Brother, but the connotation was quite different. Employees 
were members not one of another, as in a family, but in the sense of one 
of a number of individuals whose collective activity brought a 
collective sense of achievement. "You are now a member of the Burroughs 
Corporation who successfully design, develop, manufacture and market 
some of the most advanced data processing equipment in the world today. 
Your contribution is essential in order to continue the Corporation's 
high level of success and to help achieve the Corporation's objective 
which is to maximise the use of technology to solve human problems 
within the information technology industry. At the same time, it is the
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Corporation's hope that you will be able to fulfil your own personal 
goals and ambitions while working- with Burroughs at the Livingston 
facility."(24)
It is significant that if the Japanese borrowed the term "member" 
from North Auerican employee handbooks they took hold of a word that 
suits them culturally. They appear to have declined to absorb the 
radically individualised outlook reflected in these handbooks, as there 
is apparently little room in Japanese culture for the self made, self 
fulfilling individual. There are signs, however, of change particularly 
with respect to managers in Japanese industry. Ian Gow reports that of a 
survey of six hundred and sixty nine companies in Japan, "self 
development/self enlightenment was deemed very important indeed."(25) 
This may indicate an internal dualism in Japanese labour forces with a 
tendency to individualise managers, but maintain the collectivity of 
blue collar workers.
When Lemac and GEC were examined, it was apparent that no overt 
attempt was being made to induce a sense of belonging, either by the way 
in which people were designated or through published literature. That is 
not to say that a sense of belonging was absent. On the contrary, the 
atmosphere of GEC's Kirkcaldy factory and Lemac's Haddington factory was 
that of a company, if not a family of people who were well acquainted 
with each other and aware of their economic importance to the local 
community. Where they differed fundamentally from the other four, was 
that in Hewlett Packard and in Burroughs, Maxell and Brother, the common 
impression was of gathered workforces of 61ite people, either on the 
basis of expertise or simply by virtue of having been chosen to be 
employees of the company. In GEC and Lemac the labour force appeared 
socially more cohesive and was probably drawn from a smaller 
geographical area. The labour force at both GEC and Lemac tended to see 
itself as very typical of any number of people outside the company. In 
the other four factories there was a tendency towards an incipient 
awareness of being in some sense a privileged group, apart from the 
wider surrounding community. In Lemac and GEC, the overall impression in 
each factory was of a group of people initially "thrown together" in an 
almost random way, who in the face of a common management and common 
objectives, had learned to coalesce into something like a community.
Although management in these two factories was, in comparison to 
managements external to the six companies under review, "reasonable", 
sympathetic and by no means macho or excessively authoritarian, the 
divide between management and worker seemed much sharper than in either 
of the two US owned companies or the two Japanese owned companies.
In other words, the two Eritish owned factories satisfied indirectly 
the need to belong. This is a concept that will be revisited. It is 
sufficient to say at this point that there is substantial philosophical 
basis for the concept of indirectness in the Socratic element in Western 
thought.(26) It is, of course, not being argued here that British 
companies like GEC and Lemac set out deliberately to exploit this 
principle. They are, however, operating in a culture where the principle 
is deeply rooted. The major weakness revolves around the question of 
control, The present study indicates that the Japanese owned companies 
and the American owned companies retained control over the ethos of the 
community or collective thus formed. Later evidence in this thesis will 
indicate, for example, that a fairly hierarchical authoritarian ethos 
was being produced in the Japanese owned companies, and that 
competitive individualism was supported, developed and encouraged at 
Hewlett Packard and Burroughs. GEC and Lemac, on the other hand, had 
initially no control over the emerging ethos of their factory labour 
forces. It was therefore relatively easy for the factory labour force to 
acquire, for example, a conflictual model of industrial relations from 
the traditions of the local culture. In ex-mining areas such as the 
Lothians at Haddington or at Wrexham in North Wales, the tradition of 
conflict in industrial relations was well established.(27)
The work farces at Lemac and Brother had very similar roots. Many 
interviewed in both factories said their fathers were miners or ex­
miners. Yet Brother's Wrexham factory was very different in ethos and
overt attitudes compared to Lemac's Haddington factory. In the former, 
the ethos was being controlled by a particular company philosophy. In 
the latter, control appeared to be at a minimum. This would appear to be 
an example of a culture working against the best interests of the
capitalist mode of production. This mode of production as distinct from,
say, small scale craft production, demands high levels of discipline, 
both at the individual and at the corporate level, if for no other
-263-
reason than to keep ahead of the competition. Where the traditional 
craft worker tried to control demand by controlling supply,(28) the 
modern factory is almost entirely demand driven. When the market slumps, 
production must accordingly be cut. There is a sense therefore in which 
market and competition is controlling the nature and style of the 
community produced in the factory. Companies like Hewlett Packard and 
Maxell seem compelled to adopt a particular organisational style in 
order to meet the competition. "Fundamental to them all is the HP way, 
the management style which positively encourages individuals to take 
responsibility for setting targets and achieving objectives within their 
own areas. It is this principle which enables Hewlett Packard to 
attract, develop and retain talented people. In turn this reflects 
itself in both individual and corporate progress."(29) As noted in 
Chapter 4 it was clear that these organisational styles were comparable, 
with a number of similarities. Both, for example, fostered a strong 
sense of belonging amongst the labour force. Given certain features of 
Japanese culture, however, the Japanese companies found it convenient to 
foster feelings of belonging that were compatible with more traditional 
Japanese ideas of family and house.(30) The North American owned 
companies had their roots in an atmosphere that was already highly 
individualised. They therefore found it convenient to foster feelings of 
belonging that were compatible with notions of self fulfilling 
individuals as members of successful teams.
Companies like GEC and Lemac, with a laissez faire policy in this 
regard, put themselves at a disadvantage. They might be "lucky" and end 
up with a factory population that is every bit as disciplined as some of 
the foreign competition. On the other hand, they are more likely to find 
themselves trying belatedly to induce discipline by macho management 
methods long after the ethos of the factory population has formed and 
hardened. This may have been the reason for the abrasive reputation of 
younger managers at GEC.
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The need to belong is related to questions of incorporation into the 
company and identification with the enterprise, where incorporation is 
the process of including the economic activities of individuals or 
groups in company structures to minimise any perceived threat to the 
smooth running of the enterprise. The need to belong expresses the 
issue from the point of view of the employee. Incorporation into and 
identification with the enterprise, expresses the issue from the 
perspective of the company. As recorded earlier, American owned and 
Japanese owned companies make explicit attempts to induce a sense of 
belonging by encouraging incorporation into the company and by fostering 
identification with its values and goals. Maslow argued that the need 
to belong fulfilled a basic need of employees. The need to belong is the 
obverse of incorporation. Where incorporation is pursued overtly, as in 
four of the six factories, the need to belong is a form of employee 
response. This response is further encouraged in Japanese companies in 
Japan by lifetime employment and company unions. Lifetime employment 
increases the competition for promoted posts, a competition which 
manifests itself in long hours of voluntary overtime. "Under the life 
time employment system, competition among peers for promotion is severe, 
and so all work very hard."(31)
Company unions tend to take the long term view of earnings and to
promote the conviction that these are best maximised by everyone working
as hard as possible. By their very nature as company unions they 
contribute to a sense of belonging, which is further enhanced by the 
emphasis on hard work to maximise earnings over a life time.
Of course working hard can as easily produce alienation as a feeling 
of belonging. An employee at Maxell said, "The pace at which this 
factory has gone on, it has gone from nothing so fast, so quick, by 
virtue of the fact that people have worked damned hard. The problem now 
seems to be that people have given everything and they (the company) 
still want a little bit more. This is a thorn in people's sides that 
they still want more and more. What they want to see is something given 
back to them now. Wages are low and should be increased. People
sometimes work seven days a week with no social life. I feel I've got to
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put in a lot of overtime because of my job. ... There is a lot of people 
here who care for the company. There is a lot more caring here than you 
would find in an English company." This response aside, however, the 
increased work performance of the Japanese worker in Japan is stimulated 
by the twin concepts of lifetime employment and company unions, rather 
than by any indigenous propensity to workaholism in the Japanese psyche. 
Lifetime employment and company unions are part of a wider process of 
incorporation in large Japanese companies.
Neither lifetime employment nor company unions yet exist in Japanese 
companies in Britain. Thus two props of incorporation are missing. The 
drive to maximise work performance is therefore more at risk of inducing 
alienation (as in the example above).
The Americans also use incorporation to maximise work performance 
but without promises of lifetime employment and without company unions, 
and in the case of Hewlett Packard and Burroughs, without any trade 
union recognition. Instead they rely on an appeal to self interest in 
terms of salary and career. That is, they take a much more economistic 
approach than the Japanese. Behind these two approaches to incorporation 
however, are different views of what it means to work in teams. For the 
Japanese it would appear that teams are somewhat isolated units 
collectively forming the company. In Brother they were actively 
encouraged to compete against each other. At Hewlett Packard and 
Burroughs teams comprised self fulfilling individuals.
Without lifetime employment and company unions the prognosis for the 
Japanese model in Britain must be limited. The Japanese already seem to 
sense this, hence perhaps the acceptance and expectation of high levels 
of labour turnover within about five years. One alternative for them 
would be to move to the American model, but such an overt emphasis on 
individualism might be too great a cultural step for the Japanese to 
take at the moment, although some argue that this is a development 
generally in Japanese culture(32).
In fact Maxell and Brother seemed to have adopted some economistic 
appeal to the individual worker by the offer of high levels of overtime 
with continuing attempts to incorporate via single status working. In 
other words there were signs of the search for a middle road between the 
two models.
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Loyalty in the form of commitment is currently becoming a real 
battleground in industrial relations as enterprises actively seek to
weaken and break traditional employee loyalties to trade unions and 
replace them with loyalties to enterprises. "Management in many 
companies sees much less need than in the past to concede matters of 
substance to unions. They do see the need to underscore heavily that 
leadership of the company is in their hands; and that in exercising this 
leadership, and engaging the commitment of workers, they must 
necessarily diminish the union's leadership functions and the workers' 
commitment to their unions."(33)
This kind of commitment has traditionally had at least two strands, 
a need to belong socially and culturally, and to identify with others in 
a similar socio-economic position, and secondly, the need to defend and 
promote the interests of that socio-economic group. While the second has 
often been of more immediate interest, the first can be equally powerful 
as illustrated by the 84/85 miners' strike and it is the first strand 
that enterprises have their sights on in the battle to win "hearts and 
minds". It is often claimed by employers that the second set of 
interests will automatically be taken care of, if people identify with 
and acquire a sense of belonging to the enterprise.
The need to belong has a long and well documented history in
Japanese Society. To some extent it may be grounded on a Confucian 
emphasis on basic sets of human relationships(34), eg., between father 
and son, and on the Confucian concept of Jen (goodness and harmony) and 
shu (reciprocity), which enhance the sense of belonging by tying people 
into a network of relationships. Taoism achieved a similar effect by 
reminding its devotees that in being, they shared in the ground of 
being.(35) While at a later stage Buddhism was criticised for a lack of 
emphasis on the family(36), a sense of belonging was overtly engendered 
for some by the establishment of monastic orders.
The nearest Japan has to an indigenous religion is Shinto. With the
development of Shinto there emerged a religious and nationalistic 
doctrine of the divinity of the Emperor and, almost by proxy, the 
divinity shared in by every Japanese by virtue of an alleged descent
from the Emperor. Although state Shinto was abolished in 1945 and the 
Emperor relinquished his claim to divinity, the powerful feelings of 
belonging thus engendered remain in contemporary Japanese. A typical 
summary of the situation is given by Anesaki.
"National unity and social solidarity were always maintained by the 
reverence towards the ruling family, belief in the divine origin of the 
throne being inseparable from the worship of the sun goddess. This 
notion of the divine dignity of the throne has its historical 
development, but has always played an integral part in political and 
social institutions together with the related cult of ancestral deities 
and national heroes. The idea of family perpetuation and the importance 
of communal life played no less important parts. The virtues of valour 
and fidelity, as well as the faithful observance of family traditions, 
were always integral factors of the indigenous religion. The fate of 
this ancestral religion in an industrial regime like the present is a 
grave question, yet the part that Shinto still plays in the ideas and 
the life of the nation must be fully reckoned with."(37)
In practice, this seems to have given rise to strong feelings of 
authentic loyalty amongst Japanese people rather than blind obedience. 
Not surprisingly, they appear to expect these feelings to emerge in the 
foreign labour force. They are expected to emerge rather than be 
directly purchased. At Maxell and Brother there was no question of 
immediate buying of loyalty. There was a hidden cost in terms of 
conditions and facilities but no annual bonus, no promise of lifetime 
employment and no company benevolence in the form of housing loans, all 
of which are mentioned as inducements to loyalty by Pamela Briggs.(38) 
There was an assumption on the part of the Japanese at Maxell and 
Brother that to work for the company implied entering into some sort of 
relationship of loyalty with one's fellow workers and the enterprise as 
a whole. In his Japanese translation of the autobiography of Thomas 
Telford, Atushi Nagai, the president of Maxell wrote, "Although they are 
given a job order or instruction by the management, each individual 
including the managing director is equally a member of the Maxell family 
and of the Telford factory."(39) Additionally, high trust relations were 
encouraged between the Japanese, on site, and the indigenous labour 
force and it was expected that these relations would be reciprocated.
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They were designed to promote a sense of loyalty to the company, which 
loyalty when threatened, produced an immediate and angry response from 
senior management.
During the first year of operation at Maxell a TV company made a 
video of life at the factory. An employee was recorded alleging that 
wages were low and union activists discriminated against. The Personnel 
Manager confirmed that even months after the event these comments were 
seriously deplored by the Japanese, who said the employee's view 
"reflected a disappointing lack of loyalty to the company." Thus far(one 
year later in 1985), he had not been dismissed. Their reaction to his 
frankness, however, was a reminder of the dark side to employee 
commitment to enterprises in Japan. There are "coercive elements"(40) in 
the Japanese system. Briggs lists these as a labour market that is 
virtually closed for core erapoyees of large companies, seniority 
dependent on years of service with the one company, bonuses tied to 
company profitability and company benefits that bind the recipient to 
the firm. (41)
In comparison, these chief features of coercion in Japanese plants 
in Japan were so far missing in the Japanese factories in Britain. 
British industry as a whole does seem to be moving towards the Japanese 
dual labour force model and this model was already extant at Burroughs 
and emerging at Brother where a significant number of employees were 
temporary workers. There were signs at Maxell and Brother of emerging 
company benefits to bind the recipient to the firm, and of a developing 
seniority system in the wage structure, but there were no bonuses tied 
to company profitability.
It could be argued that overtime earnings, which at times were 
considerable, were a form of coercion, as was peer group pressure 
induced by team working to, eg. , reduce absenteeism. In a sense there 
was little need for overt company coercion. Any significant coercion was 
coming from outside the factory from high levels of unemployment in the 
surrounding community coupled with diminishing income support, in real 
terms, for those out of work. It could also be argued that pre-emptive 
measures had been taken to reduce the need for this type of coercion by 
selecting a young, industrially unconditioned labour force, and 
"building in" to manpower planning the expectation of high levels of
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labour turnover after, say, the first three years of operation, thus 
maintaining the malleable characteristic of the labour force.
There undoubtedly was emerging at Maxell and Brother a company 
cultural ethos that was conditioning employees at all levels to conform 
to particular work patterns, eg., high levels of overtime in response to 
sudden increases in product demand, timeous work attendance, minimising 
of absences from work, and preparedness if not willingness on the part 
of managers to work significanmt hours of unpaid overtime on 
administration, planning, etc. A total package of measures, which if 
taken singly, often appear trivial, contribute to the production and 
maintenance of this cultural ethos. Amongst these are, single status 
working, common work wear, open-plan working, exercises at the beginning 
of the day, and team working and frequent team briefings. The totality 
of the package, its all embracing comprehensive nature, is a recurring 
theme in this study. Japanese management techniques cannot be seen in 
isolation from production methods, personnel policies, relations with 
customers, suppliers, the local community, with the parent plant in 
Japan with whom there is daily contact, and investment sources and
policies. There are certain themes, eg. , quality, timing, flexibility, 
adaptability, from the inception of the idea to the delivery of the
product, that permeate the total process giving it an impressive quality 
of homogeneity.
There is a sense in which these can be summarised as oblique
coercion exerted through close personal relations with individuals and 
groups in order to apply pressure when it is needed, eg. , to maintain 
returns on investment, to meet production targets and market demands, to 
maintain zero defects in supplies of goods and services, to maintain 
zero defects on the production line, to ease planning consent for
expansion, to maximise management commitment and to maximise employee 
willingness to work overtime.
Clearly many of these features Japanese companies have in common 
with US companies like Hewlett Packard. Contrary to popular opinion in 
some management literature, neither respect for the individual per se 
nor for the quality of human relations per se, is likely to be the 
origin of close personal relations. More likely its origin lies in self 
interest in terms of the need for company survival.
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In the absence of some features of company coercion in Japan, the 
Japanese did seem to have been successful, at Maxell and Brother, in 
generating a sense of loyalty and an awareness of belonging to the 
company although they tended to deny it. The Managing Director at Maxell 
said,"There is no such thing as Japanese management, there is only 
common sense management." Nevertheless it does appear that in terms of 
loyalty, the Japanese are consciously importing into Britain an 
industrial relations ethos that has been influenced by some aspects of 
Japanese culture. Some of this is being absorbed by the local labour 
force, but to what depth is yet unknown. Cultural importation seems to 
be having an immediate two fold effect, one on British managers, the 
other on blue collar workers. Managers are being forced to rethink the 
structure and use of the day at work and to some extent their wider life 
style. They are under pressure to be on the shop floor during production 
shift time and to catch up on the paper work afterwards in unpaid hours 
of overtime.
Blue collar workers are under pressure to adopt flexible working 
practices and have already accepted the absence of traditional 
demarcations. Those recruited at Maxell and Brother seemed to understand 
this at the time of recruitment and in fact appeared genuinely to 
welcome flexibility, a point which is often overlooked in discussions on 
worker flexibility. They were also under pressure to work long hours of 
overtime and to be particularly assiduous about quality.
The roots of self fulfilment in American owned companies have a very 
different religious and cultural origin. This in turn gives rise to a 
different conception of loyalty, different approaches to motivation and 
a different basis for the sense of belonging. Their origins lie in the 
Puritan roots of the American revolution of the 1770's. The conviction 
that severed America from Britain was not just a colonial struggle for 
independence, but a revolution in social, political and religious 
organisation. Fuelled by Puritanism it emphasised personal freedom, 
religious liberty, human rights and democracy, especially in church and 
government.(42) The specifically religious ground for these new emphases 
was individual conversion and a belief in the doctrine of the priesthood 
of all believers. Kenneth Scott Latourette, one of this century's 
leading church historians wrote, "The American revolution was by no
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means anti-Christian. Some of its basic ideals were from John Locke and 
the way for it had been prepared by the reformed faith and the sermons 
of the clergy, especially in New England."(43)
The church was separated from the state, not out of a desire to 
secularise society, but to substantiate belief in independence of spirit 
throughout the totality of human existence. In this regard churchmen 
were motivated by a radical Congregationalism.
"Just because this democratic idea animated fom the very beginning 
not only the church but the body politic as well, the separation of 
church and state was able to become a positive principle by which the 
relationship between them was made to depend not on any formal bond of 
obligation but on the free concurrence and cooperation of the citizen 
who learned to make his Christian profession and to live it out both in 
the church and in the varied circumstances of civil life."(44)
What perhaps was not so clear at the time was the effect these 
convictions would have on economic and industrial life. The emphases on 
self, fulfilment, individual freedom and liberty cleared the cultural 
arena for an unprecedented expansion of capitalism.
Prima facie it may look as though the North American company's 
reimporting of these attitudes and beliefs, with the location of 
industrial factories in Britain, is an example of bringing coals to 
Newcastle. A brief look at British history in the last two hundred years 
is enough to dispel this view. If Puritanism was a minority view in 
North America in the 18th century, it is even more of a minority view in 
contemporary Britain and has almost become extinct in the 20th. century, 
although belief in individual conversion and the priesthood of all 
believers survives amongst Christians of most denominations.
Nevertheless the proximity of church and state in Britain has 
moderated the radical drive to emancipate the individual and maintained 
an awareness of collective development and collective destiny. Thus 
socialism, which emerged in a party form in Britain but not in America 
arose with the substantial support of many in the churches.
"Many of those who pioneered in the march towards democracy, for the 
organisations and the Labour Party, and for laws to improve the 
conditions of the masses were earnest Christians, products of religious 
awakenings and acting from Christian motives."(45)
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It may be that global industrialisation will eventually bring an end 
to all religion where religion is a system of rites, symbols and 
feelings based on the worship and reverence of a god or gods beyond the 
limits of human knowledge.(46) As these limits are extended by science 
and technology religion is marginalised. Bonhoeffer recognised the 
dilemma for religion more than forty years ago when he wrote, "Religious 
people speak of God when human knowledge (perhaps simply because they 
are too lazy to think) has cons to an end, or when human resources fail 
- in fact it is alsways the deus ex machina that they bring on to the 
scene, either for the apparent solution of insoluble problems, or as a 
strength in human failure - always, that is to say, exploiting human 
weakness or human boundaries."(47)
Since the object of reverence in religion is a god beyond the limits 
of human knowledge, religion is necessarily separated from the rest of 
life so that the rest of life holds no mysteries. It is all potentially 
open to rational explanation. Religion becomes essentially a 'spare 
time' activity, inappropriate in the rational environment of work. Any 
'space' for it in the world of work is in the realm of personal 
morality where some scope remains because not all human behaviour is 
clearly open to rational explanation. In other words there is an 
apparent limit to human knowledge and beyond that there is space for 
religious explanation or religious theorising in the form of moral 
precepts.
The ability so to polarise awareness between the rational and the 
religious is a characteristic of religion but not of Christianity. Thus 
secular or religionless Christianity is a tautology. Christianity spells
the end of religion in favour of faith. Religion continues to exist in
industrial society for at least three reasons. It flourishes where
Christianity is absent. It flourishes where knowledge is limited, and it 
flourishes where it exists as a consumer industry. Essentially 
capitalism prefers people not to be religious for it has other plans for 
the use of people's spare time. There it needs people not to be 
religious, but consumers. So the system strips out religion. "It (the
bourgeoisie) has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious 
fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the 
icy water of egotistical calculation."(48)
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One way of preserving religion in a capitalist society is to 
convert it to a consumer industry in its own right. Where religion is 
tolerated, as in the United States, this indeed has happened. It is a 
multi-million dollar industry with interests in property, broadcasting, 
literature production, health care and education. In Britain, 
Christianity has been more successful in impeding the drive to convert 
it into a religion. It has been assisted in this regard by the post-war 
welfare state, itself a form of Christianity, which has provided total 
care from the cradle to the grave. For historical reasons, saddled with 
more property than it needs, forbidden to buy broadcasting time, and 
left only with some limited production of literature, religion in 
Britain has never developed a significant consumer market. In short 
there has simply been less need for religion in twentieth century 
Britain and it is doubtful if it is in any sense a driving force in 
cultural change in Britain.
At the same time the legacy of Protestant Christianity's impact on 
America in the form of self development is being reimported by companies 
like Hewlett Packard and, to a lesser extent, Burroughs, not out of 
religious conviction, but because it suits their production needs. They 
are rediscovering a strand in the Christian cultural background of 
modern Britain which found so fertile a soil in the life of 18th. 
century America. It can be appealed to with as much success as the 
founding fathers of America appealed to it. The response to that appeal 
has the potential to revolutionise British attitudes at work and even 
give rise to a cultural shift in general social attitudes. It forms a 
link between the "Fordist" capitalism of the first three quarters of the 
20th. century and the "post-Fordist" society that seems to be dawning in 
the West. Under Fordism, individualism was submerged in "the large scale 
flow processes of the modern factory, the skilled factory proletariat, 
the intensification of management, the rise of the corporate giants, the 
spread of mass consumption, the concentration of capital, the forward 
march of the technical division of labour, the intensification of world 
competition, and the further spread of capitalism as a 'global 
system'"(49)
Under post-Fordism, individualism is given a new lease of life in 
flexible specialisation, through privatisation programmes and a renewed
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emphasis on self interest as distinct from group interest. Current 
emphases on monetarism, for example, appear to favour change in the 
direction of individual development within corporate employment 
structures.
American owned companies appear to take the view that the potential 
for change in the direction of American cultural mores exists within 
contemporary British culture. Therefore there is no need to adapt 
cultural practices. The cultural difference extant in the company is 
apparently being eagerly absorbed by the indigenous labour force. One 
obvious advantage to some British employees of a North American company, 
as distinct from the British employee of a Japanese company, is that the 
former know there is the potential to rise through the ranks of the 
enterprise not only in Britain but also in America. There are therefore 
enhanced job and career opportunities.
Finally, returning to the concept of loyalty, Japanese and American 
companies in Britain may well be contributing through their industrial 
relations, to a cultural change for people at work. There is a sense in 
which this cultural change does not take the form of a direct attack on 
traditional trade unionism. It is an attempt radically to individualise 
the employee. Hence the absence of collective bargaining in the four 
foreign plants of this study. By creating a new relationship between the 
employee and the employer based on individual contract, there is simply 
no longer room for traditional trade union loyalties. Amongst more 
middle class management grades this has long been accepted. It is likely 
to be strenuously resisted by established organised labour forces, as is 
already the case < eg., at Ford (UK)). The logic of employing young 
people, industrially unconditioned, as at Maxell and Brother, becomes 
even more apparent.
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Job „ satisfaction.,,
Perhaps against the trend, the two Japanese companies had induced a 
sense of job satisfaction that was higher than that at GEC, Leraac and 
Burroughs.(50) There is evidence, largely from the US, that Japanese 
workers are not so content at work as workers in western industrialised 
nations.(51) "A Prime Minister’s office survey found in 1980 that only 
20% of workers aged between twenty and twenty four found satisfaction in 
work, compared to 29% in 1971. This was not only a significant 
reduction, but a surprisingly low figure in relation to the general 
perception of Japanese commitment. This view was reinforced by a 1986 
survey of loyalty to the company, conducted by the Japanese Federation 
of Electrical Machinery Workers. Covering eleven thousand workers in 
nine countries, the Japanese ranked eighth when the degree of 
satisfaction with working life (measured over twenty factors) was 
considered. They cane behind Great Britain. West Germany, Italy, Sweden, 
Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and Hong Kong. Sweden was at the top."(52)
Maxell and Brother seemed to have induced a sense of job 
satisfaction indirectly rather than directly. Their direct contribution 
in terms of pay and non-pay benefits was poorer than at some of the 
other four factories.(53) Physical working conditions were good and the 
commonality of facilities contributed to an apparently egalitarian ethos 
that appeared to promote employee satisfaction. Essentially, however, 
they dealt with the issue of job satisfaction indirectly, by stressing 
pride in the work through concern for quality, a sense that the employee 
was needed, if not indispensable (Brother’s refusal to allow teams to 
take workers from other teams in the event of absenteeism must 
contribute to this), attention to the detail of the production process, 
involvement of all employees in that process, accompanied by a 
continuous management presence on the shop floor.
The details of that approach were similar to the details of the 
approach of the two American companies to job satisfaction. Burroughs 
appeared to have allowed the sense of employee involvement to diminish 
and had not adopted a policy of "management by wandering around” . Like 
Hewlett Packard, however, they did contribute to employee satisfaction 
by offering good pay and conditions at levels above that which the
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Japanese were offering. The difference of approach to the issue, 
indirect rather than direct, is crucial and culturally dependant. There 
appears to be no question of cultural absorption. The British employees 
were probably unaware of the nature of the difference, although they 
were aware of being treated in a "satisfactory" way - sometimes too 
satisfactorily. "There are some people I know of who have been hanging 
on by a shoelace. The manager says, ’We'll wait and see if he improves', 
but they are causing more conflict at the other end. They are not doing 
their own jobs", said one worker at Brother.
The two American companies presented the criteria for job 
satisfaction directly by taking leading positions with respect to wages 
and conditions, by overtly attempting to produce a feeling of belonging, 
in, eg. , company literature, by encouraging after-hours social 
activities and by providing employees, even with no qualifications on 
entry, with a career structure based on merit. At the same time they 
almost implied a lifetime employment philosophy. In Hewlett Packard's 
factory this approach appeared to be working well, better that at the 
other five factories. At Burroughs, levels of job satisfaction were 
worse than at four of the remaining six factories(54), and only equal to 
those at Lemac.
The British approach was also essentially indirect. It was indirect 
because both GEC and Lemac perceived themselves to be in a crisis 
situation. The emphasis was therefore on survival in the market place 
with little thought for worker job satisfaction per se. Consequently, 
the indirectness of approach to job satisfaction did not matter. Job 
satisfaction was low because morale was low, and feelings of insecurity 
were high. "There is no chance of getting on here because we are all 
threatened by redundancy," said a link operator at GEC. This raises the 
important but not necessarily decisive role of capital. The foreign 
owned plants appeared to have access to capital for start-up and 
development that was absent at both GEC and Lemac. Ackroyd et al argue 
that they are part of a "rust bowl" of sunset industries exported from a 
Japan in which they are no longer profitable.(55)
Ultimately, given that all four factories were working in a 
capitalist framework, values centre upon the production process. 
American companies like Hewlett Packard seem to use human relations as a
foil through which to engage with the production process, "....we are 
essentially and fundamentally a people orientated business. ¥hile our 
success and growth are dependent on many factors first and foremost are 
the skills, intelligence, creativity and dedication of our employees." 
(56)
Japanese companies, in this sense, engage directly with the 
production process. In the two British factories the rationale for 
focusing on the production process differed from that of the Japanese 
companies. The latter appeared to be motivated by the need to maximise 
output and market share in order to compete at an international level. 
The former were motivated simply by the need to survive. Thus Maxell and 
Brother, while concentrating on the production process, could do so in 
an innovative way that included quality circles, monthly quality 
meetings, regular works councils, and continuous management input to 
production at the shop floor level.
The two British companies with their concern for survival, 
concentrated on production effort, inducing everyone to optimise 
timekeeping, and to minimise absenteeism and time spent off the job. 
These were the only factories of the six where people used time cards. 
Clearly, the former were playing from a position of strength, the latter 
from a position of weakness. Nevertheless, the difference of values 
remained. The Japanese and Hewlett Packard valued "long-term employment 
(at least for core employees), trust, and close personal relations" 
enough to have allowed these to shape production techniques and 
practices even in two quite different ways. In the two British companies 
there appeared to be an erosion of corporate values. Indeed, some may 
never have been present from the inception of the factories. There 
appeared to be no place for what Pascale and Athos call "superordinate 
goals"(57), all of which points to, but does not necessarily indicate 
the lack of an ethical base for corporate capitalism in the British 
factories.
Individualism is most rampant in the capitalism of North 
America (58), yet the two American companies appeared to have been more 
successful than the two British companies in maintaining a corporate 
ethical basis for their operations. The individualistic ethic appears to 
be a necessary a priori for a capitalist company ethic. Where the
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religious ground of that ethic is absent as in contemporary Britain, the 
company is left with an ethic based simply on individual self interest. 
Hence the comment "We are only paid to work here eight and a half hours 
a day and I do not see why I should spend my own time thinking about the 
job" and the comment, "Without the front line troops there would, in 
fact, be no company." Thus two people at GEC and Lemac made ostensibly 
similar responses to those at Maxell and Brother with regard to working 
unpaid overtime and remaining behind to discuss work, but with the 
proviso, "providing it was for the benefit of the membership", as one 
shop steward said.
Furthermore, levels of employee contentment at GEC and Lemac were, 
in relation to the other four factories, depressed.(59) People in these 
factories, for all their ties with the local community and their 
traditional means of representation through recognised trade unions, 
returned the lowest levels of job satisfaction of the six factories. The 
company seemed to have lost its ethical impetus and employees were 
bereft of job satisfaction, The two seem correlated. Further analysis of 
the situation, however, shows that the dilemma cannot be resolved simply 
by restoring the ethic. The restoration of the ethic - as in Japanese 
and North American companies - may help to raise levels of employee 
satisfaction, but with only partial success unless at the same time 
people are aware of belonging to gemeinschaft or community. From 
conversations with employees it would appear that it was this factor 
which accounted for the primacy of Hewlett Packard in respect of levels 
of job satisfaction - not that they had achieved gemeinschaft, but they 
were aware of it as a goal which they were pursuing. Ouchi explored the 
pursuit of community in Theory Z companies, "A theory * Z' culture has a 
distinct set of such values (eg., aggressiveness, defensiveness, 
nimbleness) among them longterm employment, trust, and close personal 
relationships."(60) Hewlett Packard is one such company and Ouchi 
describes, in some detail, methods used.(61) In the context of 
contemporary British culture, these methods and results appear very 
alien. The point, however, is that they are a sign that theory Z 
companies recognise the need not only for an ethic at work and therefore 
personal satisfaction and fulfilment, but that these cannot be achieved 
outwith community. In the highly individualised culture of North America
it is the category of the moral that forms the relationship between 
personal satisfaction at work and the need for community.
Every individual is centered upon self, but the self can only be 
realised as such by engagement in moral acts, ie. , by responding to the 
commands that come to us from the world around. (62) Morality in this 
sense is not a set of rules, religious or otherwise, but the "oughtness" 
implied by the world of which the self is part. While the company 
philosophy falls into the category of rules, these rules are presumably 
framed in an attempt to respond to at least some aspects of what are 
perceived by the original framers of the rules to be of the "oughtness" 
of the world in which the company operates. The self is given an 
environment in which to be. In the encounter with the environment, a 
world is revealed to the self, filled with other people, to which may be 
addressed questions, and from which come answers and commands.(63) 
Whether the form of the question and the content of the answers and 
commands are wholly determined by the given environment (pace K. Marx 
and F. Engels) (64) does not affect the argument at this point. In fact 
the encounter is a continuous process, and the questions, answers and 
commands are part of that process. The self is free to respond to the 
commands or ignore them. In responding, it effectually actualises itself 
- the self becomes the person he or she is. In refusing to respond to 
the commands, the self remains latent and unactualised. In reality, for 
the majority of healthy people the fundamental choice is absent, only 
degrees of response remain. The response to wordly demands occurs 
essentially as a result of encounter with other people, the incipient 
community. Community is therefore an ellipse whose twin poles are the 
individual self and the self in continuous encounter with others, ie. 
participation. Insofar as the satisfied self, the integrated whole self 
can only develop in community(65),job satisfaction which is only part of 
self-integration, also needs community in which to develop.
Unfortunately industrial production of itself tends to destroy 
community by subdividing people and tasks.(66) It can make a 
contribution to community, as in Japan, where the large company involves 
itself in all aspects of employee life, from the cradle to the grave, 
but it cannot recreate community, as seems to be attempted by companies 
like Hewlett Packard.
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Contrary to Ouchi's thesis(67), a cultural distinction is therefore 
apparent at this point within theory Z companies, eg. , Maxell and 
Hewlett Packard. Japanese companies recognise that gemeinschaft cannot 
be created but only approached obliquely and preferably from a cultural 
basis that has some traditional understanding of community. Both 
Buddhism and Confucianism fall into this category. Essentially, Buddhism 
and Cofucianism understand community in terms of family. Shinto's 
contribution is to supplement concepts of the family with the concept of 
the macro family, the nation(68). Hence the heavy emphasis in Japanese 
companies on the family and on Japan. For example, the Matsushita 
workers' song states "For the building of a new Japan let's put our 
strength and mind together, doing our best to promote production, 
sending our goods to the people of the world."(69)
North American companies are at a cultural disadvantage. Their ethos 
derives from Protestant individualism. Their attempts to create 
community, as for example observed by Ouchi, therefore appear laboured 
and artificial, even although they do succeed in inducing some sense of 
belonging. For example, many employees at Hewlett Packard were very 
protective towards the company, obviously committed to it, had no wish 
to work for any other company, and appeared to look on the company as a 
large family. The end result, therefore, can look very like the Japanese 
attitude to the company but for very different reasons.
Df the six factories, job satisfaction was highest at Hewlett 
Packard, then at the two Japanese owned factories, and lowest at Lemac 
and Burroughs. Job satisfaction is part of personal well being, but 
individual personal well being is not an entity in itself. It exists 
only in correlation with community where community and individual well 
being are bound together by a common ethic. In this regard, Japanese 
companies have a cultural advantage over enterprises both in North 
America and Britain. The Japanese culture, is able to draw on the 
religious ethic of Buddhism, Confucianism and Shinto, to support the 
close relationship between individual and community. The culture to 
which North American companies belong offers, in the main, only a strong 
emphasis an individuality. British cultural values also appear to 
emphasise primarily individual sets of interests, and if community does 
not arise naturally, British owned factories like GEC and Lemac appear
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to make no attempt to induce a common sense of belonging together. Were 
these two companies therefore in the van of Daniel Bell's pessimistic 
prognosis when he wrote, "The new capitalism was responsible for 
transforming the society, and in the process undermined the Puritan 
temper, but it was never able to develop successfully a new ideology 
congruent with the change, and it used - and often was trapped by - the 
older language of Protestant values."?(70)
When thinking of the culture of the owner, the issue of democracy 
goes to the very heart of that culture, whether it be Japanese, 
American, or British, for democracy is about how people organise 
themselves and others and therefore about how people are understood. 
That is to say it is primarily an ideological question and secondarily 
an organisational question.
In the workplace it involves participation (consultation) and 
decision making, although none of these is necessarily democratic and 
to be equated necessarily with democracy. Rather they are possible signs 
of democracy or the lack of it. This point is made by Vaughan and 
Ramsay(71) in a book reviewed by Margaret Kiloh who writes, "Vaughan 
argues that part of the explanation for poor progress in the field of 
industrial democracy can be located in the usual manner of presenting 
the case in terms of the effects of participation on individual and 
organisational performance. In his view there is no equivalence between 
participation and democracy and the value of participation in economic 
terms is not the same as the value of democracy."(72)
Participation (consultation) has already been examined both 
comparatively (Chapter 4 ) and analytically (Chapter 5), now the
central issue of participation and therefore of democracy, the issue of 
decision making, is examined. Much of the literature on Japanese 
industrial practice suggests that decision making in Japan is a 
different process from that in either the US or Britain. Clark 
summarises the differences thus, "In the West decision making is
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individualistic until adversity makes it collective. In Japan decision 
making is collective until it is proved worthwhile for an individual to 
put his name to it. "(73) The ringi system of decision making per se is 
described by Naota Sasaki.(74) The Kacho or section chief calls the 
section together to discuss an idea. The discussion is reported to the 
Bucho or departmental head after which Buchos and Kachos from all the 
departments meet, discuss and agree. The ringi-sho, or formal paper on 
the idea is prepared and circulated to all departments. Managers read 
the ringi-sho and append their seal to it. It is then sent to the top 
decision making body, the senior management team. A comparatively large 
number of people therefore feel that they have contributed to the 
decision, and something of the trauma and conflict associated with 
change is minimised. People feel more committed to implementing the 
decision and some quite radical decisions can be made. Is this 
democracy? To answer that question one would need to know where the 
original idea which caused the Kacho to convene a meeting of his work 
group came from. Was it his suggestion? Did it come from a subordinate 
or, more likely if it is a question of major change or significant 
expenditure, did it come from above, and if so, how? Sasaki is vague on 
these points. Others suggest the major ideas come from above, suggesting 
not so much democracy as modified autocracy. From what could be observed 
at Maxell and Brother two things were happening. Day to day control and 
decision making was firmly in the hands of the senior Japanese managers 
on site, in consultation with the senior British managers. There were 
indications that they in turn were in daily contact with the main plant 
in Japan. Mr Kakurai at Maxell did state as much and disclosed that 
differences in time zones occasionally cost him some sleep. Alan Road 
writing about the plant diector's personal assistant at Sony, Bridgend 
says, "Whereas Pamela was accustomed in her previous job with a British 
oil company to her working day gradually gathering momentum, she is now 
totally involved the moment she reaches her desk. 'It's already 4.30pm 
in Tokyo' she points out. 'The day has already happened in Japan and we 
have to answer all their questions before starting our day'"(75)
Additionally employees were encouraged to contribute to changing 
work practices, and to improving job methods through the company 
suggestion scheme. While Hewlett Packard, Burroughs and GEC also had
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such schemes, a supervisor at Brother did say that the Japanese liked to 
have suggestions on paper and to circulate these amongst people and 
departments likely to be interested, thus emphasising an alleged 
Japanese chracteristic, viz., the fondness for circulating suggestions 
in writing.
The closely related concept is nemawashi. It means literally 
"binding the roots" or "doing the groundwork"(76) By nemawashi, 
consultation becomes part of the cultural context of work, rather than a 
formal structure superimposed. People are continuously consulted. By 
increasing participation, ringi and nemawashi contribute to minimising 
conflict. In that sense they have cultural roots in the Confucian stress 
on harmony (wa), but too much should not be made of this. In practice 
participation is understood in the West as enhancing the quality of life 
of employees.(77) Sell reports that in Japan structured Western style 
participation is essentially a response to industrial relations and
market problems.(78)
Personnel managers at both Maxell and Brother described the Japanese 
decision making process as protracted and frustrating and both men 
confessed they short-circuited the system by making some decisions and 
presenting them to the Japanese senior management as fait accomplis. The 
ringi system has the advantage of obscuring the source of the final
decision. Resentment at a poor decision cannot be focused on an 
individual but only on the "company". Since the company ostensibly 
embraces everyone, resentment partly includes the person feeling 
aggrieved. This has the potential to stimulate attendant feelings of 
guilt and shame, both powerful concepts in Japanese culture.(79) There 
was no evidence of this development amongst the labour force at either 
Maxell or Brother!
Writing in 1984, Peter Cressey noted that "The consultation 
committees and works councils that were already in existence have been 
under pressure as the recession has led to conflicts, suspicions and
anxieties. In our case studies, we have seen how this has led to the
demise of such committees and the withdrawal of cooperation by 
workforces, there is no evidence that recession breeds a ‘common 
approach* in which different interests are submerged in the struggle to 
survive. This 'lifeboat democracy' theory does not hold up against the
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evidence of a downward spiral in trust relations within companies."(80) 
The withering of consultative meetings at Burroughs and Lemac in 
particular, supported Cressey's contention and illustrated two features 
of industrial democracy, its inherent fragility and its dependence on 
labour market conditions. That the consultative system had declined in 
both the American and the British factories and that the ringi system of 
decision making did not appear to have been introduced at Maxell and 
Brother, seemed to indicate either that the culture of the owners was 
not really democratic or, if it was, that organisational demands, labour 
market pressure, or lack of it, were being more influential.
"The proletarian struggle against liberalism is a struggle against 
the bourgeois class rule that was erected with the help of liberalism. 
Its struggle for democracy is a struggle to see that all have an equal 
share in social power and economic profits."(81) Since power and justice 
are correlated(82), questions of justice in the factory are also 
questions of power. If information is power, the sharing of information 
is a question of justice. The decision maker is also in a position of 
power. In the perpetual struggle in the factory between those with power 
and those without it, the religious preconceptions within different 
cultures appear to give rise to different ways of controlling the 
struggle in capitalist production. If there was one culture, or 
complete cultural convergence, the shape of the struggle would be 
identical in almost every factory. The fact that it is not supports the 
view that cultural issues continue to influence outcomes. Essentially 
the democratic aim is always corrective, to counter balance "the 
exercise of power by the dominant group in the name of justice."<83) In 
practice in the six factories, the democratic aim appeared to be most 
successfully pursued at Hewlett Packard and GEC, and least successfully 
at Burroughs and Brother. Significantly, Hewlett Packard's company 
philosophy claimed to have a strong ethical foundation(84), and GEC's 
Kirkcaldy factory was in an area renowned for its religious and 
political radicalism. Burroughs and Brother seemed to be the most 
utilitarian of the six factories. Insofar as they were, they made the 
drawing of conclusions from a sample of two an impossibility. What can 
be said is that at Hewlett Packard there was a willingness to share 
information and to engage people in the decision making process, even if
this willingness was, in part, determined by the nature of the
production process. Cressey's observations at Comco apply to Hewlett 
Packard. "The management style that sets the form of participation in
Comco obviously has this economic context, but as fundamental, are the
technological determinants of that management style. Burns and Stalker's 
work is very relevant here, for electronics is not merely economic
growth but has technological and product change structured into its very 
work process. Hence in an environment of constant change one cannot work 
through bureaucratic, rigid frameworks, hierarchies of authority or 
separations of knowledge and ability into discreet ranks. One has to 
have an environment, a system able to adapt to the needs of change."(85)
Japanese emphasis on participation does not appear related to any 
conception of democracy per se, or to workers' involvement in corporate 
management. As already observed, the Japanese enterprises of this study 
were fundamentally hierarchical and patriarchal. Instead, participation 
appears to be a function of the Buddhist and Confucian need to maximise 
group harmony. If anything, the emphasis is on the need for managers to 
participate more in the production process on the shop floor. White and 
Trevor discerned this phenomenon at work in JEL, "Moreover to a most 
striking and extreme degree they were task oriented in the management 
style and practice," (86) and "While we have been puzzling over the 
intractable problems of bringing workers closer to management through 
participation and industrial democracy the Japanese firms have been 
rooting their management more firmly in the workplace."(87) The foreign 
employee's own cultural pre-suppositions seem to be conditioning their 
employment practices. The two quite different views of participation 
were on the whole being well received by the indigenous labour farces at 
Maxell and Brother. In this sense, the culture of the Japanese was being 
noted with enthusiasm by the British work force. The final assessment of 
cultural absorption is left to Chapter 8.
Finally the discussion of democracy would not be complete without a 
word on attitudes to trade unions. If employees individually have had 
little say in running the enterprise, traditionallythey have, via trade 
unions, had an opportunity to share in major decision making 
particularly as this has affected wages and conditions. Chapter 4 gives 
a detailed comparison of company attitudes to trade unions in the six
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factories. The demise of trade unionism in Britain in the 1980's, must 
be linked to the decline of interest in industrial democracy, the 
withering of consultative structures and the role of personnel 
departments, the emphasis on the centrality of line management, and the 
substitution of Human Resource Management for Personnel (as at
Burroughs).
Two phenomena affecting levels of democracy can be said to have 
arisen as a result of these changes. Managers have begun to reassert 
their prerogatives, to roll back any incipient democratic tendencies, 
and to reinforce direct control over the total production process. "All 
managements, except the most supine, are seeking to extend their mandate 
over their work forces: in the main they seem to be succeeding." (88)
Secondly, the commitment the members traditionally gave to trade unions 
is being actively courted for the company.
It could be argued that Burroughs move from a unionised plant at 
Cumbernauld to a non-union plant at Livingston with a human resources 
department in control of personnel was very much with the current trend 
and that Maxell's desire for a union agreement, albeit single union, was 
against the trend. On the other hand, Maxell and Brother's works 
councils with work place representatives may be a model for the future. 
Lord McCarthy is apparently arguing the case for works councils in a 
soon to be published Fabian pamphlet. Nissan at Washington, Tyne and 
Wear, have already gone down this road and indeed their Company Council 
negotiates salaries and conditions as well as.being a consultative forum 
and part of the grievance procedure.(89)
The changing face of personnel management and the attempt to shift 
worker commitment from the trade union to the company represents a 
decrease in democracy. The Japanese arrival in Britain coincides with 
the changeover making it difficult if not impossible, meanwhile, to 
assess any effect their Japanese industrial relations convictions may
have on industrial relations in Britain. Feelings at Maxell in
particular, may indicate a degree of uncertainty on the part of
management as to which road to take.
What is significant is that in the midst of this change, workers are 
not being consulted, their views are not being sought. There was no 
question, for example, of balloting the labour force at Maxell on union
-287-
membership. Thus at the wider level, product market pressures are 
imposing skill flexibility, changes in shift working, single union 
deals, non-union shops etc. Maxell, Brother and Burroughs were able 
unilaterally to impose all of these.
Conclusion,
Discussion in this chapter arose from a consideration of the second 
question of the programme, viz., how much, if any, of the culture of the 
employers is absorbed by the indigenous labour force? Certainly, it is 
clear by the way in which the two US companies and the two Japanese 
companies are organised and managed, changes in employee attitudes at 
work are being induced. Both sets of companies appeared to be making a 
bid for employee loyalty, but in two rather different ways. In the US 
companies, loyalty was being sought by encouraging a sense of individual 
self fulfilment, albeit within teams, which is very much in line with 
important strands in North American culture.
In the Japanese companies, loyalty was being induced by organising 
employees into teams per se. The team was the primary focus of loyalty 
so that the employee was loyal, firstly to his or her team, and then to 
the company. The 'casualty' in both US and Japanese factories was trade 
unionism. By inducing loyalty in these two different ways, a common 
result was achieved, namely, the marginalising of loyalty to a trade 
union. As a result of this, a further 'casualty' was the level of 
democracy in these factories. The labour forces were left with little or 
no channel to influence decision making, with the exception of employees 
at Hewlett Packard. Here the nature of the strategic core of the labour 
force, graduate technicians and engineers, dictated some need to share 
the decision making process at the micro level, if not at the level of 
plant manager and above.
Behind all these features, was a struggle to maintain and maximise 
control. In the short term, the Japanese looked as though they were 
being more successful than the Americans in this regard. Thus their 
factories had quickly become operational and quickly adjusted to meeting 
market demand. In the longer term, however, the American emphasis on
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individualism and self fulfilment rather than team and company loyalty, 
may be the more successful in maximising control where it really 
matters, ie. , over returns on investment, profitability, product 
innovation etc. There is a sense in which the Japanese approach 
represents an adaptation rather than a departure from Fordism, the 
organisation methods and socialisation associated with mass production. 
At first glance this may not seem too surprising as the plants at 
Telford and Wrexham were essentially screw driver plants, batch, if not 
mass production, factories. They were unlikely ever to be true mass 
production plants, but factories in which there would always be a high 
level of response to individual customer requirements. The modified 
Fordist approach may therefore be less appropriate in the long-term. The 
product^ design has to be adaptable to meet a flexible market demand in 
terms of quantitiy and product specification. The labour force has 
therefore to be flexible and thus the 'teams of self fulfilling 
individuals' road adopted by Hewlett Packard seems more likely to be 
successful than the 'teams of members' concept at Maxell and Brother.
The situation, of course, is not quite as simple as the above 
outline might suggest. At the technician and management level in P. and 
D. and product design in the parent plants in Japan, the Japanese could 
be operating in a more individualsied and entrepreneurial way. Neither 
is it outwith the bounds of possibility that advances in technology will 
make the employment of production teams of whatever type, obsolete. With 
fully robotised production, the issue of team types could one day become 
redundant.
Returning to the central issue of this chapter,viz., cultural 
absorption, there were signs of a very fundamental shift taking place by 
the inevitable impact of Japanese attitudes on the prosecution of the 
task process. The fact that consultation is not an end in itself in the 
Japanese plants, but linked to team working, is the clue to a wider and 
more profound difference in approach to the whole business and 
production challenge. Both Western and Japanese manufacturing must of 
necessity concentrate essentially on the production task. In Western 
thinking, however, the production task is almost immediately seen to be 
in need of 'support' from a range of 'services', eg., consultation, 
information sharing, manpower planning, personnel policies and perhaps
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even industrial democracy. This type of thinking is shared by virtually 
everyone in the Western enterprise. It is part of the cultural way of 
understanding the challenge of accomplishing a task. The task is 
understood essentially as a problem, the solution to which may be 
assisted by a range of supporting services. That is, the production task 
is perceived substantively. Similarly, the supporting services are 
thought of as concepts, subjects with substance, often meriting 
specialised attention and constituting areas of legitimate endeavour in 
their own right, perhaps in turn supported by academic study and 
engendering over time, a literature of their own.
The Japanese seem to reason in a rather different way. The 
production task is not isolated to become an issue in itself, but 
remains part of a process that begins with the initial business idea and 
ends with the delivery of the product to the customer. There is a 
radical concentration on the task process to such an extent that there 
is virtually no conceptualising of any 'support' functions, so that in 
practice, what are seen as necessary adjuncts to the production task, as 
listed above, are taken care of indirectly as almost everyone in the 
enterprise addresses him or herself to the task process. For example,
with hourly contact between operatives, supervisors and managers, the
impression is given that there appears to be little or no need for a 
separate consultative machinery. With this level of contact on a day to 
day basis, superficially at any rate, industrial democracy seems already 
to have arrived. Even some aspects of manpower planning appear to be 
common knowledge. Virtually everyone knows what manning levels need to 
be. They all have an idea of the future year or so for the factory, the
possible changes in product range and type, and the likely impact on
manning levels for the immediate future. It does not matter how accurate 
this perception is, the main point is that by high levels of contact 
between all grades in the factory, everyone soon gains the impression 
that they know almost all that needs to be known about the enterprise.
Thus the Western substantive, conceptualised way of thinking is 
replaced by a 'process' way of thought that has very obvious advantages 
for production. The substantive way of looking at solutions to problems 
in comparison, appears as something of a handicap but not an insuperable 
barrier to emulating Japanese practice. It will mean, however, that the
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emulation of Japanese production vdll need the patience to study 
differences in approach to production at a much more profound level 
than comparing praxis on the shop floor and the humility to learn from 
those studies.
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"American social science research over the past few decades has 
demonstrated quite convincingly that our group memberships have 
more influence over our attitudes, motivation and behaviour than 
does any other social p h e n o m e n o n W.Ouchi.
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In this penultimate chapter before moving to some overall 
conclusions, the question of the most influential cultural feature at 
work in industrial relations is examined. The basic issue is the nature 
of the relationship itself - the relationship between people at work, 
one with another and group with group, as fellow employees, and as
managers and managed. According to popular myth all are in the same
boat. All, or almost all, are employees with only their labour power to 
sell. The interface between the two is blurred by those - usually senior 
managers - who may have significant share holdings in the enterprise and 
indeed some of whom may be family members of the main owners or former 
owners. While a further attempt has been made to obscure the nature of 
the division by share owning schemes, some of which have already been 
mentioned in this programme, such share holdings are usually 
insignificant in comparison to the total, and there is little evidence 
to suggest they influence the nature of the basic relationship between 
the major owners and the employee, or even the nature of the 
relationship between employees, managers and managed. Chapter 4
indicates that the findings of the present programme corroborate these 
doubts.
It is the nature of the internal relationships which are to be
examined. These relations are at the core of industrial relations. Their 
practical outcomes <eg., absenteeism, quit rates, working conditions 
etc.,) and their psychological responses<eg., motivation, satisfaction, 
loyalty, etc.,) have already been examined. Mow the style and character 
of the relationship itself is examined.
Eaploy.e,ea.-ag_j^ jmb.e.rs._gf.,,_a ..f.amil  y , .
While many firms have traditionally, and usually obliquely, looked 
on employees as a family, at Maxell and Brother the Japanese had grasped 
this culturally conditioned image and told their employees in Britain 
to call themselves members and not employees. Family is a concept 
related to origins. Every human being is able to give the word some 
content. More importantly for this study, almost every different culture 
gives the word a different content. As far as people working together in
a factory are concerned, do these differences matter? If almost everyone 
holds variations on the theme of family, do cultural variations also 
make a difference? The answer in this section is in the affirmative. 
Just as personal views of family based on experience of family can have 
profound effects on inter-personal relations, so cultural differences 
can have significant effects on group relations, group harmony and group 
dynamics, all of which are of economic importance where several hundred 
people work together.
When thinking of the cluster of cultural and religious ideas which 
have contributed to the modern Japanese perception of the family, there 
are a number of particularly important strands of which account must be 
taken. Consequently when the Japanese talk of moulding a labour force 
into a family, they mean something different from what is meant when 
British and American companies talk of forming a family awareness within 
their labour forces. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a distinction 
between the Japanese perception of family and the more Western views of 
family will be understood by a typical British labour force. Of the 
seventeen people interviewed at Maxell, fourteen said they they felt the 
management's view of the firm was that of a family. Admittedly, the word 
"family" was suggested to them as one of four alternatives. (1) 
Nevertheless they did give the impression that they were very 
comfortable with the use of the word in this context. They claimed that 
if left entirely to themselves they would have used the word "family" to 
describe the network of relations at Maxell. What was going on around 
them did however, illustrate that a rather particular view of the word 
"family” was being established. There are many illustrations of this. 
The company's view of promotion is one example.Several interviewees made 
it clear that the company had not made any promises of advance for them 
through the structure. Instead, a deliberate air of ignorance seemed to 
have been cultivated around this subject. In reality, such opportunities 
were either absent or extremely unlikely for a large section of the 
labour force. Although the Japanese had been careful to promote the view 
that all were members of one large family, and that all had to be 
flexible in their attitude to the variety of jobs to be undertaken, they 
had been equally careful not to implant any seed of ambition in a 
majority of the labour force. They were being asked to be members of a
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family in which they never grew up. The management relation with the 
labour force was that of parents to children. Befu sees this as a
characteristic of twentieth century Japanese working. "What
developed......  in the early modern period and continued to World War
Two was the ideology of paternalism, according to which the whole
company was regarded as one big family and the management to be
considerate to the workers as parents would be to children."(2)
A second important connotation for the Japanese in the word family, 
is the belief in the stem or core family(ie). Befu defines the stem 
family as "all who live together and share social and economic life." (3) 
This may or may not include employees. The core continues through 
succession and inheritance and is sometimes called the "household". 
There is no necessary distinction between kin and non kin, but the group 
is correlated to its corporate economic activities, whether these be in 
farming or trading. Indeed, it is the corporate economic activity rather 
than consanguinity, that gives the stem its raison d'dtre. 
Significantly, the words for parents and children in Japan mean "leader 
of workgroup" and "member of workgroup" respectively. <4> The concept of 
family Ckazaku) as a social grouping apart from any economic activity, 
was introduced from the West at the time of the Meiji restoration. (5) 
Two immediate consequences followed, a sharp distinction between kin and 
non kin, and the payment of wages. The former has led to the gradual 
replacement of stem nuclear families by conjugal nuclear families. 
Nevertheless, the concept of kinship groups, embracing nan kin, remains 
widespread in modern Japan and gives rise to the following features 
which are still extant in Japanese economic life, a hiearchy under one 
leader, a paternal relationship between leaders and followers, and the 
protection of the followers by the leader in return for loyalty. The 
ideological base for the system rests on a sense of obligation <on) in 
terms of an awareness of repayment of debt to the leader. <6)
At Maxell the paternalism of company relationships was set by the 
Japanese Managing Director and displayed in his imposition of small 
details of dress and deportment which he impressed on the labour 
force.(7> One of the senior British managers in the factory discovered 
how seriously a breach of obligation or reciprocity was viewed. He felt 
that senior British managers should have received more generous sick pay
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terms than fifteen days of sickness before wages were halved. When he 
put this point to the Japanese Managing Director he was surprised to see 
how angry the Managing Director became. "I can't understand why he 
became so bad tempered and insisted I accept the same conditions as 
everyone else," he complained. As far as the Japanese were concerned, it 
was not a question of the company owing the employee something, but of 
the employee being in debt to the company!
Family concepts also influence career development which in turn 
raises a basic epistemological issue that illustrates the gulf between 
Japanese and Western cultures. In the West, coping with employee 
aspirations is seen as a problem seeking a solution. In this regard, 
Western companies reflect Western cultural thinking dominated by 
Judaeo/Christian and Greek influences. Human existence, and especially 
economic life, is perceived as a series of problems seeking solutions. 
By contrast, Japanese thought tends not to recognise a dilemma here for 
the majority of the labour force. It is simply part of the way the world 
is.
Susuki Hideo<8) argues that the perception of life in the world as a 
series of problems looking for solutions has its roots in the clear cut 
distinction in Western religious and philosophical thinking between good 
and evil. Japanese society has been largely uninfluenced by this
background. Japanese thinking is rooted partially in Buddhism which it
received from China through the efforts of Prince Shotoku in the 6th. 
century, <9) although it had already been filtering through to Japan from 
Korea fifty years earlier. Buddhism operates by the logic of Lemma(10). 
This is a thought form that emphasises the inter-relational character of 
everything rather than explaining differences between objects and ideas. 
By contrast, Hellenistic Christianity, rather than Jewish Christianity, 
makes distinctions between things, and is therefore essentially
confrontational, where Buddhism is inter-relational. In Christianity, 
God creates everything and ends everything. In Buddhism everything is 
related together, nothing is created and nothing ceases(11).
Hideo suggests that this distinction is based on differences of pre- 
historical origins. Judaism and Christianity emerged in a desert
setting, where it was necessary always to seek for water. It was of 
crucial importance for people to choose the right path when wandering
-303-
across a desert. They were therefore faced with a stark choice between 
right and wrong, often between life and death. Buddhism emerged in a 
jungle society where the acquisition of water was not a problem, and 
where the environment was crossed with many paths, each one of them 
leading to life giving possibilities. Hence the stark choice between 
good and evil, life and death, was not faced by the early Buddhist.
As far as the Maxell factory was concerned, the career aspirations 
of the labour force did not appear to be seen by the Japanese as a 
problem. It was the way life was and would naturally resolve itself. In 
Brother Industries this was somewhat sharpened by the view that a 
substantial labour turnover in the fifth or sixth year after joining the 
company would not be entirely unwelcome. Any accumulating frustrations 
concerning career opportunities and even rates of pay would thereby be 
removed and an opportunity given to the company to recruit a new batch 
of young, malleable labour from the local schools. The fact that* much of 
this labour was female was also culturally compatible with Japanese 
attitudes(12).
In the traditional Japanese family, one woman was given a 
substantial position of influence and auotonomy. "The merchant tradition 
in which the husband had the right to manage his wife's money, but not 
to own it, differs from the Samurai tradition in which the wife handles 
the money. Today most Japanese wage earners follow the Samurai tradition 
in that their wives manage all of their hard earned money. This 
tradition was influenced by Confucianism, which considered rice 
honourable and valuable, but saw money as unclean. Men earn money 
through their work but are not to handle that unclean money".(13) All 
other females in the family were given much less status, some of them 
even unlikely to be considered part of the overall assets of the family, 
but rather a liability to be traded off at the earliest opportunity. In 
traditional Japanese life, the mechanics of this essentially personnel 
function were accorded relatively low status(14). Likewise, in the 
modern Japanese company, the personnel department often seems to be 
accorded relatively low status in comparison to equivalent Western 
companies. The company director responsible for personnel, for example, 
is often not a personnel specialist(15). At the Maxell factory, the non­
graduate Personnel Manager was relatively inexperienced, and in contrast
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to the British Production Manager, was employed on a six month 
contract. This could be interpreted as a sign that the Japanese were 
particularly nervous about industrial relations and were leaving 
themselves the option of changing their personnel manager, if and when 
necessary. Nevertheless they must also have been aware that it did say 
something about his status, or lack of it, in the company hierarchy. 
The Personnel Manager had not been one of sixteen people sent to Japan 
for training. It could be argued that since Maxell was setting up a 
company in England, there was no particular value in sending a senior 
personnel manager to Japan, where the culture and labour force was so 
obviously different from that in Telford. At the same time they must 
also have been aware that the visit to Japan was likely to give, to 
those who shared in it, status in the eyes of the labour force, which 
was bound to subtract from perceptions of the Personnel Manager's 
importance.
At Brother there was no personnel department per se. Administrative 
functions were executed by the Japanese managing director's secretary. 
Personnel, as such, was the responsibility of the British Production 
Manager, who had no particular expertise or training in personnel, being 
primarily a production engineer.
A further strand in the Japanese concept of the family is the 
cultural phenomenomn which Ruth Benedict calls, "Taking one's proper 
station". (16) Benedict alleges this is fundamental to Japanese society. 
Every person, certainly within the family and the house, has a 
particular station or role to play in accordance with genealogy and 
seniority. Filial piety means, in fact, adopting that role and living it 
to the best of one's ability. Since it is based not only on genealogy 
and sex, but also on age, there is a kind of dynamic built into the 
role. With advancing age people continually learn and adopt the changing 
role characteristics, so that for the adult Japanese, life consists of a 
plethora of standard roles appropriate to specific situations and 
relationships. Only the very young and the old are free from these 
constraints. Some consequences of this approach to life could already be 
seen at Maxell and Brother. First impressions at the factory led to the 
conclusion that there was an apparent egalitarianism which is often 
absent from Western companies. The material features of the work
environment looked like a contribution to this egalitarianism, single 
status canteens, toilets, car parks, entry and exit to the factory, work 
wear and welfare facilities. These were apparently reinforced by morning 
exercises, the general accessibility of management to the workforce, the 
overt personal attitudes of managers in private conversation, the open 
plan design of office accomodation and the general lack of clearly 
defined signs of status. In many respects, however, the egalitarian 
image was an illusion, masking a much more complex cultural phenomenon, 
namely the view that everyone has a station in life to which there is 
attached an appropriate role<17). It was clearly seen in company 
attitudes towards women. Many of the female employees made it clear that 
they had already noticed that there were no women supervisory posts at 
Maxell and few at Brother. "They discriminate against women", said one 
respondent. In fairness to the Japanese, it must be said that their 
concept of the company is, in general, more conducive to the male 
lifestyle than that of the female, in both Japanese society and Western 
society. They expect their Japanese staff to be away from home for 
periods up to five and even seven years<18), and to be free to move 
virtually anywhere in the world at the behest of the company. On site it 
was clear that the Japanese staff did, in fact, work long hours of 
overtime stretching from 5 o'clock in the evening tD 9 and 10 o'clock in 
the evening. This performance was also expected of the senior British 
managers. The Japanese described this philosophically as "Finishing the 
day's work on the day in question". While there are, no doubt, many 
women who would welcome the opportunity of adapting this working 
lifestyle, the overall Japanese view of women in society still sees 
virtually no place for them in this kind of working structure. (19) The 
obvious result is an essentially male oriented perception of the labour 
force.
Taking one's proper station and accepting the appropriate role 
manifest themselves in other ways which tend to erode superficial views 
of the apparent equality of all in the labour force. At Maxell the 
senior Japanese manager seemed to enjoy a frankly paternalistic 
position. Ostensibly on the grounds of safety, he had insisted on one of 
the male supervisors removing his moustache. This had induced the 
Personnel Manager to do likewise since he felt he was expected to set
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an example. On other occasions this same Japanese manager had been known 
to ask people to stop whistling and to walk without putting their hands 
in their pockets. These injunctions not only eroded alleged 
egalitarianism, but also contributed to the faintly regimental ethos of 
the factory.
Additionally, awarenes of one's role on site might be the reason why 
the Japanese employees took British first names, by which they liked to 
be known and addressed by the British labour force. Certainly this must 
have contributed towards their adapting the role of the friendly, equal, 
Japanese source of help, and to remove awareness of difference and 
strangeness
One of the most difficult aspects of the Japanese concept of family 
is the complex relationship between individuality and group. Much has 
been written about Japanese groupiness, particularly as this manifests 
itself in business and industry.(20) Yamamoto asserts that the Japanese 
are highly individualistic in comparison to their neighbours. "One 
aspect of Japanese culture that is very often misunderstood is the fact 
that Japanese are basically idividualistic in comparison to other East 
Asians such as the Chinese and Koreans."(21) Maxell seemed to be a 
typical example of the simultaneous encouragement of the development of 
individuality and collectivity. The wages system was clearly structured 
to encourage competition between individuals. As already noted in 
Chapter 5, the Personnel Manager made it clear that at the beginning of 
the factory's life there was a deliberate introduction of a wage payment 
system, such that one individual did not know what the wages of another 
individual were. This was very similar to the wage payment system at 
Hewlett Packard. The hope was that the labour force would adopt a more 
middle class outlook on wages and be reluctant to discuss details with 
neighbours. In practice, this was swiftly eroded and within months 
people were sharing details of their wage packets with their neighbours 
at work.
The Personnel Manager explained it as follows; "Wage levels aren't 
secret. We can't stop people talking. I think we were a bit naive when 
we started. We thought if we presented people with a 'staffstyle' 
situation, people that have not been used to that system would accept 
that it's confidential and we didn't intend it should be talked about.
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It is, and that's human nature I suppose, but B and I thought that by- 
making people more responsible then they would not talk about salaries."
There is evidence here of British managers underestimating the 
effects of socialisation on the labour force and the strength of that 
socialisation. The management aim was clearly not only to eliminate 
demarcation between blue and white collar workers, but to individualise 
the labour force in a way that was foreign to their own culture at home 
and in the local community.
A second aspect of the wage payment system also illustrated its 
radical individualising tendency. Again, the system was very similar to 
that at Hewlett Packard. After a year's employment, the individual's 
immediate supervisor was asked to submit to the senior managers a 
statement of what he felt that individual was worth. The supervisor was
asked whether or not the employee should receive an increase in wages,
and if so, by how much. The two senior British managers decided whether 
or not they would take the supervisor's advice. The employee was
notified by a slip in his wage packet whether or not he was getting an 
increase, and if it was an increase, the amount. If the employee was 
unsatisfied with the contents of that letter, he was allowed to make 
representation on his own, first of all to the supervisor. The 
supervisor relayed the grounds of appeal, as it were, to the senior 
British managers. The employee was then asked to appear before the two 
senior British managers and one Japanese manager. At that meeting he was 
expected to present his case for an increase or for an increased
increment. Clearly this was quite a daunting prospect for many employees 
and that the system was weighted heavily in favour of the management 
decision. Since there was no trade union presence in the factory and no 
system of workers' representatives, the individual had no alternative 
but to present the case himself. It also led to at least two negative 
outcomes, a belief that there were favourites in the labour force(22) 
and unrest at a time when real earnings were declining in comparison to 
the regional norm.
In contrast to the Japanese view of the family, perceptions of the 
family in Britain and North America are probably very similar. The word 
is almost entirely restricted to a consanginous group. The nuclear kin 
family is deeply embedded in Western culture and to use the word in
-308-
connection with an economic group is almost offensive. Western thinking 
seems more definite and more full of contrast than Japanese thought. 
Although the word family is occasionally used in connection with groups 
other that the kin group, it has only a shadow of its "real" meaning, 
and often means no more than that people are friendly or have lived for 
some time in the one area and perhaps went to school together. This was 
very much the impression given at GEC's Kirkcaldy factory, where the 
labour force was largely recruited from the immediate area.
There is an implicit recognition on the part of factories like GEC 
and Lemac, that for working people the family of origin is the correct 
locus for the word "family". In Japan, the family of origin is in effect 
a succession of families, the family of birth, the family at school and 
perhaps university, and the family of the company. <23) Each one takes 
over something of the parental role of the previous one.
In Western culture there is no succession in this sense. The family 
of origin is superseded by the new nuclear family, a phenomenon to 
which Jewish interest in the power of heredity, and the centrality of 
the Holy Family in Christianity may well have been powerful 
contributors. It is a perception that leaves room for the wider 
community. The Western family is not a self sufficient unit. "We are 
certainly not suggesting that the family can be self sufficient. 
Although three generations can muster more resources than two, there are 
still many esential services which no family can possibly provide for 
itself. Few grandmothers can perform operations or teach algebra. Few 
grandfathers can, on their own, maintain children stricken by illness or 
unemployment. Children, unaided cannot support their parents through the 
years of retirement. The family is not a society on its own, merely part
of the wider society "<24)
The preindustrial family in Japan was primarily an economic 
unit. <25) Since industrialisation, large companies aim to provide for 
workers and their families from the cradle to the grave. Companies 
themselves live in "self sufficient" conglomerates<26) where one of the 
few external commitments is to Japan itself. <27)
There are also a number of similarities with practice in Britain. A 
feature of British families in the workplace is the return of the 
practice of speaking for relatives. Young and Wilmott noticed this when
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they wrote, "Since relatives often have the same kind of work, they can 
sometimes help each other to get jobs. They do this in the same way as 
they get houses for each other - by putting in a good word in the right 
quarter- and reputation counts for one as much as for the other."(28)At 
GEC in particular, but also at Lemac, there was a significant number of 
people related to each other. Dore noticed that this was a feature of 
Hitachi.(29) Secondly, acceptance and affection are marks of working 
class family life in Britain. Likewise in Japanese company families, 
people are accepted and kept on the payroll even although their 
performance may be less than adequate.(30)
Finally, the Japanese practice at Maxell and Brother of encouraging 
men to socialise after hours, was reminiscent of a former style of 
working class life in Britain, where working men saw the local bar as 
virtually an extension of the living room. "The men's refuge was the 
'conversation, warmth, and merriment of the beer shop, where they can 
take their ease among their mates'".(31)
The large Japanese enterprise in Japan thinks of itself as a family 
and relationships within it for the permanent workers are expected to be 
familial in character. Like the natural family there is an assumption 
of a common culture with shared values. Employees are expected to accept 
the calibre of those around them in the enterprise, as they would in a 
family. In other words, a certain fatalism is expected with respect to 
colleagues who may not be performing as well as others. The employee is 
expected to conclude that this simply means he or she will need to work 
harder, more consistently or longer hours in order to compensate for the 
effects of the poorer colleague. It may be possible to minimise the 
effect of such a colleague by promoting him, but to the side of the 
mainstream of the section, making way for more able people to take his 
place. What is apparently unthinkable is that he should be sacked, just 
as it is impossible to sack a member of a natural family network. (32) 
This is one of a number of features of the Japanese employment system 
that often seems overlooked by employers in the West seeking to emulate 
Japanese management practice.
Furthermore, employees of large companies in Japan appear not to see 
themselves in a contractual relationship with the enterprise. Their 
relationship is cultural/ideological in character being based on
;>
!>
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commitment. This is not to say, however, that the contractual element is 
absent. Rather,it is embedded in Japanese views of the family. 
According to Mouer and Sugimoto, "The origins of these contractual 
relations, as Fakane<1967 and 1973) suggests, can perhaps be found in 
the notion of the ie, the family which is tied together as an 
organisation by instrumental relationships and by a specific set of 
goals as an economic enterprise, not as an emotionally based kinship 
unit linked primarily by blood and sexual intercourse."(33)
When therefore the large Japanese company calls itself a family, the
nation of contract is already in place. The use of the word family has
therefore coercive as well as benevolent connotations. There was no 
evidence that anyone in the labour force at either Maxell or Brother was 
aware of the contractual element in the Japanese use of the word 
"family". It appeared to be universally accepted in these two factories
that "family" implied a paternalistic view of the labour force on the
part of senior managers.
However, at Maxell and Brother, the labour force, encouraged to see 
themselves as a family, responded to this mild paternalism with a vague 
feling of benevolence towards senior Japanese managers. In fact it was 
clear that a more robust paternalism was being exercised that might be 
better called "welfare company-ism".(analogous to welfare state-ism).
The word ’paternalism’ has at least four aspects. It is first of all 
ascriptive in the sense that it suggests the relation between a father 
and his child.It is diffuse in the sense that the relationship embraces 
the totality both of the child's life and of the father's life so that 
there is no occasion when the relation ceases to exist. It is 
particularistic in the sense that the father's obligation extends only 
to his particular children and not children in general. Finally, it is 
affective in the sense that the relationship is emotional and moral 
rather than contractual or economistic.
Following this analysis of paternalism, Dore(34) suggests that in 
the workplace, paternalism implies ascriptive characteristics (kinship, 
caste etc.) so that employers will tend to recruit on the basis of, say, 
family ties, rather than ability. Paternalism also implies that the 
employment relation is diffuse rather than specific since it embraces
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the totality of the employee's life rather than simply demanding labour 
for a wage.
Furthermore, paternalism implies that the employment relation is 
based on particular obligations,eg. , the duty of the employee to work 
hard for a particular employer and the duty of an employer towards his 
employees, rather than universal obligations such as the need to be 
profitable or to maximise earnings.
Finally, paternalism suggests that the relationship is affective, an 
emotive human one and not simply an economistic one. When the 
relationship between employer and employee in large Japanese companies 
is examined, elements of all four aspects of paternalism can be 
detected. The Japanese are taught there is a sense in which the nation 
is descended from an original monarch. Corporate welfareism suggests 
that the large company in Japan takes an interest in the totality of the 
employee's life. Lifetime employment suggests that the employee, at 
least, willingly or otherwise, understands the enqployment relation in 
terns of one company only. The practice of gathering socially after 
working hours m y  have a number of motives but indicates at least some 
desire to encourage the employment relation to be affective.
The modern Japanese company in Japan may not be as paternalistic as 
the merchant houses in pre-industrial times, nevertheless, given the 
presence of the aforementioned elements, it is fair to describe the 
modern Japanese company in Japan as paternalistic compared to Western 
industrial organisations, recognising at the same time, that these 
elements of paternalism are probably present to some degree in most work 
organisations. There seems to be no need therefore to avoid the term 
paternalism in favour of 'welfare corporatism' as in Dare.
If the styles of organisation and relations in Western and Japanese 
companies were to be rated along a continuum from thoroughly 
paternalistic, as defined above, to purely contractual, large Japanese 
companies in Japan would be close to the paternalistic end and British 
companies, like GEC and Lemac, close to the contractual end. Hewlett 
Packard and Burroughs would also be close to the paternalistic end of 
the continuum but where would Japanese companies in Britain, like Maxell 
and Brother, lie? The ascriptive element is absent. The diffuse element 
is not at all developed although there were signs of some elementary
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desire on the part of the Japanese managers so to do. After hours 
socialising was being encouraged at Brother, and Maxell was developing a 
sports and recreational side to company life.
Teamworking and in-house training were encouraging the basis of the 
employment relation in a specific rather than universal direction, 
tending to make the employee company specific rather than craft 
specific. The affective aspect of relationships in Maxell and Brother 
was to some extent being developed by the continual presence of managers 
and supervisors on the shop floor. Altogether, there were signs of an 
overall development towards a paternalistic model of industrial 
relations.
Furthermore, there were signs of another dimension to paternalism, 
as outlined by A.Fox<35), beginning to develop. Fox suggests that the 
paternalistic relation implies a hierarchy of value where "The key 
principle is that the junior, subordinate, or inferior participant is 
defined as having certain 'true1 or 'real' interests which he or she is 
incapable of perceiving D r  pursuing."(36) The employer adopts the role 
of superior and assumes responsibility for those interests in return for 
obedience and loyalty. When this is challenged, as happened at Maxell 
over the issue of sick leave arrangements for British managers, the 
"dissaffected are condemned as wickedly ungrateful."(37)
It is precisely at this point that the element of coercion arises 
for those who assume the role of protector often also assume 
control. (38) This could well prove to be a contentious area in the 
future for industrial relations in Japanese plants in Britain. If the 
Japanese continue to retain the high grade work (eg., product design and 
R. and D.>in the parent plant in Japan, it is but a short step to seeing 
the foreign labour force as inferior. Furthermore, as the welfare state 
in Britain continues to wither and individuals become increasingly
responsible for their own social protection, the potential protective
role of the company is likely to be enhanced with attendant increase in 
the elemenet of labour force control.
The Western contractual type relationship was perhaps best seen at 
the GEC factory. "In the West, the relationship between pi, a newly
recruited member, and ri, which is an individual role expected to be
performed by pi, is that of contract."(39) The employee contracts to
work for a company which, in its turn, contracts to provide him with 
reasonably well remunerated work, in reasonable conditions, and with a 
useful impact on the economy of the local community. When the enterprise 
is perceived to be failing to meet its side of the contract, albeit for 
well understood market reasons, employee feelings towards fulfilling 
their side of the contract quickly evaporate, giving an immediate 
impression of ingratitude and emotional distancing from the enterprise. 
The strength of the contract depends on rates of pay and conditions and 
perceived job security.
At Maxell and Brother, however misplaced, there was certainly a 
strong sense of job security and almost everyone interviewed said they 
thought the future for the factory was "assured". Although in recent 
years it was felt rates of pay had slipped below average for the area in 
which the factory was located, as had also holiday entitlements, there 
was already detectable an incipient awareness of the enterprise as a 
family on the part of employees in the Japanese owned factories. The 
initiative was being most firmly grasped by the company itself. There 
would be a number of reasons for this, the most important of which was 
likely to centre on the conviction that production meant teamwork. 
P.Wickens dwelt on this when recalling company attitudes not only in 
Japanese companies but also in American companies. "Specific reference 
in the Fissan philosophy statement is much simpler 'We recognise that 
all staff have a contribution to make as individuals but in addition 
believe that this contribution can be most effective within a 
teamworking environment.... Our aim is to build a company with which 
people can identify and to which they feel committed.' In simple terms 
teamworking means having all employees committed to the aims and 
objectives of the company, ie., recognising that each individual has a 
valued contribution to make but that we should aim for everyone working 
in the same direction."(40)
The need to work as a team, however, is so self evident one wanders 
why it is given so much emphasis. What is clearly meant is not that 
everyone must work as a team, but that all must work as a super­
efficient team to maximise profitability with an attendant transfer of 
loyalty from traditional cultural focii in, for example, trade unions, 
political parties and even churches, to the enterprise. By calling the
team a family as at Maxell and Brother, several points were being made. 
An attempt was being made to minimise competition between individuals 
and to maximise the virtue of helping each other. There was an implied 
assumption that the team would be prepared collectively to give extra 
effort in the face of difficulty, and to accept a radically simplified 
hierarchical structure of authority, command and loyalty (as, for 
example, in the armed forces), which left little or no room for 
competing loyalties and authorities based, for example, on religious or 
political ideologies. Implicit in the team concept was an absence of
demarcation of duties and a willingness to work long hours of overtime. 
At Maxell and Brother there was a high level of job flexibility, a 
readiness to work long hours of overtime and a growing desire to
socialise after hours. A cultural concept was being used to reinforce 
production needs, and it looked as though it was being effective. 
Already since the research was undertaken, Brother have announced an 
increase in their labour force to four hundred.(41)
Wlckens reminds his readers that the same approach is adopted by
many large companies(42), American and Japanese, and that in every case 
the emphasis on teamworking is seen as a prelude to maximising employee 
involvement and strengthening employee commitment to the company. What 
he omits to say is that there is no necessary connection between 
teamworking and employee involvement and/or commitment to the company. 
To make the connection, a cultural concept has to be introduced. 
Traditionally in nationalised industries and industries in East Europe, 
the cultural concept of the national good was invoked. Japanese industry 
still uses this in Japan, but clearly there are difficulties when 
manufacturing abroad. Hence the recourse to the concept of the family. 
It is significant that one of the most spectacular failures in this 
regard, in 1988, was that of Ford (UK) whose labour force have 
traditionally exhibited strong trade union loyalty. Ford showed every 
sign of being keen, if not desperate, to emulate work practice at 
Missan. Their failure to introduce flexible working practices, to 
eliminate a number of demarcations and to introduce Employee Involvement 
may well have foundered on the absence of an appropriate cultural 
concept on which to base the whole programme. The unions, appreciating
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the position, are struggling hard to maintain traditional loyalties 
which of course are heavily culturally conditioned.
But to return to perceptions of the family, in Hewlett Packard this 
sense of belonging to a family was perhaps even more developed. One 
interviewee said, "I think they(management) do a good job of treating 
employees as part of a family. Management has developed a real interest 
in their employees. Everyone is on first name terms."
Fotice the assumption that to be treated as part of a family is a 
good end in itself rather than, say, being treated as part of a football 
team. Clearly a question of people's ultimate concern is raised here. 
Many of the female employees interviewed in all six factories said they 
were working for money for their families. They implied that if their 
family made less financial demands on them they would not be at work at 
all. In the early 50s, Young and Wilmott detected a return to the 
centrality of the family amongst working men in East London. "These 
preliminary impressions suggest that the old style of working class 
family is fast disappearing. The husband portrayed by previous social 
investigation is no longer true to life. In place of the old comes a new 
kind of companionship betweem man and woman reflecting the rise in 
status of the young wife and children which is one of the great 
transformations of our time."(43)
In other words, the family is the ultimate concern and feelings of 
belonging frequently find their strongest resonance in attitudes to the 
family. In modern Western society, where people can experience 
loneliness and alienation, the family is one of the few remaining 
traditional loci for a sense of belonging. "But their (the people of 
Bethnal Green) sense of belonging cannot be explained simply by long 
residence. It is so deep because it is rooted in a lasting attachment to 
their families."(44) Where people feel alienated at work, the induced 
sense D f  belonging to a family grouping must obviously be a powerful 
antidote. By encouraging people to see themselves as part of a family, 
the Japanese can tap into this universal tradition, but without the 
particular cultural associations surrounding the concept of the family 
in Japan. Accompanying levels of obligatiom, loyalty, acceptance of 
authority and willingness to work unpaid overtime seem unlikely to
materialise and showed no signs of developing at either Maxell or 
Brother.
The East West divide.
In the group of six factories there was a basic division between 
East and West and a further subdivision between North American West and 
British West, and perhaps, just to complicate the analysis further, 
between English West and Scottish West. A commonly held view amongst 
scholars is that the division between East and West opened after about 
1600 ad. Until then, the known world was all Eastern in ethos. <45) 
Significantly, it is to cl600 that industrial relations theoreticians, 
such as Hobsbawn, date the inception of contractual type relations in 
Britain.(46) Also, ad. 1600 marked the beginning of the Enlightenment 
and the full sweep of the Protestant reformation in Europe.
Eastern civilisation emphasises the aesthetic, while Western 
civilisation focuses on the theoretical. Eastern civilisation is 
essentially emotional and traditional, addressing itself to feelings and 
appealing to mysticism, contemplation and religion. It is therefore 
intrinsically static in its total conception and development.(47)
Western civilisation is dynamic and fundamentally restless. It gives 
rise to a Western personality, that of Western man, who is largely 
divorced from locality and is at "home" anywhere in the world, not only 
the material world, but the world of ideas and even of time. He ranges 
over past and present and is not afraid to theorise about the future. 
Such a man is no longer in a child-like relationship to the natural 
environment and aware of the sense of mystery in the world. He is adult, 
man cone of age, who went on to use the environment, to overcame the 
world and effectually to replace the old gods of religion, mystery and 
nature. So the the Western mind focuses on concepts and abstract 
theorising, deriving from its Greek origins. Instead of appealing to the 
emotions, it enjoys a fascination for change based on experimenting with 
the material. Its mode of expression and understanding is not mystical 
but historical.
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It is significant therefore that the induced sense Df belonging in 
the Japanese owned company is based on the tradition of the family. Van 
Leeuwen explains the phenomenon thus,"If we compare a peasant in an 
occidental village with a shopkeeper in an Eastern city, the latter may 
appear to be more occidental than the former; but the crucial point is 
that in the present age the occidental village is coming to be the 
satellite of the big city, whilst in the East on the other hand, the 
agrarian spirit of the village with its strong sense of the solidarity 
of the familial group is carried over into the larger agglomerates."(48) 
Essentially in Japan, family implies patriarchy, order, deference, 
mutual support and subversion of individual ambitions and desires. 
Fulfilment is understood in group terms and the total unit is 
essentially static, conservative, and in a sense, timeless.(49) In the 
American owned companies the sense of belonging was induced by an appeal 
to maximise self interest.(50) The family was essentially a collection 
of individuals. Self fulfilment was a key concept.(51) Employees 
competed against each other, and were bound together in the enterprise, 
not by bonds of emotion, but by material concerns for the product and 
its profitable development. They were as much aware of the history of 
the enterprise and its product market as employees at Maxell and Brother 
were oblivious to these factors. Interviewees at Hewlett Packard spoke 
with concerned understanding of the market far telecommunications test 
equipment. Many employees at Burroughs knew of the impending takeover of 
the Sperry Corporation and wondered about its impact on the Livingston 
factory. By contrast, interviewees at Maxell and Brother, without 
exception, made no reference to their end products, video tapes and 
electronic typewriters. Apart from the small group who had been to Japan 
for training, and apart from senior managers, no interviewee appeared to 
have any knowledge of the Japanese parent company. Employees at Hewlett 
Packard and Burroughs had a daily opportunity of observing the changing 
product market situation and fluctuating company fortunes. Career 
opportunities were also obviously high on the list of personal 
priorities. There were signs that the labour forces at Hewlett Packard 
and Maxell were to some extent being partially conditioned by two 
contrasting sets of cultural attitudes to the capitalist mode of 
production.
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Behaviour at GEC and Lemac indicated something of uninfluenced (ie., 
uninfluenced by foreign cultural mores) behaviour at work. The sense of 
history and change was still alive. It was not so much an appreciation 
of change in the sense of progress, but change in the sense of an all- 
pervading awareness of transience. When talking of promotion, for 
example, one employee said, "There is just no chance of that here at the 
moment. Things are just too uncertain". At Lemac, a production operator 
complained, "It’s just the nature of the firm. There was redundancies 
and half the factory went. Now everyone seems to get mucked in. You're 
on such a thin line between going overboard and success. At the moment 
its touch and go." The impact of this sense of change had led more to 
lethargy than endeavour, to fatalism rather than evangelism and to 
feelings of introspection and insecurity rather than market dominance 
and company and individual self confidence.
A new spiritualism?
Prima facie the need to belong is a first choice concept on which to 
build a new so-called secular "spiritualism". Pascale and Athos call 
"spiritualism" one of the "superordinate" goals of leading American 
companies, part of a "higher order" set of human values.(52) They argue 
that commercial success depends not only on organisational blueprints, 
but on the adoption of a number of overarching objectives which have a 
moral character and effectually bind the day to day goals together. In 
Western culture, they complain that such values have been hijacked by 
the church and that it is seldom possible to talk of spirituality 
without implying religiosity. They argue for the separation of "spirit" 
and religion, alleging that this is the situation in Japan.
They seem to confuse, however, apparent secularism (sic Japanese 
society) with more authentic secular society as seen in the West. 
Furthermore, they seem to be ignoring a basic contradiction. Capitalism 
has given the world the non-spiritual, non-religious secular society. It 
asks only that people produce, provide services and consume. In all the 
conversations that were held in the six factories, only the Personnel
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Manager at Burroughs mentioned the social use and consequences of the 
product. Apart from the six personnel managers, only the nine trade 
union office bearers interviewed made mention of the social organisation 
of labour and were prepared to reflect on industrial relations 
generally.
The aegis of the moral/spiritual/religious presupposes that people 
are primarily the way they are as a result of non-material relations. 
Secular by definition excludes "spiritual". "What is needed", according 
to Pascale and Athos, "is a non-deified, non-religious spiritualism that 
enables a firm's superordinate goals to respond truly to the inner 
meanings that many people seek in their work."(53) It is, however, 
difficult to understand how superordinate goals which lie in the realm 
of values can be divorced from a theoretical framework such as that 
provided by a religion, a philosophy, or Marxism. The "inner meanings 
that many people seek in their work" do appear to imply a theoretical 
framework. The capitalist mode of production per se has no room for such 
a framework, so that the search for "spiritualism" within the production 
process, and apart from the church or some similar agency therefore 
seems doomed. The radical alternative arises from the work of Marx and 
Engels. Dialectical materialism suggests, without appeal to religion or 
spiritualism, that values are inherent in the material world and will 
inevitably emerge when the material(ie. , economic) conditions in which 
people live and work are conducive for emergence.
"The economic structure of society always furnishes the real basis, 
starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate explanation of 
the whole superstructure of juridical and political institutions as well 
as of the religious, philosophical, and other ideas of a given 
historical period."(54)
Marxism, like Christianity, commands both hope and faith, neither of 
which fit readily into the economistic base of the capitalist 
enterprise. By searching for overarching values within the capitalist 
enterprise Pascale and Athos ignore the fact that enterprises merely 
draw on value systems already present within their cultural milieu. More 
seriously, the "spiritualism" already adopted by the companies cited by 
Wickens (IBM, Hitachi, Easton, Continental Can etc.), often appears to 
be a cynical use of widespread social concerns (eg., family) to promote
an economic end, but, as will be argued in Chapter 8, they must not be
lightly dismissed. They do have some coercive influence over the
relations of production. This is particularly true with respect to the 
way in which Japanese companies in Japan link commercial success with 
national benefit. In this regard it may be argued they also appeal to
the "inner meanings that many people seek in their work".
Employees-Jls individuals.
Employment praxis is influenced not only by perceptions of employees 
as a family but also by perceptions of employees as individuals. While 
Japan is commonly thought of as a "groupy" society, Mouer and Sugimoto 
caution against too generalised conclusions of this nature in cross- 
cultural studies. In fact they argue that "....a close look at Japanese 
society will reveal healthy expressions of self interest, non conformity 
and differentiation of one individual from another. The argument is not 
that the Japanese are more individualistic than Westerners on a 
quantifiable scale, but that Japanese have developed in their own 
culture a number of ways, some qualitatively different, by which they 
can express their individualism."(55)
Individualism in terms of self fulfilment was a much valued concept 
at Hewlett Packard as has already been noted. It was rooted in a labour 
force perspective that saw people simultaneously as individuals and as 
part of a collective. It was, however, a balance between the two. While 
there was much emphasis on individual development and individual 
contribution, it was always within a framework of the maximum benefit 
for the enterprise. There was no pursuit of individualism for its own 
sake. As in the Japanese companies, individuals were also expected to 
fit in. Peter Cressey speaking of Comco, says, "A line manager remarked 
on how he could spot people who would not fit in to the Comco way- they 
were those who kept their jackets on, who wanted fairly well defined 
areas of job responsibility and a more formal sort of work 
relationship."(56) "People who keep their jackets on" would have stood 
out also at Hewlett Packard. Nevertheless, within a framework of the
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perceived overall good of the factory, individuals were given some scope 
to shape the work as they saw fit. This could occur both at the research 
level and at the level of the production line. One design engineer said, 
"I design the work. I set up my own objectives and I determine in 
advance the way the project will run." At production level, a first line 
supervisor said, "People are happy working here not because they can 
compare it with a previous employer. I have forgotten what it is like to 
work for another company. What I like is the way I am given 
responsibility to do the job my way. This freedom means more to me than 
anything else. As far as I know this is how it works throughout the 
factory. Management treat people as individuals." This approach to 
people was very clear in the wage payment system, in the system of 
setting objectives and the system of flexi-hours of working.
In speaking of the changed atmosphere in recent years, a number of 
emlpoyees indicated that one of the casualties of the change had been 
the degree of individual freedom previously enjoyed. This awareness 
seemed to be accompanied by a conviction amongst some managers that a 
gap was opening up between the traditional supervisory grades and those 
supervised. "Lower work levels", said one engineering manager "can be 
less dedicated than, say, middle management grades. Everyone should have 
the interest of the company at heart." What perhaps he failed to 
understand was that "lower work levels" are expendable. Hewlett Packard 
was dependent on its substantial team of graduate engineers to keep 
abreast of the technology and to ring the production changes to meet the 
needs of a rapidly changing market. To achieve this Hewlett Packard used 
the same technique as Maxell and Brother to achieve their ends, namely, 
they utilised a powerful cultural concept, self fulfilment. As a company 
in business to make a profitable return on investment, Hewlett Packard 
could not possibly be interested in the individual self fulfilment of 
its employees per se. They did need to play on people's intrinsic need 
for self fulfilment to achieve their company goals. The choice of 
cultural concept as a vehicle may be technologically determined. 
Companies like Hewlett Packard and Burroughs are under severe market 
pressure to innovate and are highly dependent on young graduates 
introducing the latest technology, and older employees continually up
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dating skills and knowledge. It is against that background, the appeal 
to self fulfilment must be seen.
At Burroughs in particular, but also at Hewlett Packard,the emphasis 
was on individualism stimulated by a very substantial stress on 
qualifications, the need to study for them, and the disadvantage of not 
having them. A thirty year old male assembler, typical of many of those 
interviewed, confessed his only hope of advancing his career with the 
company was by attending college and gaining some certificates. The 
company gave time off to any employees of whatever age to further their 
education. Course fees were paid by the company, although a £50 deposit 
as a bona fide sign, was demanded and had to be lodged with the Human 
Resources Department. Any complaints of boredom with the work were often 
met with an invitation to further education. The previous association of 
apprenticeships with qualifications and time off for further education 
had been largely abandoned by Burroughs.
The weight placed on qualifications probably stimulated 
individualism by making the employee feel that he was entirely to blame 
for his lack of career progress and even for the boring nature of the 
work. People do respond to this pressure. Another assembler, part way 
through a course, said, "The job I’m doing at the moment is slightly
monotonous. It is less than my capabilities." A Number of those
interviewed were either studying or had completed courses of study.
Effectually, continual pressure from the company in this area was
leading to a continually upgraded labour force and a sense of obligation 
to the company. It removed the old job security that the "time served" 
person enjoyed together with his status and pay differentials. It must 
also have been narrowing the employees' human capital so that it became 
more company specific, thus binding the employee to the firm in much 
the same way as has happened in Japan.
Individualism is contrary to the ethos of trade unionism(57), and 
young employees at Burroughs, Maxell and Brother knew nothing of trade 
unions, had never been members, and said they had never heard the
subject discussed in the factory. Even issues normally regarded as of
common concern were understood in individual terms. When one line worker 
was asked for her impression of management concern for the work
environment she said, "It is not down to managers. It is down to people,
the individual." Knowing nothing of unions, one young employee said,"How 
can I feel I want to join one?"
At the same time Burroughs appeared to put no particular emphasis on 
encouraging employees to see themselves as part of a team or family. 
There was no stress on individualism within a corporate framework, as at 
Hewlett Packard. Indeed, the philosophy as stated in the handbook was 
not being adhered to as closely as at Hewlett Packard. In its place was 
an individualism largely correlated to the drive for qualifications, 
which itself seemed to have had an essentially negative starting point, 
viz. , how can I escape this boring job? Significantly, there was a 
higher incidence in this factory of people describing the labour force 
as simply "a collection of people thrown together at the place of 
work".(58) "Uncontrolled" individualism was also apparent in a number 
of unflattering comments about management treatment of shop floor 
workers. "If they really treated their workers like human beings, as 
something like themselves, they could improve the job. They could do a 
lot there, because there is a 'them and us' situation." Another 
said,"People could be treated a lot more fairly. Some groups are treated 
superbly; other groups are treated as dirt, and this by the same 
person." The irony of this situation was that in a sense there was more 
individualism than at Hewlwett Packard. Unfortunately, from the 
company's point of view, it was largely negative in character. In this 
sense Burroughs seemed to be in danger of enjoying the worst of all 
possible worlds
At GEC and Lemac there was much individualism in the sense of 
negative comment concerning the company and its management. It appeared 
to be contained in a framework of concern for the overall enterprise, 
but seemed to have recognised channels in which to run, the consultative 
meetings at GEC, and through trade union representation at both GEC and 
Lemac. It probably also manifested itself in reduced production output, 
although this was difficult to prove, but it had not produced the 
impression of an undercurrent of hostility to management as at 
Burroughs. In fairness to Burroughs, this undercurrent was largely 
confined to the male final assemblers, a disparate group of men with 
previous work experience and some trade union experience. The company 
had allowed the monthly meeting between management and this group to
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lapse, denying them the chance to air their grievances. Grievances had 
been individualised by requesting employees to consult with their 
immediate supervisor in the first instance, and failing satisfaction at 
that point, to request a meeting with a member of the human resouces 
department. In a more traditional union shop, grievances are more likely 
to be raised with the shop steward, and shared either with the work 
group or with the union branch. In other words, a community of concern 
is engendered. Effectually employers like Burroughs are saying, if there 
is to be a community of concern, it will comprise line managers and 
members of the human resources department rather than shop stewards and 
workmates. Although the optimal solution for the employer remains an 
individualised one, involving immediate superior and the person 
concerned, clearly there was an effort here on the part of the employer 
to maximise control and to root that control, in the first instance, in 
line management. What kind of employee response can be expected? Some 
will welcome the concentration of control, seeing it as simplifying a 
previously more complicated control situation where the employee had a 
relationship with at least two groups, the company and the union. A 
number of people interviewed in the four non-union factories were 
obviously glad that they needed to respond to only one group at work 
represented by line management. When asked how they felt about trade 
unions and about how they thought management saw trade unions they 
generally opted for the phrase "a bit of a nuisance". Even in the two 
unionised factories there were people who felt like this about control 
being simplified and in the hands of management. One operator at Lemac 
summed up the feelings of a number of people when he said,"The workforce 
are too ready to run to unions. Sometimes a union Is involved when its 
really a question of misunderstanding. The issue is often exaggerated 
out of all proportion to its importance. People are too sensitive and 
too quick to look for help when they have a problem."
Others, particularly those with some experience of trade unions, 
were bound to realise that the elimination not only of unions, but of 
loyalty to unions and through that, a sense of loyalty to fellow 
workers, was under attack, A radical attempt was being made to reduce 
the employee to the level of "economistic man", concerned only with his 
immediate material benefit and devoid of altruism.
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The Company as a community within a community?
Companies can acquire something of the ethos of community, both 
directly and indirectly. In this regard they can operate almost like a 
religious cult, so that observers like W. Ouchi can say, "The 
organisational culture consists of a set of symbols, ceremonies and 
myths that communicate the underlying values and beliefs of that 
organisation to its employees. These rituals put flesh on what would 
otherwise be sparse and abstract i d e a s . (59)
Here the word 'cult' indicates devotion paid to an aim through a 
system akin to worship<60). In the case of a company, its aim, to 
maximise return on investment and to maximise its own security, can 
become something close to an absolute for some employees and 
shareholders, leading them to put this aim above moral, civil and even 
criminal law. There have been several famous examples in recent years 
including the "Lockheed scandal" in the United States and Japan.
Production methods have some intrinsic similarity with religious 
worship by virtue of the repetitive element in both. At a deeper level, 
management styles and systems that are resistive to change also exhibit 
characteristics of worship. In this thesis interest focuses on abstract 
concepts held in common by cults and companies, vis., trust, harmony, 
mutual help, an internal sense of responsibility, and particularly, the 
growth of community.
Community itself is an elusive term. It has been argued that it 
ought altogether to be avoided. (61) Here it is used in the sense spoken 
of by Martin Buber<62> who asserts that community has never yet been 
realised anywhere in the human family. It is essentially the "being no 
longer side by side but with one another of a multitude of persons."(63) 
This "multitude" has at least two characteristics, a goal and a sense of 
responsibility for each other, which binds the members together. By 
contrast, in collectivity, people are simply bundled together. In the 
approach to community the two Horth American and the two Japanese 
companies of the study favoured the direct route. In effect, the two 
British companies approached the issue indirectly. There were also in 
each case, at least two collectivities, one internal to the factory and 
its employees, the other external to the factory, called simply,
although perhaps erroneously "the local community", and involving the 
people who lived in the adjacent town and rural area.
Taking the latter first, Hewlett Packard had a lively sense of 
relating to an external ethos of excellence and expertise as represented 
by other large companies and by universities. In this sense they were 
unashamedly dlitist. They had few reservations about what they thought 
of themselves and how they related to excellence elsewhere. "We employ 
some of the world’s finest technologists, but equally, some of the 
world’s most talented marketing and sales professionals." <64)"Hewlett 
Packard continue to be actively involved in the community in the United 
Kingdom during 1985 both as a local citizen and as a contributor to a 
number of issues of national interest. Our contribution to two reports 
of Select Committees of the House of Lords, and our announcement of 
increased level of equipment donations to universities and polytechnics 
in the UK were widely acknowledged. Many of our people are actively 
working to develop the relationships between our industry and 
academia."(65) The same report detailed the company relationship with a 
number of leading enterprises in the United Kingdom. As far as the local 
community was concerned, two quite different approaches had been 
adopted. In most of the company literature the local community was 
described in terms of an adjacent area which was a desirable place in 
which to live and raise a family. These two sentences are typical of a 
much larger paragraph. "Our purpose built plant at South Queensferry is 
located in a greenfield site close to the centre of the village on the 
banks of the River Forth. South Queensferry itself is ideally located 
only ten miles from Edinburgh city centre by road, or a mere eight 
minutes by train- there is a station two hundred yards from the 
plant. " (65) The individualised view of life extended even to the local 
community which was effectually reduced to a pool of resources for the 
gratification of individual needs. Hence the local community was 
described in terms of a long list of assets, good roads, railway 
stations, airports, universities, sports facilities, entertainment etc. 
Nowhere were people mentioned, presumably because on the whole, they 
could not be bought, sold or otherwise consumed by individuals. In the 
Hewlett Packard "Statement of Corporate Objectives" the local community 
was spoken of as an area of potential improvement by the company. "All
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of us should strive to improve the environment in which we live. As a 
corporation operating in many different communities throughout the 
world, we must make sure that each of these communities is better for 
Dur presence. This means identifying our interests with those of the 
community; it means applying the highest standards of honesty and 
integrity to our relationships with individuals and groups; it means 
enhancing and protecting the physical environment, building attractive 
plants and offices of which the community can be proud; it means 
contributing talent, time and financial support to worthwhile community 
projects."(67) It was also perceived as an arena of social problems to 
the solution of which Hewlett Packard’s employees could make a 
contribution. "Each community has its particular set of social problems. 
As a major step in this direction, we must strive to provide worthwhile 
employment opportunities for people of widely different backgrounds. 
Among other things, this requires positive action to seek out and employ 
members of disadvantaged groups, and to encourage and guide their 
progress toward full participation at all position levels. ” (68) Both 
approaches reflected a weltanschaung that was radically uni-dimensional 
and propagated a philosophy that was so focused on individual needs and 
their satisfaction that even the apparently ethical view of community 
was seen in terms of a situation that needed improvement.
There were here more than echoes of American religious 
fundamentalism. The premise was the same, that of a bad situation in 
need of redemption. Those who were to do the redeeming had been 
attracted to the work by an appeal to self interest, good housing, 
amenities etc. The atmosphere of Hewlett Packard’s "Graduate Handbook” 
was that of a fundamentalist church. Here was the praise of a new life. 
It was different, and by inference, better than what went before, and 
was characterised principally by self fulfilment.
Social issues presented an essentially personal challenge even when 
they had to be prosecuted as part of a group. "As citizens of their 
community there is much that Hewlett Packard people can and should do to 
improve it- either working as individuals or through such groups as 
churches, schools, civic or charitable organisations.’’(69) The Hewlett 
Packard employee was being enjoined to work "through" such groups rather 
than as part of such groups. There was almost a fear on the part of the
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company of allowing the employee to be seen as a member of any other 
group than the one provided by the enterprise. This essentially 
unitarist view is also a characteristic of fundamentalism. In companies 
like Hewlett Packard there are a number of additional fears, key people 
under-performing, key people leaving the company, and people throughout 
the company wanting collective representation because of dissatisfaction 
with industrial relations, hence, perhaps, the substantial emphasis on 
management by objectives, the stress on good working conditions, the 
attempts to stimulate a company culture, and the "open line” project 
whereby all employees worldwide were surveyed on their views of 
industrial relations.
Contrary forces and philosophies and increasing competition in all
areas of concern, surround Hewlett Packard everywhere and at all times.
There appeared to be only one appropriate response which called for an 
aggressive marketing of the company philosophy, the advantages of 
working for the company tD be promoted, skills to be continuously 
upgraded, new products to be developed in order to remain ahead of the 
competition, and the need for the company to be seen as an "intellectual 
and social asset to each nation and each community".(70)
The advantages of working for the company were defined in cultic
terms of membership of the "congregation" of people who had committed 
themselves to the message. The need to upgrade skills was contained in 
endless rounds of "Bible study" (training teach-ins), keeping ahead of 
the competition often interpreted in terms of a continuous introduction 
of new practices in "worship" (work practices), and novel ways of 
promoting "fellowship" (beer busts etc.)
As far as the internal collectivity at Hewlett Packard was 
concerned, it was essentially a collection of individuals. The 
"Statement of Corporate Objectives" made this quite clear. "The company 
has been built around the individual, the personal dignity of each, and 
the recognition of personal achievements."(71) A further recurring theme 
was that of "sharing in the company's success."(72) Cressey at Comco 
found a philosophy geared to a "company of entrepreneurs."(73) In recent 
Hewlett Packard literature this theme was developed in terms of "this 
indigenous small comapany spirit".(74) Cressey makes the point that by 
virtue of their product, companies like Hewlett Packard are driven to
induce "a set of shared values". (75) As already noted they employed a 
high percentage of' graduates. They produced a continuous stream of new 
electronic products which, for a number of reasons, were either quickly 
obsolete or developed by the competition. In 1985 Hewlett Packard were 
moving to a three year cycle between development of a new product and 
its replacement. Corporate growth in terms of new products and 
increasing output was recognised as essential for survival in the market 
place.
"In the first place we serve a dynamic and growing segment of our 
technological society. To remain static would be to lose ground. We 
cannot maintain a position of strength and leadership in our fields 
without sustained and profitable growth."(76)
To maximise commitment, Hewlett Packard linked individual growth 
with corporate growth as was also the practice at Comco. "In situations 
where decision making cannot be precisely programmed and there is a 
management dependency on personal self development and initiative, then 
there is a need to create a set of shared values. "(77) As has already 
been noted, these "shared values" were technologically determined and 
culturally conditioned.
Ostensibly the company had avoided two areas of common concern in 
organisations, conflict and bureaucratisation. In practice, incipient 
conflict was present and aggravated by the deteriorating market 
conditions in the previous two years. One interviewee said,"There are a 
lot of people who sinply jog along and if they don't like something, 
have a little moan," and went on specifically to mention one area of 
particular tension, "When it comes to wages, sometimes you can have a 
bit of a battle on your hands." Others spoke of a division between shop 
floor workers and office staff.
Something of the phenomenon Cressey discovered at Comco was clearly 
at work in Hewlett Packard. The factory labour force divided into two 
groups, the engineers and designers who could fully absorb the Hewlett 
Packard ethos of individual development and growth, and the rest, 
service personnel, and assemblers and packers, who were doing 
essentially the same type of work as found in the other five factories. 
Their work tended to be repetitive and it must have been difficult to 
build in a sense D f  personal development. The adoption of quality
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circles (as at Burroughs), quality groups (as at Maxell) and quality 
teams (as at Hewlett Packard) was clearly a technique to provide a sense 
of job determination akin to that enjoyed by the engineers and 
designers. "The management saw in Quality Teams a natural extension of 
the problem solving format down into the support and assembly 
staff."(78)
The net result at Hewlett Packard maximised company coherence 
without the imposition of a bureaucracy. A collectivity of apparently 
equal individuals was created with recognised leadership, a hidden 
status structure, little or no bureaucracy, and an imposed common 
philosophy and shared values. Survival with continuous fine adjustments 
to the status quo and a conviction of the basic validity of the status 
quo seemed to summarise the atmosphere in which the company operated.
In so far as Japanese companies have copied North American 
industrial practices and the techniques of management of enterprises 
like Hewlett Packard, there are obviously a number of problematic areas 
for them owing to differences in culture. As already noted, Japanese 
society is essentially group centered. A number of changes or
adaptations have therefore been made to produce a new corporate culture 
in factories like Maxell's at Telford. In its relations with the
external community, Maxell's labour force divided into two. The
Japanese nationals formed a separate group with few external contacts. 
Wives and families had more opportunity in this regard and one Japanese 
wife was said to have been reluctant to return to Japan because of the 
good friends she had made in Britain and the way in which she had 
adjusted to living in England. Most of the Japanese technicians at
Brother were on short(three months) visits to Britain and consequently 
were living as single men. They tended to remain apart when off site. It 
must also be remembered that most of the Japanese were working at least 
twelve hours per day. At Brother, only the female Japanese secretary to 
the Managing Director gave the impression of having had any contact with 
the local community apart from business relations with suppliers. The 
entire Japanese staff seemed to form a separate community of people.
At Maxell, the children of Japanese employees were being educated at 
English schools, and many Japanese wives were attending day schools for 
lessons in English. As already noted, the Japanese Managing Director was
-331-
keenly establishing contacts with a variety of people in the surrounding 
area to improve relations between the local people and the Japanese. The 
Japanese, who have a very lively sense of history, appeared to be 
sensitive to the European wartime image of themselves,(79) but there was 
no attempt to apologise for Japanese culture, and at Maxell a 
determination to make as few changes as possible to normal Japanese 
factory practice. At Brother, this conviction was not as strongly held, 
as noted in Chapter 3.
The main difference between the approach to the external community 
by the Japanese at Maxell and Brother, and by the Americans who had 
influenced Hewlett Packard's publicity material, was that the Americans 
appeared to see the external community in macro terms, universities, 
neighbouring cities, fairly remote countryside and amenities to be 
enjoyed. The Japanese appeared to see only the immediate community, and 
that in terms of personalities, the local head teacher, the principal of 
the technical college,the chairman of local Rotary etc. It could be 
argued that this is a function of Japanese concepts of community that 
are largely focused on the family. The size and density of population in 
Japan may also give rise to an essentially close view of community 
compared with the wide and diffuse conception prevalent in North 
American culture. Language and cultural differences will also be 
affective in this regard. In contrast to the American companies' 
aggressively "evangelical" approach to local community, the Japanese 
approach seemed essentially passive and accepting.
In terms of the product, they had a simpler job to accomplish than 
Hewlett Packard. They were under pressure to develop existing product 
lines and to develop new products, but not as intensively as at Hewlett 
Packard. They worked to a lead time for new products of approximately 
five years. This could be reduced if competitors entered the market with 
an "improved" product sooner than anticipated. They were operating in a 
high volume market at lower profit margins per unit compared with 
production at Hewlett Packard. They gave no impression of a view of the 
wider local community as an arena of improvement. Instead, their overall 
image was that of strangers feeling their way in a community for which 
they appeared to have the utmost regard. The Managing Director at Maxell 
spoke respectfully of British industrial history. "As the birthplace of
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the industrial revolution this part of England saw many developments in 
technology relating to metal forming, metal processing and engineering 
during the 18th century."(80) He also spoke favourably of the quality of 
the local infrastructure, mentioning universities and communications in 
particular, and the high quality of the local labour market. "Being 
traditionally in the forefront of the technology, the people of the area 
today are pursuing economic development by means of the renewal of the 
industrial base, with considerable vigour."(81)
From the cultural point of view the way in which the Japanese retain 
a traditional feel for time is perhaps of more interest. Capitalism and 
capitalist economics as a view of life is essentially immediate. The
long term is given low priority, the short term is all absorbing. A
characteristic of people within the system is a loss of a sense of 
history and a lack of vision for the future. (82) Any residual historical 
awareness is principally romantic in concern, nostalgic in ethos, and
entirely unrelated to the present.(83) The present is perceived as the 
ultimate in terms of human evolution, needing only fine adjustment to 
cope with the changing fortunes of human existence. Revolution is
abhorred essentially on the basis of a widespread conviction that it is 
unnecessary, and that the status quo, while not perfect, has the 
potential to evolve to perfection apparently in fulfilment of the views 
of Saint-Simon that "All the peoples of the Earth are moving towards the 
same goal. The goal towards which they are heading is tD pass from the 
governmental, feudal, military regime to the administrative, industrial, 
pacific system....No force can resist that march."(84)
The Japanese do not appear to share these views. In the medium term
they see themselves as world leaders in the Pacific Basin in the next
century.(85) Like Christians, Jews and socialists in the West, they 
have a three dimensional view of time that appreciates the importance of 
history for the present, the essentially transient nature of the
present, and has a vision of the longer term future.
The Managing Director at Maxell had collaborated with the company 
president to produce the Japanese translation of Thomas Telford's 
autobiography. (86) He liked to mention in company literature the
company's physical proximity to the beginnings of the industrial 
revolution in Europe. In the postcript to the autobiography of Telford,
the President writes, "A project planning of a factory establishment is 
always prepared with a prospect for some period, and once the factory is 
actually established, I believe that the factory has to survive by 
taking the best counter measures, no matter how drastically the 
environment changes, and to meet the expectations of the people who have 
supported the project.
This concept has to be applied and inherited not only in our 
generation, but also in our children's and our grandchildren's 
generation, and must not be limited only in the viewpoint of business. 
When I reflect on the process of the establishment of our Telford 
factory, I am especially and profoundly concerned about this 
concept."(87) Thereby he indicated an overt emphasis on the future. No 
wonder Japanese capitalism has been called an heretical form of 
capitalism.
Internally, the ethos of the labour force at Maxell and Brother was 
quite different from that at each of the other four factories. In 
contrast to the collectivity of individuals at Hewlett Packard, Maxell 
and Brother made strenuous efforts to induce a unitary sense of 
corporate community. At Brother the corporate community was subdidvided 
into a number of competing teams. At Maxell an attempt was made to see 
the entire labour force, including the Japanese nationals, as one. Hence 
the uniformity of dress, conditions, and styles of address. It would 
appear that an attempt was being made to create the impossible, a 
homogeneous group out of Japanese and British, managers and managed. In 
this regard they seemed to be performing in a very Japanese way and with 
some at least superficial success. In a sense they had a "national" 
model for this attempt. Since 1868 the Japanese have been successful in 
creating a homogeneous industrial nation out of landowners, Samurai and 
peasants, sharing a background of Confucianism, Shinto, Buddhism and a 
variety of smaller derived philosophies and religions.(88)
At neither factory was individualism encouraged. The attempt to keep 
out unions and individualise earnings seemed largely a result of the 
influence of the British personnel managers and was being reviewed 
continuously by the Japanese. Unlike Hewlett Packard, there was no 
emphasis on individual entrepreneurship. < Without a substantial research 
and development core group as at Hewlett Packard, there appeared to be
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no pressure to make company values and aims coincide with personal 
growth and personal goals. In this respect they gave the impression of 
trying to manage the factory as though it were in Japan. There was an 
assumption that the labour force would almost inevitably equate the 
success of the factory with self interest. "Joining our company will 
enhance your future as well as ours," said the Managing Director in the 
foreword to the company handbook. "Vhat we have learned in the day to 
day running of the factory is a far cry from the complex doctrines and 
theories one might study at say Harvard Business School; it is really 
quite commonplace. It is the sort of everyday thing that may hardly 
consider worth taking seriously..."(89)
To achieve this the factory had in its favour four important 
ingredients. There was a large local pool of young, unconditioned labour 
from which to recruit. The local labour market also provided a 
substantial pool of older supervisors, free of old craft sectionalism. 
This was a group eager to be flexible in working practices and available 
for substantial levels of overtime. There was a buoyant product market 
with every sign of potential for growth in the immediate future. 
Fourthly, the company was fairly confident that it would be able to 
provide steady growth in real earnings for employees.(90)
The real test of lasting change in attitudes at work at Maxell was 
likely to come if any one of those four elements happened to change. The 
most fragile was likely to be the product market. This had proved to be 
the major area of concern at Hewlett Packard, hence the investment on 
research and development. At Burroughs, it was the failure of the 
product market to continue to grow that seemed to have allowed old class 
divisions between management and supervised employee to re-emerge. At 
GEC the uncertain product market had caused morale to plummet. Maxell 
appeared to have already sensed the danger and, as previously noted, 
were making two fairly different products at Telford. Brother relied on 
widening the product appeal with the introduction of new models.
Against this background the Japanese seemed to be creating a labour 
force mentally conditioned to think in terms of the collective good, to 
be suppressing individual emotions including conflict, competitiveness 
and pride, to form a pacific group of content, flexible generalists, 
unobtrusively controlled by an accepted hierarchical bureaucracy led by
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the patriarchal figure of the Managing Director. Already at both Maxell 
and Brother there were impressive levels of obedience, acceptance, 
loyalty and understanding of the structure.
Between these two extremes of Hewlett Packard and the two Japanese 
factories, came the variety of collectivities represented by Burroughs, 
GEC, and Lemac. In a sense Burroughs was a modified version of Hewlett 
Packard. Like GEC they were a low volume producer of very high value 
added equipment, operating in a particularly difficult market of 
apparently uncertain demand. Like Hewlett Packard they had a published 
company philosophy.(91) Unlike Hewlett Packard their philosophy made no 
reference to the external community.lt focused on individuality and self 
fulfilment, but all within the framework of a bureaucracy. "Ultimately, 
the responsibility rests with individuals, with the relationship each 
manager has with the employee under his or her supervision, and with the 
fair and consistent application of all policies, procedures and 
practices."(92) In ethos it was therefore a mixture of Hewlett Packard 
individualism and Maxell bureaucracy of benevolent rules and 
regulations.
The philosophy was essentially only an introduction to a philosophy. 
It did not appear to have been thought through as at Hewlett Packard and 
at Maxell. Consequently, the damaging effect of the demise of 
opportunities for consultation and the sharing of information seemed not 
to be fully appreciated. The withering of these opportunities was 
probably a response to a need for an immediate increase in production 
and an absence of corporate organisation on the part of the labour 
force. It eliminated, meantime, bruising encounters with militant male 
assembly workers. The induced frustrations seemed to be fragmenting the 
labour force along old fault lines of class, gender, and skill. There 
was the impression of a lack of an overall cohesive model of what the 
labour force collectively should be. At Burroughs the static element of 
the framework was in situ, line management and support services, but the 
organic element, attitudes, responses, etc., while detailed to some 
extent on paper, appeared to be diverse and uncontrolled in practice.
At GEC and Lemac, traditional British working practices were much in 
evidence. At Lemac they were softened to some extent by the personality 
of the Managing Director, whose obvious concern for the enterprise found
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a ready and appreciative response in the labour force. At both factories 
there was a type of natural spontaneous family atmosphere - almost a 
sense of gemeinschaft in spite of the divisions. The rise of 
individuality and community over time had produced a succession of 
paradoxes, the shop stewards who were accused of hoarding information, 
the benevolent Managing Director whom employees insisted on addressing 
as "Mr.", Christian employees who saw no role for trade unions, random 
trade union recruitment in a closed shop, and the tiny move to single 
status working in a highly fragmented factory.
In neither factory was there any overt attempt to induce a sense of
gemeinschaft, either of the Hewlett Packard "collectivity of 
individuals" type or the "intense family" type at Maxell. There was 
almost an intuitive appreciation that gemeinschaft could not be created 
directly, but had to be allowed to arise as a result of corporate 
belief and endeavour on the part of people who had a particular 
relationship of trust and respect for each other. "It (community) reigns 
where the fight that is fought takes place from the position of a 
community struggling for its own reality as a community."(93)
The dialectic inherent in all six factories, and probably within 
every factory within the capitalist mode of production, was that "the 
fight that is fought" is best tackled by groups of workers unified by a 
commitment to a common goal. This is perhaps the major contribution to 
management by modern Japanese industrial practice. The other side of the 
dialectic is that in capitalism competing sets of interests work to 
destroy the necessary origins of mutual commitment. Essentially, the 
Japanese appeal to two of these origins, the family and Japan. GEC and 
Lemac could appeal to neither. "I don't think the management view the 
company as a whole as a team" was the way in which one employee 
articulated the views of a number of people. Most thought of themselves 
as people "thrown together at a place of work."(94) Another said, "They 
(management) don't communicate with the shop floor in the sense of
friendliness." However much these comments may be dismissed as
subjective personal opinion, they did reflect views held in general at 
both factories and seemed reasonably typical of attitudes and 
impressions.
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The major handicap in the capitalist mode of production seems to be
that there is simply no place for a "community struggling for its
reality as a community." The concept of community is not perceived as an 
end in itself. Ends are entirely related to production. The ruthless 
objectifying ethos of the system reifies the participants, making 
community an impossibility. The best that can be hoped for is a
collectivity where inner tension and conflict is minimised.
Traditionally factories like GEC and Lemac have been forced to accept 
that these tensions are best dealt with by a recognition of "two sides" 
and a granting to trade unions the status of negotiating on behalf of a 
membership.
Conclusion,
The focus on relationships, both within the factories, and external 
to the factories, reveals a fascinating diversity of view and perhaps 
more than any other part of this study, the effect of national cultural 
mores on behaviour in the work place. Relationships operate on at least 
two levels, the level of the individual in the work place, and the level 
of the labour force as a whole in relation to its social environment 
outwith the place of work.
At the internal factory level, the social concept of the family is 
used overtly at Maxell and Brother, to some extent covertly at Hewlett 
Packard and Burroughs, and allowed indirectly to arise at GEC and Lemac. 
The use or non use of the term reflects the way in which the concept of 
family is understood in the three national cultures. Where it is used 
directly it has at least two effects. As in natural families, there is 
an apparent egalitarianism in which people seem to be treated humanely 
as respected colleagues or members. Secondly, it has the effect of 
controlling a range of behavioural aspects, from feelings of loyalty and 
feelings of alienation, to readiness for overtime and control of 
absenteeism. In other words it is used to manipulate the labour force, 
albeit in what is perceived to be the corporate interest.
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In this regard the two British factories, constrained by an 
essentially private and consanguinous view of family from the 
surrounding cultural milieu, are at a corporate disadvantage, partially 
offset by feelings of 'family' that have naturally accrued over the 
lifetime of the plants and the work lifetime of the labour forces.
With respect to relationships with the external social environment, 
the US plants stand over against the local community while the Japanese 
and British plants stand alongside the local community. The Japanese 
approach, in contrast to the US approach, seems more likely in the long 
term to win local approval. Given the public levels of diffidence with 
regard to Japanese investment in Britain, this may, strategically, in 
terms of further investment and general acceptability, be very important 
for the Japanese in the future.
Both sets of relationships have traditionally been linked with 
overarching values of a social and/or religious character. The best of 
the large US enterprises have usually enshrined these in a company 
philosophy. To some extent this has been copied by the Japanese but they 
have almost always, linked overarching values to Japanese nationalism 
and the value of Japanese culture for the world. Now in their overseas 
plants, a philosophical vacuum seems to have developed at this point, 
and if company culture is to be kept tight and sharp, this must present 
a challenge to Japanese companies wishing to maximise motivation and 
commitment in the work place. This must potentially be one of the least 
satisfactory aspects of overseas operating for the large Japanese 
company. If it is not solved and filled, it may prove to be a source of 
industrial relations problems in the future, if not identical with, 
perhaps akin to the kind of industrial relations problems more commonly 
found in plants like those of GEC at Kirkcaldy and Lemac at Haddington, 
which make little or no reference to 'superordinate' goals
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CHAPTER .,8 ,.
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"This hope of a kingdom of prosperity, peace, and dominion which 
could he accomplished on earth also entered into the development 
of industrialisation." Jurgen Koltmann.
It is clear now, in 1988, that a reversal of positions between Japan 
and the West has occurred in the eighties. Until 1980 Japan saw itself 
as "catching up with the West". By the early eighties this had in fact 
been realised, and by 1988 Japan's overseas investments, for example, 
were the largest of any nation in the world. <1> Ronald Dore's prediction 
that convergence would take place, in the sense that Japan was the 
future of Britain, seems to be fulfilling itself. <2> This study is 
particularly interested in Western companies who look to Japan in order 
to find ways of developing, which will enable them to compete 
effectively with Japanese companies. They do not speak of "catching up 
with Japan" and after some initial enthusiasm, are reluctant to talk of 
adopting Japanese practices (Japanisation) yet nevertheless are avidly 
studying Japanese industrial practice and almost continually, it would 
seem, searching for ways of emulating it in their own plants.
Sir Simon Hornby, chairman of W.H. Smith, said recently,"The one 
thing I find very unsatisfactory is having to balance the interests of 
those interested in the short term and those who understand what we are 
trying to do long term. In Japan where I have studied many companies in 
ray capacity as chairman of the Design Council, there is a different 
attitude, and that is why the Japanese have been so successful." (3)The 
concluding sentences of a report of a visit of the Industrial 
Participation Association's Central Business and Investment Committee to 
Japan says,"Japan began its industrial success by copying much of what 
British industry had done. Perhaps it is time to turn the tables and 
copy some aspects of Japanese practice for our own future security and 
success."(4)
Fully five years before that visit, Ford (UK) had already sent a 
team to Japan to study work methods and report.(5) That report, rightly 
or wrongly, was interpreted by trade unionists at Dagenham as an attempt 
by Ford to introduce Japanese style practices and was a major cause of 
grievance contributing to the February '88 strike in Ford's UK plants. 
One strike banner read, "Brits not Mips", and Ford's attempt to 
introduce Employee Involvement was consistently interpreted by the 
unions as an attempt to introduce "Japanese style Quality 
Circles". (6) Indeed such is the impact Japan has made on the world's 
economy that a whole clutch of industrial relations practices including
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Quality Circles, team working, just-in-time stockholding, single status 
working, core employment etc., are commonly referred to as Japanisation 
even when many of these practices have a substantial history and have 
existed for a considerable time in enterprises throughout the world.
Against this background three basic issues are of interest for the 
present study. Firstly, while there have been many visits to Japan by 
British industrialists, very little research has been done on Japanese 
praxis in their overseas manufacturing plants in Britain. This is partly 
the fault of the Japanese who have been reluctant to allow access to 
their British plants. Secondly, whether it is a form Df Japanisation or 
not, major changes in industrial relations, work practices, and the role 
of trade unions have been taking place in the 80s in British 
manufacturing industry much of it in line with what is known of 
practices in Japan. The principal issue, therefore, is not the extent of 
Japanese penetration into the British economy, but the changes in 
industrial relations which may or may not be directly attributable to
Japan and in the midst of which it looks as though "the British are....
attempting to adapt to changed economic conditions without relinquishing 
established bases of profit, power and influence."(7)
Thirdly, while the Japanese may have learned much from British 
industry at the turn of the century, a more immediate impact was 
understandably made upon their industrial praxis by the post-war 
American occupation and the emulation of American management practice in 
the 1950s. During the 1950s and 60s, the Americans were heavily 
investing in Britain. Why did the new management techniques and 
practices at IBM, Hewlett Packard, Kodak, Continental Can and many 
others not make more of an impact on British industrial relations? Were 
changes successfully resisted by a combination of full employment and 
strong trade unions? While Japan has virtually full employment in the 
80s (estimated unemployment is 5%) it does not have strong trade unions 
in the European sense. In the post-war years strong trade union 
militancy was ruthlessly expunged together with a general campaign 
against left wing policies. <8) Their existing company unions embracing 
foremen and managerial grades cannot possibly adopt the kind of anti­
capitalist stance seen in much of the British trade union movement.
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Although they are not entirely quietist they cannot be equated with the 
type of trade union defence of interests seen in Britain until 1980.
To some extent there has been in the last two decades or so a "let's 
copy America" syndrome in British industry but it has not been 
accompanied by the very real levels of fear and resistance (largely 
verbal) that have accompanied the penetration of Japanese companies into 
Western economies.Some of this fear is doubtless a legacy of attitudes 
to Japan stemming from World War Two. These attitudes have a cultural 
basis, specifically an intuitive distaste for what are perceived to be 
particular aspects of Japanese cultural behaviour, ie. , groupiness, 
willingness to work long hours, an alleged propensity to copy rather 
than invent, nationalism and a desire to dominate. These and more 
detailed assumptions about Japanese industrial relations formed the 
starting point of this programme
The significance of the Ford dispute of February '88 for this study, 
is that these fears, groundless or otherwise, are strong enough to 
stimulate industrial action in Britain. Are they justified? By looking 
at two Japanese factories in Britain, comparing them with two American 
factories and two British factories it is possible to make a 
contribution to the debate. Indeed it could be argued that the study of 
foreign investor industrial relations behaviour in the host country 
outwith their indigenous culture, is likely to yield a more accurate 
picture of international trends in industrial relations than comparable 
studies of factories in three different countries. While the foreign 
investor m y  be influenced by the host culture, that influence is likely 
to be minimal in comparison with social pressures to conform to "normal" 
working practices in the indigenous culture. In other words, industrial 
relations praxis in the foreign country is likely to reveal more 
accurately what the investor really wants in terms of labour relations 
or perhaps what he can get away with. Witness, eg., wages and conditions 
often provided by THCs in 3rd. world countries.
The present study claims to be observing the vanguard of changing 
labour relations in Britain in the 1980s and that a number of 
conclusions can be drawn from the observations at the six 
factories. First, however, it is necessary to say a word about 
industrial relations theory.Two long established and opposing views can
-349-
be attributed to Marx and Weber respectively. For Marxists, culture is 
determined by the relations of production which have been shaped by the 
way capital is held and deployed. For example, the conflict of interests 
between those who have capital to buy labour power and those who have 
only labour power to sell, is characteristic of the totality of 
capitalist society and determines its total cultural ethos. By contrast 
Weberians seem to suggest that culture determines the relations of 
production. Specifically, human praxis, which, it is alleged, determines 
the cultural context, shapes also the form of industrial relations(9).
The systems theory as developed by J.T.Dunlop(lO) and which has been 
so influential in the 60s and 70s, also stems from a basically Weberian 
perspective via the work of Talcott Parsons. Dunlop suggests that the 
industrial relations system is a sub-system of the wider society to 
which it belongs and that the wider cultural context supplies certain 
influences and constraints.
J .E.T.Eldridge(11) argues that Weber himself had a more complex view 
of the relationship between culture and praxis than many of his 
followers and if he appeared to draw a one sided picture of cause and 
effect he was doing so as a technical expedient to advance understanding 
and analysis of what was in reality a complex relationship. He was using 
a development of ideal-type analysis to try and penetrate the 
complexities of the subject.
Almost as a reaction to grand theorising, is, nevertheless, a new 
theoretical approach by A.Fox et al(12> who see industrial relations in 
terms of "frames of reference", unitary and pluralist. Perhaps theirs is 
not so much a theory of industrial relations as an explanation of the 
way in which people actually see industrial relations, i.e., as a single 
team pursuing a common goal, or legitimate sets of competing interests. 
Both frames of reference beg the question of the reason for these two 
referential options and the relationship of the relations of production 
to the wider culture in which they are set. For the current study this 
is in fact a basic question. Broadly speaking, most of the actors in the 
two American owned and the two Japanese owned plants in Britain seemed 
to hold a unitary view of industrial relations, and most of the actors 
in the two British factories, a pluralist view.
While this programme has spent much time analysing individual 
responses, it has done so, not as an end in itself, but to try and 
detect the influence of wider socialisation on those attitudes and 
responses. This has taken the programme closer to the approach adopted 
by Marc Maurice et al (13). Over a substantial period of time they have 
observed and analysed the responses and attitudes of actors in French 
enterprises in France and German enterprises in Germany to detect the 
influence of socialisation external to the company. They conclude that 
the shape of industrial relations in these two European cultures is 
influenced by socialisation via education and training, and the related 
phenomena of worker mobility and enterprise organisation. Thus 
industrial relations theory, which since the arrival of Dunlop's systems 
approach, has tended to focus on the internal workings of the system of 
industrial relations, has been returned by Maurice et al to a more macro 
level of analysis not just acknowledging but taking seriously, the 
impact of wider socialisation on workplace organisation and behaviour.
The current project may be accused of taking a further step back to 
what Eldridge might argue, was a more authentically Weberian position, 
namely that socialisation is not a one way process but an ebb and flow 
of external cultural influence and the ever regenerating social changes 
Induced by people in industry,(14) That is, the relations of production 
and the culture in which these operate are correlated, the one has no 
life without the other. The relations of production shape and alter a 
culture and the culture provides a set of parameters within which the 
relations of production exist and to which they conform. This is not a 
dialectical theory of industrial relations, but what Alan Swingewood 
calls a "theory of factors - X influences Y; Y influences X".(15) It is 
not a dialectic since there is no intrinsic contradiction between the 
relations of production and a culture, the one contributes to the other. 
Marxists argue that the satisfaction of human need produces the form of 
the relations of production, but that which people need, even the basic 
needs of security, food and shelter, are culturally determined so that 
the relations of production and culture are correlated. "Workplace 
relations" can therefore "be understood only in a wider context 
involving other, more complex social relations."(16) Nor in this study 
are these "more complex social relations" confined to the education
-351-
system and worker mobility as in Maurice et al's detailed study, but, 
ignoring their diffidence, are understood as embracing the wider 
cultures to which all the actors belong.
There is a fourth perspective, shared by K.Qmae(17) and 
H.Shimada(18) in Japan, and Kenneth Thurley(19) in England. It may be 
described as a primitive secular view and presupposes that neither 
culture nor the relations of production influence the shape of 
capitalist production. Industrial praxis and its success or failure 
depend on qualities of smartness and diligence in the face of the 
changing business cycle.
"One of the serious defects associated with anthropological 
explanations of Japanese industrial success, is the tendency to relate 
the recent remarkable industrial performance directly by a short circuit 
with ancient cultural inheritances without paying due attention to what 
had been done during critical periods preceding the rapid growth. This 
tendency is particularly conspicuous in foreign observers, perhaps 
because of an unfortunate imbalance of available information. Although 
information available in foreign countries on Japan is relatively 
abundant for the late 1940s, when Japan was occupied and controlled by 
the Allied Forces, and the period after the raid 60s, when the economy 
started to exhibit phenomenal growth, outside observers have little 
information about the 1950s, the period during which the critical bases 
were built for the subsequent growth."<20)
Shimada goes on to suggest that Japan's rise to economic 
independence was based upon the clever choice of promoting exports 
through industrial rationalisation. He further suggests that this choice 
was born out of a sense of national crisis and "a popular chance to 
catch up with advanced Western nations."(21) Immediately the question 
arises of the origin of this sense and of the nature and content of the 
qualities of smartness and diligence, of their origin and development. 
In fact these questions lead back into the debate concerning the 
relations of production and culture and specifically the differences 
observed between the provision of working conditions, attitudes at work, 
and employee perceptions of management.
These variations which have been documented in the previous 
chapters, cannot simply be attributed to historical cultural differences
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in the three nations represented by the six factories, but rather to the 
reaction assisted by the catalytic presence of international capitalism, 
that takes place when one national culture interacts with another at the 
place of work. To complicate the situation, international capitalism is 
not merely a catalyst but has autonomous objectives of its own which it 
seeks to impose on the resulting cultural amalgam.
The parameters of industrial relations for international capitalism 
are clear, non-union working, an emphasis on management prerogatives, 
minimising overheads, eg. , wages, numbers employed etc., maximising 
profits and turnover, maximising automation and product reliability, and 
minimising product life, etc. National cultures will tend mainly by 
political means, to constrain modify and even reverse some of those 
aims largely under the influence of traditional moral maxims with their 
origin in religion or ideology. Thus Maurice et al's thesis is largely 
accepted and the differences in industrial relations between two 
countries "... can be related to fundamental features of advanced 
capitalist societies and economies"(22).
In the present study however, observation and analysis has focused 
on firms operating, not in their own national cultural milieu, but in a 
foreign cultural setting, ie. ,. British. Here the capitalist enterprise, 
constrained and conditioned by its own national culture yet ever mindful 
of the drive to an unfettered capitalist model as oulined above, meets a 
new set of conditions imposed by the foreign host culture. These new 
conditions will be imposed unilaterally on all incoming enterprises. The 
differences in for example, attitudes at work, employee perceptions of 
management, and the provision of working conditions, must therefore 
arise as a result of their own cultural conditioning, or from the effect 
of the interaction between their own socialisation and the host culture, 
or from a combination of the effects of the two.
The evidence from the case studies at Hewlett Packard, Burroughs, 
Maxell and Brother, and from the recent workforce reactions at Ford (UK) 
and Nissan, seems to point in the direction of a combination of the 
effects of the original socialisation and the effects of the interaction 
between the culture of the incoming firm and the host culture.
The use of the concept of the family perhaps best illustrates this 
point and can be depicted graghically as in Table 53.
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Table 53. "Family" in three cultures and their interaction.
British, Extended, 
tending to become 
nuclear.
American.
nuclear.
Almost entirely Company wide: elements 
of extended family. 
Conflict open. 
Ostensibly egalitarian 
Premium on service.
Japanese.
extended,
nuclear.
Economic, 
tending to
Economic: plant wide. 
Conflict hidden. 
Paternalistic.
Emphasis on production 
Premium on loyalty.
Company attitudes to education and training also illustrate the same 
phenomenon as in Table 54.
Table 54. Company attitudes to education and training.
British education and training. 
Geared to producing blue and 
white collar workers before 
leaving school. Training, the 
responsibility of the state 
and the company.
American education and training. Emphasis on university
Ho radical separation between qualifications and
blue and white collar. promotion on their basis.
Emphasis on college and univ­ Continuous in-house training
ersity qualifications. Emphas­ especially for blue collar
is on company training and workers. Employee education
and post work experience 
training.
subsidised.
Japanese education and training. Exclusively in-house training
ffo radical separation between Bo particular desire for highly
blue and white collar. Emphasis on educated labour force. Promotion
"good*' school and university. Almost on basis of work performance and
exclusively in-house training. and age(experience). Unwilling 
to subsidise external employee 
education.
A similar approach could be extended to the analysis of attitudes at 
work, employee perceptions of management and to a lesser extent, the
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provision of working conditions, provided the variable," type of 
product," is kept constant.
For a theory to be authentic it must have some predictive power. The 
evidence from the case studies suggests that the effect of the 
conflation of concepts, as in Tables 53 and 54, will be a combination of 
the effects of the original socialisation on companies and the effect of 
the interaction of the culture of the incoming firm and the host 
culture. It will not therefore be possible for the foreign company to 
create an image of the home based plant in the host society, not even of 
working conditions. To do so would be a waste of energy and resources 
better directed at market penetration or profit maximisation etc.
As far as Britain is concerned it can also be said that the host 
cultural concepts perceived by employees to have a high moral content, 
eg. , working conditions, wages, etc., will tend to prevail in the 
resultant effect created by two or more cultures intermingling at the 
place of work. Conversely, issues that appear more utilitarian to the 
employee, eg., education and training, will potentially be more open to 
change and influence by the incoming culture. Thus "attitudes at work", 
which have an inherent moral content, are unlikely to be influenced as 
much as, say, "employee perceptions of management", which are much more 
utilitarian for the employee. Likewise the "provision of working 
conditions", generally viewed in a utilitarian fashion by employees 
rather than as a moral issue, is likely to be more open to change than 
"attitudes at work". In fact, once there was a generally agreed 
awareness of growing economic crisis and a threat to living standards in 
Britain at the beginning of the 80s, changes in working practices, ie., 
flexibility, teamworking etc., were widely introduced, largely but not 
exclusively by foreign companies operating in Britain. Where such change 
has been resisted with at least partial success, as at Ford (UK), the 
success of that resistance has depended on the trade unions translating 
changes in working practices from a utilitarian concept to a moral one. 
The successful vocabulary of resistance has included concepts of rights, 
justice and personal freedom. (23) This is probably easier to achieve in 
an established plant where there is likely to be at least an historical 
basis for comparison. It is therefore significant that change seems to 
have been easier to realise on greenfield sites where that historical
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basis is either absent, or at least weakened, as in the case of 
Burroughs at Livingston.
The key concept therefore, in predicting the outcome of the clash of 
cultures in the place of work, revolves around the category of the
moral. The differences observed in attitudes at work, employee
perceptions of management and the provision of working conditions can be 
explained by perceptions of what is regarded as moral. This goes some 
way to explain why flexibility has been resisted at Ford (UK) but 
welcomed at Maxell. Two companies operating with similar objectives and 
an almost exclusively British labour force, obtain opposite reactions 
because Ford workers have been successful in portraying flexibility as 
morally undesirable (ie., flexibility is an attack on collective 
agreements established over time and designed to protect jobs), while 
Maxell workers see it as morally desirable (ie., they are persuaded of 
the injustice of denying people the opportunity of maximising job 
satisfaction on the grounds that in their youth they did not serve a 
recognised apprenticeship.)
Every culture claims to have a moral core but one advantage the 
Japanese socialisation process appears to have over the ostensibly 
Christian cultures of the US and Britain, is that the category of the
moral has not been subsumed by secularity but is more overtly on the
daily agenda in fields such as industrial relations. Thus the 
authoritarianism of the Japanese Managing Director at Maxell appeared to 
Western eyes, to be a form of faintly Victorian paternalism. This very 
issue is mentioned by Toshihiko Yamamoto, an executive banker with 
Sumitomo, in a recent Financial Times article. "Some people have a born 
capacity to think in a cross-border type of way. It’s more than 
cosmopolitan. Christian societies have a totally different concept of 
the world, one which is often limited only to other Christian societies. 
People with a Buddhist philosophy are more cross-border."(24) Western 
socialisation seems to inhibit "cross-border" thinking of this type 
enabling the Western observer to dismiss the Japanese Managing 
Director's approach as anachronistic.
The fact of the matter, however, was that this was how he actually 
behaved and dealt with his employees. So far, in plants such as Maxell's 
at Telford, and Brother's at Wrexham, these features of Japanese
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industrial relations, which may he seen as unwelcome by the labour 
force, are presumably outweighed by the features that are welcomed, so 
that the net result is a general appreciation of Japanese management 
practice.
These studies are therefore suggesting that socialisation, 
particularly with respect to moral conditioning, is shaping industrial 
relations in the factory. American companies appear to have been aware 
of this for some time and where they develop and publish a company 
philosophy, tend to try and top up the employee's value system with 
additional conditioning perceived to be in the interests of the 
enterprise. While in practice much of this material might sound trite 
and banal, it has the potential to control the tone of industrial 
relations in the plant. More importantly, it is clear that value systems 
inculcated in the home, and the moral content of education at school and 
university and/or college, have a seminal effect on industrial 
relations.
Culture, religion and..industrial society.,.
Primitive religion has been defined and found incompatible with 
Christianity and industrialism, (see Chapter 6.> Here religion as a basic 
function of what it means to be human is defined and its relation to 
society and the world of work briefly explored. "Religion is the 
substance of culture and culture is the form of religion,"(25) said Paul 
Tillich, and that is largely the belief in this study. One important 
conclusion follows, namely, religion in secular society is not a system 
of rites, symbols and feelings, but that which is "the life blood, the 
inner power, and the ultimate meaning of all life." (26) Religion is 
therefore not a phase in the development of mankind (pace Compte) but 
correlated to human culture which will exist and has existed so long as 
there have been and will be human beings. In other words, Compte's three 
phases, the primitive, the religious and the scientific are not so much 
a neat sequence but each overlaps the other. The suggestion of this
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thesis is that the category of the religious continues even in the 
apparently secular scientific phase.
The project is based on the conviction that people are basically 
religious in a three fold sense. They are inevitably part of a culture 
and currently contribute to culture by the action of living and working 
in the world. They inevitably ask fundamental questions concerning the 
meaning of life, its origins and its future, and thirdly, people seem 
always to seek not only to satisfy needs, but to maximise security and 
hide from the transience of life by circumscribing existence with 
commonly agreed boundaries of material, legal and social provision.
From this premise it also follows that capitalist production is part 
of and contributes to the culture in which it emerges or is located. 
Furthermore, its tendency to "deculturalise" the indigenous culture, 
leads it to re-culturalise. The new capitalist culture has its own ethic 
based on an ultimate view of the market. Drawing on ethics selectively 
culled from world religions, capitalist culture substantiates its view 
of the centrality of the market and develops themes of community and 
family, nation and world, money and possessions, democracy and 
leadership, self and group. Paraphrasing Maurice et al<27), the 
conclusions to this study are based on the conviction that neither the 
work situation itself nor technology can account on their own for the 
organisation of production, the attitudes of workers, and perceptions 
workers have of management. That which does matter is the socialisation 
all the actors have undergone and continue to experience on and off 
site, and the culture of which they are part. "In other words one cannot 
study variations in organisational structure in relation to the social 
environment without considering how social relations are shaped in a 
society."<28)
The Marxist view that the industrial relations system is the 
mechanism whereby the labour force is managed, is accepted. It is not 
autonomous and not dependent on technology, factory size, type of 
product, product market farces etc., although each of these can have an 
influence. It is shaped primarily by the needs of capital and in 
particular, the drive to accumulate. The actors, however, are not 
unconditioned machines, but socialised and encultured people. Their 
socialisation etches the industrial relations system. At the macro
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level, the initial investment level, the needs of capital dominate and 
determine decisions. At subsequent plant level, socialisation modifies 
those decisions and contributes to the shape of collective action. 
Specifically, attitudes at work, and perceptions of management are 
socially conditioned before and during work for the firm, while the 
provision of working conditions is determined initially by the needs of 
capital and modified by the culture of the actors.
For foreign companies in Britain there are of course two
socialisation processes. While the socialisation of all the actors 
affects attitudes at work and perceptions of management, the
socialisation of the owners influences the provision of working 
conditions, and the socialisation of the employees influences 
expectations of the shape of the provision of working conditions.For 
foreign companies in Britain there are two cultures interacting in and 
on the organisation. The strength of one socialisation process bearing 
on virtually all the actors is absent. Its place is filled by the needs 
of capital and these appear more dominant in companies working in 
foreign environments.There must therefore be a tendency towards a more 
primitive capitalist ethos in these firms and a threat, both to the host 
culture, and to the culture of incoming owners and managers.
With these introductory remarks it is time to turn to the original
questions of the programme.
The Effect of culture on employment practices.
Three different perceptions of work group, individual self, family 
and community were apparent in the three pairs of factories. Hewlett 
Packard, and to a lesser extent Burroughs, clearly placed a primary 
emphasis on self. Even when they spoke of a family of people at work it 
was clear they had in mind a family of individuals. This thinking was 
reinforced by an emphasis on self success and self fulfilment. It could 
be argued that Hewlett Packard's "management by objectives" focus in 
particular, was a blatant attempt to maximise productive effort by 
appealing almost literally to the need for self fulfilment and even self
aggrandisement. The method of payment was also locked into this schema 
so that the employee was continuously reminded of failure to perform at 
the maximum level. The application of this very personal pressure on 
employees seems also to have a certain cultural authenticity in North 
America and may be associated with what is perceived to have been the 
early pioneering spirit of the nation.
The essence of that spirit was the need for "a place of one’s own” 
in which to earn a living, put down roots, and establish a developmental 
base for the future. These are all categories in which the capitalist 
mode of production, qua production, has not the slightest interest. 
Factories are essentially temporary and finite. If market conditions 
allow, a factory may become a developmental base for a fairly immediate 
future measured in years or one or two decades at most.
Hewlett Packard demonstrated, however, that capitalist production 
could take these categories of the need for a place, roots, and a 
future, and with skill and consistent policy, use them to motivate and 
retain a labour force. The Hewlett Packard Personnel Manager's comment 
on the company philosophy illustrated a little of how this was achieved. 
Although his opening sentence perhaps did not do justice to the work of 
those who first framed the philosohpy, the conclusion that it was a 
"discipline" should not be too lightly dismisssed.
"They just wrote them (the philosophy of the company) down in the 
1950s. They've changed slightly since then to cope with economic changes 
and environmental changes. It makes for a consistency of decision 
making. Whilst they are philosophical in nature it does give some quite 
good parameters when you come to make decisions about certain things. 
You say, OK, faced with a situation, does it fly in the face of our 
philosophy, and I think that helps to narrow it down to a consistency of 
decision making that's quite good. Faced with the same situation, people 
will make marginally different decisions, but philosophically speaking, 
the decision will be leading in the right direction, whether it be 
you're not a hire and fire company. So if you were contemplating going 
into a business that was big contract oriented, that caused you to need 
a lot of people and lay a lot of people off, then you would say, is this 
the sort of business we should be in? That would be a consistent 
decision throughout the corporation. Everyone would be able to see this
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1s no business for us because it flies in the face of our philosophy of 
people. From a broad brush point of view it should take you in the right 
direction. It's almost a discipline instilled in us." It was a
discipline, not in the sense that the philosophy acted as a touch stone
for behaviour or decision making, but in the sense that it was framed 
with some prior assumptions in mind, namely to maximise company security 
and profitability. The company therefore avoided entering a market area 
where there might be large fluctuations in employment levels since in 
the end of the day, over the long term, such an area was more likely to 
be unprofitable and risky, rather than profitable and secure. In other 
words the philosophy was not the starting point. It had been framed to 
suit a number of prior aims.
Burroughs represented an interesting departure from practice at 
Hewlett Packard. Significantly, Burroughs was not mentioned either by 
Pascale and Athos<29) or by Ouchi<30> as one of the leading American 
managed companies in the world. Burroughs appeared, not just at the 
Livingston factory, but also at the former factory at Cumbernauld, to 
have decided to be more accomodating with respect to British industrial 
practice
It has been argued that they were making intelligent use of local 
labour market conditions at the "price" of somewhat depressed workforce 
morale. (31) Even this might have been a minimal cost if the life of the 
factory was envisaged as, say, no more than twenty years.
A drop in morale was more problematic for Hewlett Packard who,
unlike Burroughs, overtly committed themselves to a presence spanning 
"generations". Burroughs had chosen not to adopt the fairly 
sophisticated philosophy of Hewlett Packard and appeared to lay little 
stress on self fulfilment, perhaps in the belief that there was more to 
be gained by allowing the employee to discover self fulfilment for 
himself. The stress on paper qualifications as the route to promotion 
seemed to be an example of the way in which they left self fulfilment to 
the individual. The emphasis on qualifications was probably American, 
but "leaving it to the individual" felt more of a British approach to 
industrial relations. Matthew Arnold certainly believed this to be the 
case when analysing Britsh culture of the last century. "Our prevalent 
notion is.... that it is a most happy and important thing for a man
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merely to be able to do as he likes."<32) A further "British" feature of 
industrial relations at Burroughs was apparent by the way in which the 
company had chosen to motivate people by wage incentive schemes. These 
■were absent at Hewlett Packard and the two Japanese owned factories, but 
present at both GEC and Lemac.
The heavy emphasis on self interest appeared to be a thinly 
disguised continuous attack on collective action and the setting up of 
sets of collective concerns. That is, it was an attack on trade 
unionism. Burroughs demonstrated the sharp way of eliminating unionism 
by closing one plant which was fully unionised and opening another 
twelve miles away, completely devoid of trade unions. Hewlett Packard, 
like IBM and Kodak, began in Britain without unions. Ford <UK) appear to 
have wanted to go in the same direction as Burroughs and establish a 
single union plant, originally in Dundee.
The Japanese with their 34,000 company unions in Japan with whom 
they are said to have cordial relations, indicated at Maxell and Brother 
the their first choice was to work without unions. It would therefore 
appear there has been an historical progression leading to a reversal of 
roles between the leader and the led. Until ten years ago, Japanese 
companies were copying management practice in large American companies 
like Hewlett Packard and IBM. Large American companies like Ford are now 
persuaded that to retain their strength in the product market, the 
managment practice of Japanese rivals must be emulated.
The Americans have apparently been able to establish non or single 
union shops in the new industries of electronics and light engineering 
products with a substantial electronics component. The Japanese, 
comparatively late into more traditional 20th. century technologies such 
as vehicle manufacture, have introduced non or single union working in 
industries heavily unionised in the US and Europe, forcing competitors 
to move in the same direction. Hence Ford's Dundee decision.
The absence of trade unions is critical for the introduction of more 
flexible working practices. As already noted, Maxell and Brother 
indicated that they would not be unhappy if the majority of their young 
female workers left after five or six years and they were able to 
replace them with a new batch of young malleable labour. Since skill 
levels are low, training costs would be minimal and there would be a
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number of positive attractions in terms of minimising the wage bill and 
minimising industrial unrest, ie. , almost eliminating production 
uncertainty. This would allow these companies to retain a labour force 
with a shape similar to that in Japan. There would be a core labour 
force of Japanese personnel, senior British managers, and a proportion 
of supervisors. All others would become peripheral workers conditioned 
to think of themselves as "members" when in fact they could hardly be 
further from membership and remain on the payroll.
Both Maxell and Brother, despite protestations to the contrary, 
imparted to their factories at Telford and Wrexham, cultural assumptions 
that clearly belonged more properly to Kyoto and Tokyo. Unlike White and 
Trevor's "Company B", (33) there were signs at both factories of an 
incipient seniority payment system associated with a typical subdivision 
of the labour force into fine strata, as observed by Dore(34> at 
Hitachi. Although a number of recent writers(35) argue that the Japanese 
are moving to a more merit based payment system, this did not appear to 
be the case at either the Maxell or Brother factories in Britain. The 
very comprehensive corporate welfarism of large Japanese companies in 
Japan is obviously not being emulated, probably because at the moment it 
is simply not needed. If there is a real erosion of state welfarism in 
Britain in the future, Japanese companies may be persuaded to move 
further down this particular road.
While neither Maxell nor Brother recognised unions it was clear that 
a) this was largely a policy temporarily imposed by the British 
personnel managers, and b) the Japanese themselves were uneasy at this 
particular development and were prepared to think of signing a 
recognition agreement, preferably with one union. On the question of 
lifetime employment, certainly there was no overt promise of employment 
for the duration of an employee's working life. This also seems to be 
the case in Japan, although the understanding and expectation of 
lifetime employment in large companies appears to be widespread. There 
was, however, a genuine substantial reluctance to sack employees and 
much open talk of operating the factories in Britain for "generations". 
There were, therefore, the seeds of a lifetime emlpoyment policy. On the 
basis of observation at Maxell and Brother, White and Trevor's(36) 
comprehensive dismissal of all these features seems a little premature.
-364-
The hidden cultural agenda the Japanese employers bring to Britain 
is of even more interest to this programme. Their perceptions of the 
individual and of the family are two of the more obvious items on that 
agenda. Their view of the labour force as a family is clearly a cultural 
advantage for them. Western companies' use of the term family is 
manifestly hypocritical. To their credit, Hewlett Packard avoided using 
the word family, and it did not appear in their published literature, 
even although some emlpoyees were prepared to use it. There is no 
equivalent in Western civilisation of the concept of the economic 
family, <37) as in Japan. Consequently, when the Japanese use the term 
family of a company, they can do so with makoto (sincerity), even if the 
Japanese managed work group looks no more like a family than an American 
or British managed work group to the sceptical Western observer. The 
point, therefore, is not in any perceived outward difference of the 
company and its structure - although there may be differences, 
especially in the latter, but that there is a genuine difference of 
attitude and conviction on the part of the Japanese management, such 
that their moral integrity remains intact. Some inner righteousness is 
maintained, allowing them, if they so wish, a disdainful dismissal of 
British and American claims to emulate the family at the place of work, 
and this by a people who belong to a society that is often accused of 
being hypocritical,(38) Japanese practice has not always been able to 
afford the high moral position. There is ample evidence to show that in 
the 1920s and 30s in particular, Japanese industrial relations were as 
poor as any seen elsewhere in the world, After World War Two, they 
seemed to make a conscious effort, perhaps even as a reaction to the 
American occupation, to reach back into the best of their cultural past 
for categories that would provide what was perceived to be a better 
foundation for a rebuilt capitalist society.(39)
Although they may be able to speak with more sincerity of the 
workforce as a family, that in itself does not make the content of what 
they mean by the word family necessarily more acceptable to British 
employees. As indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, Japanese perceptions of the 
labour force appeared to be authoritative, hierarchical and patriarchal. 
Under "normal" British circumstances these may be thought of as, at 
best, irritating, and at worst, unacceptable. They appeared to be more
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than offset, however, by the universally welcomed practice of speaking 
regularly with the workforce.In a sense this was more important and more 
basic than consultation. From the human relations point of view it is 
also glaringly obvious, and probably one reason why some Japanese 
managers denied the existence of a unique Japanese style of management, 
and preferred to speak of"common sense" managment.
As already observed, they could well have been worse than American 
and British companies at sharing real information with the labour 
force. It could also have been the case that the Japanese engineers and 
technicians on site were not really consulting with the labour force. It 
would be surprising if they had much genuinely to learn from teenage 
machine operators. The point of the whole exercise of engaging in a 
continuous succession of "meetings" was that they thereby spoke with and 
to their employees and most employees did genuinely seem to like being 
spoken to. It was a simple human touch that is likely to make the 
difference between a good company and the "best firms".
Neither is this an argument in favour of claiming the Japanese 
operate altruistically. Having highly trained managers doing no more 
than walking around talking to people is a cost. As already noticed, an 
attempt was made to offset the cost by extracting in effect, unpaid 
overtime from this same group. Nevertheless it was likely some cost 
remained even in terms of managers being more tired and less sharp than 
otherwise. The cost must be perceived to be offset by a benefit, 
presumably harmony amongst the labour force. In other words, the 
Japanese apparently rate harmony important enough to be prepared to pay 
for it. It could also be argued that this too is a common sense
approach. While conflict is endemic in the capitalist system owing to 
competing sets of interests, peace has to be bought. British managements 
have often been accused by governments of buying peace at the cost of 
increased wages, thus contributing to inflation. The Japanese answer 
seems to suggest that peace can be bought by exploiting management 
loyalty, the need for a career and for security, and by improving human 
relations at the point of production - and it is the latter phrase that 
is important. They are not simply following the theories of the post-war
school of human relations management. While the practice of large
companies in Japan may be of this type, in Britain the wide human
relations concern has been radically narrowed to include only practice
on the shop floor. In other words it is a concomitant of their emphasis
on the production task. Only under external social pressure is that
emphasis likely to be allowed to expand to include some of the concerns 
currently dealt with by large companies in Japan and by longer 
established multinationals elsewhere.
Furthermore, if the Japanese are to remain in Britain and continue 
to be convinced that the practice of speaking regularly to the labour 
force is important, will this in itself push them down a "Japanese" 
road, to lifetime employment at least for managers, in order to 
compensate for the additional demands on management time?
On the basis of this study, Ouchi's contention that type A
organisations <ie., American and individualistic) and type J 
organisations (ie., Japanese and homogeneous) are really one type Z,(40) 
is simply not true. While there were many similarities between Hewlett 
Packard at South Queensferry and Maxell and Brother, even Hewlett 
Packard appeared not to pursue quite as radically, the policy of 
maintaining contact with the labour force as at Maxell and Brother. On 
this point alone there appear to be grounds for claiming a distinct type 
J. Perhaps it is more appropriate to view companies like those of this 
study on at least two levels. At the macro-international level Ouchi may 
be right in claiming one type Z. That is, there seems to be a universal 
capitalist drive to eliminate unions, confine decision making to 
management, minimise wages, provide minimal standards of working 
conditions, minimise overheads and the number of people employed, reduce 
the average age of those employed to around 30 to 32 years, maximise 
product reliability, minimise product life, maximise profits and product 
market size etc., maximise employee flexibility, and eliminate all 
demarcatory practices.
At the national and local level, the social ethos constrains the 
above aims, modifies and even changes them. For example, cultural 
factors determine levels of corporate welfarism in Japan, annual 
bonuses, lifetime employment far the core labour force, trade union 
activity in Britain, industrial relations legislation in most 
countries, health and safety standards in most developed countries, 
political pressure to employ people, social pressure to maximise product
life and reliability, taxes etc. These constraints produce a type J in 
Japan,, a type A in America and a type U in the UK.
Quit,u r & I abgorpt i oil.
The question of cultural transference is a particularly difficult 
issue to resolve, as was recognised in Chapter 1. Even if "culture" is 
grossly constricted to embrace only mannerisms, attitudes at work to the 
production process, and to fellow employees, work methods and after work 
social habits, "absorption" is narrowly confined to perceived changes in 
these features in the short term, it remains extremely difficult to 
conclude with certainty that a cultural shift has taken place from one 
cultural setting in favour of another.
At the ultra-superficial level, some employees at Burroughs who had 
visited the parent factory at Detroit, appeared to use the ubiquitous 
phrase "I guess" in everyday speech. Attitudes to work and the 
production process seemed more influenced by American thinking at 
Hewlett Packard. There appeared to be a more thoroughgoing acceptance of 
American thinking, eg., all procedures seen as "processes", and American 
attitudes, eg., "management by objectives", than at Burroughs.
The question of cultural absorption, however, is also the question 
of cultural convergence. The "classical" convergence theory as espoused 
by Marx, Galbraith, Kerr, Bell, and others is that the basic motive for 
change is the transformation of "the opportunities of technology" into 
the "imperatives of technology".(41) Thus, it is argued, societies 
became like each other.
Dore argues that the process is complicated by at least three 
features, of which one is of immediate interest at this point, namely 
"the late development effect". (42) He suggests that "the late 
development effect" should not be confined to technology, but applied 
also to social institutions such as the educational system and to 
ideologies, eg., democratic egalitarianism. Writing in the early 
seventies, Dore saw the pressure of democratic egalitarianism 
accompanying the spread of industrialism. While the 1980s may well be
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witnessing a halt and even a reversal of this process, nevertheless 
Dore's principle is worth bearing in mind, viz., "the late development 
effect" includes ideologies. Patterns of working eg. , joint consultation 
and industrial democracy, which were developed in the older industrial 
societies can be examined and established in a more "advanced" or 
developed form by the more newly industrialised societies <ie., Japan). 
A central and important feature here is undoubtedly the decline in the 
role of trade unions and indeed their possible abolition from 
consultation and bargaining, and a decrease in their political 
influence. Is this a Japanese trait, an American trait, or a universal 
feature of world capitalism? The answer must surely be both. Primitive 
capitalism clearly sees no role for trade unions. In the US their 
political role has traditionally been low-key in comparison to unions in 
Britain. While still involved in bargaining they have not been 
interested in consultation but have majored on maximising benefits to 
members, ie. , they have been business unions. For all their 
protestations to the contrary, if given the freedom to choose, 
experience at Maxell and Brother suggests the Japanese would work 
without unions and management would communicate directly with the labour 
force. Historically this has been clear throughout most of the twentieth 
century in Japan, and their fondness for quality circles and their 
equivalent, illustrates their obvious desire to talk directly with the 
labour force. Hence at Maxell and Brother, managers were virtually on 
the shop floor throughout the production shift. Japan is now 
industrially powerful enough to set the style and content of industrial 
relations practice for world capitalism. Trade union alarm at potential 
developments at Ford (UK) is therefore understandable.
The Japanese practice of continuous encounter with the labour force 
may be an example of the "late development effect" operating on American 
human relations school of industrial relations theory. American 
companies like Hewlett Packard have evolved to almost the same point in 
a culture that has curiously often extolled the virtues of democracy and 
resisted its development within industry. Of course, "continuous 
encounter with the labour force" has little to do with democracy and 
everything to do with control of the labour force. Hewlett Packard, 
which is a relatively young company (established in the United States in
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1939 and in the United Kingdom in 1961) has itself been able to use the 
advantage of late development to take and apply an ideological principle 
more rigorously than the norm prevailing amongst North American 
companies, to produce a company ethos that is widely recognised in
business and academic circles as "superior" to the norm (qualifying eg., 
for Ouchi's Z category of company).
The fact that there were signs that Hewlett Packard at South 
Queensferry had perhaps been regressing in the previous three or four 
years into a more average style of working, does not detract from the 
above analysis. Perversely, it supports the analysis by indicating that 
a conscious effort must be made to maintain the position of the 
"advanced" ideology while the surrounding industrial culture remains 
less "enlightened" or there will inevitably be a retraction to the 
position of the surrounding industrial culture.
Where a whole industrial society is benefitting from the "late 
development" phenomenom, as in Japan, the task of maintaining the
"advanced" ideological position may be easier. Indeed, there is ample 
evidence to show that large companies in Japan have a mutually 
beneficial effect by stimulating each other and the adjacent layer of 
next largest companies to emulate "best" practice in industrial
relations. The Japanese appear to have concluded that industrialisation 
seems inevitably to be accompanied, if not by egalitarianism, then by a 
new social stratification based on a mixture of merit, qualifications 
and wealth. Consequently, they appeared readily to have adopted that 
ideological ethos, albeit still influenced by some traditional Japanese 
patriarchalism, and produced a work environment at Telford and Wrexham 
that was, in a number of ways, very comparable to that at South 
Queensferry and, indeed, in terms of encounter between people at all
levels in their organisations, perhaps better than that at South 
Queensferry. Something of their "impressive solution to the problem of 
authority in industry"(43) seemed therefore to have been imported into 
Britain. In that sense , the local labour force had absorbed a cultural 
shift.
-370-
The Influence on work place attitudes.
This section attempts to respond to the third of the questions 
raised in Chapter 1. If there is some cultural absorption, some 
convergence either to an American model or to a Japanese model of 
enterprise ethos and praxis, it seems reasonable to expect that this 
will influence a number of issues of immediate interest to employees. 
Perhaps more importantly, even the attempt to induce a change in working 
practices, as in almost all situations, will raise a number of issues 
for British employees. At the same time it may be worth keeping in mind 
a question which Dore raises towards the end of "British Factory -
Japanese Factory", viz., which elements are due to late development per
se, and which to cultural factors?(44)
Some of the issues raised by a change in employment and production 
practice can be dealt with in this thesis, with some brevity, since they 
are features of changing industrial practce per se rather than the 
result of the impact of foreign culture. Just-in-time stockholding is 
one such practice. It could be argued that its ready adoption by large 
Japanese companies like Maxell and Brother is indeed a feature of late 
development. Furthermore, while this policy has apparently been adopted 
by many Japanese companies, it is not unique to them. Hewlett Packard 
and Burroughs also pursued this policy. Indeed, Burroughs manufactured 
the electronic storage and retrieval systems that enabled the policy 
more rigorously to be pursued. Prima facie, its adoption seems to be a
function simply of good manufacturing practice. In fact, the situation
is not quite so simple, otherwise companies like GEC and Lemac would 
also have adopted it. Its financial benefits are so obvious! Large 
Japanese companies have a socio-cultural advantage when applying the 
system compared to many companies in the West. They exist in an 
industrial milieu where large companies attract a number of smaller 
supplying enterprises that are encouraged to become almost entirely, and 
in some cases completely dependent on the larger company for orders. The 
smaller companies live in an industrial culture where it may have been 
made impossible, directly and/or indirectly, for them to supply another 
customer. This "nouveaux zaibatsu" style of company existence and 
relationship is a feature of post war Japanese industry, and not present
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to anything like the same extent either in the United States or Britain, 
despite a number of phases of company mergers. For example, the series 
of company mergers that produced the contemporary GEC in Britain had 
produced a single company with, in some cases, the slimmed down remnants 
of some of the constituent parts. GEC1s Kirkcaldy factory was formerly 
owned by AEI. Such mergers have not produced, even in embryo, anything 
comparable to the conglomeration of companies to which Maxell belongs in 
Japan. The large company in Japan is therefore able to pressurise the 
smaller supplying company to such an extent that delivery of parts can 
sometimes be programmed to the hour as well as to the day.
There were indications at both Maxell and Brother that despite the 
absence of the wider Japanese culture, both Maxell and Brother had begun 
to cultivate a number of supplying firms in order to optimise their 
just-in-time system. More importantly, for the purposes of this study, 
it was clearly having at least one direct effect on employees by keeping 
their number to a minimum. The stores at Maxell and Brother were both 
operated by two employees.
Qhmae's thesis that for the Japanese, "organisation means 
people"(45) seems to be substantiated repeatedly in the current study. 
The practices which they have adopted and often developed, seem 
deliberately to have been chosen on the basis of maximising contact 
between people and through that contact, maximising control over people. 
The cultivation of suppliers fits this assertion. Almost continuous 
verbal intercourse between managers, technicians, supervisors and 
operators, also appears to be part of this overall philosophy. Open plan 
working on the shop floor and in the offices is a further example of the 
principle at work. Although open plan working can be interpreted in 
terms of easier supervision, an instant visual read out, as it were, of 
everyone's current activities in a given area, in fairness to the 
Japanese they give the impression that this is perhaps a useful by­
product of the practice but not the reason for its adoption. It 
contributes to the philosophy that, wherever possible, in what might so 
easily be a mechanical, soulless process, eg. , assembling tape 
cassettes, the manufacturing process should be "humanised" or "de­
reified", so that people can see each other, have a cup of tea when they 
feel like it, and generally feel that they are in a place inhabited by
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people rather than solely by machines. In other words, it appears to be 
a conscious and deliberate attempt to reverse the inherent reifying 
tendency of much industrial production so roundly condemned by Marx and 
many others since. Where else can this feature have come from other than 
Japan's cultural past? While the Human Relations School will obviously 
also have had an effect, together with "late development", the Human
Relations School has also been influential in British industrial
relations without engendering such an intense people-centered ethos as
seems to have emerged in Japanese companies. Obviously all industrial
societies at an earlier stage depended more on people than machines, but 
Japan more so than most. Her 100 million papulation inhabits an 
archipelago no greater in size than the United Kingdom and a usable land 
mass no greater than England and Wales. Her economy was for centuries 
dependent on the production of rice, which remains the staple diet to 
this day - a production process that has been notoriously difficult to 
mechanise - and is still labour intensive in modern Japan. No wonder, 
against this background, Japan favours either fully robotised work 
environments where there are virtually no people, or seeks consciously 
to maximise opportunities for human intercourse in otherwise highly 
mechanised work environments such as at Maxell and Brother's factories 
in Britain!
Here surely is a national cultural constraint superimposed on the 
universal capitalist need to reduce labour costs by minimising the size 
of the payroll. The result on workplace attitudes is immediate and 
obvious in those two factories. Whatever reservations their largely 
teenage labour force might have had about career prospects and wages, of 
this the vast majority seemed certain, that they were being treated 
decently, fairly and with dignity.
Only Hewlett Packard had a comparable open plan working environment. 
There too it was part of a sophisticated philosophy, and there also, the 
impact on workplace attitudes was, if anything, even more significant. 
Their labour force could hardly have been more different from that of 
unskilled and largely unqualified teenagers, yet they too readily 
admitted the basic decency with which they were employed. In the 
remaining three factories (Burroughs, GEC and Lemac), the impression 
given was that there also people often engaged in the production
process with a sense of commitment and satisfaction, but often despite 
the way they were employed. In the midst of some irritating management 
practices, lack of information, sometimes poor working conditions, and 
traditional social stratification, their inner strength of spirit as 
individuals enabled them to work with dignity and even to enjoy a 
measure of satisfaction at work. Ironically, their poorer treatment as 
employees seemed, therefore, geared to producing "tougher", more 
independent and militant employees in contrast to the quiescent, 
malleable labour force at Maxell and Brother.
A third employment feature that has connotations for employees is 
the question of how people are ranked, if at all, at the workplace. In 
Chapter 4 it was noted that Maxell and Brother had adopted a typical 
Japanese approach to this issue and had introduced fine layers of 
stratification into the organisation of the labour force. Hewlett 
Packard tended to the opposite extreme and had gone a long way towards 
creating a work climate in which almost everyone appeared to be on the 
same level. Burroughs, GEC and Lemac operated with a more traditional 
class based system. In reality, the situation is of course more 
complicated. All six factories maintained a basic divide between those 
who earned overtime payments and those who were on fixed salaries. 
Within the traditional systems at GEC and Lemac there was a hidden 
agenda of stratification comprising fitters, electricians, millwrights, 
machine operators, checkers, inspectors and testers. It was likely that 
most employees could mentally have arranged people in these skills in a 
hierarchy that would probably have found fairly common acceptance,
Nevertheless, practice at Maxell and Brother in particular did 
coincide, for example, with that observed by Dore in Hitachi (46). Dore 
makes the interesting point that, for Hitachi employees, status 
differences were more likely to be seen as "legitimate" because they 
were based on educational qualifications, and education was perceived in 
Japan to be open to all and highly respected in itself. Authority based 
on educational attainment therefore seems fair. In the two Japanese 
owned factories in Britain the system of fine stratification had been 
introduced into a labour force that was largely similar in educational 
qualification and 'characterised by an almost universally elementary 
level of educational achievement. An unfortunate consequence seemed to
be the fairly widespread awareness amongst employees of favouritism, 
which was also noted as a feature at "JEL" by White and Trevor. <47) In 
contradiction to White and Trevor, here seemed to be an example of a 
Japanese work method that did need the Japanese social milieu for its 
successful acceptance. In the absence of the Japanese educational ethos, 
the practice of fine stratification in the factories in Britain appeared 
to be producing unhelpful feelings of resentment and encouraging 
militaristic attitudes towards authority. In other words, the Japanese 
educational ethos may represent a social constraint applied in Japan, to 
produce culturally acceptable stratification in Japan, but in its 
absence in Britain, the imposed stratification based on perceived 
ability as assessed by superiors was beginning to produce a number of 
unwelcome problems. The conclusion seems to be that the Japanese ought 
to keep stratification to a minimum. Indeed this is already the course 
adopted by American companies<see eg., Hewlett Packard's thirteen grades 
for a labour force of one thousand in 1985). Ford (UK) reduced five 
hundred and fifty job titles to fifty two.(48) It has also been adopted 
by other Japanese companies in Britain. Nissan has only two basic grades 
of employee. (49)
Dore alleges that stratification is successful in Japan because it 
is accompanied by a "Canfucian self improvement syndrome"(50) and by the 
presence of managers who appear to be no more privileged than other 
employees. It is fairly safe to say the British labour force at Maxell 
and Brother were not labouring under a "Confucian self improvement 
syndrome". Many appeared to have been chosen precisely for their lack of 
ambition. The situation with respect to managers was a little more 
complex. By the adoption of single status working it might have 
appeared at first glance as though managers were not any more privileged 
than others. The policy of Britsh personnel managers vis a vis company 
cars, had, however, disturbed this effect and it is fairly certain they 
were perceived as a privileged group by the majority of employees. 
Although employees at these factories were unfamiliar with the term 
"industrial relations", they were all perfectly familiar with the word 
"manager", even although they had been instructed to see everyone on 
site as "members". In other words, they had probably brought with them 
to their work, fairly stereotyped views of managers from their British
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cultural background, which would effectually detract from a wholehearted 
support for fine statification. Again, the lack of a Japanese social 
milieu seems likely to make the acceptance of fine stratification 
problematic. It would be interesting to observe the effect over time on 
fine stratification, and to compare its 'acceptance with that of 
traditional hidden stratification in British industry.
Finally, the relationship or lack of it with respect to trade unions 
revealed management attitudes towards labour force collective rights and 
interests. The two British factories, under continuing Britsh social 
pressure, recognised trade unions. The two American factories, freed 
from American social pressure and experiencing minimal pressure from 
their British environment to conform, recognised no trade unions. 
Likewise the two Japanese companies, freed from Japanese cultural 
constraints in Japan where company unions are generally recognised, did 
not recognise unions in Britain. In other words, freed of their 
respective social constraints, both the American and the Japanese firms 
had adopted the same policy with regard to unions, and were thus 
conforming with universal primitive capitalism that sees no role for 
trade unions.
While the general policy was the same there were differences. The 
two Japanese companies at Maxell and Brother thought that there was some 
Britsh social pressure on them to recognise trade unions and were 
seriously considering doing so (1985). By 1988, with the industrial 
atmosphere in Britain moving further against unions, Maxell and Brother 
had felt the host social pressure to recognise unions diminishing, and 
remained non unionised. There are no signs here of White and Trevor’s 
•'cautious approach to industrial relations” . If the Japanese at Maxell 
and Brother had been cautious, they would have recognised at least one 
union, as at ITissan, Panasonic and Sony. Instead they were reading the 
situation and assessing how close they could come to the standard of 
primitive capitalism. They had even resisted the group pressure coming 
to them from other foreign investing companies operating in Britain 
where "it (recognising one union) is the prevailing 'good practice' 
among large firms setting up on greenfield sites in Britain”.(51)
The effect on workplace attitudes in the four foreign owned 
factories seemed to be one of studied indifference. The Japanese and
British management had successfully created an atmosphere where it was 
the accepted norm to turn in the event of difficulty to supervisors and 
line management for solutions.
Having said that, mounting disquiet over declining wage levels at 
Maxell in particular did seem to be responsible for rising pressure on 
the existing system in which there appeared to be little or no outlet 
for aggrieved feelings. By contrast, Hewlett Packard and Burroughs were 
more successful in this respect by having little hesitation in adopting 
the role of acknowledged wage leaders in their localities. In other
words, the Japanese propensity for what might be called "near but below
top-ismM was working in their disfavour as far as remaining non 
unionised was concerned. In short, it is easier to maintain the position 
of wagfe leaders in a given locality, than, having decided to be near but 
below top, continually to be monitoring the average with a view to 
remaining a little above. Traditionally the problem is contained by 
recognising a union or unions and allowing them effectually to set at 
least a base level for wages, and simply paying a little above in order
to keep the labour force quiet.
Practice at the four foreign owned factories of the study with 
respect to trade unions implied serious consequences for traditional 
British trade union activities, not least of which was the management 
desire to communicate directly with the labour force. Few unions would 
object to this desire per se. Indeed many unions and their members 
continually press for more information for their members from 
management, not less. The phrase "communicate directly with the labour 
force", however, can be a euphemism for team working practices which, in 
itself, is not a new concept. Since manufacturing is primarily a social 
function, little would be accomplished if it were not for some form of 
team working. The current use of the term, however, implies a specific 
package of industrial relations practices, no demarcation between 
skilled and unskilled, between blue and white collar work, between 
production and maintenance,and team leaders appointed by management 
with no assurance that they will be drawn from the ranks of those 
formerly classified as skilled. The implications for multi unionism are 
serious. "The introduction of more flexible working practices and team
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working dramatically shifts the basis for traditional multi union 
organisation. It creates an in-built bias for single unionism" . (52)
Maxell and Brother had demonstrated that team working could mean non 
unionism, not just in terms of non recognition, but more importantly in 
terms of changed attitudes to unions. The team concept induces a shift 
of loyalties away from the union to the immediate work group and through 
that group, to the enterprise as a whole. Team working thus conditions 
the labour force to define itself primarily by the employing company, 
rather than by craft and trade union membership, as is apparently more 
usual in Japan. Ford (UK) see the shift of loyalties as a long term 
project and have a confidential company plan spanning several years 
which includes production line workers operating in flexible teams with 
group leaders, and blue collar workers doing work done presently by 
white collar supervisors(53).
Competition seems to be inducing cultural convergence through a 
socialisation process based on changed working practices and a new 
attitude at work in line with Maurice et al's contention that "The less 
value an organisation places on educational qualifications and 
socialisation by them, the more it will try to institute a socialisation 
process of its own."(54) Educational qualifications did not appear to be 
highly regarded as a prerequisite for employment with Maxell and 
Brother. In this regard they may be the model for at least production 
workers at Ford(UK) in the future,ie., labour trained outwith old craft 
disciplines, to do a variety of jobs specific to the company and devoid 
of the socialisation induced by traditional education and training 
programmes.
As already observed, there appeared to be no pressure from the 
labour forces at Maxell and Brother for trade union recognition. Sever 
having experienced unions, and now socialised to accept close management 
contact and supervision, they literally did not know of any different or 
alternative relationship. They were still within the capitalist system 
and therefore still had different sets of interests from managers and 
owners, but these differences were being carefully masked behind a cloak 
of universal membership of the company and daily and sometimes hourly 
contact with management.
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The fourth question of the programme calls for a return to the chief 
features of an industrialised culture and their influence on employment 
praxis, A concluding comment on a number of these must now be attempted, 
beginning with what Fox calls "trust relations"(55) and the related 
concept of the role of conflict. At this point it may be true to say 
with Pascale and Athos that North America (and Britain) are "powerfully 
disadvantaged" (56) by their cultures in comparison with Japan. The high 
value Japanese place on harmony or cooperation, however, was not 
immediately apparent either in the Maxell factory or in the Brother 
factory. As with the control of conflict, the issue appeared to be dealt 
with indirectly as a result of almost complete concentration on the 
production task, so that it could be said with White and Trevor that 
"the emphasis on task combined with 'management by detail' seems to draw 
managers and their workers into a shared discipline and a common 
outlook". (57) Nevertheless, in the present study it is felt that this 
may be too facile a conclusion to make - that the robust counter culture 
of the British labour force continues to make the ensuing harmonious 
relations fragile.
At this point it is worth comparing practice at Hewlett Packard with 
that at Maxell. Both concentrated primarily on the production task. At 
Maxell this concentration emanated from a culture that is group centred 
and arranges allegiance in order of nation, company and then family. At 
Hewlett Packard task concentration was located in a culture that extols 
the virtues of individualism. Hewlett Packard, and to a lesser extent 
Burroughs, cleverly blended cultural individualism with corporate goals 
to produce a labour force of ambitious individuals who simultaneously 
knew they had little economic future outwith the collectivity of the 
company. Cressey, in his study of Comco, (58) analyses how this is 
accomplished. It needs steady and preferably substantial company growth 
which, in turn, generates job security. From this base an ethos of 
internal equality and commitment to the enterprise is sustained by a 
continuous emphasis on the corporate philosophy. In other words, this 
particular management style is technologically determined via the 
"golden cycle of expansion"(59) rather than determined by a particularly
humanitarian philosophy. This must largely have accounted for Burroughs' 
failure to emulate the Hewlett Packard company ethos, their product 
market having been much less certain than Hewlett Packard's. It may also 
account in part for the difficulty British firms like GEC and Lemac have 
in breaking out of the cycle of shrinking profit margins and brittle 
industrial relations.
The very real achievement of the Japanese, particularly at Maxell, 
was that they had almost created a Hewlett Packard type ethos without 
the apparent advantages of a technology that seemed inherently to imply 
growth, and without a high grade, multi-graduate labour force. From this 
it must be concluded that they brought to the production process a 
culture that was able to commit people to the company without appearing 
simply to control individuals. One clearly astute example of this policy 
was the way in which indigenous feelings of competition were channelled 
at Brother into team competition, as is apparently common in Japan. (60)
It is also apparent that the host culture cannot be lightly 
dismissed. Even the deliberate selection of well adjusted young people
with virtually no previous work experience, does not guarantee freedom
from traditional work habits and outlook. Hence the continuing fragility 
of industrial relations at Maxell was particularly manifest over the 
issue of alleged declining wage levels and the resistance of British 
managers to working long hours for the company.
A second area of interest is the opaque management/worker divide 
and single status working avidly adopted by most large Japanese 
companies and commonly a feature of leading American companies. These 
are generic terms for the absence of what White and Trevor call "deeply 
rooted aspects of British management methods which are difficult either 
to "unlearn" or to reconcile with Japanese systems."(61) From
observations at Maxell and Brother it was apparent that the
management/worker divide remained in at least two ways. Firstly, 
managers were not eligible for overtime payment and, secondly, British 
managers had not been recruited from the shop floor but from managerial 
ranks elsewhere, with university or near university standard 
qualifications. The gulf between the two groups was blurred in a number 
of ways, by near single status working, by the comparatively large 
number of subdivisions between operator and managing director, by the
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frequent presence of managers on the shop floor, not just in a 
supervisory capacity but visibly participating at times in the 
production process, by the universal use of first names, by encouraging 
all employees to see themselves as "members" of the company, by wearing 
a common "uniform" and by an increasing number of after hours social 
events. The divide did not appear to have been obscured by formal 
consultation, by information sharing, or even by widening the share in 
decision making. In other words, there was a sympathy towards obscuring 
the management/worker divide and, at the same time, a reluctance to 
make more radical efforts to abolish it. Why? Was there a fear on the 
part of senior Japanese management of a loss of identity, or a loss of 
control? To some extent there had been some loss of identity at Hewlett 
Packard, Most of the senior posts at South Queensferry were staffed by 
Scots and one manager did say he thought of the company, not as 
American, but as Scottish. In a sense, too, the American company had 
devolved a fair measure of autonomy to the Scottish plant. At Maxell, on 
the contrary, there was daily contact with the parent plant in Japan. No 
one was in any doubt that this was a Japanese factory and most of the 
senior positions at both Maxell and Brother were held by Japanese. 
Perhaps there is a time factor operating here and the observer ought to 
return in ten or fifteen years time. Nevertheless, at the time of the 
fieldwork research, a cultural dialectic gripped these factories, which 
was reflected in employment praxis, as already indicated. A useful spin 
off for ex-patriot managers in both Japanese and American companies 
seemed to be the reinforcing of some management legitimacy by the wholly 
spurious contribution of ethnic difference.
All of the foregoing is to be compared with practice at GEC and 
Lemac.Apart from a tiny step at GEC towards single status working, both 
factories operated with traditional British industrial relations 
systems. They differed markedly from the other four factories in their 
relationship to the local community. It was not simply that the labour 
forces were drawn from smaller areas with long established identities of 
their own, but that the local community had evolved a proprietorial 
concern for the factories, probably due in large measure to the serious 
decline of manufacturing industry in these districts and to the longer 
period of time in which the factories had been operating compared with
the other four. Consequently, neither the management/worker divide nor 
single status working was an issue per se. Concern focused more on 
personal relationships, in keeping with the indigenous cultural 
individualism that so flagrantly undermined class solidarity and had 
produced, for example, the host of negative responses to trade unionism 
that were noted in Chapter 4.
The main features of an industrialised culture influencing 
employment practices seem to be its ethic, its views of community and 
family and the place and content of religion. In the present study the 
Japanese work ethic and social ethic appeared to influence industrial 
relations in the direction of high trust relations and an emphasis on 
loyalty and discipline,(62) long hours of overtime in response to 
product sales, a reluctance to dismiss employees and a concentration on 
the production task and particularly on quality. There was no evidence 
of their alleged preference for ambiguity rather than logical 
distinction. (63) This description of the work and social ethic also 
happened to be a good "fit" at Hewlett Packard and, to a lesser extent, 
at Burroughs.
The Confucian and Protestant ethics have much in common. One
fundamental difference, however, is that Confucianism assumes the basic 
goodness of man, whereas traditional Calvinism assumes his basic 
"degeneration". (64) The difference between Hewlett Packard and Burroughs 
appeared to be that Hewlett Packard had adopted a "Confucian" 
perspective, whereas increasing management control at Burroughs had 
reintroduced an essentially Calvinist perspective leading to a regard, 
or disregard, as needs dictated, for employee motivation and 
contentment.
Of the six factories only Maxell and Brother selected employees on
the basis of their perceived ability to fit in. It was a policy that
appeared to be correlated to their views of company and family, and
supported the importance they placed on cooperation, shared values, 
corporate objectives, and control of the labour force. These were 
categories that were also clearly valued at Hewlett Packard and, to some 
extent, at Burroughs, but neither of the American companies attempted to 
screen new recruits on the basis of their personality. Technological
considerations seemed to dictate that qualifications and assessed 
ability were given priority.
At the Japanese factories, from the British cultural point of 
view,managers appeared to labour under a greater burden and effectually 
to have fewer privileges than managers in either the British or American 
owned companies. Their' own cultural bias towards the primacy of the 
family was, in terms of their work, a disadvantage to them. The 
Japanese manager's relationship with the company is said to be 
characterised by a sense of obligation(65) and appears to be sustained 
at the expense of his relationship to home and family. Pressure exerted 
by a slack labour market situation, intense trading competition, the 
need for status and security, produces an almost "spiritual" 
relationship to the enterprise that has an intrinsically ultimate 
quality about it which can also make the relationship idolatrous in 
Judaeo/Christian terms. Thus the secularised British manager feels 
uneasy about entering into this kind of relationship with the company 
even although he knows that it is in his own economic self interest that 
the company should flourish.
Consequently it may be argued that the third determinant of an 
industrialised culture is its religion, even in a culture where 
organised religion has no longer a relationship with the state 
(ie,,Japan) or in a culture where an apparent remnant of institutional 
religion is overlaid by an almost universal secularism as in Britain 
and, to a lesser extent, the United States of America. There are now 
many volumes extant in English on the possible existence of a whole 
number of religious categories in contemporary Japanese culture, and a 
number have been mentioned in this study. Likewise, there are many 
scholarly studies of the secularity of Western civilisation. The real 
point for this study is the contention that people remain basically 
religious even in a post capitalist society. That is, they retain their 
gods, continue to generate myths, and live within rules and taboos that 
are not always open to rationalisation. The culture of capitalism seems 
to be no exception. Only Marx and Engels have made any real attempt to 
explore a non religious alternative. (There is therefore a basic 
injustice in dismissing Marxism as yet another religion.) They were 
exploiting a crack in the history of human thought that had recently,
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ancL for the first time, been opened by Feuerbach and Nietzsche. How 
successful they have been is the subject of at least another study. The 
point to note here is that the religious weltanschaung is a feature of 
industrial relations in British, North American and Japanese factories 
and its presence in terms of perspectives on family, community, 
individualism, wealth creation and nationalism have been detected in 
most of the preceding chapters. Pascale and Athos' contention that "we 
in the West have evolved a culture that separates man's spiritual life 
from his institutional life" (66) appears only partially correct. It may 
be more true of factory work life than of work life for the doctor or 
social worker in the West, in which case there are grounds for arguing 
that the recovery of an essentially spiritual relation to, say, the 
company, would benefit manufacturing output in Britain and North 
America. Bell demonstrates with some conviction that that essential 
spirituality was lost when Western capitalism departed from the original 
Protestant ethic of frugality, or rather was inevitably lost because of 
its dependence on consumption as well as production.(67) The Japanese 
appear to sustain their spirituality at work with a barely disguised 
nationalism. (68)
Ih.e_Ife,as,ur-ejaant-Qf ,cu j t » Jidustr.i a l..x.el at ions.
At the inception of the study it was envisaged that an ideal 
industrial personality be defined and the actual corporate industrial 
personality at each of the six factories compared with the ideal to
determine which management regime was producing a personality closest to 
the ideal, and also to detect and measure cultural features producing
the ideal type. In the event, it was felt this approach was more
appropriate to a large sample of companies which, as far as the Japanese
companies were concerned, was not possible to acquire in Britain in 
1985/86.
It is, of course, more helpful to narrow the question of the impact 
of culture to particular features of industrial relations. Attitudes at 
work, perceptions of managment and the provision of working conditions
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have been singled out in this study for reasons stated in Chapter 5. 
Each contributes to that important but elusive concept, job 
satisfaction. Although it is acknowledged that at a time of high 
unemployment job satisfaction is less of an issue both for employers and 
employees, the concept has a certain intrinsic moral imperative that
makes it of abiding interest to caring employers and thoughtful
employees not least because man is defined by his work and seriously 
deprived if it does not give him a sense of satisfaction. Furthermore, 
much of the perceived success of Japanese industrial relations is based 
upon their alleged ability to produce "happy" workers although this is 
not substantiated by some research.(69) In the current study, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, an attempt has been made to tighten the 
measurement of job satisfaction
While the conclusion of White and Trevor that job satisfaction is 
not noticeably higher in Japanese owned factories in Britain is 
challenged, and observation at Hewlett Packard seems to confirm their 
conclusion that job satisfaction can be as high in American owned 
companies, the argument of Chapter 5 is that in the question of job
satisfaction there is no fundamental division between welfare provision 
in the broadest sense and an emphasis on rational, participative, well 
organised production. Given that people enjoy rationality, these
features are likely to contribute as much to job satisfaction as the 
more traditional "welfare" features. Briggs suggests that the whole 
concept of job satisfaction is founded in Japan upon the concept of 
endurance or "gaman". "The concept of endurance is fundamental to the 
Japanese and owes much to their understanding of 'bushido' or the way of 
the warrior. To follow in the footsteps of their illustrious ancestors 
(most Japanese, if asked, will claim descendance from a noble Samurai 
family), the Japanese must be exponents of seishinshingi - the victory 
of the spirit over material things."(70)
The second point is that this type of task oriented, well organised 
production has authentic roots in Japanese culture. (71) In this respect 
Japan does appear to have a cultural advantage over Britain and North 
America. While all three share to some extent a common work ethic, viz., 
work is a good end in itself, only Japan, it could be argued, can claim 
a centuries long tradition of corporate organised production, pre-dating
the industrial revolution in the West, which extends into their 
contemporary industrial society.
The question of participation and consultation represents a further 
area of interest in industrial relations where it appears almost 
possible to measure a cultural influence, The findings of this study 
suggest that this is a second area in which the Japanese enjoy a 
cultural advantage over Britain and the United States. Neither is it a 
question of Japan being a more egalitarian society than, say, Britain. 
In many ways it is not. It is hierarchically stratified in terms of age, 
qualifications, job status, sex and even point of birth within the 
family, producing, in comparison to Britain, a somewhat stiff, formal, 
patriarchal, authoritarian society.(72) Despite these cultural 
disadvantages, levels of communication between people in Japanese 
organisations in Britain appear to remain astonishingly high. Perhaps, 
in fact, this is the key to the issue, namely that human communication 
does not necessarily influence the above apparent disadvantages. A 
homely parallel might be the example of the wealthy titled owner of 
thousands of acres who, despite an almost unbridgeable class divide, 
still enjoys a relationship of trust and communication with his 
comparatively penniless gillie.
The so-called disadvantages of Japanese culture in this regard, seem 
often demonstrated by managers in large Japanese companies, to be 
irrelevant to the business of managing a significant group of people in 
a way that maximises each individual's contribution to the corporate 
objective, and optimises the general awareness that everyone is 
participating in achieving that common objective. Maxell and Brother 
were by no means egalitarian organisations, yet there seemed to be a 
high general awareness that most people were being regularly consulted 
and given frequent ongoing opportunity to contribute to the production 
process. Perhaps there is a lesson here for industrial democracy in 
Britain and it is possible to increase the sense of democracy at work 
without concentrating on the industrial relations framework,ie., 
consultative meetings, the issue of representation, or even 
participation in decision making and the flow of information. The 
Japanese appear to democratise the shop floor by encouraging managers to 
spend time speaking with people and even working alongside people. They
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appear to understand management not so much in terms of telling people 
what to do, but more subtly, by so establishing a relationship with the 
supervised employee that it is possible to channel the employee effort 
towards agreed company goals. For many British factories this would mean 
emphasising the technical activity of management as distinct from 
Fayol's "managerial" activity. <73) It would mean confining the planning, 
organising, coordinating and controlling functions of the managerial 
activity to hours after production has ceased for the day. From 
observations at Maxell and Brother this appeared to be the modus 
operandi of the Japanese. Whether it is, in fact, democracy or a move 
towards democracy, is another question. The point is that employees feel 
it to be more democratic and this awareness appears to be sustained by 
creating high levels of commitment to the enterprise, probably assisted 
by strong cultural factors. The British factory appears to be faced with 
the choice of attempting to create a similar climate of commitment or of 
accepting higher administrative costs by employing more people to remove 
as much of the managerial (in Fayol's sense) function as possible from 
managers. In effect, the Japanese perception of the manager is that of a 
"supra-supervisor" and therefore essentially an dlite blue collar worker 
rather than a qualitatively different white collar worker somewhat 
remote from the production process. While it is possible to agree with 
J.C.Abegglen "that the system (Japanese style management) as we see it 
now is essentially a product of the post war period", (74) nevertheless, 
as observed on several occasions throughout this study, Japanese culture 
seems to have made a substantial contribution.
Abegglen admits this himself. Writing about the business 
corporations of Japan, the kaisha, he says, "The emphasis of these 
studies is on the unique history, culture, and organisation of Japanese 
society. The management methods of the kaisha are seen as the unique 
products of a unique society. It follows from this view that efforts to 
transplant Japanese management methods into a different cultural milieu 
are bound to fail.
This is a view not to be dismissed lightly. Japanese history and 
culture are unique, as indeed are the histories and cultures of all the 
world's peoples. These leave special imprints on the nature of economic 
organisations, as they do on all other social organisations."(75)
This of itself need not deter enterprises in alternatve cultures 
from learning from an analysis of these cultural constructs at work, and 
drawing on comparable cultural mores in their own social environment to 
produce a similar result.
Latent cultural categories?
"....there are already many forces at work in our culture that can 
modify the inappropriate injunctions of our past."(76) Thus wrote 
Pascale and Athos in the conclusion to "The Art of Japanese Management". 
The purpose of this final section is to try and initiate the 
identification and explanation of a number of these "farces". A striking 
consequence of the study of cultures is not so much their differences, 
but the categories held in common. Often the variation appears to be in 
the degree of emphasis on a particular practice rather than a difference 
of substance. For example, concepts of harmony, sincerity, loyalty, 
cooperation and family, and practices of gift giving, deference and 
stratification seem to be almost universally present in human societies. 
Differences emerge in the value placed on them rather than their 
existence or non existence. From the clearly vast number of cultural 
practices and habits that have evolved over millenia, those which are 
perceived to have at least a potential contribution to make to 
industrial production are of interest in this study. Equally, from the 
plethora of these categories only those which it has been possible to 
consider in the fieldwork of this study are explored in this particular 
section.
The most important is the dichotomy between collectivity and 
individuality. There seems to be no absolute distinction between 
Japanese cultural practice and practice in either Britain or the United 
States, but rather a continuum from the individualism of the North 
American society, through the mixture of individualism and collectivity 
in Britain, to the collectivism of Japanese society. There is no reason 
why, in theory, British and even American society should not develop in 
a more collectivist direction than at present, despite the
-388-
individualising propensity of capitalism and Protestant Christianity in 
Western Europe. Some policies of the present UK government, eg., 
increasing central control over local government, the introduction of 
the Community Charge and the introduction of national standards in the 
educational system, represent moves towards a more homogeneous 
collectivist society. While Protestantism fragments and individualises, 
it is only a comparatively small part of a much greater cultural whole 
in which the primacy of the community has often been stressed, whether 
it be in feudal responses to a perceived threat, or the Judaeo/Christian 
concept of life in groups, dioceses, congregations, and churches, or the 
rise of the trade union movement and the expansion of the franchise.
Despite forecasts to the contrary,(77) Japan apparently remains a 
highly collectivist society and in large companies the sense of 
commitment to the company is still very strong, especially in comparison 
to that found in Britain and North America. The post war Japanese 
experience of capitalist production seems to represent a modification of 
the Marxist theory that the means•of production necessarily determines 
the socio-cultural shape of society. There are signs that Japanese 
culture's ability to modify some of the more dehumanising and community 
destructive consequences of Western capitalism m y  well prove to be a 
feature which the global family of man will one day regret (if it issues 
in Japanese domination of the Pacific Basin), or in which one day it 
will rejoice, if Japan represents the future for industrial society in 
the West, as suggested by Dare.(78)
The key to reviving the latent sense of community in Britain and the 
United States m y  well lie in what Pascale and Athos call the need for 
superordinate goals. (79) The lack of superordinate goals is probably 
Western capitalism's Achilles heel. The ease with which they might be 
revived along nationalistic lines was amply demonstrated by the jingoism 
engendered by the Falklands War. Historically, nations were often given 
these goals by their religions and, in recognition of their importance, 
religion accepted as an estate of the realm. The challenge facing 
contemporary Western capitalism seems to be the need to develop 
superordinate goals that will allow people at work to commit themselves 
to the common enterprise without cynicism, without feeling they are 
being exploited and with a sense that their dignity as human beings is
being enhanced rather than being trivialised. Thus the ethic of 
industrial society in East Europe appears powerfully attractive. By 
centering superordinate goals on the maximising of the common good as 
represented by the state, it appears in theory to fulfil all the 
criteria of non exploitation and enhancement of dignity, and to 
approximate to the "non deifying, non religious spiritualism" (80) that 
Pascale and Athos feel is essential for the future of industrial 
production. Neither has the concept been fundamentally alien to the 
Judaeo/Christian tradition. The periods of theocracy enjoyed by pre­
diaspora Jews and the substantial overt proclamation of the Kingdom of 
God in the Gospels both appear to support the view that herein lies the 
key to the future good of civilisation.
Meanwhile many British and American enterprises appear to be trying 
to achieve the same end, viz. , commitment to the enterprise, by an 
entirely "non-spiritual" route via team working. They have latched on to 
a particular feature of Japanese industrial relations ignoring the fact 
that as with so many Japanese practices, it is part of a wider set of 
culturally conditioned features, in this case, linked with Japanese 
nationalism. The Japanese apparent success with team working in Britain 
may have more to do with rates of pay and job security at a time of high 
unemployment than with team working per se.
Furthermore, two different cultures, West and East, are producing 
two different concepts of the team, as noted in the conclusion to 
Chapter 6. The West, as represented by, say Hewlett Packard, seems to be 
producing the team of entrepreneurially minded individuals. The East, 
represented by, say, Brother, seems to be producing the team in which 
individualism is suppressed so that decision making and responsibility 
is team based rather than individual based. The former is clearly not so 
likely to include superordinate goals linked with a sense of community 
as the latter.
A second area of primary interest for this study is represented by 
that group of more abstract and inter related ideas of loyalty, harmony 
and sacrifice. That they are high on the agenda of most Japanese 
employees is the common belief of the majority of observers Df Japanese 
industrial relations. Mot one is absent from the socio-cultural 
tradition of either the United States or Britain but both of these
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nations do appear to have developed a somewhat different "central value 
system" from that found in Japan.
The Japanese central value system was developed essentially in the 
Tokugawa period (1600-1868). As in feudal Europe, the concept of loyalty 
to the local lord was paramount. In Japan, the feudal lord was more 
likely to be an honest, frugal and perhaps ascetic figure, in contrast 
to the more common stereotype of the "carousing robber barron" of 
Medieval Europe. Loyalty to the lord developed into loyalty to status, 
paralleled in Europe by a developing class awareness. In this Tokugawa 
period, Japanese society evolved under the twin influence of Buddhism 
and Confucianism, the former contributing habits of frugality and 
asceticism, the latter emphasising bureaucracy and family. The net 
effect was a fairly fundamental transition from a militaristic society 
to one more concerned with intellectual and economic development, and 
politics.(81) In the post 1868 Meiji period, the Samurai warrior class 
supplied men capable of running business enterprise, organising local 
government, and building up the political infrastructure of an 
industrial society, The loyal, hardworking and frugal labour force came 
from the peasantry reinforced by a highly developed, structured, 
familial Ifestyle from which emerged the thousands of small family 
businesses, often operating in harsh and primitive conditions, and which 
formed the backbone of industrialism in Japan. Without examining the 
reasons for the differences, it does appear as though the medieval 
Church in Britain was less successful in imposing an ethic of asceticism 
and frugality than Buddhism and Confucianism in Japan. Instead of an 
evolution of Church or religion with the state, effectually a revolution 
occurred with the Protestant Reformation in Scotland and the separation 
of the English church from Rome in England and Wales. The resultant 
fragmentation and polarisation of British society appears to have 
provided a hardworking pool of labour drawn from the land, as in Japan, 
but without equivalent levels of either loyalty to status or strength of 
extended family bonds. A less homogeneous and less religious society 
than that of Japan began to develop superordinate goals of a 
politico/economic nature, emphasising qualities of individuality, 
egalitarianism and national strength increasingly based on wealth 
creation and the supply of raw materials from abroad.
Whereas in Japan the inception of the Tokugawa period and the Meiji 
restoration were separated by some two hundred and fifty years, in 
Britain the comparable social movements occurred almost simultaneously 
with the Reformation and the Civil Wars. The resultant central value 
system is thus secular, individualised, more egalitarian than in Japan, 
based on the nuclear family capped by a more amorphous sense of loyalty 
to nation than the specific sense of Japanese loyalty to enterprise and 
the royal family. In North America the pioneering days seem to have 
bequeathed a legacy of heightened individualism and egalitarianism, an 
emphasis on status based on wealth, and a nationalism closer to that of 
Japan, focusing on the offices and institutions of government in lieu of 
a royal family.
Clearly history cannot be re-run. Nor can a culture be created 
directly. An analysis of the past can, however, suggest solutions to the 
problems of the present. By comparing Japanese social development with 
that of Britain and America, these features of culture, ethics, religion 
and metaphysics which seem to optimise the conditions for the 
development of industrial production do appear to become a little 
clearer. For a society to have a perception of the direction in which it
wishes to go is surely more satisfactory than simply meeting the
existential challenge as it arrives moment by moment. The difficulty for 
the somewhat disparate societies of Britain and the United States 
compared with that of Japan, is that of gaining majority support for the 
chosen direction. Such is the nature of capitalist society, it could be 
argued the future of industrial development will be imposed on the world 
by the most recent developers, as Britain was in the 18th, and 19th. 
centuries. If this is the way industrial production effects social 
change, those who do not face up to their cultural disadvantages are
likely to be left behind.
In an interesting comparison between China and Japan, Bellah<82) 
describes Chinese society as one which emphasises the primacy of
integrative values, where social goals and social change are secondary 
to maintaining the existing social structures and cohesiveness is more 
important than wealth, and maximising the quality of the status quo more 
valued than improving overall performance. In many ways this also seems 
to be a fair description of contemporary Britain. The fascination of the
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study of Japanese and North American companies operating in Britain is 
that they create a cultural interface between people conditioned in a 
culture where integrative values are stressed and people conditioned in 
a society where goal achievement values are stressed. All three cultures 
have benefitted historically from religious support for central values 
of hard work, frugality and selfless devotion to corporate goals. 
Asceticism in Japan and fundamentalism in the United States appear to 
continue to contribute to industrialism but what future is there for the 
revisionist religion of hedonistic capitalism where growth and 
consumption struggle to maintain even the sporadic flicker of Victorian 
values?
This thesis argues that the cultural background at every level, is 
important for industrial relations. Many features of Japanese culture 
are particularly suitable for a form of capitalist enterprise, vis. , 
that form that does not make the market an absolute but leaves room for 
judcious central planning at government level and at the level of the 
business conglomerate. It is a form also that does not absolutise the 
individual but gives a central place to team working and thereby 
channels individual competitiveness into group competition and 
ultimately to competition between companies and groups and conglomerates 
of companies. This has the effect of isolating companies within the 
conglomerate and from companies in other conglomerates which in turn, 
strengthens and promotes company culture thus closing the circle that 
makes for a formidable manufacturing unit. Within that unit, 
manufacturing techniques may not be any more advanced than in 
competitors' factories. Management techniques may indeed simply be based 
on 'common sense*. The crucial feature is the strength of corporate 
commitment. Where that is strong, as in the early days of start-up, with 
a strong sense of corporate purpose, astonishing time schedules can be 
met and extraordinary targets achieved. Where it is weak, as in GEC, and 
to some extent in Burroughs, strong management and the latest technology 
on the production line, are not enough to 'lift' the labour force, boost 
production and improve factory efficiency and profitability.
Under the guise of being British, as at Brother, and more overtly 
Japanese as at Maxell, the Japanese are imposing a culture in the 
workplace - a culture of dependency, ranking, deference, obedience and
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coraraitment to the work ethic, a degree of asceticism and incorporation 
into the company beyond that in the US or British owned plants. There 
are certain ground conditions that make this possible, the distribution 
of organised labour, people hungry for work in areas of high 
unemployment, industrial relations legislation that has removed 
expensive protective rules and regulations, a climate of job insecurity, 
and people conditioned to believe the external social setting is one of 
diminishing law and order. Within the factory, the Japanese and to a 
lesser extent the Americans, offer the chance to be part of a social
dlite, those who have apparently secure, and in comparison to the local
average, well-paid jobs. They offer well regulated purposeful work 
environments, where people are treated decently. They create the 
appearance of consultation and information sharing and offer an internal 
society where everyone knows their place, their status and rank, which 
in itself diminishes feelings of insecurity,
At the macro level, the Japanese seem to be using the same
techniques as in Japan, collecting around them and binding to them an 
army of suppliers of parts and sub-assemblies. Over time, this army may 
become more and more dependent on the Japanese buyer. In return it will 
will be under constant pressure to maintain a fault free output while at 
the same time having an almost guaranteed market for that output so long 
as it continues to meet Japanese standards of quality.
At the level of the plant, the Japanese economic family ethos
prevails. In contains a strong element of sacrifice for the common good. 
In this case, management grades are being asked to do the sacrificing. 
In return they maintain some status in the company. The labour force is 
reduced to hewers of wood and drawers of water. No element of sacrifice 
is asked of them, neither is loyalty expected although it is sought. It 
is expected of management.
The days of the Japanese 'catching up' with the West are over. They 
are now setting the pace, not only in factory organisation, but in the 
total organisation of the capitalist enterprise, from investment to 
sales to the customer. In fact this is where Japanese culture makes its 
maximum contribution. It is not so much in terms of specific cultural 
details, although as seen in the thesis, these can be useful. Rather it 
lies in the fact that the culture is homogeneous. It is the culture of a
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total ly integrated whole and it is this feature above all, that is 
effective within the Japanese company and probably within the 
conglomerate and the nation.
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The following question was put to employees:
How often are you late for work? Seldom (3 times
per year) 3
Never 4
Often (once per 
week) 1
Sometimes (once 
per month) 2
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